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Abstract
During the Second World War, around 8,000 men from fifteen colonial 
territories fought for the British Empire in locally-raised naval volunteer forces. Their 
relatively small size has meant that up to now they have remained merely a footnote 
within the wider historiography of the war. Yet, if examined beyond their ambiguous 
wartime contribution and placed within the broader context of imperial history, they 
provide an important new lens for analysing the dynamics of imperialism during the 
twilight of the British Empire. Through a comparative analysis of three case studies - 
the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and East Asia - and by reconciling the 'official' record 
in the 'metropole' with 'subaltern' sources located in those regions, this thesis 
examines for the first time the political, social and cultural impact of these forces. It 
explores how they emerged out of a climate of 'imperial overstretch' as bulwarks for 
the preservation of British 'prestige'; how imperial ideology and racial discourses of 
power influenced naval recruitment, strategy and management, affecting colonial 
conceptions of identity, indigenous belief systems and ethnic relations; and how 
naval service, during both war and peacetime, influenced motivations, imperial 
sentiment, group cohesion and force discipline.
This thesis will also assess the evolution of these part-time colonial volunteer 
forces into professional sovereign navies within the context of decolonisation. It will 
investigate the extent to which British hegemonic influence was maintained within 
post-colonial relationships. Issues of nationalisation, its utilisation as a tool for 
'nation-building', and the impact of nationalist ideology and social engineering upon 
service efficiency and esprit de corps will also be examined. In the process this 
thesis furthers developments within the 'new naval history', by reconceptualising our 
understanding of navies as not merely organisations for the physical projection and 
maintenance of political and economic influence, but as human and cultural 
institutions, in which power was expressed as much in the ideas and relations they 
cultivated, as the barrels of their guns.
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General Introduction
During the Second World War, around 8,000 men from fifteen colonial 
territories fought for the British Empire in locally-raised naval volunteer forces. These 
were founded in Trinidad, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Mauritius, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, the Straits Settlements, 
Hong Kong and Fiji, all between the years of 1933 and 19411. Their relatively small 
size has meant that up to now they have remained merely a footnote within the wider 
historiography of the war. Yet, if examined beyond their ambiguous wartime 
contribution and placed within the broader context of imperial history, they provide an 
important new lens for analysing the dynamics of imperialism during the twilight of 
the British Empire. It is illuminating that these forces were formed within less than a 
decade of each other, presenting a significant shift in naval policy towards the 
recruitment of colonial manpower at a time of distinct internal and external pressures 
on British imperial power. Important questions are raised as to the degree in which 
this marks a cultural change in British attitudes towards non-white colonial subjects 
and their suitability for naval service, or whether practical concerns of imperial 
defence predominated. This in turn prompts a reconsideration of 'imperial 
overstretch' as a genuine concern for contemporary imperial and naval officials and 
how they reacted to offset such pressures.
Through a comparative analysis of three case studies - the Caribbean, 
Southeast Asia and East Asia - and by reconciling the 'official' record in the
1 Not included are the Dominions or India, as they were self-governing, and had professional navies 
on which a sizeable literature already exists.
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'metropole' with 'subaltern' sources located in those regions, this thesis examines for 
the first time the political, social and cultural impact of these colonial naval forces. It 
explores how they emerged out of a climate of 'imperial overstretch' as bulwarks for 
the preservation of British 'prestige'; how imperial ideology and racial discourses of 
power influenced naval recruitment, strategy and management, affecting colonial 
conceptions of identity, indigenous belief systems and ethnic relations; and how 
naval service, during both war and peacetime, influenced motivations, imperial 
sentiment, group cohesion and force discipline. This thesis will also assess the 
evolution of these part-time colonial volunteer forces into professional sovereign 
navies within the context of decolonisation. It will investigate the extent to which 
British hegemonic influence was maintained within post-colonial relationships. Issues 
of nationalisation, its utilisation as a tool for 'nation-building', and the impact of 
nationalist ideology and social engineering upon service efficiency and esprit de 
corps will also be examined.
It is commonly recognised that both military and naval history have been 
relatively late in engaging with the 'cultural turn' in historical scholarship, partly on 
account of their professional associations and the number of non-academically 
trained former armed forces personnel who have gone on to write service histories. 
Military and naval history has thus traditionally adopted a 'top-down' approach, 
focused on strategy and technological issues, and emphasising the forces' 
importance in national diplomacy, high politics and economics. Writing as late as 
2003, Quintin Colville has concluded that 'the overriding concern of most of the 
existing academic literature on the Royal Navy (RN) in the twentieth century, has 
been to assess the organisation's performance of its stated duties: the protection of
British interests and sovereignty in peace and war.'2 While naval historians may have 
exhibited a reluctance to engage with cultural history methodology and themes, 
cultural historians are equally culpable in not applying their conceptual frameworks to 
maritime contexts, perhaps partly due the innate prejudice that prevails in some 
quarters towards naval and military history as an academic discipline. Even in the 
early years of the twenty-first century, it has been observed by Max Jones that 
'practitioners of the "new cultural history" have devoted surprisingly little attention to 
maritime life after 1850'. In fact, in surveying over 650 books and articles published 
under the subject of 'Naval Forces' in the 'Royal Historical Society Bibliography of 
British and Irish History' between January 2003 and October 2007, he found that 
fewer than 20 texts could be described as deploying cultural historical methodology3. 
A belated cultural shift within military history has been aided by interest in the cultural 
dimensions of British imperial rule, inspired in part by Edward Said's Orientalism. 
Colonial conflicts that have subsequently been studied, however, such as the 1857 
Indian Mutiny/Rebellion and the Second South African War of 1899-1902, were ones 
in which the Navy played merely a supporting role4. In more recent years, culturally- 
informed naval historians have finally begun to reconcile this historiographical 
oversight, with Jan Ruger's The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age 
of Empire (Cambridge, 2007) proving particularly influential within this renaissance5.
2 Quintin Colville, 'Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer: The Role of Uniform in Shaping the Class - 
and Gender-Related Identities of British Naval Personnel, 1930-1939', Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 6th series, Vol. 13 (2003), pp. 105-29, p. 105.
3 Max Jones, "The Surest Safeguard of Peace': Technology, the Navy and the Nation in Boys' Papers, 
c. 1905-1907', in Andrew Lambert, Jan Ruger, Robert J. Blyth (eds.), The Dreadnought and the 
Edwardian Age (Surrey, 2011), p. 109.
4 Ibid., p.110.
5 Other notable recent studies include Colville, 'Jack Tar'; Lucy Delap, "'Thus Does Man Prove His 
Fitness to Be the Master of Things": Shipwrecks, Chivalry and Masculinities in Nineteenth- and 
Twentieth-Century Britain', Cultural and Social History, 3/1 (2006): 45-74; Jeffrey D. Glasco, "'The 
Seaman Feels Him-self a Man'", International Labor and Working-Class History, 66 (2004): 40-56;
Ken Lunn and Ann Day, 'Britain as Island: National Identity and the Sea', in Helen Brocklehurst and
3
The vast majority of these studies, however, have thus far been 
overwhelmingly Anglo-British-centric in their focus. This has also been demonstrated 
by certain trends within Second World War historiography. At the start of the 
twentieth century, Britain's maritime dominance was far from assured, compounded 
by relative industrial decline and geopolitical rivalries which threatened the Empire's 
collective security. One perceived solution was to draw closer to the Empire, and to 
encourage the colonies to take on increased responsibility for their own naval 
defence. The 'white' Dominions were the first to establish full-time navies of their own 
after the 1909 Imperial Conference, followed by the formation of the Royal Indian 
Navy in 1934. The significant contribution of these forces to the Second World War 
has been historiographically acknowledged, partly on account of their size, but also 
due to a traditionally western-centric representation of that conflict, with the more 
'martial' Indians presented as an exception alongside the victorious white Anglo- 
Saxons.
Over the last thirty years, postcolonial and subaltern studies have sought to 
readdress this coloured distortion, with notable work being conducted on the 
contribution of African army regiments to that conflict, particularly by David Killingray6 
and Timothy Parsons7. A key point of historiographical debate here has been the 
impact of wartime imperial military service on the development of anti-colonial 
nationalist politics. Israel8, Grundlingh9 and Parsons10 have argued that ex-
Robert Phillips (eds.), History, Nationhood and the Question of Britain (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 124-36; 
N.A.M. Roger, 'Queen Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea-Power in English history', Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 6th series, Vol. 14 (2004): 153-74.
6 David Killingray, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World W ar (Woodbridge, 2010).
7 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the 
King's African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Oxford, 1999)
8 Adrienne M. Israel, 'Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads: Protest and Politics in Post-War Ghana', 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, 1992, pp.359-368.
9 Louis Grundlingh, 'Soldiers and Politics: A Study of Political Consciousness of Black South African 
Soldiers After the Second World War', Historia, Vol. 36, Issue 2, November 1991, pp.55-66.
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servicemen were a significant influence in African colonial independence movements, 
while Killingray11, Schleh12, Olusanya13, and Headrick14 have contested their relative 
importance. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper have broadened the geographical 
scope to encompass British colonial armies in Asia15, but still with a predominant 
military rather than naval focus. Though the operational presence of colonial naval 
forces beyond the Dominions and India has been acknowledged by Ashley 
Jackson16, their wider social and cultural impact in the Second 'World' War and on 
British imperialism continues to be largely overlooked by academics. While some 
commemorative histories of contemporary independent navies examine their colonial 
roots, they are inevitably produced with a self-celebratory agenda, bearing jingoistic 
titles like Honour and Sacrifice17 and Serving the Nation™, and serve as nationalist 
propaganda for post-colonial nation-building, such as in trying to foster national unity 
in an unequal multiethnic society:
I want the Malaysian Navy to be an example to the nation and to the whole 
world where unity is concerned. As Malaysia constitutes races of different 
religions and nationalities that have always lived in peace and harmony, 
we should extend this harmonic state of affairs more effectively whilst 
serving in the Malaysian Navy... I want, last but not least, a Malaysian
10 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the 
King’s African Rifles, 1902-1964  (Portsmouth NH, 1999)
11 David Killingray, 'Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen, and Politics in the Gold Coast, 1939-50'. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 21, 1983, pp.523-34
12 Eugene Schleh, 'The Post-War Careers of Ex-Servicemen in Ghana and Uganda', Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2, August 1968, pp.203-20.
13 G. O. Olusanya, 'The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics', Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2, August 1968, pp 221-232.
14 Rita Headrick, 'African soldiers in World W ar IP, Armed Forces and Society. Vol. IV. 1978, pp.502- 
526.
15 Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945  
(Cambridge, 2005) and Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire (London, 2007).
Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World W ar (London, 2006).
17 Royal Malaysian Navy (ed.), Honour and Sacrifice (Kuala Lumpur, 1994).
18 Royal Malaysian Navy (ed.), Serving the Nation (Kuala Lumpur, 2004).
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Navy that would consist of officers and men who possess a sense of 
loyalty and patriotism.19 
Such books lack academic rigour, as generally do naval histories written for popular 
audiences often by amateur historians and former servicemen20, meaning these 
forces are not analysed within a broader historical, theoretical or comparative 
geographical context to explain their wider significance.
In 1999, Barry M. Gough commented within the Oxford History of the British 
Empire (Volume V), that 'far from being an old-fashioned field of inquiry, naval and 
Imperial themes are rich in possibilities for studying the interface of societies, 
systems, and states', yet the 'general linkage of navy to Empire continues to escape 
historians, perhaps because the task is such a daunting one'. To rectify this, Gough 
suggested an area in need of further research was 'a study of how the Royal Navy 
influenced the course of the early history of colonial and Commonwealth navies'.21 
This is one of the main themes this thesis will address. In extending recent cultural 
explorations of naval history, the thesis will also add a more global dimension to 
naval historiography's current predominantly Anglo-British-European focus, 
incorporating interactions within the Caribbean, East and Southeast Asia.
An examination of discourses of race and ethnicity is crucial in analysing the 
British-colonial relations that underpinned these naval forces. Within the military 
context, martial race theory heavily influenced the recruitment and organisation of 
colonial armies from the nineteenth into the twentieth century. Despite drawing 
criticism from postcolonial circles for what they see as perpetuating Western
19 Chief Petty Officer Radiman, quoted in ibid., p.8.
20 Commodore P.J. Melson CBE Royal Navy, White Ensign - Red Dragon: the History of the Royal 
Navy in Hong Kong 1841-1997, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong, 1997)
21 Barry M. Gough, T h e  Royal Navy and the British Empire', in Robin W. Winks, The Oxford History of 
the British Empire: Volume V Historiography (Oxford, 1999), p.340.
6
constructions of the Oriental 'other', there has been a resurgence in contemporary 
interest in the concept, partly inspired by the war in Afghanistan and 'human terrain 
mapping', which places pronounced importance on understanding the social and 
cultural battlefield as well as the physical one. Yet, regardless of its American-centric 
rebranding, the relationship between the social sciences and the military stretches 
back to the nineteenth century, at least from a British perspective, and it was this 
marriage that gave voice to the martial race theorists. Critical historical studies of this 
ideology have predominantly emerged only within the last fifteen years, and typical of 
a relatively young field of enquiry, it is rife with debate. The prevalence of martial 
race discourse in India during the post-1857 period, when 'martial' became a 
synonym for those groups who remained 'loyal' during the mutiny, similarly extended 
elsewhere in the British Empire, has fuelled the argument put forward by David 
Killingray, 'that certain peoples or societies had a special capacity for military service 
- was largely a colonial construct'22. Yet, as Douglas Peers has shown, such 
depictions began to emerge from the 1830s onwards, before the mutiny occurred23. 
The view that martial races were merely a 'colonial construct', also presents the 
impression that an omnipresent 'official mind' was at work, directing complicit 
colonial officials and military recruiters in implementing this ideology as part of a 
concerted 'imperial project'. Yet, the officers themselves, such as George MacMunn 
who wrote the longstanding The Martial Races of India (1933) following lengthy 
service in the Indian Army, were 'invested in the truth of the martial race ideology'24.
22 David Killingray, 'Guardians of Empire', in David Killingray and David Omissi (eds.), Guardians of 
Empire (Manchester, 1999), p.15.
23 Douglas M. Peers, "Those Noble Exemplars of the True Military Tradition'; Constructions of the
Indian Army in the Mid-Victorian Press', Modern Asian Studies, Vol.31, No.1 (1997), pp.109-142.
For MacMunn, it was not a colonial construction for dividing and ruling the 'natives', 
but an observational certainty.
Rather than simply being an imperial imagining, which itself ascribes a passive 
role to the colonised, imperial observations, though manipulated and distorted, 
nevertheless were based on some element of empirical reality. 'Martial races' did not 
suddenly appear overnight just because the British decided to attach a label to them. 
In many instances, the people documented in anthropological studies and colonial 
military reports were conscious of their own martiality, having either been personally 
involved in combat or had their group identity reinforced by the celebration of 
ancestors' armed exploits, wearing it as a badge of pride and honour. They still do in 
some instances; in an interview with Jaswant Singh Gill, the first Punjabi Sikh to join 
the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (MRNVR) in 1949, early on he identified 
himself by reciting his military heritage:
My grandfather was the AVC [Army Veterinary Corps] to King George V, 
my father fought in the First World War, my uncles fought in the Second 
World War... as a community, we are a martial race... it comes naturally to 
us... the motivation is there. Our community says you are a martial race, 
you are a soldier, you fight... The British never said 'you are a martial race' 
and therefore you become a martial race, no, We were already a martial 
race, the only thing the British realised was that we were a martial race. 
Soldiering comes to us naturally.25
Such an account would come under criticism from those who argue that it merely 
represents the internalisation of colonial discourse, that 'reputations, inflated or not,
25 Interview conducted by author with Jaswant Singh Gill, 10 July 2009, Singapore.
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often have an effect on the self-image of the regiments and the soldiers concerned', 
thus producing 'a circular, self-replicating effect' in which 'it may even be argued that 
the supposed martial races became more warlike precisely because it was expected 
of them.'26 Heather Streets has confronted why martial race theory has been so 
intangible for historians to define, concluding that: 'the power of martial race ideology 
stemmed from its very flexibility and ambiguity: it was adaptable to a variety of 
historical and geographical situations and functioned alternatively to inspire, 
intimidate, exclude, and include.'27 It was neither entirely a colonial construct, nor an 
objective reality, but a mutually-influencing combination of the two, creating a 
'chicken or egg'-like scenario. This thesis will argue that it represented a form of 
imperial 'collaboration', to draw on Ronald Robinson's theory28, it being mutually 
beneficial for both the colonisers and the colonised to cultivate that identity.
Yet, what, if any, was its impact upon colonial naval forces formed during the 
1930s? Though there were parallels in the stereotypes depicted and the discourse 
used by the ruling elite, there were distinct differences in regards to their naval 
application. Races seen as inherently 'martial' would not necessarily possess the 
same set of characteristics and skills required to make them ideal naval recruits. 
What naval recruiters were looking for instead were 'seafaring races', coastal 
peoples with nautical traditions in maritime trade and fishing, for example, but most 
importantly, possessing the 'call of the sea' that the British saw in themselves as an 
island race and naval power, though theirs was naturally believed to be of a superior
26 John M. Mackenzie, in Heather Streets, Martial races: The military, race and masculinity in British 
imperial culture, 1857-1914  (Manchester, 2004), pp.viii-ix.
27 Heather Streets, Martial races: The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857- 
1914 (Manchester, 2004), p.4.
28 Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of 
collaboration', in E.R.J. Owen and R.B. Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 
1972), chap.5.
paternalistic kind. The men recruited into colonial naval forces thus underwrote 
British hegemony and contemporary 'development' discourse which had evolved 
from earlier ideas of the 'civilising mission'. Beneath this guise a 'divide and rule' 
policy was pursued, with certain ethnic groups within the colonies excluded from 
naval service because of their perceived 'racial' unsuitability, though this too masked 
concerns over their imperial loyalty. Colonial naval forces were thus also dependent 
on the collaboration of such groups, not only for their operation, but for the 
maintenance of British 'prestige'. The ideological development of this theory of 
'seagoing races', the influence of such discourse on colonial identities, and the 
practical and political implications of this for both the Navy and British imperialism 
will form a central line of analysis in this thesis.
To attempt to study all fifteen colonies that raised naval volunteer forces, 
providing sufficient background information to interpret the different cultural and 
political contexts, and to cover the timeframe from their formation in the 1930s, 
through the Second World War to decolonisation, taking in additional flashpoints, 
would clearly be unfeasible within the limits of a thesis. Attention will therefore be 
focused on three regional case studies: the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and East 
Asia. These have been selected on the basis that they constituted the extremities of 
Empire, were the most active colonial naval theatres against the two major 
belligerents in the Second World War, and as a result their forces were also amongst 
the largest. On a practical level, they also provide the most fertile opportunities for 
primary research, being localities with sizeable collections of well-catalogued, 
accessible original documents, along with pre-recorded oral histories. These will be 
considered in relation to Admiralty and Colonial Office records located in the United
Kingdom, in order to provide a more transnational and holistic mode of analysis than 
that traditionally performed by exclusively imperial/metropole/top-down or 
local/peripheral/subaltern approaches. This thesis thus aims to bridge the gap 
between official imperial policy and individual colonial experiences, metropolitan 
perspectives and local viewpoints.
Methodological considerations are raised notably by the use of oral testimony 
and the recording of original interviews. Unlike the social sciences, oral history 
'interviewees are selected, not because they present some abstract statistical norm, 
but because they typify historical processes. The real issues are historiographical, 
not statistical'29. Therefore the need for a large representative sample of participants 
is not as relevant here, crucially as the number of potential interviewees for the war 
period dwindles as time takes its inevitable toll on that generation. Testimonies are 
intended to provide personal insight, atmosphere and texture into the culture of the 
service rather than to provide evidence for scientific theory or to illustrate patterns. 
The sample is thus seen as indicative rather than representative. Interviewees were 
identified through existing oral history projects, such as the Oral History Centre in the 
Singapore National Archives, and professional ex-services organisations such as the 
Commonwealth Ex-Services League, the World Veterans Federation, and the 
Cayman Islands Veterans Association.
One of the main issues for historians concerning oral history is the extent to 
which oral evidence can be deemed as 'reliable'? To answer this, one must first 
consider the reliability of documentary evidence, naturally being the yardstick by 
which oral history is measured. Whereas archival documents' traditional reliability
29 Ronald J. Grele, 'Movement without aim: Methodological and theoretical problems in oral history', in 
Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), The Oral History Reader (London, 1998), p. 41.
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has rested on the notion of their unchanging nature, this in itself is not entirely true, 
as sometimes the same document can appear in different collections, but with 
amendments. Collections can be incomplete, and do not always hold previous 
correspondence or accurately convey the original context in which an item may have 
been written. For example, a collection may be compiled around a particular theme, 
such as to commemorate an important event, but this raises problems in itself, in that 
it reflects what the archivist or curator considers 'important', not necessarily what the 
author had originally intended. Can an archivist or curator legitimately reflect the 
attitudes of other groups represented in a source to which he/she is not a member?
Such records can therefore be distorting, framed by subsequent events and 
discourse. The original author of a document can often be commenting or reflecting 
on events from afar, for example within imperial history, on the periphery from the 
metropole, through second-hand information collected on the ground passed up 
through subordinates and sent over thousands of miles, or even looking back upon 
events that occurred several months earlier, such as for the purposes of an annual 
report. This distance can also constitute cultural distance, where those written about 
represent a different social/ethnic group to that of the author, who do not possess or 
have been deprived of the means or opportunities by which to represent themselves 
in the historical record. Such sources can thus represent a skewed and often 
Occidentally-orientated depiction of 'subaltern' groups, though this in itself can reveal 
fascinating insights into the perceptions and prejudices of the author, particularly 
useful for the study of identity within this thesis. Consequently, those flaws which 
have been levelled at oral history can also be aimed at 'traditional' historical sources, 
and consequently 'all sources need to be tested against other evidence'30.
30 Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History (Oxford, 2003), p.26.
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One of the biggest concerns surrounding oral history is the role that memory 
plays. Often interviews will be conducted many years after the events in question. In 
such circumstances it would be difficult for the interviewee to recall precise details 
such as dates and names, and this highlights the need for the interviewer to have 
carried out archival research beforehand so as to be able to place the testimony 
within its proper context and test any conflicting information. Photographs, journals, 
letters and CVs can serve as useful prompts for memory. The selective nature of 
memory can also be shaped by subsequent events, so as to retrospectively elevate 
the importance of an original action. Similarly, a person's perceptions of self and 
'others' can also alter over time to reflect contemporary social issues and thus may 
not be reflective of how that person originally felt and how their views influenced their 
actions. Yet, rather than discrediting such testimony altogether, these factors 
themselves can provide important cultural insights into shifting societal attitudes. 
History can be utilised as a tool by which a post-colonial independent country can 
formulate a 'national' identity for nation-building and power-conciliatory purposes. In 
doing so, a nationalist mythology can emerge around particular historical moments, 
retrospectively elevated in significance so as to support the national project and 
underline the ruling party's legitimacy. The extent to which public memory invades 
personal memory and how that influences constructions of identity, particularly within 
plural societies, can provide fascinating insights into the effectiveness of such 
discourses and how the nation views itself. This, however, again highlights the 
importance of drawing on several reference points from which to formulate 
conclusions for this thesis.
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Of course, a researcher will go into an interview with preconceived ideas 
based upon background reading from both the historiography and the archives, and a 
set of questions and issues they wish to address. It is important, however, to allow 
the interviewee to work through their personal narrative first, and not rush them into 
responding to very specific and potentially sensitive questions, possibly out of context 
to what they consider to be important. This is a key part of the rapport-building 
process and establishing a mutual trust which will put the interviewee at ease and 
feel more comfortable to talk about any sensitive issues later. Considering this, the 
interviews for this research began by asking an open-ended question to provide a 
starting-point for the interviewee and establish context, for example, 'please could 
you tell me a bit about your background growing up, where you came from, etc.?' The 
interviewee took this opportunity to then work through their personal narrative, 
offering an overview of their life and career, which helped provide the first indication 
of key moments particularly important to them. This process also provided hooks to 
return to afterwards to ask more specific questions that led onto the main themes of 
the thesis. It was important, however, not to ask leading questions, or try to 
manoeuvre the interviewee into a position where they were asked to verify an 
argument or agenda created by the interviewer. Not only is this ethically unsound 
practice, but it would also produce misleading testimony based on statements not 
conceived by the interviewee themselves. The interviewer, however, also needed to 
be alert throughout to the question of whether the interviewee was qualified to talk on 
a particular subject; were they in a position to experience events firsthand or are they 
simply passing along second-hand information?31
31 ibid., p.34.
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The key research questions of the thesis can be grouped into three 
predominant themes, explored through the three regional case studies. They 
comprise 1) The formation of the naval forces: What influence did 'imperial 
overstretch' play in the creation of colonial naval forces during the 1930s? Were local 
or imperial factors predominant in their foundation and development? How did 
imperial and racial ideology influence naval planners and recruitment? What were 
the motivations for colonial naval volunteers? 2) The operation of the forces: What 
were the envisaged roles of colonial naval forces and how effectively did they fulfil 
them? How did the forces reinforce British imperial 'prestige'? How was colonial 
manpower managed and with what consequences for discipline? What influence did 
war and naval service have on colonial conceptions of racial/ethnic identity? 3) The 
cultural, political and social impact of the naval forces on the colonies: What impact 
did colonial naval service have on indigenous belief systems and ethnic/racial 
relations? How did the forces adapt to the changing post-war context of the Cold 
War and decolonisation? What issues were raised by the transfer of power and 
moves to naval autonomy and nationalisation? What imperial legacy/influence was 
left within post-colonial navies?
The first case study will focus on the Caribbean, which hosted the only
colonial naval unit in the Western hemisphere. Though this was based in Trinidad, it
included volunteers from almost all of Britain's West Indian colonies, and thus was
the most cosmopolitan of all the colonial naval forces raised. Consequently, it
provides a unique case for examining the interaction of different ethnicities within
such an imperial structure. How did motivations vary for different sets of volunteers?
What influence did imperial racial ideology have on the recruitment and the treatment
of different ethnic groups and their identities? How did volunteers react to this and
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the pressures of wartime naval service? Simultaneously, Britain's imperial position in 
the region was facing the duel pressures of colonial nationalism and rising American 
hegemony, a process accelerated by the Second World War. Therefore, what role 
did the force have on British imperial 'prestige', particularly following the American 
influx to the islands after 1940? These questions will be explored by comparing the 
contrasting experiences of Trinidadians and Cayman Islanders.
Case study two examines Southeast Asia, another ethnically plural region, but 
one which was not reflected in the naval forces' composition, where initially only 
Malay volunteers were incorporated. It also provides the key example of a colonial 
volunteer force which evolved into a professional independent navy that continues to 
exist today, highlighting issues of imperial transition and decolonisation in the 
process. Again, a key question will be how did racial ideology influence the 
discriminatory recruitment policies adopted? What impact did defeat by the 
Japanese have on imperial prestige and naval organisation in Malaya? How did 
'collaboration' work within a naval context? What was the legacy of British 
imperialism within naval nationalisation and the 'nation-building' policies of the post­
colonial government?
The final case study encompasses East Asia, centred on colonial navalism in
Hong Kong, but relating to Chinese culture more broadly and Britain's regional
position regarding Japan, and Nationalist and Communist China. It offers a
contrasting example to Malaya in that there was no case of imperial transition here,
at least not during the traditional era of decolonisation, with Britain looking to
reassert colonial control and prestige in Hong Kong during the post-war period. What
strategies did the Admiralty adopt to overcome obstructive local elements and
encourage naval volunteering? How did Chinese cultural perceptions influence
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British concerns regarding the naval suitability and imperial loyalty of local recruits? 
What impact did compulsory service have on naval and colonial cohesion? And what 
role did the naval force play in upholding British imperial policy and prestige in the 
region?
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Imperial Overstretch and Colonial Naval Defence
To understand what was particular about the geopolitical climate of the 1930s 
that resulted in the proliferation of colonial naval forces then, we need to first explain 
the key issue of 'imperial overstretch', and the roots in the nineteenth century. The 
popular mythology of Pax Britannica aside, the second half of the nineteenth century 
was already one of uncertainty for the British Empire and its collective security. The 
Crimean War, followed not long after by the Indian Mutiny had 'illustrated the danger 
involved in undue dispersion of the armed forces of the Crown, and the necessity for 
taking steps whereby the overseas people of the Empire would provide, at least in 
part, for their own security'. The Volunteer movement, which emerged in Britain in 
response to the threat of French invasion, offered a potential solution and 'gave a 
stimulus and an example to the Colonies in the direction of self-defence'32. The 
nautical nature of the British Empire meant that imperial defence was invariably 
seaward in its orientation, and the first Colonial Naval Defence Act was passed in 
1865 to allow the white settler colonies to raise a body of volunteers to provide local 
naval defence. New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania 
and New Zealand took up this option to form small auxiliary naval units over the next 
few decades, though the legislation restricted them to territorial waters33.
As British imperialism expanded during the nineteenth century and technology 
advanced, costs for the Royal Navy's upkeep inevitably also rose, placing an
32 Sir Charles Lucas (ed.), The Empire At War, Vol.l (Oxford, 1921), p.77.
33 Bob Nicholls, 'Colonial naval forces before Federation', in David Stevens and John Reeve (eds.), 
Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power (Crows Nest, 2001), 
pp. 125-39.
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increasing burden firmly on the shoulders of the British taxpayer. The colonial 
Empire, which derived defensive and economic benefits from a strong navy, 
contributed nothing. This drain on the British finance and manpower led the Liberal 
statesman Charles Dilke in 1872 to argue that 'the colonies are a source of military 
weakness to us, and our 'protection' of them is a source of danger to the colonists'. 
His argument for economic pragmatism was balanced by a paternalistic concern for 
colonial growth, rhetoric that would be resurrected by 1930s colonial navalists:
As for our so-called defence of the colonies, in war-time we defend 
ourselves: we defend the colonies only during peace. In war-time they are 
ever left to shift for themselves, and they would undoubtedly be better to 
do so were they in the habit of maintaining their military establishments in 
times of peace. The present system weakens us and them - us, by taxes 
and by the withdrawal of our men and ships; the colonies, by preventing 
the development of that self-reliance which is requisite to form a nation's 
greatness.34
The Russian war scare of 1878 prompted the creation a Royal Commission, 
chaired by Lord Carnarvon, 'to enquire into the defence of British possessions and 
commerce abroad', and which came to the conclusion that 'the time, in our opinion, 
has arrived when the Colonies may reasonably be expected to take upon 
themselves some share of that defence - a burden hitherto exclusively borne by the 
mother-country.'35
34 Charles Dilke, Greater Britain, in Peter Cain (ed.), Empire and Imperialism: The Debate of the 
1870s (Chippenham, 1999), p.23.
35 Quoted in Richard Harding, 'Review of Donald M. Shurman, Imperial Defence 1868-188T, Journal 
for Maritime Research, Vol.5 (2003).
19
In response, a colonial conference was convened in 1887 to negotiate the 
issue, and achieved a combined flat contribution of £122,597 per annum from the 
Australian colonies and New Zealand towards the maintenance of a naval squadron 
in their waters. This was but a token gesture, however, appearing to the Colonial 
Secretary Sir Henry Holland, as 'trifling in comparison' to a British peacetime naval 
expenditure exceeding £13,000,000 36. The impending naval arms race with 
Germany exacerbated this disparity, with Britain struggling to maintain the 'two- 
power standard', formally adopted as part of the 1889 Naval Defence Act although it 
built on previous informal policy, whereby the Royal Navy would at least equal her 
next two largest rivals. With the rapidly-expanding Imperial German Navy 
concentrated directly across the North Sea, Britain was forced into recalling warships 
on overseas stations to protect home waters. This was partly off-set by the signing of 
the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which put the defence of Britain's colonies in 
East Asia and the new Dominion of Australia under the Imperial Japanese Navy's 
charge, much to Australia's chagrin. More importantly though, this represented the 
point at which the Royal Navy was no longer able to meet all of its imperial 
commitments single-handedly. At the Imperial Conference of the same year, Joseph 
Chamberlain appealed to the rest of the 'white' Empire for help:
We do require your assistance in the administration of the vast empire 
which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under the too 
vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden for many years. We think it 
is time that our children should assist us to support it.37
36 Richard Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol. 1 (London, 1911), pp.41-2.
37 Phillips Payson O'Brien, T h e  Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before the 
First World War', Past and Present, No. 172 (August, 2001), pp.146-169, p.146.
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The withdrawal of the Royal Navy to European waters both literally and 
metaphorically brought 'home' the reality that defence of Britain would always be 
prioritised over the rest of the Empire, something that would be borne out in both 
World Wars. This was emphasised in 1910 by the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
which admitted that more remote parts of the Empire, geographically but also distant 
in regards to strategic and economic importance, might have to be sacrificed so as to 
ensure British security:
In order to avoid exposing our fleets to the risk of suffering defeat in detail, 
naval action in remote waters might therefore have to be postponed until 
by clearing of the situation in home waters adequate naval force could be 
brought to bear.38
The question of 'imperial overstretch' or 'strategic overextension' is a major 
debate within British imperial history. Chamberlain's 'weary Titan' analogy has led 
some to argue that Britain faced this problem from at least the turn of the century. 
Paul Kennedy has posited that as nations ascend they will seek to expand outside of 
their natural borders, acquiring additional territories, but also increased strategic 
responsibilities. This continues until the defensive costs to maintain an empire 
eventually exceeds the economic benefits derived from it, at which point it begins to 
decline and be eclipsed by other nations who have not yet acquired those same 
burdens.39 Kennedy argues that this was the case for Britain in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when she was faced with the problem of having to 
provide for the defence of the Empire while at the same time experiencing relative
38 Ibid, p. 155.
39 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500-2000 (London, 1988), p.xv-xvi.
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economic and industrial decline.40 Along these lines, Corelli Barnett41, Bernard 
Porter42, and Patrick O'Brien43, have all argued that the costs of administering and 
defending the Empire effectively stifled Britain economically prior to 1914, with Lance 
Davis and Robert Huttenback asserting that 'of all the subsidies enjoyed by the 
colonies, none was more lucrative than that for defence.'44 As Table 1 demonstrates, 
the colonies expended a disproportionately low amount, both in regards to the rest of 
the Empire and particularly Britain, and in relation to naval as opposed to military 
defence:
Table 1. Imperial Defence Expenditure, 1908-1910
Military Naval Total
Military expenditure Naval expenditure Total expenditure
Pop. expenditure per caput expenditure per caput, expenditure per caput
ear Country (m.) (£m.) (£) (£m.) (£) (£m.) (£)
1909-10 UK
Dominions
44.539 27.459 0.62 35.143 0.79 62.602 1.41
1907-8 Canada 6.154 1.359 0.22 0.099 0.02 1.458 0.24
1907-8 Newfoundland 0.234 0.000 0.00 0.003 0.003
1907-8 Australia 4.222 1.025 0.24 0.272 0.06 1.297 0.31
1908 New Zealand 1.021 0.193 0.19 0.100 1.10 0.293 0.29
1908 South Africa 5.474 1.258 0.23 0.085 0.02 1.343 0.25
Total Dominions 61.644 31.295 0.51 35.701 0.58 66.996 1.09
1908-9 India 294.317 20.071 0.07 0.482 0.00 20.553 0.07
Colonies 38.871 1.155 0.03 0.000 0.00 1.155 0.03
Total Empire 394.83 52.522 0.13 36.184 0.09 88.704 0.22
ource: Avner Offer, T h e  British Empire, 1870-1914: A Waste of Money?', Economic History Review, Vol.46 (1993), p.227.
Other historians, such as P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, have contested the 
claim that imperial military and naval expenditure caused irreparable domestic
40 Ibid, pp.224-32.
41 Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), p. 120.
42 Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1995  (London, 1996), 
p.37.
43 Patrick K. O'Brien, 'The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914', Past and Present, 
no.120 (August, 1988), p.200.
44 Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Economics of British 
Imperialism (Cambridge, 1988), p.145.
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damage, presenting Britain as 'formidably strong' at the outbreak of the First World 
War, and even after due to her extensive financial and commercial interests, 
particularly in her 'invisible empire'.45 In 1991, Gordon Martel et. al. in a special 
edition of The International History Review, also contest the imperial overstretch and 
decline theory46. Martel suggests that rather than acting as a drain on her resources, 
'for the first time, Great Britain was able to use military power drawn from the empire 
to enable her to act as a terrene power on the Continent'47 during the First World 
War. He goes on to say that in the interwar period, Britain 'was more powerful that 
she had been for the 150 years that preceded the Second World War', not merely 
being 'the pre-eminent world power' but 'the only world power'48. Avner Offer has 
also supported this notion, suggesting that 'over and above the private returns, 
Britain also acquired a strategic asset' that 'extended considerably Britain's capacity 
to wage war, by adding to its military, demographic, and economic resources'.49 
Furthermore, Offer argues that the logistical benefits that the colonies provided the 
Empire as bases for the Navy and as 'links in the chain of steam-coal navigation and 
undersea cables' offset their lack of financial contribution towards imperial defence50.
These claims have been taken forward by Ashley Jackson, who also attests to 
the logistical strength of the Empire, a 'global network' which facilitated 'Britain's 
capacity to move food, goods, munitions and troops from one side of the world to the 
other', and with vast manpower resources which could be mobilised for both the 
economic and industrial war as well as on the frontlines, demonstrated most
45 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000  (London, 2002), pp.395, 405.
46 Gordon Martel et al., T h e  Decline of Great Britain', The International History Review, Vol. 13, No.4 
(November, 1991), pp.662-783.
7 Gordon Martel, T h e  Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain', The 
International History Review, Vol.13, No.4 (November, 1991), pp.662-694, p.687.
48 Ibid., p.692.
49 Offer, 'The British Empire, 1870-1914', pp.234-6.
50 Ibid., p.228.
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effectively during the Second World War51. Yet, Jackson admits that this capability 
was neglected and remained largely theoretical until war broke out, with strategic 
planning failing to keep up with technological progress and the changing geo-political 
system. He argues that on the eve of the Second World War, 'there was not one 
adequately defended base throughout the entire Empire when judged against the 
scale of likely attack using modern weapons', and though the prominence of the 
Navy within imperial defence strategy was still unquestioned, 'the gap between 
theory and actuality was now enormous, though there was nothing meaningful that 
could be done about it. It was a classic case of imperial overstretch'52.
As the First World War showed, fighting just the Germans for supremacy in the 
North Atlantic and the North Sea tied down almost every ship the Royal Navy 
possessed, and victory was achieved only after extraordinary effort.53 This sorry state 
of defensive preparations during the interwar years was created due to reasons of 
'economy, domestic politics and international stability':
As a sated power, recovering from the First World War and the effects of 
the depression, with a population that would not hear of another war and... 
elected governments only too pleased to translate this into cost-cutting 
action... To achieve their several aims, Britain's naval power had to be 
crippled, and its Empire fundamentally weakened and at least partially 
dismantled.54
51 Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London, 2006), pp.1-4.
52 Ibid., p.14.
53 Phillips Payson O'Brien, p. 153.
54 Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, p.11.
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At the same time, the end of the First World War and the elimination of all 
major naval threats to Britain in Europe left the Royal Navy in a quandary; having 
been heavily orientated towards fighting a short-distance war, now it 'had to think 
again in terms of global strategy and to reconsider factors such as bases, endurance, 
and sea-keeping qualities in this light'55. The Admiralty hoped to create an 'Imperial 
Fleet' for this purpose, bringing together all the Empire's naval forces under a single 
unified command. Again, it was hoped this would be part-funded by the Dominions, 
but as in the past they baulked at the cost and preferred to develop their own 
individual fleets. The 'absolute right of the Dominions and Colonies to control their 
own budgets' had to be respected, but this could diverge from strategic requirements 
perceived differently from the metropole and the periphery56. In 1919, when the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer recommended a reduction in the number of capital ships 
to fifteen, the Admiralty played on fears of a naval race with the United States and 
Japan, emphasising the loss of prestige and trade and weakened imperial bonds with 
the Dominions that this might result in.57
Just as the First World War had begun with one naval arms race, so it ended 
with another. The conflict had left Great Britain, the United States (US) and Japan as 
the three major naval powers in the world, all of whom had a vested interest in the 
Pacific Rim. The wartime alliance quickly deteriorated into tension and suspicion as 
both the US and Japan embarked on new naval construction programmes. In the 
post-war climate, there was not the political and public support, the economic
55 The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J.H. Godfrey, iii, pp.11-12, MSS. Churchill College, Cambridge, cited 
in Paul Haggie, Britannia At Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931-1941 
(Oxford, 1981), p.1.
Nicholas Tracy (ed.), The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900-1940, Publications of the 
Navy Records Society, Vol. 136 (Aldershot, 1997), p.ix.
57 Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939: Preparing for W ar against Japan 
(London, 2004), p.21.
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leverage, or the industrial capacity for it to be able to compete with America in naval 
building and remain on top, as Lloyd George attested to the Committee of Imperial 
Defence:
[W]e could not fight the United States for economical as well as for military 
reasons... If the Committee were to decide now that Great Britain must 
enter into competition with the United States in naval shipbuilding, it would 
be the biggest decision they have taken since 1914, and conceivably 
greater... We should be up against the greatest resources of the world.
We should be up against a growing and intensely virile population... No 
British statesman, therefore, could commit his country to what might be a 
disastrous rivalry, except for the most imperative and convincing
58reasons.
One potential solution to offset American naval superiority was to renew the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance, which was due to expire in 1921. Yet, this was one of the main 
factors behind American naval expansion, so as to readjust the balance of power in 
the Pacific which was weighted against them as a result of the agreement. Some 
within the Committee of Imperial Defence, most notably Churchill, believed that rather 
than securing Britain's interests, renewing the alliance might have the opposite effect 
and spark an arms race with the US, potentially culminating in war59.
The solution was a policy of naval arms limitation between the three powers, 
concluded at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. This resulted in a ten-year 
agreement for each navy to limit its number of capital ships by a ratio of 5:5:3, the
58 The National Archives (TNA), CAB 2/3, Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes of the 134th 
Meeting, 14 December 1920.
59 Wm. Roger Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (Oxford, 1971), p.54.
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total displacement for Britain and US each being 525,000 tons, with 315,000 tons for 
Japan.60 No new constructions were to be made for the period of the treaty, and 
limits were also imposed on gun calibre (16 inches) and aircraft carriers. A 10,000 ton, 
8-inch gun limit was set for cruisers, though no total displacement. Similarly, no limits 
were set for smaller auxiliary craft, used for escort and local defence duties. To 
ensure American acquiescence, however, Britain had to terminate its alliance with 
Japan.
Though a consequence of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was the 
preservation of good relations with the US and maintaining British naval parity, it 
decreased Britain's security in East Asia while proportionately increasing the risk 
posed to its interests there by turning an ally, Japan, into a potential enemy. It also 
meant increased responsibilities for the Royal Navy, as Britain's possessions in the 
region had previously been guarded indirectly by Japan. Thus, the decision was 
taken to construct a new naval base at Singapore for the fleet to operate from, at an 
estimated cost of £13million 'in the first instance'61 but which would more than 
quadruple by the base's completion, adding further financial strain, despite some 
subsidies coming from the Straits Settlements, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and the 
Federated Malay States. The strategic imperative given to Singapore by the 
termination of the alliance was why the British were determined to keep it out of 
article XIX of the Treaty, which stipulated the 'status quo... with regard to 
fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained'. The area agreed upon was east 
of the meridian of 110° east longitude, which did, however, encompass Britain's 
colonies of Hong Kong and Fiji.
60 ’Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922', Vol. 1, pp.247-266, pp.252-3, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/navJim.html.
61 TNA, ADM 1/8715/189, Letter from Admiralty to the Colonial Office, 22 July 1927, p.2.
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The significance of article XIX's imposition was that it meant that if those 
colonies were to be seriously defended, naval forces would have to play a central 
role. As a consequence, the long-established policy of not tying naval forces to the 
local defence of bases would have to be revised.62 The Committee of Imperial 
Defence which convened on 14 December that year suggested that a Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) force might be established in Hong Kong to compensate 
for the restriction on improving Hong Kong's physical defences63. This idea that the 
colonies could contribute to imperial defence by raising local RNVR forces was first 
suggested to the Imperial Cabinet the previous year. It was only considered viable, 
however, for those colonies which possessed sizeable white communities, as it was 
not felt that the 'native' populations could by relied upon to take on this responsibility, 
and why such a scheme had previously only been pursued in the 'white' Dominions:
Some difficulty may exist in raising local forces of the R.N.V.R. in India 
and in those Colonies where coloured races predominate... this should not 
prevent the formation of local detachments composed entirely of 
Europeans, for it will probably be found at large and prosperous ports, 
where a considerable proportion of the white community are connected 
with shipping, and where yachting may be indulged in, that service in a 
naval corps would be attractive to many.64
The restrictions of Washington prompted the Admiralty to revise its aspirations 
and adopt a new 'one-power standard', though the rather unwieldy syntax and 
caveats in this policy convey its compromising and less than ideal nature:
62 TNA, ADM 116/3125, 'Remarks on Paragraphs in Detail, Part II', p.5.
63 TNA, CO 323/902, Item 121, M .0311.23, From Committee of Imperial Defence to Admiralty, 21 
March 1923.
64 TNA, CAB 21/187, Empire Naval Policy and Cooperation, February 1921, p.44.
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The requirements of a one-Power standard are satisfied if our fleet, 
wherever situated, it equal to the fleet of any other nation, wherever 
situated, provided that arrangements are made from time to time in 
different parts of the world, according as the international situation requires, 
to enable the local forces to maintain the situation against vital and 
irreparable damage pending the arrival of the Main Fleet and to give the 
Main Fleet on arrival sufficient mobility.65
Under this doctrine, 'local superiority was not required, and local naval forces could 
be inferior in strength until the arrival of the main battle fleet'66. A more defensive 
strategy was pursued as the ability of the ageing battle fleet to operate from forward 
bases such as Hong Kong decreased. Despite this reorientation, a self-confidence 
prevailed within the service that 'British material and superior training would produce 
decisive results against Japan'67. This outlook was influenced by imperial ideological 
undertones, in particular the perceived racial superiority of the British at the prospect 
of fighting an Asian adversary, further reinforced by the latent hegemony in their old 
teacher-student relationship, quite literally the case for Japanese officers who 
attended the Britannia Royal Naval College.
The financial climate of the interwar years inevitably took its toll on the Navy. 
The war had reversed the 1914 balance of service accounts, where the Navy had 
enjoyed a better than two to one budgetary superiority over the army68. As chart 1
65 CID definition of 1925, quoted in memorandum by the CNS on the situation prior to the 1935 Naval 
Conference, ADM 116/2999, quoted in Haggie, Britannia At Bay, p.7.
66 Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, p.11.
67 Idem.
68 Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922  (London, 
1976), p. 109.
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demonstrates, the percentage of national expenditure devoted to the Navy had 
dropped dramatically:
Chart 1. Naval Expenditure as a percentage of total national expenditure, 1914- 
1922
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics o f the United States, 
cited in Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 
1914-1922 (London, 1976), p.162.
As the economic situation in Britain worsened, the Royal Navy was exposed to 
additional cuts, most notably to wages. A committee in 1923 concluded that naval 
pay was too high relative to other workers and in 1925 an Admiralty Fleet Order 
established a lower rate of pay for men joining after 5 October of that year. Following 
the 1929 Wall Street Crash and with the country already in a grave financial state, 
another committee, chaired by Sir George May, decided that further cuts in naval pay 
were necessary and that no earlier guarantees regarding the higher rate of pay had 
been made. Despite the First Sea Lord's protests, the Royal Navy had little choice 
but to accept the May Committee's recommendations.69 This led to the Invergordon 
Mutiny, which shook the Navy in September 1931. Just when the reliability of the
69 Field, p.13.
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existing men was called into question, it had been reported in April of that year that 
numbers were so reduced that 16,000 reservists would be needed to fully man the 
fleet; normally the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships were each 140 seamen short of 
complement, and consequently only able to man half the six-inch secondary 
armament.70 Yet, the predominance of the battleship remained central to the 
Admiralty's strategic doctrine of the 1930s:
In maintaining a balanced battle fleet and focusing on an extreme case, 
war with Japan, the Admiralty was attempting to maintain a fleet capable 
of a world-wide deployment, and concentrating on a battle fleet, with the 
battleship at its core, supported by aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers 
and submarines.71
This 'big battleship mindset' and its overwhelming focus on maintaining a roaming 
battle fleet, meant that auxiliary areas of fleet operations were comparatively 
neglected, such as anti-submarine warfare, minesweeping and local defence. At the 
same time, though maintaining the security of maritime routes, and the refuelling 
stations and safe harbours along them would be vital to this roving strategy 
envisaged, they were relegated to secondary importance. Decreased investment 
and an ageing fleet prompted the 1931 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual to 
paint a bleak assessment of the state of Britain's naval defence:
The close of 1930 found the Royal Navy in a condition not altogether 
satisfactory to those who believe that the Fleet is still the main bulwark of our
70 Haggie, p.9.
71 Field, p.14.
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security. Less money is spent on it; there are fewer ships in hand;
replacements are not being provided for as they become due.72
This sentiment was echoed in an appreciation prepared for a three-party Committee 
on Disarmament in April 1931. It stated that Britain had carried out more 
disarmament than any other nation, while her activity in modernising capital ships 
and coast defences, and in maintaining essential auxiliary services had been the 
least, 'thus both absolutely and relatively the strength of the Royal Navy had 
declined'73. By 1933 British naval spending was well below the record low set in 
1924 at just 6 per cent of Government expenditure74.
The response was the Admiralty's decision to devolve some of the Royal 
Navy's responsibilities in the colonies to local volunteer reserve units. The relatively 
lower colonial wages they could offer there, subsidised by local financial contributions, 
presented a potential solution to these deficits of strategy, finance and manpower. A 
new Colonial Naval Defence Act was passed in 1931 which legislated for this 
potentiality, replacing its 1865 predecessor which had covered the Dominions before 
being superseded by the 1911 Dominion Naval Forces Act. This in itself was an 
acknowledgement of the lesser priority that had been given previously to colonial 
naval defence in the Empire and admittance that the Royal Navy was no longer able 
to meet all of its responsibilities. The frustrated experience of trying to encourage the 
Dominions to contribute financially to the Navy's upkeep had taught the Admiralty 
that 'there is no intention of plunging into the old controversy of direct money
72 Commander C. Robinson, RN, and H.M. Ross (eds.), Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1931 
(London, 1931).
3 Quoted in Haggie, p.9.
74 Field, p.43.
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contributions versus local defence forces'75. It was reaffirmed at the Overseas 
Defence Committee meeting of 23 May 1927 by Captain Egerton, RN, that the best 
way in which British Colonies could co-operate in the naval defence of the Empire... 
was by the organisation of local minesweeping forces, manned by local branches of 
the Royal Naval Reserve or Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve':
From the naval point for view the most important aspect of this question 
was the organisation of local minesweeping services to ensure that 
sporadic minelaying would not bring the overseas trade of the Colonies to 
a standstill, and thereby dislocate the steady flow of shipping in which the 
empire depended for its very existence.76
It was admitted that the Royal Navy could no longer guarantee the defence of 
colonial trade itself, and 'no reliance could be placed on naval minesweeping vessels 
being available for this work'. This was because minesweeping was typically carried 
out by small, slower vessels which would take too long to travel, and 'would be 
required elsewhere... for keeping the approaches to the Fleet anchorages clear and 
for safeguarding the approaches to the home ports'77. Thus again, despite the threat 
of Japan, colonial naval defence was given a lower priority to that of Britain.
This came at a worrying time, as Japan began to demonstrate its aggressive 
ambitions in China. First, it invaded Manchuria in September 1931 under the pretext 
of the Mukden incident, establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo in February 1932. 
More significantly for Britain was the short war between Japanese and Chinese 
nationalist armies in Shanghai between January and March 1932 which directly
75 TNA, CAB 21/187, 'Contributions by Colonies towards cost of Naval Defence', p.2.
76 TNA, CAB 21/187, 'Extract from 278th Minutes of the O.D.C. 23.5.27', p.1.
77 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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threatened British interests, not only in China, but potentially the rest of the Empire 
too as officials viewed it as a potential precursor to imperial disintegration:
If Japan continues unchecked the British will have to retire altogether from 
the Far East. If it is decided that we must check Japan certain preliminary 
measures could be adopted - such as rupture of diplomatic and economic 
relations - but in the end Japan can only be checked by force. Ultimately 
we will be faced with the alternatives of going to war with Japan or retiring 
from the Far East. A retirement from the Far East might be the prelude to a 
retirement from India.78
The Manchurian and Shanghai crises convinced Britain of its unpreparedness for war 
in East and Southeast Asia, and in a review of military expenditure in September 
1933, short-term priority was given to augmenting the defence of possessions and 
interests there79.
It was short-term because from the early 1930s there had been a shift in 
strategic thinking back towards Europe as threats other than Japan began to 
emerge closer to 'home'. In 1930, France and Italy refused to limit their fleets, with 
the resultant naval rivalry potentially compromising Britain's dominance in the 
Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the 1933 Defence Requirements Committee identified 
Germany as the ultimate potential enemy80. At the London Naval Conference of 
1935-36, there was an acknowledgement that the Royal Navy did not possess the
78 Documents on British Foreign Policy, ser.2, vol.lX, no.238, note by Sir J. Pratt, 1 February 1932, 
quoted in Ian Nish, 'Japan in Britain's View of the International System, 1919-37', in Ian Nish (ed.), 
Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of 
the Second World W ar (Cambridge, 1982), pp.43-4.
79 Ian Nish, 'Japan in Britain's View of the International System, 1919-37', in Nish (ed.), Anglo- 
Japanese Alienation, pp.43-4.
80 Field, p.43, p.99.
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strength to adequately protect all corners of the British Empire. A prioritisation of 
Home defence meant the naval defence of its colonies, particularly in the Pacific 
Rim, was correspondingly neglected:
A Power with world-wide responsibilities needed adequate defence in 
every area. Its forces could not be concentrated in one part of the world, 
for that would mean denuding its home waters of naval defence.81
The reality of naval overstretch hit home uncomfortably during the Abyssinian Crisis 
of 1935. The 'pusillanimous attitude' of the British Government and the Navy towards 
imposing sanctions on Italy was influenced by a fear that Japan would take 
advantage of the situation should Britain become embroiled in a conflict in the 
Mediterranean. The Naval Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1937 realised 
the 'impossibility' of waging a war against Japan at the same time that most of the 
fleet would be required for duty in European waters. Britain simply did not have 
enough ships to act as the world's policeman:
We cannot foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong 
enough to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests against 
Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously.82
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield reaffirmed this bleak forecast and its implications 
for the wider Empire, the interests of which were consequently subordinated to those 
of the metropole:
81 Lord Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1936, cited in Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New  
Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941 (Oxford, 
1981), p.11.
82 The Chiefs of Staff, 12 November 1937, quoted in Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, p.26.
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Imperially we are exceedingly weak. If at the present time, and for many 
years to come, we had to send a Fleet to the Far East, even in conjunction 
with the United States, we should be left so weak in Europe that we should 
be liable to blackmail or worse.83
This pressure forced Britain to review previous policies which disbarred 
colonial manpower from naval service. Naval Volunteer Forces had already been 
successfully formed, largely on local impetus, in Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, 
Gold Coast and Ceylon. In June 1938 the Overseas Defence Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence prepared a report emphasising that 'every single 
Dependency... from the smallest and least well-endowed to the largest and most 
wealthy, has its own part to play in Imperial Defence'. It admitted that 'at the present 
time the forces of which the United Kingdom Government disposes are barely 
sufficient to meet the numerous threats which confront the Empire in all quarters of 
the world'. By providing for their own local security, the colonies would reduce the 
demands upon the Royal Navy and thus contribute to the Empire's security as a 
whole:
At every defended port local naval forces have to be maintained for 
minesweeping and other local defence duties. For these purposes Naval 
Volunteer Reserve units are particularly valuable, since they enable a 
corresponding economy to be made in regular naval personnel, who can
83 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield to Sir Thomas Inskip (Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence), 
28 January 1938, quoted in ibid., p.26.
36
be more profitably employed in other duties requiring a higher standard of 
technical training.84
Table 2. Colonial Naval Force Complements
Colonial Naval Year Strength Greatest Known
Force Formed Mobilised in 1939 Strength 1942-1943
Officers Men Officers Men
Hong Kong RNVR 1933 ? ? 167 600
Straits Settlements/ 1934/1938 158 650 158 650
Malayan RNVR
Ceylon RNVR 1934 22 142 61 1127
Gold Coast NDF 1936 17 53 15 40
Gambia NVF 1938 8 32 5 63
Zanzibar NDF 1938 6 52 N/A N/A
Trinidad RNVR 1939 20 110 70 1131
Nigeria NDF 1939 N/A N/A 55 600
Sierra Leone NVF 1939 N/A N/A 8 40
Kenya RNVR 1939 7 102 45 724
Tanganyika NVF 1939 11 154 15 160
Fiji RNVR 1939 4 26 30 476
RN (Malay Section) 1939 N/A 400 N/A 1450
Burma RNVR 1940 N/A N/A ? ?
Mauritius CDS 1941 N/A N/A ? ?
Total 253 1721 629 7061
Source: TNA, CO 968/145/1, 'Colonial Naval Forces', 1944-1945 and TLDM (Royal Malaysian Navy) 
Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009.
By the end of 1938, Gambia and Zanzibar had formed their own Naval Volunteer 
Forces85, along with a Malayan RNVR unit based at Penang. These were joined by 
Trinidad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Fiji in 1939, Burma in 1940 
and Mauritius in 1941. A full-time Royal Navy (Malay Section) was also formed at the 
start of the Second World War, specifically to provide Malay seamen for Royal Navy
84 Item 340: Memorandum 'The Co-operation of the Colonial Empire in Imperial Defence', signed by V. 
Sykes, Secretary, Overseas Defence Committee, 8 June 1938, in Tracy (ed.), The Collective Naval 
Defence of the Empire , pp.587-593.
85 The nomenclature varies between these naval volunteer units: Naval Volunteer Force, Naval 
Defence Force, Coast Defence Squadron. Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve status is granted once the 
force is offered to the Admiralty for general service by the colony's Governor.
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vessels on deployment to the East, thus relieving RN regulars for duty in the active 
European theatre. Cumulatively, these forces provided around eight thousand men 
for service during the Second World War.
Map 1. Location of Colonial Naval Forces
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Britain's preoccupation with its relatively weak East Asian position was not 
solely dictated by strategic concerns for the protection of its colonies and Dominions 
in the region. The political and economic situation in China featured prominently in 
British thinking, the safeguarding of her investments there and in particular 'the myth 
of the China market':
Again and again the China market was referred to as a place on which the
future development of British trade and employment would depend... if
British companies were forced to pull out of China, as they threatened to
do unless the British Government backed them up, the carry-over effect on
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India and the rest of the Empire would be incalculable. Britain's prestige 
had to be maintained, for it was on this national asset that possibilities for 
profitable trade and financial gain depended.86
Naval power was the physical manifestation of British prestige, and its seeming 
absence from Britain's further-flung colonies not only fostered concerns regarding 
their external security, but also the internal political integrity of the Empire, as well as 
its leverage over non-sovereign countries that it perceived to be within its sphere of 
influence. To attempt to placate Japan by giving it concessions in China would not 
only run the risk of antagonising the United States, it would also allow them to 
swallow up British interests there. Though this would not have been economically 
shattering to Britain, it would undermine Britain's great power status. Once Japan 
refused to cooperate on naval limitation, 'there was no quid pro quo which could be 
obtained from her which could compensate for a revelation that Britain could not 
police her interests or carry out her imperial role in the far eastern and Pacific areas'. 
Thus, the Foreign Office was not prepared, 'to recommend that a step involving such 
risks to Britain's image as an imperial power should be taken'87.
Yet, not taking action was already achieving just that, and as Ian Nish has 
argued, Britain 'to a degree lived on illusion. She was conscious of being over­
extended and felt vulnerable in the face of actions from restless powers'88. During the 
Tientsin crisis of June 1939, British prestige had diminished to the point where Japan 
publically demanded that Britain renounce her support of the Chinese nationalists. 
This led Lord Chatfield to comment that Japan, 'trading on our relatively weak naval
86 Stephen Lyon Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937  (Manchester, 
1975), p. 184.
87 Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937 {Cambridge, 1975), pp.213-14.
88 Nish, 'Japan in Britain's View of the International System, 1919-37', p.53.
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position, was insulting British nationals in Tientsin, in a manner that would have made 
a Georgian or Victorian statesman issue violent ultimatums'89. The European 
situation had become too unstable to consider sending a naval fleet to East Asia.
This chapter has outlined the geopolitical context of the interwar period and 
the key issues of imperial defence from which colonial naval volunteer forces 
emerged by the start of the Second World War. Though the time and nature of 
'imperial overstretch' has been heavily debated by historians, the interwar years was 
certainly a period of relative decline for the Royal Navy. The First World War had 
galvanised aspiring naval rivals, while leaving Britain politically and financially 
antagonistic to pursuing a new policy of navalism. The Washington Naval Treaty 
prevented another arms race and meant the Royal Navy was not eclipsed, but left it 
relatively weaker in that its strength was now only equal to the next largest navy, that 
being of the United States, compared to its former two-power standard. It also forced 
the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, meaning Britain now had to look to 
defend its interests there which had previously been secured by the treaty. Thus 
decreased security was multiplied by broader responsibilities plus an increased threat 
in that region. When Japan began asserting itself more aggressively in Asia in the 
1930s, it coincided with a more bellicose Italy and a resurgent Germany, thus Britain 
went from having one major naval threat to consider to three. In this scenario, Europe 
and the Mediterranean were always going to take priority over East Asia and other 
imperial peripheries. By the end of the 1930s there was admission that the Royal 
Navy was no longer able to guarantee the security of the whole Empire, and
89 Quoted in Marder, p.35.
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prompted the colonies to contribute more to their own local defence, both in terms of 
finance and manpower.
British imperial security relied on psychological as well as physical fortification, 
however. It has been argued that the British Empire was able to sustain itself by 
perpetuating 'the convenient belief held by non-British people that armed forces could 
be summoned up at will for immediate deployment in any part of the world'90. 
Prestige thus acted as a substitute for actual naval and military strength:
Few people appreciated the yawning gap between defence theory on the 
one hand, and actual power on the other. Although this gap had been 
widening since the late nineteenth century, the illusion of Pax Britannica 
and the grey guardians roaming the sea lanes of the world was still etched 
on the British national consciousness, and on that of its Empire.91
When analysing the development of colonial naval volunteer forces, one must 
therefore not view them merely as a strategic response to problems of local and 
imperial defence, but also consider the ideological role they played in fortifying British 
'prestige' and authority in the wider Empire, particularly as they came under the dual 
pressures of nationalism and war.
The following case studies will analyse colonial responses in more detail, and 
assess the degree to which they strengthened the imperial system, both in terms of 
naval defence and reinforcing British hegemony, or whether imperial racial 
stereotyping and discrimination that had inhibited the devolution of such
90 Ged Martin, 'Was there a British Empire?', Historical Journal, Vol.15 (1972), pp.562-69, cited in 
Keith Jeffrey, 'The Second World War', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Volume IV  The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), p.306.
91 Jackson, p.15.
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responsibilities to the non-white colonies in less-stretched times, in fact contributed to 
the post-war break-up of the Empire.
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Case Study One: The Caribbean
Introduction
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, for most of the interwar period, 
the main threat envisaged to the British Empire came from Japan, reflected in the 
early priority given to colonial naval defence in East and Southeast Asia. Yet, 
imperial overstretch by its nature meant that Empire defence could not be focused 
on any one region against any singular enemy. It presented, in essence, a domino 
effect. The Royal Navy's revised 'one-power standard' following the Washington 
Treaty meant that should war break out against a major power, virtually its entire 
regular fleet would have to be mobilised to meet that threat. This would leave other 
areas of the Empire unguarded and potential prey to an opportunistic aggressor.
On the other side of the world to Asia lay Britain's Caribbean colonies, a 
legacy of its earliest imperial ventures, yet an increasingly costly one, as its relative 
economic value declined with market demand for its traditional cash crops, 
exacerbated by the Great Depression. Poverty, unemployment and crime fuelled 
nationalist agitation during the 1930s, raising internal defence costs further. Yet 
within this classic example of imperial overstretch, with its diverging cost-benefits, lay 
one significant strategic and economic virtue. It included the only oil-producing 
territory in the formal Empire, and Britain's main source in the Western hemisphere: 
the island of Trinidad. Since the First World War, the Royal Navy had largely moved 
from coal-powered, steam-drive ships to oil-fired ones, thus the fate of Trinidad was 
in its service interest. The rise of Fascist Germany and Italy during the 1930s
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presented the prospect of fighting a two-hemisphere war with a one-power navy, 
stretching the Navy's resources to the limit and posing a threat in the Atlantic too. 
The potentiality of war in the Pacific thus indirectly impacted upon the local defence 
of Britain's Caribbean colonies, and the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
(TRNVR) was formed to relieve some of the operational shortfall. In addition to its 
strategic value, which as this case study will show was variable, the TRNVR also 
had a political purpose, as a bulwark for British imperial prestige in the region. In this 
regard, Britain's opponent was not so much Germany, but colonial nationalism, and 
its wartime 'ally' the United States. Thus the Caribbean offers an important case 
study for analysing British responses to its declining imperial influence before 
decolonisation.
Beginning by contextualising the force's origins, this section of the thesis will 
explore the key imperial concerns of oil and nationalism in Trinidad, tensions of 
imperial versus local defence, and the issues raised by early service life, recruitment, 
and expansion. Part one will provide a point of ethnic comparison by examining the 
experience of the Cayman Islanders who volunteered to serve in the cosmopolitan 
West Indian TRNVR. It will explore the ideological motivations for both those 
volunteering to serve, and the naval recruiters selecting them; the impact of colonial 
prejudice and cross-cultural interactions; the causes and effects of service discontent 
and protest; and the role of identity and historical memory in cultivating imperial and 
service loyalty. Part two will analyse Trinidad itself: the American 'invasion' of the 
island following the 1940 Destroyers for Bases Agreement; the significance of 
Calypso warriorhood and masculinity in naval volunteering and culture; the influence 
of wartime propaganda on reinforcing imperial hierarchies; and debates regarding
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the post-war role of the naval force, centring on issues of professionalism, prestige 
and prejudice.
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Origins
A detachment of petty officers and seamen from Trinidad, Jamaica and 
Barbados had served in the Royal Navy during the First World War92, yet it was not 
until 1939 that serious discussion took place regarding the utilisation of local 
manpower in an indigenous naval unit. Trinidad's geographical position made it 
accessible to favourable ocean currents into the western Atlantic. If the island fell 
into enemy hands, primarily Germany, the deployment of U-boats would pose a 
significant menace to British shipping by opening up a second front in an Atlantic war. 
The Admiralty's primary concern, however, was clear: 'there is no doubt that in war 
the safeguarding of oil supplies from Trinidad is one of the greatest importance... 
and that this is essentially an Imperial interest'93. In 1938 Trinidad was the largest 
producer of oil within the British Empire, contributing 38 per cent of its consumption94. 
Furthermore, that year, the Committee of Imperial Defence, on the recommendation 
of the Oil Board, had ranked the colony higher in strategic importance than Rangoon 
in Burma and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf as a source of oil for Britain, largely due to 
its geographical location to the west of the Suez/Mediterranean route95.
Any German occupation of Trinidad would also potentially open up the vast oil 
fields of Venezuela. Furthermore, at Pitch Lake, Trinidad possessed the world's 
largest deposit of Asphalt in the world, and the island's location also made it
92 H.C. Ferraby, The Imperial British Navy: How the colonies began to think imperially about the future 
of the navy (London 1918), p.95.
93TNA, ADM 1/10969, Minute Sheet No. 1, M.05222/39.
94 Vernon C. Mulchansingh, T h e  Oil Industry in the Economy of Trinidad', Caribbean Studies, Vol. 11, 
No. 1 (April, 1971), pp.73-100, p.73.
95 Cited in Fitzroy A. Baptiste, 'The European possessions in the Caribbean in World W ar II: 
dimensions of great power co-operation and conflict', Ph.D. thesis (University of the West Indies 
(UWI), Trinidad and Tobago, 1981), p.21.
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strategically central to the protection of important bauxite shipping from British 
Guiana, a key component in radio and aircraft production.
Pressure for stronger defences was also being exerted from business 
interests on the island. Yet, it was the internal threat posed by members of the 
island's black community which concerned them more than any potential German 
threat at this time. Through the 1930s Trinidadian nationalism had been on the rise, 
evincing itself in labour protest, and culminating in the bloody Butler riots of June 
1937. In a meeting held at the Colonial Office on Monday 8 May 1939, Mr Ashley 
Cooper, Chairman of Trinidad Leaseholds Limited, raised the issue of labour 
agitation on the island. Construction of an iso-octane plant meant that a 
'considerable amount' of labour would have to be imported from other areas of 
Trinidad and potentially from outside the island to meet the needs. In Cooper's 
opinion, this situation held 'explosive elements' that 'would 'provide a good 
opportunity for agitators to raise trouble'96. His opinions followed several incidents of 
trouble which had taken place over the preceding months, namely two cases of 
sabotage of the tanks at the Kern Oilfields, as well as three strikes at Guayaguayare, 
two at Apex, and one at the Pitch Lake. In addition to local economic causes there 
were a number of known agitators97. An expensive consequence of this was that 
'insurance with Lloyds involved higher premiums for Trinidad than in most other parts 
of the world'98. Cooper proposed that 'the situation would never get out of hand if half 
a Company of white troops were permanently stationed there'99. He believed that 
using black or 'coloured' troops would merely stoke the political fires inflamed by the
96TNA, ADM 1/10969, 'Defence of Trinidad Oil Refineries, Note of a Meeting held at the Colonial 
Office on Monday, 8th May', pp.2-3.
97 Ibid., pp.3-4.
black labour movement. Though the Governor of Trinidad, Sir Hubert Young, refused 
to be drawn on admitting there was a unique problem on the island, he did 
acknowledge that 'it might be a good plan to have a local unit stationed near the 
oilfields', as 'the danger of internal trouble would be increased if external attack came, 
and this raised the general question of the defence of Trinidad'100. It was suggested 
that HMS Terror, an Erebus-class monitor which at that time was serving as guard- 
ship at Singapore, might be dispatched for this purpose. Yet this idea was dismissed 
by the Admiralty, as unpractical as it would be vulnerable anchored as a floating 
battery off Trinidad, requiring a 'considerable' amount of anti-submarine protection 
for itself, and would only be able to protect one of the two existing refineries101. The 
issue of the island's naval defence had now been pressed to the forefront, however, 
and in early July 1939 HMS Ajax was dispatched to Trinidad to prepare a report into 
establishing a locally-raised naval force on the island. As soon as war broke out it 
became 'essential that the force should come into being without delay'102, and it was 
inaugurated in October 1939.
Very early on in the life of the new Trinidad Naval Volunteer Force (TNVF), a 
Naval Volunteer Ordinance was submitted by the Governor of Trinidad on 22 July 
1940 to amend the original 1939 version. This allowed, in summary103:
• The colony to maintain and use 'vessels of war'.
• The Governor may offer to place said vessels at His Majesty's disposal 
for general service in the Royal Navy and vessel so maintained.
1U1 Ibid., pp.5-6.
102 TNA, ADM 1/10969, Para. 3, M.08060/39.
103 TNA, ADM 1/10969, 'Naval Volunteer and Defence Ordinance, 1940', p.3.
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• Officers and men of the Force were liable to service and training outside 
the territorial limits of the colony.
• Royal Navy regulations for the enforcement of discipline to apply to the 
Force.
• Officers and men may be entered into general service with the Royal 
Navy in emergency.
To understand the legal and strategic nature of these colonial naval forces 
being studied, the meaning of 'vessels of war' needs clarification here. Within the 
1931 Colonial Naval Act, to which all subsequent colonial naval ordinances were 
subject, a naval volunteer force raised in a colony was limited to its 'territorial waters' 
unless a provision is made to place said force at 'His Majesty's disposal', at which 
point such vessels could theoretically be deployed anywhere on the globe. Within 
British naval doctrine, only then could a ship be considered a 'vessel of war', as naval 
warfare was dictated by engaging enemy ships on the high seas before they posed a 
threat to the shore; a ship sitting outside a port was merely an extra stationary 
battery104. It is this philosophy which traditionally distinguished 'imperial defence' from 
'local defence'105. There was also a political dimension to this debate, however. If a 
colony was able to deploy its own naval forces to areas outside of its territorial waters 
independently of the Admiralty, it would expose Britain to liability for that force's 
autonomous actions:
104 TNA, ADM 116/2396, Items 47-8.
105 Such debates also featured in debates regarding Australian naval defence surrounding the 1887 
Colonial Conference. See Daniel Owen Spence, 'Australian Naval Defence and the 1887 Colonial 
Conference: Context, Policy and Reaction', International Journal of Naval History, Vol.6, No.1 (April 
2007), www.ijnhonline.org.
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Upon the High Seas, in reference to other States and the Governments of 
other countries, it would be impossible for the Imperial Government to 
divest itself of the responsibility which might be incurred by the acts of 
Colonial officers106
Such actions could potentially contravene international maritime law, with these 
'naval militia' potentially being branded as privateers, with captures "liable to be 
condemned as prizes"107. Moreover, if a colony was able to project naval force 
independently outside its territorial waters, it would provide that colony with a means 
of exerting an independent foreign policy, and thus consequently diminish its political 
reliance on Britain, thereby potentially strengthening the case advanced by colonial 
nationalists.
By including a provision for the Governor to place the TNVF at 'His Majesty's 
disposal' and thus make its ships and men liable for service globally in the Royal 
Navy, the force became the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (TRNVR) in 
January 1941. Despite this provision being offered immediately by the Governor, 
however, the Admiralty initially refused to take control of the TRNVR because of the 
corresponding shift in administrative responsibility108, which negatively affected force 
morale and caused 'extreme disappointment' amongst some its members109. 
Wrangling between the Governor and the Admiralty over force expenditure was a key 
factor and inhibited the TRNVR's urgent need for expansion to meet its growing 
wartime commitments. This led the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies in
106 TNA, ADM 116/2396, 'Extract from Colonial Office letter to Admiralty of 1st October, 1860', Item 48.
107 Ibid.
108 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Admiralty's communication no. 1617/14/12/40, 15 December 1940, to C-in-C 
America and West Indies.
109 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Captain in Charge Trinidad's communication no. 14/185/3001, 19 November 
1940, to C-in-C America and West Indies, p.4.
50
December 1940 to comment that the 'local Government has lost interest in [the] force 
and regards it as an incubus', causing a 'depressing effect on prestige and esprit de 
corps'110. Furthermore, the fact that the 'TNVF being part of locally raised forces is 
technically under Administration of officer l/C [in command] local forces who is an 
army officer', was an association 'undesirable in view of increasing importance of 
naval service in Trinidad', and compounded by traditional inter-service rivalry, led to 
'administrative delays and disputes as to liability for certain expenditures'111. As a 
consequence of this, the Admiralty decided to finally accept the offer to place the 
TRNVR at its disposal.
The TNVF was placed under the command of Lieutenant Commander D. St. G. 
Lindsay of the Royal Canadian Navy, who appropriately had a background in 
minesweeping having formerly been Commanding Officer (CO) of the minesweeping 
trawler HMCS Festubert. The force possessed an initial complement of 15 officers 
and 110 ratings. Despite there being no formal recruiting campaign at the outset, 'five 
times more men than needed volunteered from all parts of the colony'112. Its early 
officers were selected primarily from white, rural police officers, colonial authority 
figures with experience of commanding black subordinates and preserving internal 
order and discipline, but with little seagoing experience113, and of 'average ability'.114 
The ratings were mainly made up from the island's black and East Indian 
communities. As Trinidadians were seen as lacking in British notions of natural 'sea-
110 TNA, ADM 1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies' communication no. 1204/19/12/40 to 
Admiralty, 19 December 1940.
111 Idem.
112 The Trinidad Guardian, 22 December 1939, p.1.
113 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'A Short Story of the Trinidad Royal Naval Reserve', p.1.
114 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Future of the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve', From The Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, To The Senior British Naval Officer, Western Atlantic, 17 July 1944, p.3.
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mindedness', the Royal Navy sent a couple of retired Chief Petty Officers, Merry, a 
Gunners Mate, and Cowley, a Torpedo Gunners Mate, in order to instruct the force 
technically and 'breathe naval atmosphere over it', in the process 'earning the 
affection of all'115. Still, the force in its early days was stretched, under-strength both 
in terms of men and equipment. The 'fleet' was initially made up of four motor 
launches running 'practically continuously', the Lady Hollis, Berwind, Bin, and Lobillia, 
the last of which caused much 'excitement' amongst the men due to her 'predilection 
for catching fire'116. These limited resources prevented the force from engaging a 
potential enemy directly, and so alternative tactics had to be employed, leading to 
other launches including three speedboats being fitted with smoke dispensers so as 
to fill the Bocas del Dragon (Dragon's Mouth) with smoke should a raider approach. 
They also offered little spare time for the instruction of the men117.
Despite the publicised rush of volunteers, likely driven by economic hardships 
and perhaps exaggerated to stimulate wartime recruitment and create a sense of 
imperial unity, the TNVF initially lacked prestige locally, its members being branded 
ignominiously as 'Venezuelan Admirals', and 'Customs clerks'118. It was not easy to 
establish the force's authority. For example, when on patrol, Lady Hollis signalled for 
another ship to stop. She slowed down sufficiently for Lady Hollis to come up with her 
but did not stop, leading an indignant Lieutenant Commander Blakeney to hail "stop, 
or I will put one up your stern". This prompted the dismissive reply, "do not make so 
much noise or you will wake the passengers and if you get impudent I will drop a
115 'A Short Story of the Trinidad Royal Naval Reserve’, p.2.
116 Ibid., p.2.
117 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Senior Naval Officer Trinidad's communication no. 14/185/756, 3 August 1940, 
to Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies.
118 Ibid., p.3.
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barrel of cement on you and sink you"119. The TNVF may not have met the 
professional standards of the Royal Navy. Official radio communications would be 
interrupted by unauthorised expletives such as "get off my foot you land lubber... 
sorry for this clumsy apology for a sailor". Accommodation was poor, and cooking 
had to be done outside under the palm trees, a task made difficult during the wet 
season. The service lacked much in terms of equipment, including any signal rockets, 
and so a local 'expert' was called in and a trial of his wares was arranged on the 
beach under Commander Lindsay's supervision, but instead of going skywards 
'Lindsay had to run for his life as the rocket chased him along the beach'120. In 1940 a 
signal station was built on Chacachacare Island, and to keep the station supplied two 
donkeys were bought and named 'Ajax' and 'Dundee' after the Royal Navy ships of 
those names. As the station was a Royal Naval one and not TNVF, Ajax and Dundee 
became the first Able Seaman, RN, on the books in Trinidad. When on 18 May 1940 
Italy suffered her first ship casualty of the war by the sinking in Trinidad of the 
freighter Alrinira Lights, it was ironically attributed to the fact that 'when this ship saw 
the formidable TNVF fleet she promptly scuttled herself!'121 Though such stories 
demonstrate the good humour of the force, at least in its early days, their self- 
deprecation emphasises its amateurish nature, displaying a general lack of respect 
towards the naval service and the professional standards expected of it by the 
Admiralty, which would later undermine group cohesion and discipline.
The local youth organisations were targeted as a source of ready-made 
recruits, and specifically 'the signaller squad was drawn from senior members of the 
Boy Scouts, keen young Trinidadians who learned Morse and semaphore without
thinking that their proficiency would become a vital link in the Colony's defence 
chain'122. Among these scouts was the future celebrated Caribbean literary figure 
Sam Selvon.
Selvon left school in 1939 at 16, with his sole qualification, he said, being his 
Boy Scout first aid knowledge. He initially worked in a garage, then in the Trinidad oil 
fields as a safety inspector, before volunteering for the TRNVR. Selvon admits that 'I 
don't think we had any idea of serving our country or defending our home island, no 
thought of fighting for humanity. To tell the truth our interest in the war was only 
casual and only the adventurous urge of youth led us to volunteer'123. Despite British 
reservations regarding Trinidadian 'seamindedness', the strongest pull factor for 
Selvon was the 'call of the sea', which he and his friend 'B' already exercised through 
the sea scouts:
May 1940 found me restless and eager to go to sea I used to talk of ships 
all day, and never a schooner or steamer or tanker pulled in at the jetty 
without our knowing it... In San Fernando, where we lived, every spare 
hour was spent on the sea, and our parents were often scared to death 
when we were becalmed for hours in the Gulf and nightfall found us still at 
sea. Any mention of work on a ship was drowned with protests, and we 
decided we had to work out some scheme if our lust for sea life was to be 
satisfied.124
122 Trinidad Guardian, 5 November 1939, p.2.
123 Sam Selvon, 'We Join the Navy', Guardian Weekly, 14 December 1946, Item 549, Sam Selvon 
Collection, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago.
124 Idem.
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They were initially turned away at Port of Spain, despite the fact that 'we even 
pleaded in vain - even got patriotic'. If patriotism was merely deployed as a last-gasp 
tactic to curry favour, personal status was an important motive for volunteering. 
Selvon adds that 'in the town, naval ratings looked especially smart in their khaki 
uniforms and peaked hats', which appealed. It also represented camaraderie and an 
exclusive group that Selvon wanted membership of, reinforced by 'sailors who looked 
indifferently to us, and laughed and joked among themselves. How we envied 
them!'125 Having received a tip-off to try the TRNVR HQ at Staubles Bay, they were 
told that only option was to join the Communications Division as there was no need 
for additional seamen. Selvon went on to serve as a wireless operator on 
minesweepers and Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) until the end of the war, which was 
where he acquired one of his pen-names, 'Ack-Ack', being a code signal to identify 
an unknown ship.126 His period in the Navy proved to be a formative one for his future 
literary career. Since he used his time during the long watches to write poetry and 
short stories127, winning several prizes, and leading the Editor of the "Naval Bulletin" 
to commend 'his style and ability as a coming journalist'128.
Trinidad's growing importance in the war as a convoy port led to the 
appointment of a Flag Officer in Charge, with Rear Admiral Hodges hoisting his flag 
in HMS Benbow. Under his leadership expansion plans continued apace, four more 
anti-submarine and patrol vessels, 24 officers and 195 additional ratings were 
acquired for the force. Because of the TRNVR's existing heavy commitments it was
126 Sam Selvon, Foreday Morning: Selected Prose 1946-1986  (Essex, 1989), p.vii.
127 'Biographical Sketch', Marilyn Geofroy, A guide to the Samuel Selvon Collection: Manuscripts, 
Short Stories and Plays, p.4, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago.
128 Reference from Communications Officer, HMS Benbow, 21 September 1945, Box 7, Folder 627, 
Sam Selvon Collection, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago.
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decided by the Royal Navy to preclude their withdrawal clause for service elsewhere, 
retaining them in 'local waters' except for an emergency129. More implicit in this 
decision however is the influence of racial thinking. It was raised by the Captain-in- 
Charge at Port of Spain that as the force was composed of 'white, coloured and black 
personnel', 'it would be difficult to discriminate in the selection of white personnel only, 
for service overseas, without causing considerable discontent'. The solution 
suggested was for the coloured and black ratings to be sent to 'tropical climates only', 
and only with 'forces already employing such persons'. The paradox of this 'non- 
discriminatory' alternative appears to have gone unnoticed. It was further considered 
that 'if ratings have to qualify in accordance with naval standards, that the standard of 
intellect will debar practically all coloured and black ratings from general service in 
the Royal Navy'130. Their unsuitability for general service was blamed on their 
perceived innate racial deficiencies rather than on the inadequate training provided 
them, a defect which would have recognised British culpability, undermining the 
rulers' racial and moral authority.
Force expansion came at the same time as Trinidadians were drawn to higher 
paid construction work on the new American bases established there following the 
1940 Destroyers-for-Bases agreement 131 , indicating how financial motives 
predominated within this group. This fostered a perception that 'most Trinidadians do 
not like the sea'132, despite the presence of individuals such as Selvon, and 
demonstrating how 'seafaring race' theory could arise in response to external
129 TNA, ADM 1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies' communication no. 191/1025, 4 March 1941, 
to Admiralty.
130 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Captain in Charge Port of Spain's report no. 27/2359/3665, 12 February 1941, 
to the C-in-C American and West Indies' station, pp.2-3.
131 TNA, CO 537/1891, Item 28, 'Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve', 1946, p.2.
132 Norman Rudolph McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy (Miami, 2002), prelude.
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political and economic factors. Recruitment was consequently expanded to 
encompass Britain’s other West Indian colonies. Guyanese volunteers started to 
arrive from July 1941, preference being given to men with knowledge of engineering 
and previous experience aboard ships133. In June 1942, 80 men were brought from 
Barbados for training, a contribution which eventually grew to 349, giving it the 
second largest representation in the force after Trinidad. Additional contingents 
arrived from ten of Britain's other West Indian colonies, growing the TRNVR to 75 
officers and 1,215 men by the end of the war, and making it a truly cosmopolitan 
West Indian force134:
Table 3. TRNVR ratings per West Indian colony, April-June 1945
Colony Complement
Trinidad 501
Tobago 39
Barbados 349
British Guiana 53
Grenada 56
St. Vincent 36
Antigua 13
Montserrat 1
St. Kitts 3
Caymans 124
St. Lucia 33
Dominica 3
Total 1,215
Source: TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies After The 
War', Senior British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix "A".
133 The Daily Argosy, 29 July 1941, in Oliver Marshall (ed.) - The Caribbean at War, British West 
Indians in World W ar II (London 1992), p.25.
134 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The W est Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix "A".
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While the majority of the ratings were classed as 'coloured', only 12 of the officers 
were non-white135. The extension of recruitment across the Caribbean raised issues 
around the status of different West Indian groups. The British came to favour the 
Cayman Islanders136, and it is their special standing which merits further analysis.
135 TNA, ADM 1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies Station to Admiralty, A.W .I.No.493/820/4, 2 
November 1951.
136 TNA, ADM 1/23215, C-in-C America and West Indies' communication no. 191/102/5, 4 March 1941, 
to Captain in Charge Port of Spain.
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Part One: The Cayman Islands
During the Second World War, out of a population of just over 6,500, around 
800 Caymanians served in the British Merchant Navy137 with another 201 in the 
TRNVR, two-thirds of the adult male population138, and constituting the highest 
contribution per capita of any Allied country. The obvious explanation for the level 
and nature of this participation was that an intrinsic connection to the sea permeated 
every facet of Caymanian society. Whereas other West Indian islanders 'remained 
tied to the land even in postslavery times and... viewed their coastlines as 
boundaries or barriers', the Caymans' lack of terrestrial resources meant that they 
always 'depended on the sea as a resource and an avenue for survival'139. Many of 
its early settlers had been British mariners wrecked on the islands, and the local 
economy was dominated by turtling, rope-making and boatbuilding140. Even this was 
mobilised during wartime, with the Caymanian master shipwright, Captain Rayal 
Bodden, being commissioned to construct two wooden minesweepers for the Royal 
Navy141. Such maritime traditions were passed down through generations, and it was 
considered that in Cayman, ‘every able-bodied man is, or has been, a seafarer’142. As 
soon as they could walk, boys would start sailing model boats, and ‘by the time they 
are in their teens [they could] handle the local cat boats, craft about 20 feet long,
137 James H. S. Billmyer, T h e  Cayman Islands', Geographical Review, Vol.36, No.1 (1946), pp.29-43, 
p.34.
38 Michael Craton, Founded Upon the Seas: A History of the Cayman Islands and Their People 
(Kingston, 2003), p.291.
39 Roger C. Smith, The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands (Florida, 2000), p.51.
140 Billmyer, T h e  Cayman Islands', p.33.
141 The Northwester, March 1974, pp.6-8.
142 A. J. A. Douglas, 'The Cayman Islands', The Geographical Journal, Vol.95, No.2 (1940), pp.126- 
131, p. 128
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pointed at each end and built of island timber’143. The 1934 census recorded fifty per 
cent of the islands' manpower between 18 and 60 years of age as being engaged in 
the seafaring industry144, and the biggest event of the year was the annual sailing 
regatta.
Motivations
Typically, both group and personal motivations inspired volunteering, but 
imperial patriotism was a very powerful driving force for Caymanians. This was 
exhibited on the eve of the Second World War, when 'large numbers of people of all 
classes of the community anxious to serve their KING and COUNTRY in the present 
crisis' stepped forward, despite there being 'no plans for recruiting nor any need for 
such generously afforded services' at that time145. This zeal had not diminished by 
the time the TRNVR began recruiting there in early 1941, as one volunteer later 
recounted:
The old and young alike from Cayman offered their services to go and 
fight for their mother country, including myself... I was a young boy, still in 
my teens, proud to go and fight for my country.146
To Caymanians, despite never having seen it themselves, Britain represented 'my 
country', so that her conflict was consequently their own. Part of this bond was forged
143 Ibid., pp. 128-9.
144 Cayman Islands National Archive (CINA), 'Colonial Report 1937', p. 13.
145 CINA, 'Government Notice, No.98/39', 30 August 1939.
146 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, prelude.
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by a shared belief in the ‘call of the sea’, an innate characteristic of maritime peoples, 
which determined that Caymanians would naturally seek out a life on the waves. As 
put by one volunteer, T. Ewart Ebanks, ‘most of the young people, then, all they had 
in their life... on their mind, is to go to sea.’147
Peer pressure and lack of domestic employment opportunity drove some to 
sign up, with Roosevelt Rankine saying ‘I thought everybody else could go and I 
could do the same too... Twenty-four and no special job, I just wanted to get off the 
island.’148 The relatively poor state of the local economy acted as a key motivator for 
many:
It came up that we had want [sic] people to go to Trinidad in the Navy...
So I say that’s a good chance... time for me, now, to make some money... 
a dollar a day... $30 to the month.149
Although those who chose to join the Merchant Navy could earn higher wages, 
some volunteers saw greater prestige and significance in service in the Royal Navy, 
an attraction which overrode the desire for pure monetary gain:
Sometimes I felt I would rather have been in the Merchant Marine, the 
Merchant Navy, but I guess that was because you would make more 
money... but it wasn’t altogether that... in the Navy you know you had the 
feeling you was doing a more important job.150
147 CINA, Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), conducted by Heather McLoughlin, 19 February 2003, 
transcript p.20.
148 CINA, Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), conducted by Heather McLoughlin, 15 January 1991, 
transcript p.2, p.5.
149 Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p.21.
150 CINA, Interview with Carley Ebanks, conducted by Liz Scholefield, 31 May 1996, transcript p. 18.
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As with martial race theory, anthropological studies were also used to set 
apart Caymanians from other West Indians in a number of physical and moral 
respects, which made them more appealing to prospective naval recruiters:
The average Caymanian is probably of better physique, is healthier, and 
has a better intelligence than the average American or the inhabitants of 
any other island in the West Indies and the countries bordering the 
Caribbean. This is attributable primarily to his energetic life. Other factors 
are his higher moral standards and the absence on the island of the usual 
tropical diseases.151
The reference to the Caymanians’ 'energetic life' is particularly illuminating 
since the British typically depicted those native to tropical climates as lethargic. 
Caymanians were considered 'hard-working'152, and 'honest'153, on account of their 
religiosity, and therefore complemented the Admiralty's desire that 'special 
consideration should be given to providing men who can stand a tropical climate, and 
who can be relied on to work without constant supervision'154. Possessing 'but little 
feeblemindedness', the 'average Caymanian possesses an unusually good 
intellect'155, seen as connected to skin colour. Significantly, the majority of the 
population of the Caymans were white or mixed race, with a comparatively small ex­
slave population:
Most of the people are hardy and healthy, tall, and wiry, like their seafaring 
forefathers from the east coasts of England and Scotland... The proportion
151 Billmyer, T h e  Cayman Islands', p.42.
152 Ibid., p.40.
153 Ibid., p.41.
154 TNA, ADM 1/10969, 'Page 7, to Enclosure to "AJAX'S" Letter No. 0196 of 19th July 1939'.
155 Billmyer, 'The Cayman Islands', pp.41-2.
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of whites and mixed to blacks is considerably higher than in most of the 
other islands of the West Indies. Roughly, whites and mixed form about 40 
per cent each, blacks 20 per cent.156
Caymanians possessed a hereditary link back to Britain, a connection visibly 
reinforced by their lighter physical complexion compared to that of other West Indians. 
Seen as ‘noticeably fair’, and possessing even ‘strong traces of Scandinavian 
origin’157, the connection drawn between fairer skin colour and naval aptitude echoes 
nineteenth century martial race theory's preoccupation with Aryanism. Certain Indian 
groups were said to have retained “old Aryan stock” passed down from the fair­
skinned peoples of central Asia who conquered northern India in ancient times. It was 
assumed that the descendants of those Aryan invaders, most notably Punjabis and 
Dogras, thus inherited their ‘superior military capabilities’158. In a similar manner, 
seafaring ability was believed here to have been passed down from Britain to 
Cayman.
Amongst the Caymanian sailors, any racial delineation was overridden by a 
collective self-assurance in their own maritime abilities. This underpinned their 
shared sense of Caymanian identity, and bound them together as a distinct ethnic 
group judged primarily on their professional qualities, not their skin colour; as one 
recruit, James Robinson, put it: The Cayman Islands seamen was recommended as 
the best seamen in the world... it was no difference between white and black'159.
1i>b Ibid., pp.34-5.
157 Douglas, T h e  Cayman Islands', p.127.
158 Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920  (London, 
2007), p.72.
159 CINA, Interview with James Robinson, conducted by Leonard Bodden, 11 June 1993, tape 2, side 
A, transcript p. 10.
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Although within a colonial naval force such as the TRNVR, Caymanians 
garnered more respect than their West Indian colonial colleagues, they were still 
viewed as inferior to regular British sailors. Harry McCoy served aboard HMS Nigeria 
for a time as the sole Caymanian in a Royal Navy crew of over seven hundred. There 
he had to overcome a degree of discrimination, though he did not consider it racial in 
nature:
There was, has always been, you know, a little bit of prejudice among 
English people and up to this day they always saw themselves superior to 
the Colonials... of whatever colour... you had to accept that, you see. But 
after you worked along with them and they saw that you were equal to 
them in every respect... I had no problems.160
Whereas Harry McCoy was able to work to overcome any negative 
preconceptions and prove himself before judging eyes, others were not given that 
same opportunity within the TRNVR. Preference for Caymanians acted to disbar 
other ethnic groups from certain assignments and occupations within the force. 
Individuals came to be judged not on their own merit but by their ethnicity, and the 
relative maritime skill supposedly attributed to that. In one instance, TRNVR 
personnel were assigned to relieve the British crew of HMS Corsair. All were 
Caymanian with the exception of one Barbadian, prompting the Captain to summarily 
"send him back" having specifically requested an "all Cayman crew"161. Such 
prejudices led to Caymanians gaining a monopoly in the seamen branches, where 
their seafaring skills could be put to most effective use:
160 CINA, Interview with Harry McCoy, conducted by Heather McLoughlin, 3 July 1991, tape 2, side B, 
transcript pp.33-4.
161 Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p.41.
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Most of those boats you could look for the majority of the seamen, the 
deck men, would be Caymanians... The vast majority of the deck 
department would be Caymanians, a few in the engine room, few in the 
galley or the steward department, but the actual working sailors the most 
was Caymanians.162
One branch's overwhelming dependence on a single ethnic group created 
logistical problems when it came to managing leave, causing homesickness, 
discontent and disillusionment amongst the men:
Every time, one of us mentioned the word vacation, the answer was that 
we could not be spared since ninety-six per cent of the warships were 
manned by Cayman Naval Seamen... at the time it appeared as if we had 
become the forgotten men of the Navy.163
It took ah impromptu inspection by the local admiral for this to be addressed, and all 
the Caymanian volunteers were subsequently sent home on leave in three 
staggered batches, but this was the only time most got to return to the Caymans in 
over four years in the TRNVR164.
On one ship, preconceptions about the Caymanian seamen led to the group 
as a whole receiving preferential treatment:
All the deck crew were Caymanians... The captain was so pleased with 
our performance that... he called us all up, all the Caymanians... and
162 Interview with Carley Ebanks, p.19.
163 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, p.87.
164 Ibid., p.88.
rated us Able-bodied Seamen from the day we had in our required time... 
that’s the only time I have heard about it being done.165
Individual merit, normally the key factor in determining promotion, was here 
subsumed by group identity. This may have been fostered by the fact that up to sixty- 
eight of the recruits shared the same characteristically Caymanian surname:
"STEP FORWARD Ebanks," yelled the drill instructor, irate at a 
mistake by one of his squad of recruits. His temper rose when the whole 
squad stepped forward.
"I only said for Ebanks to step forward, not everyone," he shouted.
"We're all Ebanks," came the chorus from the men in reply.166
As a consequence, the group was further de-individualised by British officers, who 
from then on referred to each Ebanks as a number, 'starting with 1 and ending with 
68 ' 16 7 .
Ethnic categorisation inevitably fostered stereotypes, even though it may have 
been a seemingly positive one of Caymanian maritime aptitude. Conversely though, 
this led to negative stereotypes being developed of other groups within the force, 
fostering divisions. W. Hewitt Rivers describes his impression of the unprofessional 
attitudes of the Trinidadian servicemen he served alongside:
We used to have Trinidadians and different people mixed up in the 
watchman job... every Trinidadian you had they didn’t stay in the job very
165 CINA, Interview with Clive Glidden (2), conducted by Heather McLoughlin, 6 June 1996, tape 2, 
side A, transcript p. 10.
166 CINA, 'When 40 Ebanks went to war', The Northwester (November, 1972), pp.46-7.
167 Sir Vassel Johnson, As I See It: How Cayman Became a Leading Financial Centre (Sussex, 2001), 
pp.50-51.
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long. They went off and go home... they would catch them up and throw 
them in jail for going away... sometimes I had to stay on duty for nine days 
by myself.168
Discontent and Protest
Caymanians had more negative impressions of Trinidad, conveyed in letters
home:
It was an anxious [time], we were all upset... my brother was upset, he 
wanted to come home, but they wouldn’t... he wasn’t allowed to come 
home, you know, he had to stay there. And every letter that we got from 
him was a crying time, because he was very upset about being there... He 
wanted to go, but after a lot of them got up there, they found things that 
they didn’t like, you know.169
Norman Rudolph McLoughlin was another who volunteered under an apparent 
misconception cultivated by the colonial authorities:
The first group left for Trinidad in early May and arrived there within eight 
to ten days. Promising reports were sent back that made the rest of us 
very eager to join them. I regret to say that after I arrived in Trinidad, I
168 CINA, Interview with W . Hewitt Rivers, conducted by Arthurlyn Pedley, 24 June 1991, transcript
p.16.
69 CINA, Interview with Edith Ebanks (nee Orrett), conducted by Tricia Bodden, 19 March 2003, 
transcript p. 15.
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discovered some of those promising reports to be false, and why they 
were sent back to Cayman was never explained to me.170
Upon their arrival at the TRNVR base in Staubles Bay, the Caymanians were faced 
with a foreign environment, poor facilities, professional neglect, and lack of proper 
uniform and medical care, causing many to fall ill; yet for some, such as McLoughlin, 
this failed to diminish his imperial patriotic determination to fight:
It was a 'real dump and mud hole'. When it rained, the mud slid down from 
the hills, coming right across the highway on to the base and out to sea. It 
was common to be walking through six to eight inches of mud and water 
over most of the base... We were still wearing our own clothes, shoes, 
and socks, which were wet most of the time. As a result of this exposure, 
most of us came down with an awful flu or even pneumonia and lay sick in 
our bunks for days. The medical service was terrible, consisting of one old 
doctor from St. Lucia. He did not appear to be qualified to take care of the 
situation, nor did he care a damn about us... I felt so proud to fight for my 
King and Country, that come hell or high tide, I was determined to stick it 
out.171
170 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, prelude.
171 Ibid., p.4.
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Image 1. The TRNVR on parade at its headquarters in Staubles Bay, Trinidad, 1943 
[Source: TNA, ADM 1/13014, 'Publicity in UK for Colonial Naval Forces]
The health of the Caymanians was not helped by the standard of food they received, 
another cause for discontent. Here, cultural insularity meant that they were 
unfamiliar with foreign tastes and cooking methods they encountered in the multi­
cultural force, with consequences physically, economically, and for morale:
The food was awful and poorly cooked by the Trinidadian cooks. They 
either could not cook our Caymanian type of food or were simply poor 
cooks. There was plenty of food, but it was badly prepared and most of us 
could not eat it... [I] ate very little of the food prepared in the galley, and 
started buying biscuits, chocolates, soft drinks, etc. from the canteen. Of
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course, having very little money to spare, many nights I found myself 
going hungry.172
Such complaints did not garner popular sympathy, however, and served to ostracise 
the Caymanians from the local populace. The successful German U-boat campaign 
waged in the Caribbean from February 1942 took its toll on island shipping, causing 
extreme food shortages amongst civilians. One fifth of all merchant ships in the 
Caribbean were lost to submarine action, 385 in 1942 alone173. As those responsible 
for the safety of the convoys, despite the difficulties they worked under with the poor 
equipment afforded them, naval personnel became obvious targets for civilian blame, 
especially as from the outside they appeared to be sheltered from civilians' 
sufferings.174
Local resentment towards the Caymanians sailors meant that ‘in going ashore 
you had to go in gangs, we wasn’t allowed to go alone, because some time you’d 
meet some of them that want to fight you.’175 The Office of Naval Intelligence 
reported that by late 1942, there was 'hooliganism in Trinidad -  a wave of disorder 
and petty crime... directed at North Americans, British and other white persons'.176 
Yet Caymanians were also 'othered' in this way by the lighter colour of their skin, as 
they had been by naval recruiters. With very little crime back home, the deeply 
religious Caymanians were shocked by the relative vice they witnessed on Trinidad:
Trinidad was a wicked place, a lot of killing and shooting of people and the 
like used to go on... when you go to dance in the night, you coming back
172 Ibid., pp.5-6.
173 Gaylord Kelshall, The U-Boat War In the Caribbean (Annapolis, 1988), pp.foreward-1.
174 Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), p. 15.
175 Ibid., p.8.
176 Quoted in Annette Palmer, T h e  United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1940-45', Ph.D. 
thesis (Fordham University, 1979), p.244.
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home, you can run over, you can walk over several dead man on the 
road.177
For some of the volunteers thrust into these transnational encounters, local abuse, 
ignorance and prejudice overrode their initial motivations for enlisting, spurring them 
to try to leave the force and return to the Cayman Islands:
After I stop the turtle business, I went to the war... and stayed there four 
years and six months... More went, but they got ‘fraid and come back 
home... It was bad business; it was mean set-up... the people there in 
Trinidad thought that we had come from nowhere.178
Being transnational volunteers, however, they were stranded on an island 
thousands of miles away from their home, without the means themselves to return, 
and completely dependent upon the will of the British authorities whom many saw as 
accountable for their sufferings. Those men unable to cope faked illness in the hope 
they would be sent back, as Rankine testifies: ‘so many performed, ‘formed like they 
were sick... and let them send them home.’179 Rivers also witnessed this charade, 
but a stronger sense of patriotic duty drove him to stay:
The impression that I had first, it was so cold that I wouldn’t want to relive 
that again... the majority of boys that came back from Cayman, they just 
played sick and they didn’t want to stay there... but I decided that if I was 
able to do something for... I would have to say for my country, I would stay,
177 CINA, Interview with Armenthea Watler (2), conducted by Elizabeth Ebanks, 19 August 1991, 
transcript p.25.
178 Interview with James Robinson, pp.8-9.
179 Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), p. 19.
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and I stayed all the time. It was four years and eight months that I was 
there.130
Civilian violence and hostility was not restricted to Trinidad, but was 
encountered during port visits to other islands too, such as in Kingston, Jamaica, 
otherwise known as the ‘mother colony’ of the Cayman Islands dependency. Despite 
this status, local economic problems meant that Jamaicans simmered with 
resentment over the relatively ‘high’ naval wages their ‘junior’ colonials were 
perceived as receiving:
It was rugged then. Went shore there and they pelt the boys with bricks 
and all those kind of things... you know seaman meets it hard most of 
them places... any part you go to, they feel that the seaman has plenty of
1 ft1money.
Such wartime military-civil tensions might have fostered a greater sense of in­
group unity and esprit de corps amongst the multicultural TRNVR members, with the 
civilian population defined as its out-group182. The reason it did not in this context 
perhaps is because naval service identity was competing with a much stronger in­
group identity, that of ethnicity, which united Trinidadians within the force and the 
island more broadly and overlapped military-civil boundaries. Ethnic identity 
superseded service unity in this instance. Thus transnational identities were both 
strengthened and challenged by wartime service. The issue of food continued to act 
as a source of contention and division within the TRNVR, evincing itself when roles
180 Interview with W. Hewitt Rivers, pp. 12-13.
181 Interview with Roosevelt Rankine (2), p.6.
182 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, T h e  Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior' in S. Worchel 
&
W. Austin (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago, 1986), pp.7-24.
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were inverted, with Caymanians taking on the cooking duties and Trinidadians the 
disgruntled consumers. In its most extreme case, this resulted in violent abuse. Lloyd 
Seymore was in the camp cooking breakfast when a Trinidadian rating asked him for 
fish. After being told fish was not on the menu, the Trinidadian disappeared and 
came back with a wooden 'beladen pin', which he 'muntled' Seymore over the head 
with.183 After a month in hospital, Seymore was discharged, only to be re-admitted 
after experiencing haemorrhaging though the nose. He was put in the condemned 
ward, number eleven, where he developed a big abscess in his nostrils and was not 
cleaned or fed.184 It took the intervention of Petty Officer McLoughlin, one of the 
senior Caymanians, before Seymore was moved, received food, and began to make 
a recovery, finally being honourably discharged from the force. Not all the 
Caymanians were as ‘lucky’ as Seymore, however:
We learned that one of our Cayman boys had died... Before we could get 
over the shock of Johnson's death, we were told that another person had 
passed away a few weeks before... By now, I had become very angry and 
had changed from the young, quiet, loyal man who had left Grand 
Cayman on the 29th of July, and had turned into a hardened, tough man 
who was ready to join the others in protest... regardless of the
185consequences.
183 A 'beladen' or 'belaying' pin is used for securing belaying rope. ‘Muntled’ means he clubbed him -  
the muntle is a heavy hand-carved wooden club used primarily for killing/stunning shark and other 
large fish. ‘Licked’ means hit. Interview Armenthea Watler (2), p.24.
184 Ibid., p.24.
185 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, p.8.
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Within an hour the men had fallen in on the quarter deck and demanded to see 
Commander Wilkinson, the base Commanding Officer, from whom they requested 
their discharge from the TRNVR, and made the following demands:
1. Better medical service.
2. Replace the cots in the barracks with proper double bunk beds.
3. Pitch the base to prevent any mud holes or water from settling.
4. Improve the cooking system in the galley.
5. Change the behaviour of The First Lieutenant towards us which 
included screaming and threatening us and passing sarcastic 
remarks.186
Of these, item 1 ‘was the principal reason why we were so angry and disappointed in 
the Navy. We felt that our two country service men died from the lack of proper 
medical aid’187. Again, the in-group pull of ethnicity proved stronger than the service. 
This was an exclusively Caymanian protest, with the other islanders within the 
TRNVR not participating, despite the general nature of some of the grievances. 
Although discontent ran deep and stretched back to their initial arrival, it took 
strength in numbers later on and the death of two of their own, to galvanise the 
Caymanian men into action, and overcome the social pressure of the larger 
Trinidadian group who occupied a dominant position within the force because of 
their local status:
When the second and third batches of volunteers [from Cayman] arrived 
on the base, there already were quite a number of Trinidadians and even 
some from the other islands in addition to the first batch from The Cayman
Islands. They [the first batch] all must have been scared to fight for better 
conditions on the base. I can understand their reluctance in protesting, 
since they might have been outnumbered by Trinidadians, and those from 
the other islands who appeared not to worry about anything; perhaps they 
might have been accustomed to that way of life.188
Despite this external expression of Caymanian solidarity, members found 
themselves internally conflicted between their personal desires and the pressure of 
group allegiance. It also raised questions regarding the attitudes of the British 
authorities:
I endured a restless night dreaming about the Navy and what the future 
held in store for me. Although I was still standing firm with the others about 
going home, I honestly did not want to. I was hoping that most of them 
would change their minds providing that the Commander would make 
good on his promises... there was one important question that was never 
asked: 'is it true the British treated us so subordinately because they were 
still practising their colonial prejudice against all of us? If not, why did two 
of our men have to die before we were treated better?'189
In a matter of days, most of the complaints were being taken care of, and the 
situation on the base began to improve slowly. Yet, it could not displace the negative 
impression that had been conveyed of the British:
I had spoken to an Irishman in the Navy who told me not to expect too 
much improvement on the base. Because we were all colonials, The
British seemed to believe that we were inferior to them. He went on to say 
that even though he was an Irishman, he was not treated any better, and 
would have never volunteered to join were it not for the fact that he was 
about to be drafted anyway and did not want to end up in the army.190
Anti-imperial sentiment was fermented here by the transnational encounters that 
war facilitated, and colonial volunteers like Clive Glidden were no longer 
prepared to submit unquestioningly to their imperial ‘masters’:
The Commander, he says, “You know what you call a forced man?” I say, 
“No, I don’t think I do.” He says, “Well, in the old days, you were told what 
to do.” I say, “I think those days are past.” So he never gave me no hard 
time.191
The war had prompted a growing realisation amongst Caymanians that ‘the 
British needed us more than we needed them’192.
Whereas Harry McCoy had experienced a degree of colonial prejudice 
whilst serving aboard HMS Nigeria, it was in isolation. The deaths of Uline Eden 
and Seaman Johnson brought home that sense of inferiority to the rest of the 
group, an act of paternal betrayal they would not forget:
Those two naval men died in vain. I am still so bitter against the British 
naval authorities over their deaths. When we joined the Navy in July, 1941, 
we discovered that the medical standard for colonials was inferior 
compared the standard of medical care for the British naval men. For
190 Idem.
191 Interview with Clive Glidden (2), p.3.
192 McLaughlin, The Forgotten Men of the Navy, p. 16.
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instance, we, the colonials, were given one old local doctor to take care of 
us, while the British naval men at Royal Navy Camp had excellent 
qualified doctors to take care of them.193
In the end, as ‘most of our demands had been met, we were satisfied to stay. A 
small rebellious group held out however, and were eventually sent back home.’194 
Even though it was felt that the ‘Mother Country’ had broken her commitment to 
them, the majority of Caymanians refused to break theirs, remaining loyal and 
continuing to fight for Britain until the end of the war:
There is no question in my mind that we were The Forgotten Men of the 
Navy. Speaking for myself, I am proud that I volunteered to go and fight 
for my Country, and if I were young enough and my services were 
required, I would not hesitate to do so again.195 
This imperial patriotism was preserved by the British by appealing directly to the 
Caymanians' sense of maritime worth, integral to conceptions of their self-identity: 
Although we, the Cayman naval men, at times might have been 
mistreated or had to do more than our fair share, in the end, the top 
military brass bestowed a lot of praise on us and openly admitted that we 
were the cream of the naval crop.196 
Rather than feeling aggrieved at Caymanians having had to 'do more than our fair 
share', this was turned into a badge of honour to reflect their indispensability. In this 
way, the British were able to preserve Caymanian loyalty by fostering their sense of 
cultural pride and seafaring superiority over the other West Indian sailors in the
TRNVR:
We had good reputation up there, and the Commander... when we were 
coming home, he gived [sic] a speech, he say... “Unna Caymanians was 
the pride of the Navy.”197
Identity and Historical Memory
Several oral historical accounts express similar assertions that 
Caymanians represented the 'best seamen in the world', yet T. Ewart Ebanks, for 
one, admits 'I don’t know how they knew it.'198 Though naval service helped them 
gain post-war employment with international shipping companies, the islands' 
comparative isolation from the rest of the world provided limited opportunity to 
draw such conclusions beforehand. As a Caymanian cultural identifier, it has 
gained retrospective significance in emphasising the islands' wartime contribution, 
a historical distortion which has become engrained through collective memory. 
Though Caymanian maritime heritage is indisputable, the conception of them as 
the 'best seamen in the world' was one which was initially cultivated by colonial 
authorities to serve imperial and naval ends.
Allen Wolsey Cardinall, Commissioner of the Cayman Islands from 1934 to 
1941, was accredited with drawing British attention to the colony’s seamen as 
potential recruits for the Navy199. Described as an ‘efficient District Commissioner’,
197 Interview with T. Ewart Ebanks (1), p.41.
198 Ibid., p.33.
199 CINA, Interview with Harold Banks, Carley Ebanks and Harvey Ebanks, conducted by Liz 
Scolefield, 18 May 1996, transcript p.20.
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who ‘takes a great interest in the Native customs and habits’, he implemented 
several measures to improve the social and economic condition of "the islands that 
time forgot" 200. Many of these drew on Cayman’s maritime strengths, with 
consequences for future naval recruitment. In January 1935, Cardinall founded the 
first annual Cayman Islands sailing Regatta, which drew participants from across the 
Caribbean and the United States. He hoped to foster a greater sense of Caymanian 
unity by 'bringing the islands and islanders together in friendly competition'201. This 
coincided with the opening of the George Town radio station on 23 November 1935, 
where messages were exchanged with Australia, Ceylon, South Africa, Canada, the 
Falkland Islands, as well as Britain and most of the other West Indian colonies202, 
instilling Caymanians with a greater sense of belonging to the imperial family. This 
world-view instilled in the younger members of the population held sway a few years 
later when, with a greater appreciation of the global nature of the conflict, 
volunteering to serve in the TRNVR offered the rare chance to escape the quiet life 
of the islands and seek adventure overseas:
I don’t think anyone really got scared. In fact I know I was glad of it. As a 
youngster you know. I thought you know, that it was an opportunity to get 
out and get in some action, and see the world, and I think that this was the 
feeling of the young people.203
Each regatta would be honoured by a visiting Royal Navy warship, with two sailors 
from the vessel accompanying each schooner participating in the race, ‘largely to put
200 Craton, Founded Upon the Seas, p.280, p.253.
201 Ibid., p.281.
202 Ibid., p.286.
203 CINA, Interview with Harry McCoy, conducted by Heather McLoughlin, 3 July 1991, tape 2, side A, 
transcript p.6.
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a bit of prestige into the regatta’s sporting affairs’204. The Admiralty was drawn by the 
recruitment possibilities such association offered, considering that 'as a potential 
source of seamen for the Auxiliary Patrol Service, these ready made sailors seem to 
justify every encouragement'205. Subsequent visits reaffirmed the opinion that 'the 
Cayman Islanders... would make fine material on which to draw in time of war, in the 
same way as the Newfoundland fishermen were in the last war'206. The Admiralty 
acted on this by loaning a cup for the race winners, as 'the presentation of such a 
prize would stimulate interest in the Royal Navy that might be invaluable in the event 
of hostilities'207. Such efforts succeeded in raising enthusiasm for the Royal Navy on 
Cayman, and sentimental ties were formed between local inhabitants and visiting 
warships. One example was the cruiser, HMS Orion, which earned local affection for 
her role in retrieving the popular Caymanian schooner Goldfield after a storm in 
September 1937208, and was later involved in the hunt for the German pocket- 
battleship GrafSpee:
This created much interest in Cayman.... Caymanians enjoyed listening to 
the battle in South America, not only because of knowing the Orion when 
she attended Cayman’s 1938 regatta but also because we had great faith 
in the mother country’s naval fleet, the most formidable in the world.209
Such visits helped inculcate Caymanians with a belief in British power, both imperial 
and naval, a greater sense of patriotic pride, and heightened the prestige of the
204 Johnson, As I See It, p.60.
205 TNA, ADM 1/9749, 'From Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "DRAGON" at Minatitlan, To The 
Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies', 2 February 1937.
206 TNA, ADM 1/9749, 'H.M.S. "Dundee’s" No.2/37', 28 February 1938.
207 TNA, ADM 1/9749, 'Cayman Islands Regatta - Proposed Presentation of a Cup', 4 May 1937.
208 Smith, The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands, p. 144.
209 Johnson, As I See It, p.60.
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Royal Navy, all of which increased the appeal of naval service when the opportunity 
to volunteer presented itself:
It had been grounded in us that, you know, ‘Britannia ruled the waves’, and 
Britons never shall be slaves’. Well this extended all over the Empire; you 
know we just felt that Britain was invincible.210
One way this patriotic belief in Britain and the Royal Navy had been 'grounded' 
in young Caymanians was through the 'Trafalgar Day' school essay competition, 
instigated by Cardinall in 1935. Echoing Harry McCoy's reference to 'Rule Britannia', 
Linda Borden eulogised that 'when we study the lives of such men as Lord Nelson, 
we are proud to know that we form a part of the British Empire, and with the spirit of 
Nelson we can truly sing: "Britons never shall be slaves'". In his essay entitled 
'Supremacy of the Seas', Glendower McLoughlin expressed that 'we should all aspire 
to have the same feeling towards our Country as Nelson had, and have as our watch­
word Nelson's great and noble words "England expects every man to do his duty'". 
'Today Trafalgar seems to say we are a unit of the greatest nation on Earth, therefore 
we should make ourselves worthy of the greatest and best', so argued David 
McLaughlin. Another, Cecil Wood, wrote that '[Nelson] has left us his mantle of 
inspiration which is inspiring thousands of youths of the British Empire today'211. That 
'mantle' would then be carried by those Caymanians in the TRNVR.
To organise the regatta, Cardinall created the Cayman Islands Yacht and 
Sailing Club, whose members numbered 134 by 1937. The Commissioner also 
helped form two troops of Sea Scouts in George Town and West Bay, which in 1937
210 Interview with Harry McCoy, tape 2, side A, p.7.
211 CINA, Trafalgar Day', Central Registry File 706/35, 5 October 1935.
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totalled eighty-two boys, with another fifty-nine more in two cub packs212. As in 
Trinidad, these organisations provided a valuable potential pool of organised and 
disciplined recruits for the TRNVR come wartime213, such as Harry McCoy:
I was there [in the Home Guard] for nineteen months... the day I took off 
my uniform, I left to join the Navy... that had been my life’s ambition as a 
boy... I was a Sea Scout, and being a Caymanian, I already had the salt 
water in my blood... so I volunteered when the opportunity came.214
When Royal Navy warships would visit the islands during the regatta, the Sea Scouts 
would be invited aboard them, thus exposing them first-hand to British naval culture. 
Together they helped lay vital foundations for post-war employment in an 
environment which traditionally provided limited education and opportunity:
Between [the Sea Scouts] and the TRNVR, turned out some of our best 
sailors, best seamen. Well, some of them that weren’t Scouts had the sea 
in their blood anyway... with the limited education, basic education, that 
they had... the experience of those four years in Trinidad among those 
who were there, and went to sea afterwards, was amazing.215
Here the colonial authorities emphasised their own active role in the ‘production’ of 
Caymanian seamen, accrediting their measures as having ‘turned out’ some of the 
best. Furthermore, though ‘some... had the sea in their blood anyway’, it was clearly 
not universal, and even those who did required colonial assistance to develop their 
skills so as to make a positive contribution to Cayman society. Paternal British
212 Craton, Founded Upon the Seas, p.281.
213 CINA, Interview with Ernest Panton, conducted by Iva Johnson-Good and Roger Good, 1979-80, 
transcript p.2.
214 Interview with Harry McCoy, tape 2, side A, p. 10.
215 Interview with Ernest Panton, p.5.
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leadership was thus highlighted as a key actor in this discourse of development, 
carrying on the tradition of the imperial civilising mission. Again, though Caymanians 
may have been viewed and treated in a more positive manner than other West 
Indians, they were still considered an imperial infant to Britain, requiring the 
motherland’s guidance in order to grow and develop.
Caymanian society was highly religious, dominated by the Presbyterian 
Church, and the intrinsic connection drawn between religious and maritime tradition 
on the islands is engrained in Cayman’s motto taken from Psalm 24: “He hath 
founded it upon the seas.”216 Just as the paternalism of the civilising mission 
prevailed, so religion continued to act as its conduit. The colonial authorities were 
conscious of the powerful influence that religion had over the local population. When 
they put out the call to arms, they did so in the setting of the Presbyterian Church, 
thus instilling their message with a religious symbolism that subconsciously appealed 
to potential recruits through that sacred setting, and framing the struggle against 
Hitler as a holy and righteous war in which God was on Britain’s side:
It was difficult to leave home, but I had a mind to serve because as 
Commissioner Cardinall said in his speech at the Presbyterian Church in 
George Town, war was like a dark cloud hanging over the world and Hitler 
had to be stopped. I wanted to play my part too.217
Nazi racism was framed as being anti-Christian, and acted as a moral inducement to 
serve as well as a legitimising contrast to Britain's 'tolerant' authority:
216 Craton, Founded Upon the Seas, p.406.
217 Conray Forbes, ‘An Experience of W ar’, Newstar, 52 (1995), p. 15.
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Intolerant authority is the essence of Nazism and has provided the most 
dangerous menace to Christianity and civilisation that the World has yet 
seen... the British, as a race, the most tolerant of men. Not only do we 
believe in toleration for ourselves but also for others. We are prepared to 
fight for that and, in fact, it is that for which we are fighting.218
This verged on crusading zealotry, with the prospect of killing another human being 
excused on account of the fact that 'they were fighting an enemy, an infidel, who 
didn't share the same beliefs that they shared, that didn't share the same notion of 
God that they had'. They saw it as their 'religious duty, as well as a civil, civic, and 
national duty' to 'volunteer to fight, and if necessary, to make the ultimate sacrifice, to 
lose their lives themselves, or in the process, to kill the persons who they deemed 
their enemy'.219 Several church services were held for the islands' volunteers, both 
before and after their departure, which itself helped to unite the islands. Even in the 
Caymans, where racial divisions were less stark, 'in the "old days" the "coloured 
people" sat on one side of the church', but 'this was changed during the war years 
when many Caymanian men travelled to serve in the TRNVR'220. This helped 
strengthen Caymanian group identity beyond race, with all islanders uniting in prayer 
for the safe return of their men. Each batch of recruits that set sail for Trinidad did so 
under the charge of Reverend George Hicks, a veteran from the First World War and 
the Presbyterian Minister for Grand Cayman221, as if shepherded into battle under the 
Lord’s divine protection. In the words of Bertram Ebanks: 'I have taken Christ as my
218 Editorial, 'Toleration', The Goshawk, 1, No. 7 (July 1941), p.552.
219 Roy Bodden, local historian and chairman of University College Cayman Islands, Path to Life: 
Honouring the Cayman Islands Veterans, documentary broadcast from George Town, 8 November 
2009.
220 Sybil McLoughlin, Cayman Net News, 3 March 2006.
221 CINA, XH/117/5, Government Notice 73/41, 2 June 1941.
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shield and defender so I've nothing to dread, and I'm willing to do anything I can to 
help bring an end to this great conflict'222.
Prior to the Second World War, Caymanian seamen were not conscious of 
their relative standing in the world; it was something they had acquired by the time 
they returned to the Cayman Islands at the end of the war. It has since become a 
central facet of Caymanian identity, key to the islands' post-war economic growth, 
and consequently is an ideal which has been retrospectively elevated through 
historical memory to become engrained in the nation's tradition. This is not to say that 
the Caymanian 'call of the sea' was purely a colonial construction. As with martial 
race theory, this identity is anchored in a degree of empirical reality, but over time it 
became layered. The natural environment of the Cayman Islands, its resources, its 
settlers, and the local economy that developed from these, meant that nautical skills 
and traditions inevitably evolved amongst its people. Certainly seafaring ability made 
them attractive as recruits for the Navy, but it did not in itself differentiate them from 
many other peoples who hailed from nautical backgrounds. It was during 
Commissioner Cardinall's tenure that Caymanian maritime heritage was 
institutionalised in the spirit of social and economic development and through 
'invented traditions'223 such as the regatta, but with an ulterior aim of fostering 
imperial spirit and a belief in British naval invincibility that aided volunteerism during 
war. He was a man preoccupied with his own legacy and establishing a position for 
himself in the island's folklore 'so that when I leave you will remember me always'.224 
This he achieved by eulogising Caymanian maritime worth to the Navy and
222 CINA, XH/117/5, Letter from Bertram Ebanks to Acting Commissioner, 6 July 1941.
223 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).
224 Neville Williams, A History of the Cayman Islands (Grand Cayman, 1970), p.77.
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cultivating a collective pride in this identity, though his sentiments have consequently 
gained disproportionate weight in the popular memory of Caymanian naval veterans.
Race was a key factor in the Navy's initial preference for Caymanians, being 
lighter in complexion compared to other West Indians. The influence of martial race 
theory evinced itself in this link with 'Aryanism', and the use of anthropology to 
legitimise racial discrimination and preferential selection within the force, based on 
pseudo-scientific deductions regarding intelligence and fitness. Transnational 
encounters with the British and other West Indians strengthened Caymanian identity, 
though at the expense of force cohesion, and left them isolated when problems 
arose. Though Caymanians considered themselves victims of colonial as opposed to 
racial prejudice, this imperial subordination within the naval chain of command 
prompted protest, and for some eroded their original motivations to fight. To help 
preserve patriotic loyalty for the majority to continue fighting, like Cardinall, British 
officers, thus appealed to Caymanian ethnic pride by lauding their maritime worth, 
and instilling in them the belief that they were 'the best seamen in the world'.
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Part Two: Trinidad
The American 'Invasion'
On 2 September 1940 the Destroyers for Bases agreement was signed, 
transferring 50 antiquated destroyers from the United States in exchange for land 
rights on several British West Indian territories for the construction of military bases. 
There was no consultation with the islanders over the agreement, the lease of which 
ran for 99 years. In Trinidad, the main US Naval base was to be built at 
Chaguaramas, adjoining the TRNVR's headquarters. As with the TRNVR's formation, 
the strategic merits were overshadowed by the political implications, with the political 
ruling class believing that the bases were "bulwarks of capitalism, miraculously at 
hand to help them in strangling at the birth, any post-war upsurgings of labour" and 
would 'stand as "bastions against the infiltration of subversive doctrines” which they 
had suspected of being at the core of the upheavals in the thirties'.225 Though in 
Trinidad, 'prominent leaders of various sections of the community' unanimously 
welcomed the announcement, though there was underlying feeling that "while we 
welcome the greater affinity and understanding between the United States and 
Britain, we should certainly not wish to be alienated from British sovereignty":
"There is nobody that would more strongly oppose any scheme having as 
its object either the question of converting the West Indies into a Canadian
225 “'Caribbean Bastions' written by a native Trinidadian in July-August 1941, of European descent 
who wishes to remain anonymous”, Appendix “O” to Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, “Social 
and Political Forces”, p.536, quoted in Annette Catherine Palmer, 'The United States and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, 1940-45', Ph.D. thesis (Fordham University, 1979), pp.76-7.
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Province or bringing about American annexation, but at the same time 
there is no one but sees the practicability and the sound statesmanlike 
reasons, in peace or war, for any scheme which will place the Atlantic 
under the control agreed upon between the English speaking 
democracies."226
Sir Lennox O'Reilly commented that "everyone welcomes the agreement that has 
been reached between the two Anglo-Saxon speaking nations", while the Honourable 
T.M. Kelshall, Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council, added:
"The agreement must command the wholehearted approval of every 
sensible person in this community and the entire freedom-loving world. I 
see no two sides to it. Britain and America coming together in this way are 
defending not only themselves but also civilisation."227
Similar language was espoused by Major D.A. Strafford of the U.S. Marine Corps a 
year later, at the inaugural raising of the 'Stars and Stripes' at the new base when he 
reassured: “We come as friends, as the bond of common democracy links us in a 
struggle against the enemies of freedom and justice the world over.”228 The rhetoric 
expressed from both sides bears the prevailing hallmarks of nineteenth-century 
Anglo-Saxonism, which emphasised the superiority of the British and American 
peoples and their civilisation based upon principles such as liberal democracy. Such 
ideology provided a moral justification for imperialism by teaching those values and 
'elevating' the colonised peoples through paternalism.
226 Director of Geo. F. Huggins and Co., The Trinidad Guardian, 8 September 1940, p.13.
227 The Trinidad Guardian, 8 September 1940, p. 13.
228 Box 2 Miscellaneous, Annex "C", 'Article on the first flag raising taken from the “Trinidad Guardian”,
1 April 1941', p.217, Fitzroy Baptiste Thesis Materials, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago.
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There was a realisation that the concept of Empire did not sit easily with the 
notion of fighting a war for freedom and democracy. The local press were enlisted to 
help combat the critics 'who say that we are waging a war in defence of imperialism. 
They speak as though our Imperialism were something which was gross, greedy and 
grabbing, as though it were a system of exploitation and oppression on the grand 
scale'229. The Trinidad Guardian ran a series of articles distinguishing between the 
'Two Kinds of Imperialism', practiced by Britain and Germany. An article entitled 
'Two Ideas of Empire' written by the historian and Liberal politician Ramsay Muir, 
defined this as 'Either - The British conception of the equal partnership of free 
peoples. Or - The Nazi master-race theory where the dominant nation treats the 
others as slaves'230. Central to this distinction was the notion of 'trusteeship':
In saying that there are peoples in different parts of the world who are not 
yet ripe for self-government, we are not being guilty of any hypocrisy which 
cloaks other motives. We have the authority of the high-minded authors of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations to confirm that view... There are 
territories which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. The well­
being of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation.2^
Thus, a war on behalf of civilisation was by its definition, a war to uphold the existing 
British imperial system, endorsed by international mandate. In contrast it was 
asserted that 'Nazi Germany is grossly unfit to take charge of peoples "not yet able to
229 The Trinidad Guardian, 23 June 1940, p.6.
230 The Trinidad Guardian, 6 July 1940, p.6.
231 The Trinidad Guardian, 23 June 1940, p.6.
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stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world", because 
they lacked the civilised qualities of the Anglo-Saxons:
The terrors of the prison camp make the blood of decent men run cold. If 
this is what Hitler and his Germans do to Aryan people, fellow-citizens of 
Europe, partners in the same civilisation of the West, what then would be 
the character of their rule over African, Asiatic or Polynesian people, it 
these were so unhappy as to fall into their clutches.232
Yet this assumption that the German treatment of Africans, Asiatics or Polynesians 
would naturally be worse than of Europeans itself indicates the British still perceived 
such peoples as inferior rather than equal partners, despite rhetoric professing 
otherwise. Similarly, stronger fears expressed privately regarding the potential 
erosion of British authority in Trinidad were joined by a moral concern over 
anticipated American attitudes towards the colony's black population:
There is a marked fear on the part of the West Indians that the 
establishment of the bases will affect British sovereignty in these ancient 
Colonies and derogate from their cherished British nationality... The plain 
fact is that the West Indians, in spite of their present poverty and their 
clear realisation of the financial benefits which will certainly accrue from 
the establishment of United States bases, are yet most apprehensive of 
the arrival of United States forces. This is due partly to a deep-seated 
loyalty and attachment to British traditions, and not less to the fear that
232 Idem.
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American treatment of the Negro and coloured population will follow the 
lines notorious in the Southern United States.233
Despite the economic benefits the agreement promised the island, the 
prospect of large-scale construction work further problematised domestic recruitment 
for the TRNVR due to the higher wages the Americans were prepared to pay, 
prompting additional intakes to be sought from Britain's other West Indian territories.
The influx of over 20,000 American servicemen to an island population of 
approximately 510,000 inevitably had a profound effect on the political, economic and 
social dynamics of Trinidad. American motives were ideological, strategic and 
economic. It has been seen partly as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine and 
assertion of US primacy in the Americas. Protection of the strategically vital artery of 
the Panama Canal was of vital importance. The advent of oil-combustion-engine 
aircraft and submarines during the period 1913-1939 meant that offensive operations 
could now be carried out over longer distances, with greater rapidity and over a 
greater combat radius than before. This 'threatened to shrink considerably the degree 
of security that, until then, oceans such as the Atlantic and Pacific afforded to the 
United States'234. A far-advanced-base concept was first mooted by the famous naval 
theorist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan between 1884 and his death in 1914, but it was 
the First World War which crystallised thought in that direction:
There is no other consideration so formidable and serious to an invading 
fleet as that of a securely-defended and well-equipped naval base
233 TNA, CAB 66/14, Item 82, 'War Cabinet: United States Activities in the West Indies and Other 
British Dependencies, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies', 27 December 1940.
234 Fitzroy Baptiste, 'United States-Caribbean Relations from World W ar II to the Present: The Social 
Nexus', in Ransford W. Palmer (ed.), U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Their Impact on Peoples and Culture 
(Praeger Publishers: Westport, 1998), p. 14.
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possessed by the country to be invaded and situated at a position well
advanced beyond the objective of the invading fleet.235
Furthermore, the increasing significance of air power meant that 'a naval air 
service must be established, capable of accompanying and operating with the fleet in 
all waters of the globe'236. This prompted a raft of reports during the interwar years on 
the US need for bases in the Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific, with a lobby in the US 
Congress and the US Navy Department to get the United States to purchase 
Caribbean territories from amongst the European colonies in part settlement for First 
World War debts237. This included an approach for the Cayman Islands in 1934 238 Of 
course, as well as highlighting the increased strategic threat posed to the United 
States, technological advances further amplified the strategic and economic 
importance of oil. Up to the 1970s, the prime source of US oil imports was the 
countries of the circum-Caribbean, notably Venezuela, British Trinidad, Mexico, 
Columbia and Dutch Aruba and Curagao239. In addition, this area was also the 
source of two other important raw minerals, bauxite, used in aircraft production, and 
mica, used in the manufacture of radios, radars, motors and generators. By 1939, the 
British and Dutch Guianas were the world's largest producers of bauxite an industry 
controlled primarily by the US-led Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), and 
provided the United States with 50 per cent of its needs at the outbreak of the
235 Lt. Commander Virgil Baker, US Navy District Communications Superintendent in Puerto Rico, 
cited in Baptiste, 'United States-Caribbean Relations from World W ar II to the Present', pp.14-15.
236 General Board of the US Navy Department, cited in Baptiste, p. 15.
237 Baptiste, p. 13.
238 Williams, A History of the Cayman Islands, p.79.
239 Baptiste, p. 16.
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Second World War240. Safeguarding the channels to these vital raw materials for both 
the American military and the rest of the economy was of extreme importance.
Amongst the American troops initially stationed on Trinidad, and despite 
protests from both Governor Young and local nationalists, were 2,484 black 
soldiers. Concentrated in only two locations on the island, they caused a 
significant imbalance in the male-female population ratio within that ethnic group. 
Local males suddenly found themselves in increased and uneven competition 
for the island's women. In their favour, the Americans had 'the attractiveness of 
their uniform, the possession of more money and time to enjoy it, and the 
novelty of being foreigners'241. Prostitution rose exponentially, recorded in 
calypsos such as 'Rum and Coca Cola', which tells of "Both mother and 
daughter/Working for the Yankee dollar". The young women of Trinidad were 
'defying tradition, custom and authority for the generous rewards for sexual 
favours which the black Americans were willing to pay', and in doing so 
'threatened the social fabric of the community'242. This caused acute resentment 
amongst local black males. Furthermore, 'the unrelieved tension and inactivity in 
the Caribbean war theatre aggravated the ill feelings', leading to 'numerous 
incidents of trigger-happy soldiers using the local inhabitants for target 
practice'243. Trinidadian men, whose identity was intrinsically linked with strong 
masculinity, found themselves emasculated as traditional gender roles and 
assumptions were quickly demolished. This crisis of identity led Trinidadian men
240 Ibid., pp.15-6.
241 Annette Palmer, T h e  Politics of Race and War: Black American Soldiers in the Caribbean Theater 
During the Second World War', Military Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), p.59.
242 Ibid., p.60.
243 Annette Catherine Palmer, T he  United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1940-45', Ph.D. 
thesis (Fordham University, 1979), p.251
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to seek to reframe their masculinity within this new social paradigm, 
externalising itself for some in acts of crime and violence. Others drew on the 
tradition of the calypso warrior, defining their masculinity through military service 
in the local volunteer forces, including the TRNVR, and pursuit of their own 
warrior deeds.
The travelling British journalist Arthur Calder-Marshall, visiting the island in the 
late 1930s, commented that 'if a free ballot were taken in Trinidad as to whether the 
inhabitants would prefer to remain British subjects or join with the United States, 
there is no doubt that a large majority would be in favour of making the change1. He 
added that 'among the coloured people of Trinidad, I met no one who felt loyalty to 
the Empire, and among the white Trinidadians, a negligible few.'244 Yet, amongst 
those who volunteered for the TRNVR, imperial patriotism was audibly expressed in 
musical form. As sea shanties have been synonymous with the life of sailors for 
centuries, songs also became an integral part of naval life for Trinidadians. These 
songs however carried added cultural currency through their manifestation in calypso, 
a form indigenous to and deeply engrained in the fabric of Trinidadian society, where 
calypsonians took on the role of social and political commentators. Sailors in the 
TRNVR carried this torch, the chorus of one such example being:
Commander Lindsay say 
Cheer boys cheer 
With unity and the TNV
244 Arthur C. Marshall, "Trinidad wants to be American", Living, December 1938, pp.322-23 quoted in 
Annette Catherine Palmer, T h e  United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1940-45', Ph.D. 
thesis (Fordham University, 1979), p.55.
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We gonna conquer Germany.245
Note the rhythm of the chorus and the phonetic spelling of 'gonna', reflecting Creole 
dialect. Naval songs for Trinidadians were more than ditties sang to relieve boredom 
and pass the time. They were expressions of national identity. Here though, 
traditional cultural forms were being used not as anti-colonial nationalistic 
expressions, but to reaffirm Trinidadian identity with the imperial cause, united in their 
mutual struggle against Germany. This does not appear to reflect Calder-Marshall's 
observations, or historian Annette Palmer's opinion that this situation did not improve 
there or on the other islands when the war started246. It can be argued that there was 
clearly a degree of loyalty to Britain amongst those Trinidadians who served, and 
who chose to vocalise this 'unity' in this manner. The above chorus is in fact a clear 
pastiche of a famous patriotic calypso song from the First World War, written by 
Henry Forbes:
Run you run, Kaiser William, run your run) repeat [sic]
Hear what Kitchener say: cheer, boys, cheer
With surety and sincerity
We going conquer Germany247
Another naval-themed calypso from the Second World War was written by 
'Atilla the Hun' celebrating the destruction of the German 'pocket battleship' Graf 
Spee, which had sunk nine merchantmen in the Atlantic, affecting food supplies to 
Trinidad:
245 'A Short Story of the Trinidad Royal Naval Reserve', pp.3-4.
246 Annette Palmer, 'Rum and Coca Cola: The United States in the British Caribbean 1940-1945', The 
Americas, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Apr., 1987), pp.441-2.
247 Quoted in Errol G. Hill, 'Calypso and War', Black American Literature Forum, Vol.23, No.1 (Spring, 
1989), p.68.
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The sinking of the Admiral Graf Spee 
Must remain incontestably 
A monumental testimony 
To Britain's naval supremacy.248
Such songs tied into calypso's rooted associations with battles and warrior 
deeds, and provide a deeper cultural interpretation as to why Trinidadians enlisted in 
the armed forces. The origins of modern calypso can be traced to nineteenth century 
calinda chants which accompanied stickfighter duels, and further back than that it has 
roots in the djeli, West African tribal singers who would praise the heroic exploits of 
the tribe's warriors and revile its enemies249. As an extension of this, calypso was 
overwhelmingly a male discourse, and the connection between masculinity and the 
complex of warriorhood was a prominent feature in the formation of Trinidadian 
identity after emancipation which carried over into the twentieth century250. The act of 
the stickfight itself is a crude metaphor for 'manliness', with the points of the sticks 
carved in the shape of phalluses. When Trinidadians enlisted into the TRNVR and 
armed forces in general, they were doing so for more than merely financial 
betterment, imperial patriotism, and national honour; deeper than that they were 
responding to the calypso warrior's call. War allowed them to prove themselves as 
men, and more significantly, as Trinidadian men, as had been ingrained in them 
through songs and traditions passed down through the island's history and culture. 
When the men of the TRNVR sang calypsos, they were framing their own heroic
Ibid., p.74.
249 Ibid., pp.61-2.
250 Gordon Rohlehr, 'I Lawa: The Construction of Masculinity in Trinidad and Tobago Calypso', in 
Rhoda E. Reddock, Interrogating Caribbean Masculinities: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses 
(University Press of the West Indies, 2004), pp.326-8.
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deeds as part of this longer warrior tradition, and in the process reaffirming their own 
masculinity, so affronted by the American servicemen.
Imperial Propaganda
In Britain, discussions took place between the Ministry of Information and the 
Colonial Office regarding the raising of awareness in the Mother Country to the work 
done by the TRNVR and her sister units. For 'while Colonial Naval Forces have not 
had a spectacular part to play in the war, they have done, I think everybody will agree, 
a most useful job of work and we feel that far more should be published about them 
in the Press here'251. Yet, it was not just a case of giving the colonial sailors the 
recognition they deserved, and a number of strategic, economic and political factors 
also influenced this attitude. One was the Admiralty's 'policy to encourage the 
establishment of local Naval Forces in as many Colonies and territories as possible', 
and 'at the expense of the Colonial Governments concerned'252, thus reiterating the 
significance of strategic overstretch for the Navy, a situation further exacerbated by 
the war. Thus, there was a deliberate attempt to cajole colonial governments, whose 
interest in providing such forces 'should not be allowed to falter'. Again, there was a 
growing realisation of Britain's own dependency on the Empire, and the increasing 
mood of colonial 'partnership'. Therefore, 'if these Forces are to be maintained and if 
they are to be of the fullest value it is essential that a spirit of "esprit de corps" should 
be fostered', and 'we should display as much interest in them as possible, particularly
251 TNA, ADM 1/13014, From Downing Street to Admiralty, 18 November 1943.
252 TNA, ADM 1/13014, 'Publicity in United Kingdom for Colonial Naval Forces', 24th December 1943.
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in view of the fact mentioned by the Colonial Office that very satisfactory publicity has 
been given to Colonial personnel in the Army and R.A.F.253'. Here, traditional inter­
service rivalry and their competing interests for the same pools of colonial manpower 
also emerges. A call was thus put out for 'anything, in short, which would lend colour 
to a broadcast or published account of the work of these forces.'254
The most enthusiastic response came from the TRNVR, which had already 
utilised the local press in its self-promotion. Ironically, it was commented in an article 
published in the Trinidad Guardian on 5 November 1939, that the Navy earned its 
name the 'silent service' in part for its 'traditional distaste for publicity'255. Again, the 
article emphasised the seafaring qualities of 'Trinidad's Jack Tars':
All of them love the sea and most of them know the waters they patrol as 
well as they know the streets of Port-of-Spain. The majority are yachtsmen 
and keen deep-sea fishermen; there are some with Naval experience; 
others who have had merchant marine experience on the high seas; some 
who are youths fresh from school256
Beneath such plaudits, however, lay an underlying sense of otherness and 
inferiority. Upon being asked how he liked it in the TRNVR, one signaller replied "I 
love it", leading the reporter to comment that 'there was not much of the Silent 
Service in that crisp confession. It came straight from the heart. A smiling young 
Negro in three words spoke volumes'257. This imagery conveys a dual message; first
254 TNA, ADM 1/13014, From A.R. Thomas, Deputy Public Relations Officer, to Information Officers, 
Fiji, Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Ceylon, Trinidad, 21 
January 1944.
255 Trinidad Guardian, 5 November 1939, p.2.
256 Trinidad Guardian, 5 November 1939, p.2.
257 Idem.
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it reflects the 'happy-go-lucky' black African stereotype, reinforcing white British 
distinctiveness and professionalism by the fact the signaller represents 'not much of 
the Silent Service'; secondly, it portrays a willing readiness to serve the British, and 
an endorsement of colonial authority.
In the piece written for the Ministry of Information, aimed at a different 
audience, a metropole as opposed to colonial one, there were attempts to relate the 
TRNVR to British audiences. Trinidad is described as 'an island a little larger that the 
County of Sussex', and for the men of the force, English sports such as 'Cricket is 
their main recreation, but they also enjoy football', though it is also mentioned that 
'American baseball is beginning to become popular', illustrating the cultural influence 
from the American bases. Together these represent the paternalist teachings of 
superior western culture and civilisation, and their willing adoption by the locals. 
Cayman Islanders are singled out for special mention, as 'from these tiny islands 
alone come some of the best sailors in the West Indies'. Parts of the article read like 
a tourist brochure: 'swimming always helps to keep the heat of the tropical sun from 
becoming duly oppressive'; the crime, violence and poverty are not mentioned of the 
capital of Port of Spain, 'where cinemas and clubs provide an assortment of 
entertainments'. Overwhelmingly, no great sense of danger or sense of the war is 
conveyed in the piece. Instead, the work carried out by the TRNVR is described as 'a 
hard grind each day', and 'dull work' that will 'in some small way' ultimately contribute 
to Britain's victory:
Their jobs in the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve are not exciting, 
and carry few thrills, and few thanks, but it Is a job that has to be done, 
and they do it with a will, knowing that by so doing, they will assist in some
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way to shorten the war and allow them to get back to their jobs as 
fishermen, as cotton growers, sugar workers, and the numerous 
interesting West Indian industries that through shortage of labour are now 
suffering.258
The mention of 'interesting' West Indian industries reemphasises the traditional 
imperial division of labour, and equates the provision of naval service with that of raw 
materials. This does not represent an equal relationship, but reemphasises an 
economic, and by extension racial, hierarchy whereby the colonies supply their 
resources, in this case manpower, for the benefit of Britain. It is an inversion of 
contemporary rhetoric regarding 'development' and contradicts the supposed role 
reversal whereby the 'mother country' instead provides aid to her colonial children. 
The piece is not so much a celebration of the TRNVR's valuable contribution, but 
rather serves as propaganda for the imperial status quo and to reassure people back 
in Britain, whose confidence had been shaken, that the Empire and their world status 
that went with that was not about to crumble. Again, the final paragraph emphasises 
that 'the work that the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve does has to be done 
by someone', inferring it as being of lowly status, but suitable for colonials.
The photographs which accompanied the Ministry of Information's propaganda 
visually emphasises this imperial racial ordering, displaying white officers inspecting 
darker-skinned subordinates, deferentially standing at attention:
258 TNA, ADM 1/13014, 'Publicity in United Kingdom for Colonial Naval Forces', 1944.
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Image 2. TRNVR ratings under inspection [Source: TNA, ADM 1/13014 'Publicity in
UK for Colonial Naval Forces']
Another depicts a British flag officer stopping to speak to a young black rating:
Image 3. TRNVR rating with flag officer [Source: TNA, ADM 1/13014 'Publicity in UK
for Colonial Naval Forces']
Such paternalist messages were reinforced in several scenes portraying British 
officers giving instruction to attentive local recruits in a variety of naval matters:
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Images 4 and 5. TRNVR ratings under instruction [Source: TNA, ADM 1/13014, 
'Publicity in UK for Colonial Naval Forces']
Discrimination and Disorder
The implicit racial prejudice of this imperial propaganda manifested itself in 
explicit racial discrimination experienced by TRNVR ratings, both at home and 
overseas. The seafaring race lobby again reared its head when the force was 
considered for deployment to other theatres, and it was suggested by the Captain-in- 
Charge at Port of Spain that the coloured and black ratings should be sent to 'tropical 
climates only', and only with 'forces already employing such persons'259. Their 
perceived racial characteristics largely excluded them from leadership roles as 
officers. Deemed 'useful material if well led', their perceived 'lack of imagination' was 
seen to make them 'very suitable for monotonous work, such as mine sweeping and 
local patrols'. Yet 'being naturally unimaginative' also made them 'generally unable to 
concentrate for Ipng periods at a time', which excluding them from higher technical 
training in Anti-Submarine, Gunnery, Radar and Torpedo branches. The 'professional 
ability' of West Indians was only considered 'sufficient for "second line" service'260, 
and it was believed that 'if ratings have to qualify in accordance with [Royal] naval 
standards, that the standard of intellect will debar practically all coloured and black 
ratings from general service in the Royal Navy'261. Though it was considered that 
even the West Indian 'European' had by and large made a 'disappointing officer', and
259 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Captain in Charge Port of Spain's report no. 27/2359/3665, to the C-in-C 
American and West Indies' station, 12 February 1941, pp.2-3.
260 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Future of the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve', 17 July 1944, p.1.
261 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Captain in Charge Port of Spain's report no. 27/2359/3665, 12 February 1941, 
to the C-in-C American and W est Indies' station, pp.2-3.
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required 'considerable training in an environment other than the West Indies'262, 
ultimately there was nothing innate that was seen as preventative from him taking a 
place in the fleet other than the morally-sapping environment in which he found 
himself.
The policy of appointing officers based upon colour and social status and not 
the professional attributes needed for the Navy, in stark contrast to the enlisted crew 
whose seafaring qualities were strongly emphasised, meant that there was a lack of 
respect in the chain in command:
During the war, clerks and businessmen who had no business in the Navy 
got commissions and spoke harshly to ratings to hide their inabilities. They 
shouted commands at you because they weren't sure of what they were 
doing. They wore their uniforms smartly because that was one of the ways 
you knew they were officers. And they kept harping on at you to do this 
and do that, pull up your stockings, straighten your cap, and “wipe that grin 
off your face”.263
Though this may have been the attitude of the locally-mobilised part-timers, there 
was more respect for the full Royal Navy officers seconded to the force, both for their 
professionalism and the mutual respect they showed towards the men. This was 
manifested in the form of a tall, blue-eyed Lieutenant referred to by Selvon as 'G.P.':
I felt I'd trust him blindly, do anything he ordered. Out of the scores of men 
who wore officers' uniforms, he was the only one who made us like being 
under his command. But for all that, I never thought of him as an officer so
262 Ibid., p.3.
263 Michael Wentworth (Sam Selvon), 'A Man I Remember', Evening News (Trinidad), 27 March 1948, 
p.3, Item 579, Sam Selvon Collection, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago.
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much as a rational human being. He was one who put ideals and high 
thoughts above everything. He was a thinker, then a gentlemen, then an 
officer... He was stern, but understanding. He was an officer, but he didn't 
think it below his dignity to greet you with a good morning and a smile. 
He'd come and yarn when you were on duty, for he knew how difficult it 
was to keep awake when you were tired and sleep as just an eye-blink 
away... Other officers we feared or hated, but G.P. won our respect and 
admiration.264
Part of this mutual respect stemmed from the fact that G.P. was not aloof from his 
men, the local culture or customs, but in fact expressed a genuine interest in them 
and learning more, and he 'was one of the first persons to see and encourage 
Selvon's writings'265:
He ate "khaja", "mitai", and "mahambhog" (Indian sweetmeats) and 
enjoyed them. After the meeting we had a chat with the Pundit, and he 
showed great interest in the Hindu religion. Afterwards he told me that he 
had learned a lot. On duty nights, I told him all I could of Trinidad. He 
wanted to know of our culture, our ways of living, our political trends.266
Such officers were in the minority, however.
The TRNVR was ultimately never deployed to East Asia. During a port call by 
one TRNVR vessel to Durban, South Africa, violent disturbances broke out when the 
local bars refused to serve TRNVR ratings. It was later emphasised in the local
264 Idem.
265 Sam Selvon, Foreday Morning: Selected Prose 1946-1989 (Essex, 1989), p.xii.
266 Michael Wentworth (Sam Selvon), 'A Man I Remember', Evening News (Trinidad), 27 March 1948, 
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papers the next day that they were West Indians not Africans, and were to have 
European facilities267.
The reality though, was they were not treated the same as Europeans. Back 
in Trinidad, if a coloured rating committed an offence he was sent to the Royal Gaol 
among ordinary criminals, but 'owing to no white warders being available, it was 
considered unsuitable'268 for white ratings and officers, who would instead be 
detained at the barracks. This discrimination led to racial disturbances on the 14th 
and 15th May 1943 at the TRNVR base at Staubles Bay. Two coloured ratings, 
Ordinary seamen Harrington and Thomas, had been arrested for disobeying orders. 
Following their arrest a number of escape attempts were made leading to violent 
exchanges. Several guards refused to apprehend Thomas after he appealed that 
'they, as coloured men, should be his friend and not arrest him'269, after which a 
white naval guard was ordered to Staubles to arrest him. Meanwhile four deserters 
took the opportunity to cause trouble at the base. An anonymous source stated that 
[quote] 'the coloured boys are under-rated to such an extent and maltreated that in 
every one of their faces you can just see discontent, hatred and even fear... they are 
being treated like slaves... we are volunteer soldiers of the Admiralty - we ought to 
have white rights... then you hear some fancified [sic] speeches about democracy'270. 
Such men clearly saw through colonial propaganda attempts to mitigate the clear 
hypocrisy of wartime rhetoric, and whereas Caymanians like Harry McCoy identified 
with Britishness and thus believed the schooled imperial rhetoric that 'Britons never
267 Lionel Straker, 'A Stoker in the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve', The Building Exploratory, 
31 January 2006, www.brickfields.org.uk.
268 TNA, ADM 1/11057, 'Trinidad - Report of Proceedings from January 1st to March 31st, 1941', p.1.
269 TNA, CO 968/80/7, 'The disturbances at TRNVR HQ May 14-15, 1943 and their causes', 9 
October 1943, p.1.
270 TNA, ADM 178/301, 'Opinion voiced about the TRNVR', Appendix to Board of Inquiry Proceedings, 
1943.
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will be slaves', this was not the case for Trinidadians who felt they were perceived 
and treated as inferior. Service disenchantment was epitomised in the dialectic line 
'God bless Hitler, God bless Uncle Sam and fook the TRNVR Navy'271, found written 
upon one of the prison cell walls. Lieutenant-Commander Wilkinson, the 
Commanding Officer at Staubles, was singled out for particularly derogatory abuse. 
He was renowned as a tough officer, nicknamed 'The Dragon' on account of the 
dragoon tattoo adorning his arm, and thrice weekly he would read out the Articles of 
War to the men, emphasising that "Any man who shall desert in the face of the 
Enemy - the Penalty is Death in accordance with King's Regulations and Admiralty 
instructions".272 The board of enquiry later agreed that the ratings had 'ample cause 
for discontent' which arose from a 'complete absence of sympathy for the men 
shown by the officers'273. Wilkinson remained in his position, however, with the First 
Lieutenant Anderson made the scapegoat and transferred to another post. 
Discrimination was also material as well as verbal. The rates of pay for TRNVR 
ratings 'compared very unfavourably with the local military forces' and their British 
counterparts and they did not receive family allowances274. This was revised 
following the disturbances, with 'an increase to full British rates of pay for all 
personnel and the introduction of family allowances at full British rates for officers 
and 2/3 British rates for other ranks.275
Yet feelings of discontent were not isolated to prisoners and deserters. On 5 
July the previous year, Ordinary Seaman Edgar Mittelholzer, a Guyanese of German
271 TNA, ADM 178/301, 'Copy of Cell Writings', Appendix to Board of Inquiry Proceedings, 1943.
272 Robin Austin, 'Wartime Memoirs of Robin Austin', Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical 
Socirty, Vol. XLVI (2000), pp.161-186, p. 168.
273 TNA, ADM 178/301, 'Disturbances at Staubles - Interim Report of Board of Enquiry', letter 26 May 
1943.
274 TNA, CO 968/145/1, From Sabben-Clare to Commodore Dick, January 1944.
275 TNA, CO 968/80/4, Colonial Naval Forces - Trinidad R.N.V.R., 1943, p.36.
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extraction, who like Sam Selvon would become a leading Caribbean writer after the 
war, submitted his letter of resignation after only 10 months in the force. 'Deeming it 
my duty to give some service to the Empire'276, he left Guyana to join the TRNVR in 
December 1941, in what he would consider to be 'one of the blackest and most 
unpleasant interludes in his life'277. His experiences in the force had caused him to 
lose 'my spirit and enthusiasm for everything'. His resignation was prompted by his 
transfer to Staubles for Able Bodied (AB) Seaman training, away from his post at the 
Quartermaster's office at HMS Benbow in Port of Spain. This meant that even if he 
were to have passed the AB test, he would have received $17 to $18 less victualling 
allowance than had he still been an Ordinary Seaman living in the capital. His primary 
concern was his ability to support his wife, whom he had married four months 
previously, and upon joining he had been made to understand that the wives and 
family of naval men would be provided for. Yet upon taking his problem to the 
aforementioned Commander Wilkinson, he was told he 'should have thought of that 
before [he] got married'. Mittelholzer goes on to say about Wilkinson:
I have a commanding officer who is harsh and unsympathetic and even 
indifferent and contemptuous of my domestic affairs... there isn't a single 
man on this base who has a good word for Lt. Commander Wilkinson. Not 
ten minutes pass - and I mean this literally - without somebody uttering a 
resentful statement against this monstrous tyrant, and every day the 
grumblings of the men rise in tone.278
276 Letter from Mittelholzer to Captain C.C. Denison, HMS Benbow, 5 July 1942, private collection of 
Michael Gilkes obtained from Jacqueline Mittelholzer.
277 A. J. Seymour, Edgar Mittelholzer: the man and his work, being the text of the 1967 Edgar 
Mittelholzer Memorial Lectures (Georgetown, Guyana, 1968), p. 12.
278 Letter from Mittelholzer to Captain C.C. Denison, HMS Benbow, 5 July 1942, private collection of 
Michael Gilkes obtained from Jacqueline Mittelholzer.
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Ultimately these 'grumblings' grew into the mini-mutiny which broke out at the 
base the following year. His resignation was turned down, and to get discharged from 
the Navy, Mittelholzer 'had to feign madness and perform the works of a madman. 
His enemies say that these were natural acts as he was cracked anyhow, but his 
friends tell of his storming into an officer's room and carrying on in some outlandish 
manner'279. Members of the force such as Selvon seemed to believe that Mittelholzer 
was mad, ascribed in part to his literary bent; to write, like being mad, placed one 
outside of social convention. For some, such aspirations represented an unrealistic 
position to achieve within colonial society, and thus they became associated with 
madness:
When I had left home in 1950, people who wrote poems or stories were 
definitely mad, only fit for the madhouse up in St. Anns. I can remember 
before I began to write seriously, seeing the Guyanese novelist Edgar 
Mittelholzer strolling around the Savannah in Port of Spain, and thinking to 
myself that this was the man that everybody said was crazy, that he wrote 
books, whoever heard of a thing like that?280
279 A.J. Seymour, Edgar Mittelholzer: the man and his work, being the text of the 1967 Edgar 
Mittelholzer Memorial Lectures (Georgetown, Guyana, 1968), p.13. Some uncorroborated anecdotes 
regarding Mittelholzer's behaviour in the navy include the following (courtesy of Juanita Cox): ’1) He 
was given instructions, but when he refused to carry out the task he was told by his commander that 
he did not have an option so long as he was wearing the Kings uniform. Mittelholzer thus took off all 
his clothes and stood stark naked before wandering off to his quarters; 2) Mittelholzer was under 
surveillance according to one person because he kept writing letters in support of the communists and 
according to another person because he kept writing letters in support of the fascists; 3) One of the 
ships captains was murdered and Mittelholzer was accused because other naval ratings informed 
police that there had been strange goings-on between them. When interrogated Mittelholzer 
explained that he and the captain believed in astral projection and he had been trying to see if they 
could send telepathic messages to one another. The police called in a psychologist and Mittelholzer 
was branded a mad man. With the help of his wife's friends, Mittelholzer was released from custody 
but he found the experience humiliating. 4) Mittelholzer had often helped out the English members of 
the navy by writing letters homes to their loved ones so was stunned that they continued to treat him 
as an inferior despite the evident fact that he was more intelligent than them.'
280 Item 90, p.10, Sam Selvon Collection, UWI, Trinidad and Tobago.
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In the same month that Mittelholzer's resignation letter was submitted, the July 
edition of The Goshawk, the local Royal Navy journal, carried a leading article 
entitled 'Toleration':
A uniform can make a civilian resemble a soldier or a sailor, authority can 
regiment his mind, but only tolerant and wise leadership can make him 
fight... Buchan has written that the nursing ground of intolerance is a 
complete dogmatic certainty about the ordering of the World... Intolerant 
authority is the essence of Nazism... if there must be tolerance in authority 
there must also be tolerance of authority. If it be true that man cries out for 
authority then man must be prepared to trust and believe in authority... the 
British, as a race [are] the most tolerant among men. Not only do we 
believe in toleration for ourselves but also for others. We are prepared to 
fight for that and, in fact, it is that for which we are fighting.281
This article carries several, almost contradictory, messages. It emphasises 
Britain's innate moral authority to lead next to the 'intolerant authority' of Nazism, and 
the need for Trinidadians and other colonial subjects to respect her authority, thus 
legitimising British rule and serving as a mechanism for the preservation of civil and 
military discipline. It is because of this selfless tolerance and universal human right 
for which Britain was fighting, thus highlighting the global nature of the war, and 
reiterating Trinidad's stake in it, even though the latter found herself on the periphery 
of the actual fighting. Yet, it quite profoundly stresses the need for British officers to 
act tolerantly in their positions of authority, disputing the innate racial nature of this 
quality. In the TRNVR, where racial ideology and stereotypes underpinned almost all
281 The Goshawk: The Journal of the Royal Naval Air Station, Trinidad, Vol.1, No.7 (July 1941), p.1.
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aspects of force organisation, the quote adopted from novelist and imperial 
administrator John Buchan of how 'the nursing ground of intolerance is a complete 
dogmatic certainty about the ordering of the World' resonates profoundly. 
Considering once more the timing of the article, it is perhaps not coincidental that 
such warnings should go out when the 'grumblings' of discontent were beginning to 
be heard among the men on the ground.
The blatant intolerance and disregard for Mittelholzer's domestic affairs as 
displayed by Wilkinson contradicted assertions that 'one of the things we are 
supposed to be fighting for is the protection of our homes'282. Harking back to the 
earlier argument, the disruption caused by the incursion of American money into the 
colony, meant many local men, including Mittelholzer, could no longer provide for on 
their regular wages, leading some wives and girlfriends to the Americans. Thus, 
Mittelholzer's concerns are symptomatic of much larger social and economic issues. 
After the Staubles incident, the Admiralty recognised this problem and introduced a 
proper marriage allowance for the force.283
Post-War - Prestige, Professionalism and Prejudice
From mid-1944, with the U-boat threat in the Caribbean quelled, discussions 
began to take place regarding the future of the TRNVR come the end of the war. 
Though there was no longer any obvious strategic threat, the continual maintenance
282 Letter from Mittelholzer to Captain C.C. Denison, HMS Benbow, 5 July 1942, private collection of 
Michael Gilkes obtained from Jacqueline Mittelholzer.
283 TNA, CO 968/80/7, T h e  disturbances at TRNVR HQ May 14-15, 1943 and their causes', 9 
October 1943, p.3.
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of a colonial naval presence was considered important so as to 'keep the White 
Ensign flying permanently in areas which the Royal Navy could visit only occasionally, 
and where the presence of other flags (e.g. in the West Indies) makes the need so 
much greater'284. The 'other flags' alluded to in this context were the stars and stripes 
of the United States. Since the Destroyers for Bases agreement had been signed, 
there were fears in some circles that it was the first step in an eventual American 
colonisation of the British Caribbean. These were exacerbated in April 1944 by a 
House of Representatives Naval Sub-Committee report, recommending the 
permanent possession of the leased bases.285 It was thus suggested that the 
establishment of a full-time naval force in the region would act as a bulwark against 
American designs, and 'greatly assist in the task of keeping the Empire as a whole 
together and of upholding the prestige of His Majesty's Forces overseas.'286 Though it 
was acknowledged that this was more 'for political rather than Naval reasons'287, and 
in this regard the Admiralty were subject to the interests of the local colonial 
governments:
The presence of British Island possession in what may be a permanent 
American sphere of influence requires a British Naval Force in being to 
assert sovereignty and keep intact the maritime rights and facilities 
required by British Sea Power in this area... West Indian Governments, 
particularly those with American Bases in their midst, are sensitive to the 
indirect political pressure which the presence of U.S. Armed Forces exerts
284 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Naval Forces of the Colonial Empire and Mandated Territories and 
Protectorates', p.3.
285 Annette Catherine Palmer, 'The United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1940-45', Ph.D. 
thesis (Fordham University, 1979), pp.254-5.
286 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Naval Forces of the Colonial Empire and Mandated Territories and 
Protectorates', p.4.
287 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p.2.
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upon them... as long as this state of affairs continues they will press to 
have at least token British Forces in this area to act as a political counter 
balance.288
In this context it was emphasised that 'the necessity of encouraging citizenship and 
Empire responsibility amongst West Indians applies with equal force to local youth, 
and it is accentuated by the incidence of American occupation of bases in the West 
Indies'. It was believed that this could be achieved through 'the training and moral 
standards taught by the Navy'289.
Mr. Archer, representative of the Leeward Islands, expressed that he 'would 
like to see training carried on in the Colony - if only from a prestige stand point.... 
where the White Ensign could be hoisted, or perhaps a Club or some other focal 
point established where a naval atmosphere could be fostered.'290 It was also 
considered 'most important that British prestige should be promoted in Windward 
Islands', and therefore it was agreed at a conference of the West Indian colonial 
Governors that in addition to the Headquarters at Trinidad, minor sub-stations might 
be established either at Castries, St. Lucia, or St. Georges, St. Grenada to this 
effect.291 St. Lucia was 'not only one of the poorest areas of the West Indies but was 
regarded as one of the slums of the Commonwealth and among the most poverty 
stricken areas of the new world'292. The island had been dependent on the coaling 
trade, in decline since the Navy and other ships moved across to oil. The
288 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Future of the Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve', From The Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, To The Senior British Naval Officer, Western Atlantic, 17 July 1944, p.2.
289 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The W est Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p.5.
290 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Resume of points of discussion at a meeting held at the Royal Naval Camp, 
Trinidad on 4th January', 1946, p.3.
291 TNA, ADM 1/23215, From Governor Windward Islands To Secretary of State, 26 January 1946.
292 O'Loughlin (1968), p.46, cited in Tennyson S. D. Joseph, Decolonization in St. Lucia: Politics and 
Global Neoliberalism, 1945-2010  (Mississippi, 2011), p.21.
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unemployment this created was 'aggravated by the existence of an economy of 
"notorious artificiality", associated with the availability of high-paying, short-term 
employment opportunities' created by the US military bases in the south of the 
island.293 Thus a British naval presence was seen as a way of addressing this 
economic and political imbalance.
Although most of the British West Indies contributed to the manpower of the 
TRNVR, the same could not be said of its financial upkeep, which remained the 
responsibility of the Trinidadian legislative council, subsidised by the Admiralty during 
wartime. By contrast, it was suggested by the Admiralty that both the personnel and 
financial contributions towards the proposed 'Royal West Indian Navy' (RWIN) should 
be shared between all the colonies on a per capita basis, displayed in the table below:
Table 4. Apportionment of colonial personnel and financial contributions to 
proposed Royal West Indian Navy
Colony Personnel Finance
Trinidad 200 £44,000
Barbados 100 £22,000
Jamaica (including British 
Honduras and Cayman Islands)
100 £22,000
British Guiana 20 £4,400
Windward Islands 25 £5,500
Bahamas 20 £4,400
Leeward Islands 10 £2,200
Total 475 £104,500
Source: TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Resume of points of discussion at a meeting held at the Royal Naval 
Camp, Trinidad on 4th January', 1946, p.5.
Yet despite there being general support for the new force in principle, few of the 
colonial representatives could commit to this expense. The old issue of whether
293 Tennyson S. D. Joseph, Decolonization in St. Lucia, p.21.
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control of the force should rest locally or with the Admiralty continued to be a 
stumbling block. The Admiralty wanted the colonies to take on the operational 
responsibility for the RWIN so that they would also be morally obligated to take on 
the financial responsibility also. It feared a repeat of the TNVF, whereby it was 
obliged to foot the additional costs for the force after it was placed at its general 
disposal:
The arguments in favour of local control appear to be as follows: (a) 
Colonial Governments may feel that if the Force are under their own 
control, greater interest would be fostered locally in imperial defence than 
under any system of control from Whitehall, (b) No room would be left for 
the criticism that the local Legislature was being asked to vote funds for 
forces not under its administration. You will appreciate that as Admiralty 
funds will be limited the feasibility of the Scheme for permanent Colonial 
Naval Forces may well depend, whatever the system of control, on the 
willingness of Colonial Governments to bear a large proportion of the 
cost.294
The problem was that while personnel and financial contributions for the RWIN were 
organised on 'a Federal basis and not a Colonial one', only one Governor could act 
as Commander-in-Chief, and inevitably that would be from Trinidad being the 
headquarters of the main force.295 Discussions were consequently hampered by 
colonial parochialism, emphasised by Mr Lindo, the Jamaican representative, who 
stated that 'if his colony voted money it would be natural that there would be a feeling
294 TNA, ADM 1/23215, Letter from G.H. Hall to Colonial Office, 4 November 1945.
295 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The W est Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, Appendix "A", p.8.
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in some quarters that Jamaica had a claim to establishment of headquarters in that 
Colony.' He also pointed out the difficulty in passing the requisite legislation by eight 
separate political bodies.296 When the question was subsequently considered in the 
Jamaican Executive Council, it was of the opinion that 'in view of the heavy 
programme of essential works to be undertaken in the next few years... it is not 
possible to justify a contribution from Jamaican funds for defence purposes other 
than a contribution of the annual grant of £25,000 towards Imperial defence.'297
The Barbados representative, Commander W.R.M. Wynne, also stated that 
the only way local control could work was 'for Trinidad or some other Colony to have 
charge of the Force with the functions of the other participating Colonies limited to 
making contributions of money and personnel', in which case 'such a force could 
scarcely be said to be a "Royal West Indian Navy" and such an arrangement is 
unlikely to be acceptable to the Legislature of this Island'.298 Thus he 'emphasised 
that his Government wished the force to be under Admiralty control', which was 
exactly what the Admiralty did not want. In any case, like Jamaica, Barbados was not 
willing to exceed its existing imperial defence contribution of £6,000.299 It was a 
similar pattern from the other colonies, expressions of moral support for the scheme, 
not backed up by the required financial support.300
296 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Resume of points of discussion at a meeting held at the Royal Naval Camp, 
Trinidad on 4th January', 1946, pp.2-3.
297 TNA, ADM 1/23215, From The Governor of Jamaica to the A/Governor of Bermuda, 12 February 
1946.
298 TNA, ADM 1/23215, From Governor Grattan Bushe, Barbados, to G.H. Hall, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, 22 January 1946, p.2.
299 Ibid., p.3.
300 TNA, ADM 1/23215, From Governor Gordon Lethem, British Guiana, to G.H. Hall, 11 December 
1945. 'Resume of points of discussion at a meeting held at the Royal Naval Camp, Trinidad on 4th 
January', 1946, p.3. From Governor Windward Islands To Secretary of State, 26 January 1946.
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Nor were the problems restricted to the financial side, as there was 
considerable disagreement amongst the local naval authorities regarding the 
personnel of both the existing and proposed forces. While the Senior Naval Officer, 
Trinidad believed that the TRNVR was 'a loyal, well disciplined and efficient force and 
a considerable asset to the British West Indies'301, the Senior Intelligence Officer by 
contrast considered that with the 'exception of a few officers they are a useless lot' 
and it would be better to start again from the beginning'.302 As well as keeping 'alive 
the Naval tradition springing from the present war' and forming 'a nucleus for naval 
expansion in the West Indies in the event of a future', it was hoped that a continued 
local naval force would 'encourage "sea-mindedness" in a population which, although 
utterly dependent on sea communication for its very existence, is singularly lacking in 
interest in sea-faring matters.'303 This was emphasised in a census taken in 
December 1944, whereby only 13 officers and 277 members of the TRNVR indicated 
a definite willingness to stay on in a permanent force after the war.304 Racial 
prejudice continued to influence the opinions of the British naval authorities. The 
Senior Operations Officer equated that lack of 'sea-mindedness' with the perception 
that the black ratings 'are not intelligent', for while 'as infantry men or Artillerymen 
they might be of great value... they could not man the ship properly', but to add white 
technical ratings into the mix 'would confuse the messing and bathing 
arrangements.'305
301 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The W est Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p.1
302 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'West Indian Naval Force', Senior Officer (Intelligence), 28 March 1947.
303 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p.5.
304 Ibid., p.3.
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Despite this, 'a considerable number of European ratings possessing the 
higher technical qualifications' were considered necessary for the new force on 
account that 'experience has shown that the West Indian is not suitable for higher 
technical training in such specialist subjects as A/S, Gunnery, Radar, Torpedo etc., 
being naturally unimaginative and generally unable to concentrate for long periods of 
time'.306 It was again reiterated that 'the West Indian negro, although of excellent 
physique, is mentally underdeveloped. He is not necessarily stupid but emotional and 
lacking in self-restraint and responsibility'. Consequently, 'a strict but paternal 
discipline is necessary and... it is therefore imperative that officers be of the highest 
quality'. The role poor leadership played in the indiscipline that rocked the TRNVR 
was tacitly acknowledged by the admittance that 'with certain notable exceptions the 
West Indian European has made a disappointing officer', though this was put down to 
the local environment. It was therefore considered necessary that the Senior Royal 
Naval Officers in charge of the other Headquarters, be appointed from the United 
Kingdom, and relieved after a normal commission period of two and a half years' so 
as to 'ensure that the organisation shall not become dormant through permanent 
senior appointments being held by persons who by long residence in the tropics lose 
their energy and efficiency or tend to regard their duties in the light of a "hobby"'.307 
Yet this failed to take into account the Britain's 'own manpower shortage'308, which 
such colonial naval forces were meant to mitigate.
No further progress was made, and the Admiralty resigned itself to the fact 
that the case for a 'permanent Naval Force in the West Indies after the war is not
306 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p.3.
307 Ibid., Appendix "A", p.8.
308 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Royal West Indian Navy', 11 October 1946.
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convincing'. The lack of colonial financial support and their own racial prejudices 
combined to mean that 'there is a danger that insufficient local manpower will be 
available to meet the commitment', and ultimately 'its establishment appears neither 
practical nor economical.'309
309 TNA, ADM 1/23215, 'Appreciation of Naval Organisation In The West Indies After The War', Senior 
British Naval Officer, Trinidad, 3 June 1945, p.5.
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Conclusion
Though formerly established just after the outbreak of the Second World War, 
it was not a fear of Germany that was the main impetus behind the TRNVR's 
conception. Imperial overstretch affected not just Britain's ability to defend the Empire 
against external threats, but also internal dissidents who threatened the colonial 
status quo. Unable to spare imperial troops for internal security duties, local and 
metropole-based colonial officials and commercial interests hoped that raising a 
volunteer naval unit would improve the island's civil order, as well as lower its 
insurance premiums, in the face of growing Trinidadian labour nationalism, while the 
Navy looked to secure its oil supplies. The TRNVR was meant to be a symbol of 
Britain's prestige, but the poor quality of training and equipment afforded its recruits 
due to financial wrangling between the Imperial and colonial governments over who 
should foot the bill, meant the force lacked local authority and gravitas. Testament to 
the TRNVR's operational ineffectiveness is the fact that when Germany launched a 
serious U-boat campaign in the Caribbean from February 1942 it achieved huge 
successes, until the Americans took over anti-submarine operations.
There were some signs that the force helped cultivate imperial patriotism 
initially, expressed through jingoistic naval calypsos. Yet, colonial order began to 
break down after U-boat shipping losses took their toll on the island's food and 
supplies, and servicemen were marked out as targets for civilian discontent. The 
fractious situation was exacerbated by the United States' arrival following the 
Destroyers for Bases Agreement, with its troops undermining Trinidadian masculinity,
while its money drew away potential recruits for the Navy to alternative employment.
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Naval recruitment was thus opened up to the other British Caribbean colonies, with 
particular preference attached to Caymanians on account that they were a 'seafaring' 
race. Such ideologies underpinned the inherently racial nature of British colonial 
naval recruitment. Though seafaring experience was deemed a prerequisite for the 
enlisted men, it did not extend to the officer class, where the predominant attribute 
was the whiteness of their skin. It was well-recorded through anthropological surveys 
and colonial reports that the Caymanian black population was significantly lower than 
anywhere else in the Caribbean, and thus seafaring race theory was articulated to 
legitimise preferential selection on the basis of colour. Racial prejudices affected not 
only recruitment, but also operational deployment, with the force exempt from general 
service elsewhere with the Royal Navy on account of its black members' alleged 
mental deficiencies, and their character which was only deemed suited to tropical 
climates. Yet there also existed colonial prejudice, which was more ethnically than 
racially defined, as even the Caymanians were treated as inferior to the Europeans, 
notably in regards to medical care. The imperial hierarchy was then reinforced 
through imperial propaganda.
There was a clear distinction between the quality of the professional Royal 
Navy officers seconded to the force and local Europeans granted wartime 
commissions. Interestingly, it was the former who expressed more sympathy, 
interest and respect towards the indigenous customs and cultures they were 
unfamiliar with, whereas those raised in the colonies carried their local prejudices 
with them. Institutionalised discrimination also existed in the form of inferior pay and 
lack of marriage allowances for TRNVR ratings compared to their British Royal Navy 
counterparts. Such inequalities were reinforced by the Allied rhetoric that they were
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fighting a war for democracy, further destabilised by the American influence. It was 
this that was of prime concern to the colonial and naval authorities after the threat of 
Germany had been eradicated. Once again, the force’s raison d’etre was defined in 
response to Britain’s local position, with the primary concern not towards an external 
naval threat, but about fortifying Britain’s imperial prestige and colonial authority in 
the face of America’s growing hegemony. Yet, the scheme to form a permanent 
Royal West Indian Navy in the TRNVR’s stead encountered the same obstructive 
issues of finance and manpower, and without the imperative of war, common 
consensus and imperial unity could not be found to offset the range of competing 
metropole, regional and local interests. The parochial ingroup mentality that had 
inhibited the growth of esprit de corps and shared service identity during wartime 
evinced itself on a political level, scuppering not only hopes for the naval force, but 
also ultimately West Indian Federation.
We now turn to a case where the colonial naval force did successfully evolve 
into a full, sovereign navy, that of Malaya. Here too though, imperial ideology and 
ethnic divisions would continue to inhibit its development, even after independence.
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Case Study Two: Southeast Asia
Introduction
Much academic attention has been focused on the Singapore naval base, the 
'impregnable fortress' constructed during the interwar years at great expense to the 
Empire, which ultimately did little to prevent the fall of British Malaya and the Straits 
Settlements to the Japanese on 15 February 1942 after just eight days of fighting310. 
Yet, local naval defence did not rest solely on this imperial 'white elephant', and the 
largest contingent of colonial naval personnel, outside of India, was raised in 
Southeast Asia. Malaya was the only dependency to form a full-time naval force, the 
Royal Navy (Malay Section), more commonly known as the 'Malay Navy', and this 
was supplemented by two naval reserve forces based in Singapore and Penang. 
Following the defeat at Singapore, the survivors of these forces continued to fight 
until the end of the war, mainly in Ceylon but also Australia and East Africa.
Unlike the Caribbean, where the surrender of the Axis powers meant there 
was no longer an operational imperative for the continued existence of local auxiliary 
naval units, the Malayan 'Emergency' of 1948 to 1960, followed by the Indonesian 
Confrontation or 'Konfrontasi' between 1962 and 1966, meant the Southeast Asian 
naval forces continued to find relevance in a shifting geopolitical landscape. The 
Cold War and decolonisation meant that rather than dying with British colonialism in 
1957, the Malayan naval forces became the foundation for an independent,
310 See W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942  (London,
1979), James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 
1919-1941 (Oxford, 1981), Ian Hamill, The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New  
Zealand, 1919-1942 (Singapore, 1981).
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professional Malayan Navy. They thus provide a significant case study for analysing 
issues of imperial transition and nationalisation. They also provide an opportunity for 
examining the colonial and post-colonial dynamics of the region's ethnic plurality, its 
impact on imperial racial ideology, naval recruitment and service, and the tensions 
this created, particularly following the intervention of nationalist politics in the 
operations of the Navy, with its policies of 'Islamisation' and affirmative action.
Part one of this case study analyses the key themes of the pre-1945 period: 
the origins of the Malayan naval forces; the influence of racial Ideology upon early 
recruitment; the role and impact of the Second World War; and the effects of 
evacuation and exile in Ceylon upon service and ethnic unity. Part two will examine 
the post-Second World War period, where the main issues comprise: the British 
return to Malaya; the influence and 'collaboration' of Chinese secret societies; the 
reconstitution of the force and its role during the 'Emergency'; issues of force 
expansion and nationalisation; the influence of graft, corruption and patronage; and 
the effects of 'Islamisation' and the introduction of a quota system upon naval 
efficiency and esprit de corps.
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Map 3. British Malaya, c.1922
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Part One: Pre-1945
Origins
As early as 1902, significantly the year the Anglo-Japanese naval treaty was 
signed, the military authorities in Malaya began pressing for the creation of locally- 
recruited volunteer forces. Ian Hamilton, the inspector-general of overseas forces 
argued in 1913 that 'a loyal and patriotic Malay nation, trained to arms might well 
prove in future a fitting guardian for the western portal to the Pacific, a doughty 
defender of one of the richest and fairest portions of the British Empire'311. Malays, 
however, were considered 'soft1, 'indolent', and not a 'martial' race312. This belief was 
influenced by the view that the Malays had not put up the fierce resistance to 
colonialism that the Indian martial races had done, and they were too 'easy going' to 
be martial313. The governor, Arthur Young, argued that Malays would 'resist routine 
and also prolonged barrack life with continual discipline', though as an alternative he 
suggested that 'a naval unit would appeal to the Malay, he would feel perfectly at 
home on the water. His objection to discipline and hard work on land would not be 
the same when on water'. This proposal was considered unfeasible, however, due to 
the expense in providing ships, and the interference it would cause with their 'padi 
planting and harvest'314.
311 Nadzan Haron, 'Colonial Defence and British Approach to the Problems in Malaya 1874-1918', 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol.24, No.2 (May, 1990), pp.275-295, pp.286-287.
312 Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920  (London, 
2007), p.77.
313 Kevin Blackburn, 'Colonial forces as postcolonial memories: The commemoration and memory of 
the Malay Regiment in modern Malaysia and Singapore', Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig (eds.), Colonial 
Armies in Southeast Asia (London, 2006), p.302.
314 Haron, 'Colonial Defence and British Approach to the Problems in Malaya 1874-1918', p.287.
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There are records of a temporary, locally-instigated unit named the Coast 
Defence Volunteers, raised in 1917 in Singapore and Penang, which served afloat 
conducting anti-submarine patrols.315 Its nine officers and 200 other ranks were 
drawn solely from European manpower, however, and the unit was disbanded at the 
end of the First World War.
Discussion did not seriously arise regarding the formation of a more 
permanent local naval force in Singapore until the mid-1920s. One lesson learnt from 
the First World War was, 'that no force it is possible to maintain in time of peace can 
be wholly adequate for all the duties that fall upon the Navy of such an empire as 
ours in time of war'316. The creation of other colonial naval units was seen as 
necessary to 'place our defences on sound foundations', and 'draw into active 
sympathy with them the very considerable number of our citizens who have inherited 
the ardent sea-love of our native country'317. Not only would local naval units plug 
operational gaps, but they were also seen as forces for the spread of British prestige 
and imperial unity.
The priority given to creating naval reserves in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
much like the decision to construct the Singapore naval base, was heavily influenced 
by the shifting geo-political landscape, significantly the emergence of Japan as a 
naval superpower with growing imperial ambitions of its own and a deteriorating 
relationship with Britain:
315 Sir Charles Lucas, The Empire At War, Vol.II (Oxford, 1923), p.382, p.385.
316 Straits Times, 18 April 1925, p.8. This was demonstrated by the fact that two-thirds of the struggle 
against the German u-boats in the First World W ar had fallen to reserve men who plugged such 
deficiencies until regular naval forces became available, or freed up the regulars for more urgent duty 
elsewhere.
317 Straits Times, 18 April 1925, p.8.
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...If the hopes of a long peace are disappointed we who live on the border 
of the Pacific will be nearer to the war than we were to the last great world 
conflagration. Siam is our only land neighbour and she is our friend and 
ally. If we have to face danger it will come to us over the blue waters, and 
when our big ships go forth to fight, we shall need watchful eyes to guard 
our commerce, and to keep our waters free from hidden dangers.318
Historical irony aside, this is an apt summary of the Royal Navy's envisaged future 
role. Unable to perform both tasks, the RN would resort to its traditional mission of 
seeking out and engaging enemy ships on the high seas, leaving duties such as 
harbour defence, local convoy escorts, minesweeping, and anti-submarine patrols to 
colonial naval reserves.
Regardless of its strategic importance, Singapore was seen as an ideal 
recruiting ground for one of the new naval units as it already possessed 'ardent 
yachtsmen' and 'fine waters in which naval training may be given'319. It was 
envisaged that the establishment of such a force and the associated training would 
provide benefits beyond the strategic defensive. It would be a moral force, which 
bound together an ethnically disparate society and fortified 'character' otherwise 
sapped by the inherent lethargy of the tropics:
Even a few hours on the water acts as a tonic, and weekends may be made 
wholesome on a Naval Volunteer cruise. Until a few years ago, the sea was 
curiously neglected by Singaporeans, but the Yacht Club which started 
bound almost at once into popularity, and it has become a source of delight.
We believe that the proposed naval unit will be equally popular, once our 
tropical inertia has been overcome.320
It would be a further nine years, however, before the unit would finally be 
established, as the scheme became bogged down in legislative and financial 
wrangling. In September 1932, a question was raised in the legislative assembly by 
the Honourable Mr J. Bagnall over the real purpose for the proposed force; whether it 
was being created primarily to protect the naval base, whether this constituted an 
imperial rather than a local interest, and should it not therefore be funded by the 
British Government rather than the colony. It was argued that the idea of a RNVR unit 
had not been mooted before that of the naval base which was first announced in 
1923, and that if the unit's conditional purpose were to prevent a "blockade of 
[Singapore's] waterways by hostile ships", then 'the real objective of a blockading 
force would be the paralysis of the Naval Base'. The RNVR's raison d'etre was 
therefore inextricably tied to the base, and if the latter was 'not big enough to look 
after itself and at the same time provide protection of our food supplies, it is hardly 
likely that the task could be performed satisfactorily by an $84,301 RNVR unit'321. 
The British desire to turn colonial thinking 'into active sympathy' with its idea of 
imperial defence was clearly still a lofty aspiration. Ultimately the decision rested with 
the Governor of the colony, and he refuted the notion that the scheme was linked to 
the naval base, saying that it concerned 'simply and solely the maintaining in times of 
emergency, of free passage to the Singapore harbour... a vital interest to this Colony 
and we all ought to be anxious to safeguard it'. He also argued that:
320 Idem.
321 Straits Times, 27 and 28 September 1932, p. 12 and p. 10.
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It is a very lamentable fact not greatly to our credit that we did not pay any 
contribution whatever to our defence by sea or air. We are content to allow 
the whole of the burden to fall upon the British taxpayer although everyone 
of you knows that he is more heavily burdened than we are. This service is 
intended for our use entirely... all steps that are in my opinion, necessary, 
and which are within my power, and can be afforded by the Colony, should 
be taken to safeguard our vital interests.322
Race and Recruitment
On 20 April 1934, the Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
(SSRNVR) was finally established, based in Singapore. Initially administered by the 
Army but trained by the Navy, the force began with a complement of 25 officers and 
150 ratings, quickly growing to 50 officers and 200 ratings and still with a large 
waiting list of willing recruits. Initial training was conducted on the Governor's yacht, 
Sea Belle II, until 18 January 1935, when the Acacia-class sloop HMS Laburnam was 
formerly handed over to the force to act as its headquarters and drill ship. The officer- 
in-charge, Lieutenant-Commander L.A.W. Johnson, RN, had previously acted as 
chief of the Fishery Protection Gunboat, Liffey, and was accredited for his 'keenness 
and energy'323, at least officially. Unofficially, it was later stated within Admiralty and 
colonial circles that the appointment 'has not been altogether as successful as had
322 Straits Times, 19 October 1932, p. 12.
323 S traits Times, 1 December 1934, p. 13.
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been hoped', with Johnson being described as "tired" 324, a problem perhaps 
inevitable given colonial reliance on retired naval officers. He was assisted by E.W. 
Hull, an ex-RN Chief Petty Officer and instructor at the torpedo school HMS Vernon 
in Portsmouth. The Army connection was strengthened by the loan of Sergeant Major 
Adnan Raji to the force from the Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps to acts as drill 
instructor325, and he was the first Malay to be promoted to the rank of Chief Petty 
Officer326. The rest of the officers were Europeans, some with 'experience of nautical 
matters'327, though many were also 'merchants, brokers, planters and miners'328. 
They were trained to be thoroughly conversant in the subjects of pilotage, 
minesweeping, signals, mining and depth charges, gunnery, field training, and 
seamanship. The ratings were Malay, some possessing seagoing experience as 
fishermen or merchant seamen, although others were clerks, tambies329 and motor 
engineers. The ratings were put through a four-year course similar to that of the 
officers, minus pilotage, and signalling was learnt by the signals section only.330 
Members of the unit were given the opportunity to embark on cruises aboard HMS 
Terror, the RN monitor stationed at the naval base, as well as other ships. These 
were designed not purely for practical experience, but also to 'promote social 
contacts, and generally to make this unit feel like the navy has taken the RNVR under 
its wing in no uncertain manner', and to promote 'esprit de corps and keenness' in the 
unit, not just among the officers stationed in Singapore, but also from visiting ships
324 TNA, CO 877/13/27, 'Vacancy for officer instructor in Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force', 22 
January 1937.
325 TLDM (Royal Malaysian Navy) Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009.
326 Royal Malaysian Navy (ed.), Honour and Sacrifice (Kuala Lumpur, 1994), p.21.
327 S traits Times, 7 December 1934, p. 13.
328 Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10.
329 'Tamby' is a Tamil word, being an endearing term for a younger brother, but since colonial times 
came to refer to Tamil office boys. As the ratings were uniformly Malay, it is assumed that this term 
was misused in the original source, and 'Ahmad', the term used for Malay office boys and chauffeurs, 
should perhaps have been used instead.
330 S traits Times, 7 December 1934, p. 13.
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who themselves displayed 'the utmost helpfulness and friendliness towards the naval 
volunteers'331.
Despite a dominant Chinese population existing in Singapore, with significant 
Chinese communities spread across the Malay Peninsula, recruitment for ratings was 
restricted exclusively to the Malay population. Justification for this discriminatory 
policy lay in British assumptions of their nautical qualities. Malays were considered a 
'seafaring people and along the coasts of the Peninsula there are hundreds of sturdy 
fishermen suitable for training'332. The reality that Malays were also recruited from 
inland and from non-maritime backgrounds indicates that seafaring aptitude was 
seen as being an innate racial quality, and like the British, who viewed themselves as 
the archetypal maritime race, this 'call of the sea' was something which was inherent 
along particular ethnic lines.
The early aspirations of using the SSRNVR as a force for social and moral 
change re-emerged when it was suggested that it could be utilised as an outlet in 
which to channel the colony's unemployed Malays:
...the pay is enough to satisfy the easy-going Malay (a dollar a day), the 
work suits him, the discipline also apparently suits him - very much better 
than anyone expected it would - and he likes the sea and boats and 
everything associated with them.333
The rhetoric of the argument is loaded with racial stereotypes, and illustrates 
colonial logic regarding the Malays' suitability for naval work. As well as an innate 
love of the sea, the stereotype of the 'lazy Malay' is also reflected in their 'easy-going'
331 Straits Times, 8 December 1935, p.2.
332 Straits Times, 26 January 1937, p.11.
333 Straits Times, 23 May 1937, p.2.
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nature which dictates here that they could work for lower pay, and would less likely 
antagonise the chain of command, preserving the discipline of the force. The Chinese, 
by contrast, were seen as hard-working but commercially-orientated, and thus less 
likely to work for the lower wages. A report on the Fighting Value of the Races of 
Malaya, published in 1930 by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Singapore, 
Major-General Harry Lionel Pritchard, had asserted that though the Chinese were 
intelligent, had initiative, enterprise, determination and persistence, they only 
displayed 'fighting value' when it was for personal gain, as demonstrated when 
'Chinese burglars stood up well in their brushes with the police'334. Whereas Malays 
'could be relied on to be loyal to their Sultans', the British had doubts over Chinese 
political loyalties, both towards the Kuomintang, and the Communists whose 
egalitarian ideology ran counter to notions of naval/military hierarchy and discipline. 
There was also concern over the influence Chinese secret societies wielded. Of the 
Indians in Malaya, it was thought that 'one cannot make soldiers out of Tamils'. 
Though Sikhs were proven fighters, they were also considered 'well-known intriguers 
by nature', while Sikh policemen had been 'passively disloyal' when a Punjabi Muslim 
battalion mutinied in Singapore in 1915.335
The SSRNVR's discriminatory recruitment policy drew criticism from the 
Eurasian community, with the issue becoming politicised and adopted by Eurasians 
to highlight their wider campaign for greater political and social representation:
...the Eurasian position is tragic, due to the fact that we are brought up in 
European environment, with European traditions and living standards. As 
a rule we are not an agricultural race, so we cannot go back to the land, as
334 Quoted in McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942, p.225.
335 Ibid., pp.225-6.
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some suggest. Neither do we get a dole... The pro-Malay policy in Malaya 
as a whole has crushed our hopes, and we are being entirely "cabined". 
Our Malacca lads would jump at the chance, if given the opportunity to 
enrol in the navy or the RNVR, as they are on par with the Malays, where 
the sea is concerned, having come from a long line of seafaring 
forebears.336
Though the GOC's report believed that the Eurasians in Malaya were better 
than those in India, their martial ability varied greatly; the 'cross with Chinese' was 
considered better than with Malays, and while the best type of Eurasian could 
'almost' be on a par with pure British, the worst were 'quite useless for any 
purpose'337. Seafaring ancestry here was not enough to qualify Eurasians as a 
‘seagoing race’. In fact, their very lack of legislative recognition as a distinct 'race' 
was why they were fighting for greater rights. Whereas groups recruited in other 
areas of the Empire, such as Cayman Islanders, were similar to Eurasians in 
possessing European ancestry with some seafaring tradition, Caymanians had a 
separate culture developed in comparative isolation over a couple of centuries, 
distinct enough from that of the British so that a sense of ‘otherness’ and racial 
difference prevailed. This was not so clear in the case of Eurasians, who for the 
majority were only a couple of generations separated from their British heritage, and 
possessed similar customs though they were perceived as racially ‘other’. They 
served as troubling reminders to British administrators about the dangers of ‘going 
native’ and the dilution of British racial stock. Furthermore, in the hierarchy of the 
Navy, they would have distorted the relationship between class and colour which
336 Straits Times, 25 May 1937, p. 12.
337 Quoted in McIntyre, p.225.
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demarcated the chain of command and reinforced the authority of the European 
officer class. By refusing to provide legislative recognition or cultural validity to 
Eurasian ethnic identity, both within the Malay Navy and the broader colony itself, it 
helped maintain the illusion of British racial superiority, and the imperial hegemony 
that went with that.
Consequently, despite external pressures, even as the force expanded, 
recruitment policies remained the same and focused around European officers and 
Malay crew, most of whom possessed lower levels of education from local English 
schools. As of March 1937 several officers trained in Singapore began to be 
stationed in Penang and were known as 'list 2 officers'338. These formed the nucleus 
of a second SSRNVR unit created and based there from October 1938, which was 
soon renamed as the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (MRNVR). The force's 
membership grew from 20 officers and 100 ratings, to 650 ratings and 158 British 
officers on the eve of the Second World339. When war broke out on 4 September
1939, the officers and ratings of both RNVR forces were released from their civilian
occupations and mobilised for full-time service for the duration of hostilities. Unlike 
the experiences of the TRNVR, officers and ratings received the same rate of pay as 
their counterparts in the Royal Navy340.
On the same date, under the auspices of the Admiralty and the Ministry of War 
Transport, a large-scale programme of requisition and modification was embarked 
upon involving merchant vessels of Singapore, Malayan and Hong Kong shipping 
companies, most notably the Straits Steamship Company. By 1941, 51 trading
338 Straits Times, 6 March 1937, p. 13.
339 TLDM (Royal Malaysian Navy) Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009.
340 Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10.
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vessels had been commissioned into the SSRNVR as His Majesty's Ships (HMS), 
equipped with cannons, Lewis guns, depth charges, and minesweepers.341 These 
ships retained their original crews, which included some Chinese, and their Malay 
'serang'342. Their captains were given temporary commissions in the SSRNVR, and 
the flag of the line was replaced by the white ensign343. "Korang" and "lebeh" became 
the two most common words on the bridge of an SSRNVR minesweeper, as the CO 
sent instructions in Malay to the engine room to either speed up or slow down344.
In addition to the RNVR units, in 1939 a full-time Royal Navy (Malay Section) 
was formed to release some of the European RN personnel for service elsewhere, 
known colloquially as the 'Malay Navy', and based at Singapore in HMS Pelandok345. 
The force was again open exclusively to Malays, aged between 15 and 20 years old. 
Higher educational standards were required for joining, with those possessing Malay 
School Standard Five entering the Marine Branch, and those with Senior/Junior 
Cambridge or Standard Seven at English schools entering the Telegraphy branch. 
Seamen under training were paid $28 a month, rising to $45 a month for a petty 
officer. Engine room personnel received a higher wage, from $40 for stokers to $90 
for chief engineers.346 The men were issued with 'smart and effective shore uniforms 
- white shirt and coat, blue and gold sarong and black cap', which were seen as 'a 
never-ending source of pride' that appealed to prospective recruits347. Recruitment 
posters and notices were published in the local press and issued at District offices
341 TLDM (Royal Malaysian Navy) Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009.
342 'Boatswain'.
343 Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10.
344 S traits Times, 21 February 1940, p. 10.
345 'Pelandok' is Malay for 'mouse deer', a creature native to the peninsula and a favourite character in 
Malayan folk tales.
346 Idem.
347 Straits Times, 28 September 1940, p.11.
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throughout the country348. By the end of 1939, around 400 Malays, drawn from 
Singapore, Sarawak and Peninsula Malaya, were serving in the Malay Navy, growing 
to 800 men the following year, and 1,430 by the end of 1941349, with thousands more 
on the waiting list350 The force's popularity amongst Malay volunteers was again 
attributed to their seagoing nature:
The sea attracts the Malay like water does a duck. He joined the SSRNVR 
when the call for volunteers came - and he and his friends are still joining. 
Last September, there were whispers in the Bazaars and the Kampongs that 
Malays would be wanted in a unit of their own in the RN. Before the naval 
authorities in Singapore could fully appreciate the work of the whispers, they 
were inundated with applications.351
Malays were framed in traditional culturally stereotypical terms here, and once 
more it was argued that such naval forces played a role not purely for external 
defence, but also as outlets for elevating Malays out of positions of oriental 
stagnation into becoming productive members of society:
It is another step towards employing the "sons of the soil" in the defence of 
their own country. First there was the Malay Regiment. Then - as a 
venture, one might say - came the SSRNVR which confirmed the belief 
that coffee-shop loungers and office peons could be turned into good
348 Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia: 55 Tahun - Royal Malaysian Navy: 55 Years (Kuala Lumpur, 1990),
p.20.
TLDM (Royal Malaysian Navy) Museum, Malacca, 2 July 2009.
350 Straits Times, 28 September 1940, p.11.
351 Idem.
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sailors, and that in the country there was plenty of material that could be 
absorbed into the RN proper.352
The Navy was seen as a transformational force, not merely a social one, but 
also a cultural one, simultaneously and subliminally reinforcing the validity of the 
imperial project, civilising mission, and the British right to rule. Under British tutelage, 
the traditional image of the 'lounger' or 'lazy Malay' thus became transformed into that 
of an alert, dedicated professional sailor:
On a visit to HMS Pelandok yesterday, we saw the ratings at their training, 
noticed the concentrated looks on their faces as they listened to lectures 
on boxing, the compass, anchor and cable work, and the rule of the road 
at sea; watched their nimble fingers making bends and hitches and 
splicing wires; heard the dots and dashes of an electronic "buzzer" as they 
were being taught signalling and telegraphy, and appreciated their 
quickness at the guns.353
By April 1940 five Malays, aged between 21 and 31, had passed out as 
leading seamen to become instructors and were being trained as Petty Officers. 
These men were used to illustrate the progress of the force and illustrate how it was 
'beginning to fulfil the policy of the Admiralty that all instruction will be given by 
Malays', though the European officers would remain in advisory and administrative 
capacities. The most senior of these men, Hashim bin Karim, had been a policeman 
for three years before joining the Malay Navy in September 1939, and previous to 
that he had served aboard a merchant ship. When asked whether he would stay in
the RN he replied: "Of course I'll sign up for another year, and another, and another". 
Another of the five was Ali bin Ibrahim, who had also been a merchant seaman since 
1936, and was awarded the Royal Humane Society medal for rescuing the ship's 
storekeeper when he fell overboard on one voyage to Liverpool. Acting Petty Officer 
Haroun, an ex-railway guard who had served in the SSRNVR for a number of years, 
professed his sense of duty and imperial loyalty in that: "We in these ships are doing 
our best to help to win the war, and of course, we will win. We are all united, aren't 
we!"354
One volunteer, Mohamed Haji bin Yunos was a clerk in the Singapore 
Municipality when he was mobilized on the outbreak of war in Europe. In the early 
months he was attached to a minesweeper, work he described as "hard and long 
hours", but nevertheless, he added, "I and my brother are proud to be of service to 
our king and country"355. Like PO Haroun, this could be interpreted as an expression 
of imperial allegiance, yet it could be interrogated further by questioning to which 
king was Haji referring? After all, only the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Malacca 
and Penang technically had British crown colony status. The Malay states were tied 
to Britain by treaties and retained their own Sultans, who continued to act as 
Malaya's religious leaders with complete authority over Islamic matters. The Sultans 
themselves had forged links with the Navy, being 'deeply sensible of the benefits of 
British protection' and desiring to 'express their loyalty in some tangible form', they 
had paid for the construction of the Queen Elizabeth-c\ass battleship, HMS Malaya, 
in 1913 'with a view to the strengthening of the British Empire and maintaining her
354 Straits Times, 21 February 1940, p. 10.
355 Straits Times, 28 December 1939, p. 10.
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naval supremacy'356. The fact that Haji adopts such linguistic iconography as that old 
British adage of 'king and country', even if he was simply parroting the phrase, 
indicates an assimilation of British discourse and cultural hegemony. In this context, 
a conception of both 'king' and 'country' is misleading and culturally displaced. For 
not only were there multiple monarchs competing for Malay loyalty, but Singapore 
was not technically a political entity in its own right, being but one part of the Straits 
Settlements, never mind a unified country or nation, with competing ethnic identities 
superseding any nascent sense of 'Singaporeaness' at this time. Such an identity, it 
can be argued, wasn't properly articulated until the late 1960s after the city-state's 
ejection from Malaysia. Instead Singapore was a place of conflicting ethnic 
allegiances.
The Second World War
The most famous, or perhaps infamous, naval action involving Singapore 
during the Second World War was arguably the sinking of the HMS Prince of Wales 
and HMS Repulse on the 10 December 1941. Much has been written about 
Churchill's decision to send just two capital ships, one an un-modernised First World 
War battlecruiser with light armour and the other a battleship only just commissioned 
without a proper work-up, with no cruiser or aircraft carrier escort, to act as a 
deterrent to the much larger Japanese fleet. The mythology of the Royal Navy's 
superiority, coupled with racial preconceptions regarding Asiatic peoples, influenced
356 H.C. Ferraby, The Imperial British Navy (London, 1918), p.91.
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the underestimation of the threat posed by the Imperial Japanese Navy. The sinking 
of 'Force Z' led Churchill to later proclaim "In all the war, I never received a more 
direct shock... As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in 
upon me... Over all this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme, and we 
everywhere were weak and naked"357. With Japan able to operate with complete 
impunity in both the skies and sea-lanes, Singapore surrendered to the Japanese on 
15 February 1942, prompting Churchill to label it the "worst disaster" and "largest 
capitulation in British history". This is the popular memory surrounding the fall of 
Singapore, in what has become a watershed for postcolonial nationalist 
historiography in general; the British Empire had been defeated by an Asian power, 
shattering British 'prestige' and illusions of superiority.
Although Singapore is popularly remembered, at least in the West, for this 
'capitulation' and the embarrassment suffered by Britain and the Royal Navy, it does 
in fact have interesting parallels with Dunkirk, another defeat, but one which is 
conversely remembered as a moment of national heroism and celebration. 
Immediately after the war, the Straits Times published numerous articles celebrating 
the wartime exploits of its local military forces, including the naval forces. Like those 
at Dunkirk, these men were praised for their efforts in helping evacuees, first from 
Penang, and then from Singapore in its final hours, for which they paid a high price; 
only nine out of 61 MRNVR ships managed to break through the enemy cordon to 
reach Sumatra and Java, with the rest being sunk by the Japanese fleet and air 
force.358 Around 41 MRNVR officers died or were Missing-ln-Action (MIA), 49 were 
taken prisoner, and only 30 got away. In total MRNVR officers won 10 Distinguished
357 Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (London, 1950), p.487.
358 Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia: 55 Tahun, p.77.
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Service Crosses (DSC), one Distinguished Service Order (DSO), and eight mentions 
in dispatches. Of the Malay ratings, it is known that 53 were Killed-in-Action (KIA), 
120 were MIA, with around 500 recovered.359 These were depicted locally as 'acts of 
bravery and devotion which make us humble at the thought that we are beneficiaries 
of such sacrifice'360, and contradict Western representations of the battle.
Dahim Ahmad bin Noordin joined the Malay Navy as a signalman in October 
1941. His opinion of the retreat from Dunkirk when it was relayed to Malaya was that 
it was 'terrible', at odds with images of the 'disaster turned triumph'361 and 'miracle of 
Dunkirk', that Churchill perpetuated in Britain. The collective anaesthesia that the 
'Dunkirk spirit' served for the British did not seem to extend to Malays. Here there 
was no semantic illusion; it was plain and simple defeat. Despite this, it did not shake 
Ahmad's sense of imperial patriotism. He clearly displayed pro-British sympathies, 
and he promptly joined the Malay Navy, expressing the opinion that, 'I just wanted to 
join, that's why, stood for something, that so wrong? Rather than be a civilian, I know 
in war time civilians suffer'362. The prestige of the service and the grander cause 
clearly appealed ('stood for something'), but also to Ahmad, civilian life during 
wartime held more fears than being in the military. He was not so much worried about 
the consequences of war as he was a 'bachelor'. This was seen as a desirable trait 
within the Navy, who wanted men who would 'not pine, and whose total 
disappearance for months on end is no cause for distress'363. His Cambridge English 
Certificate, of which he said his naval interviewer was impressed, qualified Ahmad to
359 Straits Times, 7 July 1946, p.4.
360 Straits Times, 12 February 1950, p.8
361 The Times, 6 June 1940, p.5.
362 Interview with Ahmad, Dahim bin Noordin, conducted by Dr. Daniel Chew, 1 November 1991, 
accession number 001318, reel 2, OHC, Singapore.
363 T he  Age of Entry of Naval Cadets', Naval Review, Vol.8 (1920), pp.535-38, p.538.
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join, though beyond this the interview did not seem too stringent and offers an insight 
into recruiting methods through peer pressure:
They didn't ask much, only they look at the certificate, they say "you like to 
join the navy", "yeah, I like to join the navy", "oh that's good"... I accepted, 
and they said "why don't you call your friends to join?"364
Ahmad recalled his training lasting between three to four months, and after 
two months war with Japan broke out, at which point he received 'training to kill, to 
shoot, to use the bayonet'. According to Ahmad, the British officers treated the 
Malays 'alright, so far, at that time, though it was years ago, no discrimination... but 
still discipline', at which he explained that they had to be back at the barracks at 
seven o'clock sharp or they would be punished.
There appeared to be a real belief in Britain's supposed military superiority, 
with Ahmad expressing his confidence at the time that they would defend Singapore 
because there so many troops were stationed there, mostly from India, though he 
described the British and Australian troops as 'raw'. Ahmad's confidence was 
inevitably shaken by the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and he 
met some of the survivors at the naval base when the destroyers brought them in:
We were shocked, because, we read in the papers a few weeks before the 
outbreak of the war, according to Mr Churchill, British pride of the navy, 
the Prince of Wales and Repulse, unsinkable.365
364 Interview with Ahmad, Dahim bin Noordin, conducted by Dr. Daniel Chew, 1 November 1991, 
accession number 001318, reel 2, OHC, Singapore.
365 Interview with Ahmad, Dahim bin Noordin, conducted by Dr. Daniel Chew, 5 March 1992, 
accession number 001318, reel 3, OHC, Singapore.
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HMS Prince of Wales was also nicknamed HMS 'Unsinkable'. This hegemonic myth 
was clearly internalised by Ahmad and his fellow Malay ratings. The Prince of Wales 
was more than a ship; it was the technological manifestation of the British Empire's 
professed cultural superiority. It's sinking thus not only undermined Churchill's, and 
more broadly Britain's imperial self-assurance; it also shook colonial faith in it.
At this time Ahmad did not go to sea. Instead he was engaged with filling 
sandbags for defence, working alongside Australian troops placing granite rocks on 
the airfield so enemy planes could not land, and carrying out guard duties at military 
installations around the island. Despite this, he says 'we were not even given [a] 
weapon to defend ourselves because we were naval personnel not soldiers'. When 
the Malay Navy barracks were damaged by Japanese bombers, Ahmad and his 
fellow full-time ratings ended up sleeping alongside the naval volunteers in HMS 
Laburnam, the SSRNVR's headquarters at Telok Ayer Basin. When the call to 
evacuate Singapore was put out on 10 February 1942, Lieutenant-Commander H. 
Vickers, R.N., the Malay Navy Commanding Officer, gave his men a choice; either to 
stay in Singapore with their families or following the British in leaving Singapore. 
Ahmad decided to leave with the British, more out of fear than loyalty:
I was really scared because if the Japanese capture us and find out we 
were former members of a naval unit, maybe they will take us as POWs or 
maybe kill us. You heard stories of Japanese brutality in China. So I left 
the others.366
Ahmad left aboard a transport with European women and children, and around 40 
other Malay ratings. During the crossing to Jakarta, they came under attack and were
366 Idem.
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immobilised, forcing them to abandon ship and land on Bangka Island, where they 
were taken prisoner and Ahmad was forced to do work on the airfield. On the second 
day, as he was forced to carry ammunition cases across the island, Ahmad managed 
to escape when after two or three kilometres he feigned a toilet break and darted off 
into the bushes. After four months on the run, he moved to a town where he ended 
up working for the military administration. After two and a half years he requested to 
go to Jakarta in order to join the Japanese Navy. This was no casual transfer of 
allegiance, but an elaborate plan to return home. After attending the navigation 
school there for eight months, Ahmad joined a Japanese rice cargo ship on its way to 
Singapore. Upon reaching Singapore he posed as a 'coolie' working in the ship, got 
past security, and returned to his mother's house where he saw out the rest of the 
war. Upon Britain's return, Ahmad rejoined the Malay Navy, typing signals until April 
1947 when the force was disbanded.
British imperialism in Malaya relied on collaboration with the Sultans. British 
administrators believed this relationship ensured the loyalty of the Malay population. 
Yet, Malays did not all conform to stereotyped colonial paradigms, some renounced 
the adat, Malay custom, which society imposed on them along with the traditional 
hierarchies that it reinforced. Anti-establishment sentiment was thus not only aimed 
at the colonial authorities, it was also expressed towards their Sultan allies, as 
trustees of adat and the Islamic religion which served as a mechanism for social 
control. Naval loyalty was thus more ambiguous in such instances. One example of 
this was Rahman Abdul bin Ya'acob, who served in the local RNVR during the War, 
though he was drafted rather than being a volunteer at the outset. He had been 
educated in an English school, which he described as 'broad minded', and his father
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had also been educated in English to a high standard. At around the age of fourteen, 
Abdul began to develop anti-establishment feelings, both towards the British and the 
Malay Sultans, not agreeing that one had 'to raise two hands to pray to thee', despite 
being religious:
I don't like the way they treat Asians, see, whatever they did was right, and 
these Asians, we had to bow to them... People respect them because they 
think that the Sultans and the British people are divine, which I never think 
that. I think that only God is divine.367
Abdul left home without telling his father for fear of being caned, and went to 
the shipping office in Penang. At the time, it was apparently easy to get a job aboard 
a ship as 'nobody want to work as a sailor because people look down upon sailors'. 
Aboard the ship Abdul was bullied by other sailors because of his education, and 
though the Captain apparently respected his ability to speak English, it was also 
balanced by distrust:
I cannot go near the chart room because I understand English I might 
learn something from there, they are very selfish, the Captain and the 
officers.368
The officers were all European, beneath whom the Hainanese and Malay sailors 
were considered 'lower class'.
In 1941, Abdul was working as a quartermaster aboard a Straits Company 
steamship when it was requisitioned and mobilised into the MRNVR. Abdul says 'we
367 Interview with Rahman Abdul bin Ya'acob, conducted by Dr Daniel Chew, 5 July 1994, accession 
number 001527, reel 1, OHC, Singapore.
368 Idem.
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didn't know the reason at the time so much because we are still not on the know side, 
maybe war, or nothing, whatever it was were kept secret'369. The ship's officers were 
given naval officer training. The vessel was fitted with a small gun, operated as an 
examination vessel out of Penang, and conducted patrol duties. Whereas beforehand, 
their voyages would take them to Burma, Thailand, and the Nicobar Islands, within 
the MRNVR they were confined to local waters only.
Abdul did not mind the strict discipline of the ship, describing it as a 'free life' 
comparatively. It represented escapism, from the more repressive elements he had 
left back home, such as his father's brutality and the idolised worship of the Sultans. 
Most deckhands were Malay, with the engine room (greasers), cooks, and 'boys' 
(stewards) Chinese. According to Abdul, the Malays and Chinese aboard were 'very 
co-operative'; they were bound together by the same life as sailors which 
distinguished them from 'shore people'370, and forged a group identity which 
transcended ethnicity and religion.
The men mostly ate European food, which included plenty of meat. Abdul 
never questioned whether it was pork or not; 'we just say "as long as we don't 
know"... sailors at that time we don't care much about the food, whether halal or not, 
we just eat what is served'371. Similarly, Islamic customs regarding alcohol and prayer 
were not always observed:
I was brought up very strict so I never touched alcohol, although some
sailors did drink when they go ashore. Sometimes when you have an
369
370
371
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opportunity you pray, if you don't have, you don't pray. No special time or 
places to pray.372
As there was no modern equipment such as radar or gyroscope, they had to 
rely solely on their eyes and ears to guide the ship. It was seen as a 'brave' life, going 
out to face the unpredictable and often tempestuous dangers of the sea, and for 
Abdul, formed an important part of their identity. What little free time they had was 
spent 'resting, sleeping, joking about, that's all, we never do anything much because 
it's a small ship'.
Soon after the Japanese declared war Abdul's ship was bombed and the crew 
were forced to abandon her. They then helped the European civilians evacuate 
Penang in another ship to Singapore. After the Singapore invasion Abdul and some 
of his fellow sailors were caught by the Japanese:
I was arrested by the Japanese, and after being questioned, tortured for a 
while, taught how to respect the Japanese soldiers and so on... after 
hammering, slapping, kicking, then told how to bow to the Japanese, and 
then we were released. We are helpless, and to me, torturing, all these 
things, I ever had getting from my father.373
Some of Abdul's friends were subjected to water torture, though not he. When they 
were interrogated the questions would be asked exclusively in Japanese, except on 
occasion to say 'British, Britisher, slave to the British'. Despite these efforts to 
undermine his spirit and loyalty, when the war ended Abdul rejoined the RNVR in
373 Abdul makes reference here to the violence he experienced at the hands of his father, one of his 
motivations for running off to join the navy, idem.
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Singapore. He was restricted to carrying out 'odd jobs' ashore, however, something 
he was not happy about, and so in 1946 he left the force to return to Penang.
Exile in Ceylon
In 1941, the Singapore-based SSRNVR was itself renamed as the MRNVR so 
that both reserve forces now fell under the same banner374. With the fall of British 
Malaya and Singapore, the MRNVR was disbanded, and its surviving officers were 
transferred to the 'Imperial RNVR' with effect from 1 March 1942, with a number 
seeing service as part of the Eastern Fleet. The bulk of the remaining Malay ratings, 
around 300, were engaged on non-continuous service (N.C.S.) in Ceylon, consisting 
mainly of port duties, although several also found service in East Africa, India, and 
Australia.375 Those men who escaped the Japanese occupation suddenly found 
themselves in exile, and the treatment that they received, both morally and physically, 
only served to heighten their sense of alienation. In June 1943 rumours emerged of 
dissatisfaction among the men of the Malay Navy and MRNVR based in Ceylon. This 
was investigated by Mr C.D. Ahearne, Colonial Office Representative in India, and 
Political Secretary to the Commander in Chief Mr E.A. Ross of the Malayan Civil 
Service:
There was a spirit of discouragement and depression amongst them 
caused by a feeling that they were being unfairly treated and were 
friendless exiles in a foreign country. They mentioned that the promises
374 TNA, ADM 1/12995, Straits Settlements Defence (R.N.V.R.) Regulations, 1941.
375 TNA, ADM 1/12995, 1 September 1943.
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made to them when they were recruited had not been kept and they 
compared their conditions with those of the CRNVR and the Dutch Malay 
ratings.376
Specifically, the men possessed grievances relating to the colonial and overseas 
allowance they received, their kit allowance, and the fact that they had to travel third 
class when the local Ceylon RNVR (CRNVR) ratings were allowed to travel second 
class. In response, the kit and travel complaints were resolved, and a small increase 
of pay was granted. Despite this, it was said by Lieutenant Ramsden, who was in 
charge of the Malay naval men from April 1942 to March 1943, that the main trouble 
was 'internal':
The men feel they have been abandoned and the position has been made 
worse by the arrival of four Malay RNVR men from Australia. The RNVR 
people who got to the country were all billeted in private houses. One 
married an Australian girl and deserted. Four came on to Colombo. They 
had lost all sense of naval discipline and had even abandoned their Malay 
adat.
As Abdul earlier attested, Malay custom was subordinated to the demands of the 
service in regards to eating and drinking habits and time allotted for prayer, thus 
eroding away at Malay identity. From March 1943, the men were moved from 
separate houses into barracks first under the charge of Warrant Officer (WO) Toms, 
but who had no previous experience of Malays and so was replaced by WO Baigent. 
Baigent did not speak Malay, though he had been an RNVR instructor at HMS 
Laburnam in Singapore and identified with the RNVR men, who were seen by
376 TNA, CO 968/145/5, 'Notes on visit to Ceylon', Item 50.
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Ramsden as 'the bad hats of the group'. Despite their shared ethnicity, the Malays 
who found themselves on Ceylon were not considered a homogenous group; there 
was an old feud between the MRNVR and the Malay Navy in Singapore which had 
resulted in a stabbing affray. Baigent had apparently fallen under the influence of one 
of the RNVR men from Australia, Ismail, who alone spoke English, undermining the 
authority of the Malay Navy Petty Officers. According to Ramsden, some Malay Navy 
men, who were generally younger, were 'afraid to sleep in their beds and slipped 
outside to take their rest and thus avoid possibilities of being victimised'377.
Ramsden suggested that as a solution, the 52 Malay Navy seamen at the 
Barracks should be sent to the American forces on Ceylon; however, Ahearne and 
Ross dismissed this as 'politically dangerous'. Among the Americans was a Lt. 
Meade, formerly a Police Inspector in the Straits Settlements Police Force before 
becoming an American citizen. It was suspected that Meade was trying 'to create a 
nucleus of Malays who would form a spearhead of American influence on our return 
to Malaya'. Such an arrangement would also risk creating further dissatisfaction by 
any comparison with the pay drawn by American and Dutch East Indies personnel, 
as the latter received four times what the British Malays were paid.
Having proceeded to the barracks, Ahearne was told by its Commanding 
Officer, Captain Harris, that 'under Lt. Ramsden discipline had been lax. They had to 
be moved into the barracks and since the move they had altered beyond all 
recognition and are now one of the smartest divisions'. After being presented with 
what Ahearne considered 'the finest body of Malay youths I have ever seen', over a 
dozen men were questioned, among whom only one, Abu Othman, said that
377 Ibid., Item 51.
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'relations between the two bodies outside the barracks were not cordial. Others said 
they were all friends with no distinction between them and another said "they were all 
like relations'". The one great complaint was that wages were not enough and that if 
they married locally they would need a family allowance. One of Ramsden's so-called 
'bad hats', Karim, also complained that the meat was 'not killed according to 
Mohamedan custom', prompting Ross to explain that 'owing to rinderpest in India 
goat was not obtainable'378.
One seaman, 'a very good looking lad' named Ismail bin Haji Othman of Kuala 
Lumpur, had been a clerk in the health office in Klang when he was drafted in as a 
telegraphist:
He said he was fed up with the service. He had no hope if he remained on.
He would like to get out and get another job of any kind whatever. He had 
no trouble with any other men, he was just sick of life. He was obviously in 
a miserable state of melancholia.
Ismail had been put on light duties and kept under observation, but a release from 
the Navy into local employment was not seen as a cure, as 'the lad would be without 
relatives and be deprived of the friends he had now'. The doctor claimed that there 
were 'a bigger percentage of such cases amongst the Malays than amongst the 
Europeans as their mental background was not sufficient to enable them to stand up 
to the strains imposed on them'. Furthermore, 'a case of attempted suicide recently 
was due to the development of religious mania'. These medical opinions were 
influenced by the pseudo-scientific colonial belief that 'Malays were, as a whole, 
capable of developing a psycho-pathological disorder called latah', and 'any Malay is
378 Ibid. Item 52.
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capable of developing into a typical case of latah if he is sufficiently persecuted, 
teased, and harassed'379. Latah is a culture-based syndrome particular to Malaya and 
Indonesia, in which some Malays when exposed to certain pressures, sudden noise, 
shock or fright, will lose their self-control and fall into a trance-like or hysteric state, 
shouting obscenities, imitating words, gestures or actions, and unable to recognise 
their own identity. Writing on latah, in this case naval medical reports, 'created and 
perpetuated images of mental deficiency of the Malayan Other, which justified and 
encouraged European domination'380, and reinforced Orientalist discourse.
In response to this, Ahearne recommended the secondment of 'a good Malay 
speaking officer to act in the capacity of welfare officer'. He also arranged for Ismail's 
transfer to Delhi, 'where there is plenty of Malay company', to be employed in his old 
role as a clerk. In addition, the pay for Malay seaman was brought to a level more in 
line with the CRNVR, promotion opportunities were improved with the creation of an 
additional Malay post of Chief Petty Officer, a Marriage and Children's Allowance 
Scheme was introduced for those ratings married and supporting a wife outside of 
Malaya, and a daily food allowance was introduced with the ratings doing their own 
catering. Lt. Ramsden's allegations were largely discounted, and a report filed by 
Captain Harris concluded that 'the Malays are a happy contented and loyal body of 
men... all the Malays expressed their willingness to serve in the Imperial Forces till 
the end of the war'381. It was emphasised separately by both the Admiralty and 
Colonial Office 'the importance from the political point of view of ensuring that the
379 Syed Hussein Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of Malays, Filipinos and 
Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism 
(London, 1977), p.48.
Robert L. Winzler, Latah in Southeast Asia: The history and ethnography of a culture-bound 
syndrome (Cambridge, 1995), p.3.
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men return to Malaya with good opinion of their treatment under British protection 
Ceylon'382.
382 TNA, CO 968/145/5, Admiralty to C. in C. Eastern Fleet, Item 59, and Sabban-Clare to Fox, 10 
June 1944, Item 64.
Part Two: Post-Second World War
The British Return to Malaya
As early as September 1943, discussions took place within the Admiralty 
regarding the potential reconstitution of the MRNVR and utilisation of the core of 
Malay ratings based in Ceylon for the re-occupation of Malaya. By April 1944, it was 
assumed that 'sooner of later the ports of British Malaya will be in our hands', and 
that as Malay was the 'lingua franca' over a great part of the East Indies it was 
considered the necessary medium for any contact with 'Asiatics' ashore. Furthermore, 
the establishment of 'patriot forces' such as the MRNVR served a useful propaganda 
role, and 'the revival of this Force should be a particularly valuable contribution to 
associating the inhabitants of Malaya with the turn of the tide, and to easing our own
position on re-occupation'383. This clearly displays a distinct unease from the British
as to how their return would be greeted locally, a microcosm for much larger 
concerns regarding the reestablishment of the Empire in the post-war climate. 
Consequently, 'the presence of other (Naval trained) Asiatics in a British party ought 
to be a great advantage to any N.O.I.C. [Naval Officer In Command] or senior officer 
landed, in his dealings with the inhabitants'384. Such Malay RNVR men were not to be 
employed simply as "hands" like before, but elevated to act as 'orderlies, tallymen, 
piermasters, interpreters with local labour, or even in offices'. Among the suggestions 
was the possible recruitment from the small Malay colonies established in the Cape,
383 TNA, ADM 1/12995, E.E. Sabban-Clare to M.J. Fox, 27 July 1943.
384 TNA, ADM 1/12995, A.H. Phillips, Director of Local Defence, 26 April 1944.
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however, this was discouraged because 'it is understood the Union Government are 
not in favour of recruiting "natives" in the armed forces'385. Despite this, in a marked 
shift from previous recruitment policies, it was emphasised that the reconstituted 
MRNVR should be open to all the races of the peninsula 'without discrimination':
It would appeal as a patriotic rallying point to all in Malaya and not simply 
the British oriental subjects resident in the Straits Settlements. The active 
cooperation and goodwill of the coastal Malays and Chinese will we 
assume be important to attract.386
Ultimately, the Japanese surrendered before Operation Zipper, the codename for the 
British 'liberation' of Malaya, ever took place. After helping facilitate the British return 
to Malaya and Singapore, the briefly reformed MRNVR was disbanded on 26 
February 1946 due to financial burdens, with the Malay Navy following suit a year 
later on 11 March 1947387.
It was not long before this situation once again changed, with the declaration 
of a state of Emergency in Malaya on 16 June 1948. This led to the creation on 24 
December 1948 of a new full-time unit, the Malayan Naval Force (MNF), based in 
Woodlands Barracks and adjoining the Royal Naval Base at Sembawang, Singapore. 
The MNF was placed under the command of former Malay Navy officer, Captain 
H.E.H. Nicholls, and composed of previous Malay Navy members and new recruits. 
Having been born in Sungei Lembing, Pahang State, Nicholls spoke fluent Malay, but 
was considered an 'absolute misogynist' as a result of a failed first marriage and he 
thus preferred his officers to be unmarried. Of course the notion of the 'bachelor
385 TNA, ADM 1/12995, C.C. Hughes-Hallett, Director of Plans, 5 May 1944.
386 TNA, ADM 1/12995, E.E. Sabban-Clare to M.J. Fox, 27 July 1943.
387 TNA, CO 537/2534, 'Malayan Naval Forces', 8 August 1947, Item 26.
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officer' was one which was longstanding in the Navy and encouraged by the fact that 
an officer would not receive marriage allowance or accommodation unless over the 
age of 28. It was remarked that Nicholls used his supreme authority to run the MNF 
as a personal 'fiefdom'388. He had had his 'Super Porpoise' shipped out to Singapore, 
and he kept one MNF rating permanently attached to the yacht, responsible for 
keeping it impeccably clean and readying the boat for whenever he wished to go 
sailing. Among the social activities of the force were the regular sailing races that 
were held, and Nicholls would get 'terribly upset' if he did not win389.
The pragmatic realities of the Emergency were to force an ideological shift in 
the Navy's restrictive pre-war recruitment practices. This resulted in a concerted 
effort on the part of the British to recruit more Chinese into the armed forces, so as to 
offset the Communist insurgents by drawing the Malayan Chinese closer to the 
state.390 As has been previously highlighted, however, discussion had taken place 
much earlier within the Admiralty on integrating the Chinese population into the local 
naval forces. They had recognised the importance of acquiring 'the active 
cooperation and goodwill of the coastal Malays and Chinese' in order to help ease 
the British return to Malaya and reassert their formal control. Yet, in attempting to 
stabilise British power through seeking the favour of the Chinese community, 
fractures were created with the Malay population; the Admiralty's moves drew 
opposition from the Malay-language newspaper Utusan Melayu, which argued that 
the defence forces of Malaya should consist of Malays only.391 Despite these 
protestations the British pressed on with their recruitment plans and by July 1953 the
388 Interview conducted by author with Peter Fosten on 14 August 2009.
389 Ibid.
390 Cynthia H. Enloe, 'Ethnicity in the Evolution of Asia's Armed Bureaucracies', in DeWitt C. Ellinwood 
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Royal Malayan Navy (RMN), as the MNF had become, was made up of around 80 
per cent Malays, 10 per cent Chinese and 10 per cent other races, though it was 
hoped more Chinese would have been forthcoming392. Also symptomatic of the 
Emergency and uniquely to Malaya, all potential new recruits were subjected to 
additional security, political and criminal screening, to ensure the force was not 
infiltrated by communist elements393.
Secret Societies
In addition to the Communist insurgents, there was another large, influential, 
and potentially-destabilising Chinese group the British had to pacify. Secret societies 
had existed in Singapore ever since the colony's founding in 1819. Brought across by 
immigrants from mainland China, they were 'branches' of the Heaven and Earth 
League, more commonly known as the Triad Society394. The League was known by 
other names, including the Hung League and the Three United League, based on the 
bonds that exist between Heaven, Earth and Man and where the word 'Triad' is 
derived from, and was originally deemed as a religious society promoting the lofty 
aim: 'Obey Heaven and Act Righteously'395. Similarly, the early societies in Singapore 
were initially less about criminality than providing the Chinese with a 'social structure,
392 Straits Times, 8 July 1955, p.7.
393 TNA, ADM 1/21872, Item 22, 1 July 1949.
394 Maurice Freedman, 'Religion and Social Realignment Among the Chinese in Singapore' in George 
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livelihood, protection and possibly some measure of spiritual fulfilment through its 
activities'396. The Hung League's sole political aspirations were aimed at overthrowing 
the Manchu Dynasty, and there were no ambitions for political control in Singapore, 
instead they 'kept their ideological weapons aimed at their rulers at home'397. Once 
transported overseas, however, 'it lost its political significance and degenerated into 
an organisational machine for the oppression and extortion of the Chinese 
communities'398. Inevitably, clashes occurred when societies encroached upon each 
others territory, culminating in the Penang Riots of 1867, the 'Veranda riots' of 1872, 
and the Chinese Post Office riots of 1876 in Singapore399. Colonial legislation 
followed, leading to the registration of the societies, and successfully curbing their 
membership and influence by the end of the nineteenth century. Driven underground, 
they thus became secret.
As it did for many other marginalised groups, the political, social and economic 
chaos caused by the Second World War provided a fillip for the resurgence of secret 
societies in Singapore. Knowing that secret societies were 'centres of Chinese 
patriotism', the occupying Japanese attempted to check them by lopping off fingers 
for even the smallest thefts400. Thousands of members were executed, and those 
captured and tortured were only released if they betrayed their compatriots and 
worked for Japanese intelligence401. The extreme actions carried out against the
396 Irene Lim, Secret Societies in Singapore: Featuring the William Stirling Collection (Singapore,
1999), p.13.
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Chinese, however, served to bind the secret societies together in the form of 
resistance groups, where they put their subversive skills to expert use:
They were literally underground people, forces that would attack the 
Japanese camps, sabotage and did all kinds of things. That was when the 
original clan members or the so called original Chinese secret society 
people played a part in the country. Not so much for the country of Malaya, 
but more because they hated the Japanese. Many of them were involved 
in a group called the Sua Niau Chih (Jungle Rats or Hill Rats). They would 
always be in the jungle, hidden. I guess that was the reason why at the 
end they became communists. Later on, some of them became bandits 
during the British Occupation, when the British returned.402
The British return is referred to here as an 'occupation', much like the Japanese. A 
spark of nationalism had been flamed by the war. Whereas the rebellious actions 
carried out by the secret societies served to inspire the Chinese population, by 
contrast, the surrender of the British and their public degradation in the Prisoner of 
War (POW) camps at the hands of the Japanese undermined their previous imperial 
authority:
Those [British] that were caught on the island became very pathetic POWs, 
often begging around for food, shabbily dressed. It was very pathetic. They 
offered very little resistance, actually. It was the locals, especially the 
Chinese, who gave [the Japanese] a lot of resistance, especially this group
402 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 8, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.97, Oral 
History Centre (OHC), Singapore.
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of resistance fighters... they would have raiding parties, and then they 
would disappear in the jungles.403
Emerging from the war with newfound support and influence, the secret 
societies were able to take advantage of the power vacuum and the return of a 
humiliated and hesitant Great Britain, to reassert their control over Singapore. The 
colonial government, keen to encourage the formation of political parties to foster the 
development of an electoral system, introduced new legislation under which societies 
could operate without having to register404. An aborted attempt was even made to 
introduce a branch of the China Triad Democratic Party in 1947405. Yet there was a 
more daunting political affiliation competing with the British for Chinese support:
There was a little bit of confusion and all Chinese at the time, especially 
the Chinese-educated, were kind of taught that all Chinese must be 
communists. Some were quite sold on the idea. Many of the secret society 
members joined the Communist Party or the communist group.406
The declaration of a state of Emergency caused a fear that additional Malayan 
Chinese would join the insurgents, a prospect made more ominous by the societies' 
own wartime jungle-fighting experience. In September 1948 banishment orders for 
900 secret society members suspected of being involved with the Communists were 
served. A police raid of a Communist hideout in December 1950 led to the arrest of a 
number of members of the 18 Gang, and 59 Communist demonstrators were
403 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 8, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.98, OHC, 
Singapore.
404 Irene Lim, p.31.
405 Freedman, 'Religion and Social Realignment Among the Chinese in Singapore', p.174.
406 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 8, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.96, OHC, 
Singapore.
162
arrested six months later, also found to be members of the 18 Gang407. Despite 
individuals sympathising with the Communists, Communist penetration was not 
reflective of the secret societies as a whole, and some helped raise awareness and 
supplied financial support for the Kuomintang's fight against the Communists. With 
the British desire to acquire 'the active cooperation and goodwill' of the Chinese, 
these activities were encouraged through the adoption of a more lenient and 
collaborative attitude towards those secret society members free from Communist 
affiliation. In the words of one leader:
The British mentality I suppose at that time was to solve in a diplomatic 
way, by giving them [the secret societies] unofficial recognition and 
working through them so that there would be peace.408
The secret societies were thus a mechanism which helped facilitate the reassertion of 
British imperial control in Singapore. The British could not risk antagonising the 
secret societies or the Chinese population they influenced, because the legitimacy of 
their own returning authority was questionable. Consequently, a blind eye was turned 
to many of the secret societies' nefarious activities, and they in turn supported British 
power: 'the British were lauded when they returned, because it meant more freedom, 
leeway after the strict and cruel Japanese ways, we welcomed the British'409. There 
was thus little support for the nationalist parties among the gangs: 'We favoured the 
British as we were safe under them. We knew if the PAP took power we would be in
Irene Lim, p.32.
408 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 8, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.103, OHC, 
Singapore.
409 Interview conducted by author with Rev. Neivelle Tan on 14 July 2009.
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trouble'410. After they were elected to power in 1959, the People's Action Party (PAP) 
introduced legislation which ultimately eradicated the secret societies.
The secret societies were thus able to integrate themselves into the 
Singaporean local economy, becoming influential 'businessmen'. They were involved 
in illegal car rental businesses, prostitution, and syndicated crime411. They controlled 
the illegal lottery and chap jee ki (a Chinese card game)412. The 'general dislocation 
of employment, the lack of rice, and the overall shortage of supplies' created a 
'climate favourable to crime'413, including smuggling and blackmarketeering. The 
influx of capital brought by the presence of British service personnel helped fuel the 
secret societies through their frequenting of gang-protected restaurants, bars, 
gambling dens and brothels. It was protection that still amounted to the biggest 
earner for the secret societies, as it had traditionally been in the nineteenth century. 
Leong's assertion that the societies forgot their religious and social mission and 
degenerated into an 'organisational machine for the oppression and extortion of the 
Chinese communities', is supported in this later period by Reverend Neivelle Tan, a 
former secret society leader:
The main source of income was protection money but protect the 
community against whom? There was nobody else so they ended up 
protecting the community against themselves.414
From the secret societies emerged gangs who had little regard for the 
traditional rituals and customs of the nineteenth century. The largest of these was the
Irene Lim, p.29.
413 Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Historical Study (London, 
1969), p.409-10.
414 Interview conducted by author with Rev. Neivelle Tan on 14 July 2009.
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Hokkien gang , which itself was comprised of several smaller gangs, each identified 
by a number, the major ones being '08' '18', '24', and '108'. Furthermore, each gang 
would be affiliated to a particular service to which the majority of its members were 
attached. For example, members of the Fire Brigade made up the 08 Gang. The 
Navy became affiliated with the 18 Gang.
A problematic consequence of imperial pressures on the British to relieve their 
manpower burden overseas through the recruitment of local forces, was the 
infiltration of such groups by secret societies. The local men employed to work in the 
naval base and the RMN, ended up carrying with them close links to the 18 Gang 
(Siao), one of the strongest gangs in Singapore, and headed by Tan. Gang members 
carried tattoos, symbolic of both their profession and their gang allegiance, and the 
Navy men in the 18 Gang were identified by a tattoo of an anchor. This common 
maritime symbol helped hide them from the suspicion of the British officers, but it 
carried an additional cultural association; the cross at the top of the tattoo was also 
the Chinese symbol for the number 10, whereas the anchor at the bottom was 
inverted so as to represent the Chinese number 8. Sometimes this would be 
accompanied by a rope knotted in a figure 8. The tattoo would be located on the back 
of hand, thus subtly revealing one's gang association to another member when 
shaking hands, but would be obscured when saluting a British officer415. Gang 
members were also identified by specific names bestowed upon them, for example,
415 Idem.
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'amongst the Chinese, if his name is Ah Tee, he would be called Hai Kuan Ah Tee, 
Navy Ah Tee'416.
Despite their cultural origins, these gangs were not composed solely of 
Chinese, and most included Malay and Indian members within their ranks also. Nor 
was any demarcation made within the gangs. Allegiance was primarily to their gang 
'brotherhood' rather than their ethnicity417. This tied in to a longer triad tradition, 
where 'secret society alignment and dialect "group" loyalties often cut across one 
another'418. One example would be the case of the Maria Hertogh riots in December 
1950, which has primarily been represented as a racially-motivated protest following 
a court judgement that a Dutch girl raised by Muslims should be returned to her 
biological Catholic parents, yet:
That was when many secret society members were actually the ones that 
were creating the problem. It was not so much racial. However, it was put 
as racial. But most of the clashes, most of the riots were backed by secret 
society members who were actually influenced by the communists 419
It was not merely the British authorities at the top who were guilty by 
association of allowing the secret societies to carry out their activities without 
intervention. Some British naval officers were more directly implicated, with Tan 
knowing at least three personally, one who possessed a background in gangs in
416 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 9, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.108, OHC, 
Singapore.
417 Interview conducted by author with Rev. Neivelle Tan on 14 July 2009.
418 Freedman, 'Religion and Social Realignment Among the Chinese in Singapore', p. 174.
419 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 8, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.96, OHC, 
Singapore.
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England420. Such men would be approached by an influential and ranking gang 
member within the Navy, and would be offered favours in exchange for their 
cooperation. These favours would normally extend to providing the British officer with 
women, usually prostitutes, bar-girls or waitresses under gang 'protection', places to 
gamble, free drinks and VIP treatment421. In exchange, the officer would become the 
gang's 'go-to man'. For example, if the 18 gang was involved in a clash with a rival 
gang - 'the hai koon (navy) and bing (army) were always the main warring parties'422 - 
then a call would be put through to the naval base and a signal made to the 
aforementioned officer, at which point a naval truck filled with twenty to forty naval 
gang-members, still in uniform, would be dispatched to aid in the fight. On such 
occasions the police would not get involved as the Army and Navy carried more 
power and influence at the time, and it would take the military police to settle such 
disputes. If the regular local police force arrested an army or navy member all it 
would take was a call to a favoured officer and someone would be sent to release 
him. This privileged status was one reason why gang members chose to remain in 
the service. Sometimes quarrels would break out among members of the same gang, 
quite often over women, leading to fights at sea and even a stabbing423.
Contraband, cigarettes, beer and liquor would also be smuggled out of the 
naval base and sold on the blackmarket by gang-members. Illegal beer was brewed 
in the woods around the naval base, though this was made for local consumption 
mainly as it tended not to suit European tastes. One of the main roles of the local
420 Interview conducted by author with Rev. Neivelle Tan on 14 July 2009.
421 Idem.
422 Interview with Rev. Neivelle Tan, conducted by Miss Chua Chee Huan, 7 February 1995 to 30 
August 1995, accession number 001600/41, reel 8, transcriber Ms Chuang Lai Beng, p.95, OHC, 
Singapore.
423 Interview conducted by author with Rev. Neivelle Tan on 14 July 2009.
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naval forces was anti-smuggling operations, and occasionally when a patrol vessel 
returned from such a mission, smaller boats manned by gang-members would go 
alongside to collect the contraband before the vessel entered the naval base. It would 
then be distributed to the syndicates.424
Although the British avoided directly challenging the secret societies, there 
were more subtle attempts at curbing their influence. A paternalist approach was 
reverted to, with the formation of navy-run boys clubs to try and attract young males 
off the streets and away from the gangs through the appeal of sports and games, 
traditional British vehicles for the development of moral 'character1. These started off 
well, and soccer, cricket and softball in particular were a 'big draw at first'. Eventually 
though, the gangs came in and took control of the clubs. They were able to do this 
because a local was put in charge to run them and he would have his own gang 
allegiances or would be susceptible to gang pressure, thus the collaborative 
relationship broke down. Navy chaplains were heavily used in this paternalist mission, 
and before he got involved in the gangs, Tan and several of his peers were recruited 
from school by one and taken on a tour of HMS Terror425, where they would be 
brought to the chapel, do puzzles, and listen to stories from the chaplain. A concert 
was even organised for them, but lots of local boys could not identify with the western 
conventions, instead they related more to the Chinese street concerts arranged by 
the gangs426. Such cultural differences and a failure to properly understand them 
undermined British attempts to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the Chinese youth.
424 Idem.
425 The official name given to the naval base, after the Second World W ar monitor which had been 
stationed there.
426 Interview conducted by author with Rev. Neivelle Tan on 14 July 2009.
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Reconstitution and the 'Emergency'
As well as wider social and political pressures, there were also practical 
imperatives which forced changes in the MNF leading to the recruitment of Chinese 
personnel. When the Malay Navy was reconstituted at the end of the war, despite still 
possessing around 350 Malay ratings, most of these were 'semi-trained men' from 
the seaman and communications branches and the force was restricted to operating 
just two vessels, a landing craft (gunnery) and a motor fishing vessel, specifically due 
to a lack of engine room personnel427. There was a large number of trained Chinese 
mechanics and engineers in Singapore, many of whom worked on the naval base, 
therefore when the MNF was created they were sought to plug this operational 
deficiency. Most of the chief engineers on the force's early MLs thus came to be 
Chinese. Racial stereotypes, however, also had an influence. The British believed 
that 'the Chinese by and large make very good engineers'428, whereas the Malays' 
generally lower education meant that they did not possess the same level of higher 
technical knowledge or standard of English that was essential for the engineering 
branch. Furthermore, their religion was viewed as an unreliable and undesirable 
element for such a position of responsibility after one Malay engineer had a habit of 
believing that 'Allah might provide the fuel' and causing his ML to run out before it 
reached port429.
Five former Harbour Defence Motor Launches, which had been used in the 
Arakan Campaign in Burma and were left rotting in Keppel Harbour after the war,
427 TNA, CO 537/2534, T h e  Malayan Local Forces', p.3, 1946, item 96.
428 Interview conducted by author with Peter Fosten on 14 August 2009.
429 Idem.
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were transferred on permanent loan to the MNF by the Royal Navy to serve as patrol 
vessels. They carried mixed Malay and Chinese crews, still commanded by British 
officers: two older reservists finishing their time after the war, and three regular Sub- 
Lieutenants seconded from the Royal Navy. One of these was Peter Fosten, who 
was serving aboard the frigate HMS Cardigan Bay in 1950 as part of the RN Far East 
fleet when a call was put out by the Singapore Government for RN volunteers to 
serve in the MNF. Having spent the first six years of his life on a rubber research 
institute station in Malaya, Fosten felt an urge to return to his roots and submitted an 
application, and six months later he was seconded on loan to the Singapore 
Government for a period of three years to serve as Commanding Officer of the ML 
P.3509.
Image 6. Peter Fosten and the crew of P.3509 [Source: Peter Fosten's personal collection]
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In light of their 400-mile patrol area, these patrol vessels were re-designated 
as 'Seaward' Defence Motor Launches, though they were not originally built for that 
purpose. Patrols initially lasted three months, though this was later cut down to four 
or five weeks, with a week in port to replenish. As well as Singapore, there were 
refuelling ports in Port Swettenham and Penang. The MLs had been built by a 
furniture company to last just a year or two and were not designed for the intensive 
role demanded of them by the bourgeoning MNF. Only the wheelhouse and bridge 
were armour plated which tended to make the vessels unstable at sea. The rudders 
and propellers were unprotected and not designed for traversing uncharted rivers 
and bars, leading to the loss of many a propeller blade. The hulls would be dotted 
with copper patches from where holes had been punched through by the bamboo 
jetties. One ML would always be operational on the west coast, with one on the east, 
though during the North East Monsoon the MLs had to be withdrawn as sea 
conditions became too severe. Their primary role on the west coast was to search 
coastal craft for terrorists and weapons being transported to and from Indonesia. 
They made sure, however, that they remained within Malayan territorial waters as the 
MLs were only armed with tw<"> ?nmm npriiknng anh capable of a maximum speed of 
11 knots, whereas Indonesia was equipped with several ex-US Navy patrol boats 
capable of 40 knots and boasting twin power-operated turrets and were believed to 
be 'a little trigger happy'.430 The MLs performed a similar role on the east coast, but 
would additionally check that terrorists were not resting on the fishing kalongs there. 
Occasionally the MLs were also called on to support army operations further inland 
by transporting small parties of troops, often Gurkhas, up-river behind the terrorists 
thus bypassing the thick jungle, and lending fire support to such operations.
430 Idem.
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Image 7. P.3509 in Mersing, Malaya [Peter Fosten’s personal collection]
Although there was also a Royal Navy frigate operating on each coast at all 
times, the MLs acted completely independently of them, were allowed to make their 
own programmes, reported directly to the Flag Officer Malaya, and were only 
expected to radio in once a week to report on their fuel consumption and their 
proposed programme for the next week. This free rein was open to abuse, however. 
One British skipper was a very keen rugby player, and it was noticed after several 
months that his ML's patrol programme would always involve visiting Port 
Swettenham on Saturdays. It transpired that the officer was a stalwart pillar of the 
local rugby club and 'it was quietly suggested to him that his promotion prospects
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would be vastly improved if he if he saw fit to resign from the team at once!'431 On 
one occasion, another of the skippers, after a heavy night in the Gurkha mess, 
managed to put his boat aground on a chartered sandbank. In order to get her off he 
had to jettison the bulk of his fuel so as to lighten the vessel. His solution to avoid the 
authorities ever knowing of his error was to anchor in a remote bay for ten days and 
send entirely fictitious movement records until he had 'used up his fuel'. His crew 
remained loyal and officially no one ever knew at headquarters 432
Image 8. A Malayan motor tongkang searched on patrol, depicted by Peter Fosten 
[Source: Peter Fosten's personal collection]
431 Commander Peter Fosten, RN (Retired), 'A Far East Odyssey Part Two: Aiding the Civil Power, 
Malaya 1950/53', personal memoir acquired from the author on 14 August 2009.
432 Idem, and interview conducted by author with Peter Fosten on 14 August 2009.
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One thing that was emphasised very clearly to the British officers in the MNF 
was that their function there first and foremost was 'to aid the civil power'.433 This 
responsibility evinced itself most for Fosten during what began as a regular search of 
a motor tongkang on the east coast. The coxswain would take two men aboard the 
vessel to conduct the search while the CO and the rest of the crew remained on the 
ML covering them with the Bren Gun mounted on the bridge wing. In this particular 
instance the coxswain returned with a cigarette tin filled with chandu, or raw opium. 
The man who had been discovered with it said he had fallen out with the smugglers 
and offered to show them a big cache if they took him aboard, most likely hoping for 
a reward. They were directed to an island close to Pulau Tioman, went ashore in a 
dinghy and began digging above the high tide line, eventually uncovering 44 kerosine 
tins of chandu. Fosten, conscious of their mission 'to aid the civil power' and the need 
to involve the police at an early stage, left his second coxswain in hiding while they 
returned to Mersing, the nearest police post. There only Fosten went ashore, keeping 
the informant aboard to maintain secrecy, and collected the Officer Commanding the 
Police District and several of his men in the hope they could set an ambush. They 
didn't return to the island until after dark, at which point the second coxswain reported 
that just after sunset he had heard what sounded like a motor fishing boat close to 
the beach and a boat being lowered into the water. This was followed by a piercing 
whistle from the jungle, the sound of someone running down the beach to the boat, 
and a furious splashing of paddles after which the boat made a rapid departure:
It says much for the discipline and common sense of my second coxswain
that he withheld fire, for if it had been innocent fisherman he could have
433 Fosten, 'A Far East Odyssey Part Two'.
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ended up in court of manslaughter charges. Such are the difficulties of
Aiding the Civil Power.434
Image 9. The crew of P.3509 digging for opium on Pulau Tioman [Source: Peter
Fosten's personal collection]
Without radar at that time searches of the surrounding islands proved fruitless, and 
the following morning the forty four tins, weighing half a ton, were loaded aboard and 
returned to Mersing. When the Straits Times reported the discovery of a huge haul of 
opium, it was accredited to the police, something which 'galled' the crew. It was later 
found that this amounted to only half the shipment, as a further half ton was 
recovered from the sea off Singapore. It also transpired that it had originally been 
shipped in one of the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries bringing oil from the Persian Gulf.
434 Idem.
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In addition to the five MNF-run MLs, two MLs crewed completely with Royal 
Navy personnel operated alongside them. Patrols would take the MLs up the 
Peninsula as far as the Siamese border, where there was a fear that Siam was 
allowing terrorists in for rest and relaxation. To discourage this and earn local favour, 
Fosten's ML was sent to Phuket to 'show the flag1, accompanied by one of the RN- 
manned MLs. There they anchored in the river while opening up the ship to the 
general public, including a couple of Buddhist monks. The interest was 'phenomenal', 
as seen in the pictures below, so much so that when the boat came to take off the 
visitors, as they all rushed to one side of the ML it almost tipped over:
Image 10. 'Showing the flag' in Phuket, Thailand [Source: Peter Fosten's personal
collection]
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Image 11. 'Showing the flag' in Phuket, Thailand, with visiting Buddhist monks (left) 
[Source: Peter Fosten's personal collection]
Fosten was faced with a 'somewhat challenging cultural situation' when the local 
Chinese community, in order to express their thanks, decided to provide the two 
Commanding Officers with a meal followed by a trip to the 'best brothel in town'. This 
put Fosten into a rather difficult position as he was recently married (something that 
had not been welcomed by Nicholls) and did not feel this was part of his 'remit', 
though upon being taken upstairs he spotted pairs of black 'Pussers' Crabs'435 
outside the bedroom doors, indicating some of his crew did in fact. He took this 
opportunity to tell his hosts that while he was most grateful for their kindness, he 
would seriously lose face if he used the same establishment as his sailors, and
435 Naval issue shoes.
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returned to the ship. What happened to the other RN Commanding Officer is not 
quite known.436
The general operational effectiveness of the two RN-crewed MLs was 
questioned by members of the MNF, as they carried no one aboard who could speak 
Malay or Chinese and interact with the local population437. All MNF officers, however, 
were encouraged to learn Malay, financially too as if they passed an oral exam they 
earned 18 pence a day extra pay. During his childhood in Malaya, Fosten used to 
discuss everything in Malay with his Tamil minder, and therefore upon his return he 
states: 'my Malay came back to me quite quickly and I was able to get totally under 
the ethos of another culture'438. Post-war imperial instability and uncertainty in this 
context helped turn British attention to an increasing need for cultural understanding 
in order to maintain moral authority, something further articulated by the 'hearts and 
minds' campaign simultaneously being waged in Malaya; for their part, the Navy 
would visit remote villages, drop anchor, let the kids aboard and show them films439. 
The primitive conditions of the MLs also meant that the men were entitled to 'hard- 
lying' money whilst at sea, meaning religious customs were still not always observed.
436 Interview conducted by author with Peter Fosten on 14 August 2009.
437 Fosten, 'A Far East Odyssey Part Two'.
438 Interview conducted by author with Peter Fosten on 14 August 2009.
439 Interview with (Captain) Chitharanjan Kuttan, conducted by Jason Lim, 11 September to 24 
September 2002, accession number 002697, reel 4, OHC, Singapore.
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Image 12. 'Make and Mend' - The crew of P.3509 earn their hard-lying money 
[Source: Peter Fosten's personal collection]
Water was carefully rationed, and the men were only able to wash properly when in 
port. The MLs technically carried two separate fridges and sets of pans as the Malay 
Muslims were not supposed to eating from the same equipment as the rest of the 
crew. Within half an hour of departing on their first patrol, however, the Malay 
coxswain aboard Fosten's ML suggested that it would be much simpler to put away 
one set of pans, let one man do all the cooking, use one fridge for all the food and 
the other for drinks. The rest of the crew were happy with this arrangement, apart 
from the rating who had been appointed as the cook when he was in fact a steward, 
and so the coxswain had to first teach him how to cook. If they were on patrol during 
Ramadan the men were allowed to eat normal meals during the day because of the
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strenuous duties they had to perform in the tropical heat, but if they were in the 
barracks they would have to observe the fast until after dusk. Therefore, whenever 
ML P.3509 returned to port around lunchtime, the coxswain ensured they all received 
a good meal first, before the men would fall in all trying to look desperately hungry as 
the ship went alongside. Because of the heat the ice boxes would not last long and 
had to be regularly replenished. Often the ice was acquired from local fishing boats, 
and was inevitably brown, resulting in tapeworms among the crew.440
Image 13. 'Makan' (food) - P.3509's crew at mealtime [Source: Peter Fosten's
personal collection]
Expansion and Nationalisation
440 Interview conducted by author with Peter Fosten on 14 August 2009.
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On 29 August 1952 the MNF was given the title of Royal Malayan Navy (RMN). 
Expansion grew, and the first batch of Malayan officer cadets were recruited and sent 
to Dartmouth for training three years later. The advertisement published in the Straits 
Times newspaper indicates a presumption that the young men of Singapore were not 
naturally inclined to maritime life, and depicts the Navy as a healthy occupation filled 
with adventure, emphasising the patriotism and traditions of the service:
Singapore depends on the sea for its livelihood. It is therefore fitting and 
essential that young men in Singapore should be encouraged to take an 
interest in the sea and ships. In peacetime, sea life is wonderful for healthy 
intelligent men. In war it is a most honoured service - the protection and 
defence of one's country. In peace or in war, there are fine traditions, good 
companionship, endless interests and countless voyages to places far and 
wide.441
Compared to the make-up of the earlier forces, those who applied were a mixed 
group both geographically and ethnically. Out of over 500 applicants, nine were 
recruited: two Malays, three Chinese, two Indians, one Sri Lankan, and one Eurasian. 
Seven of these were drawn from across the Peninsula, from Perlis, the northernmost 
state, down to Johore Bahru in the South. Perhaps reflective of the advertisement's 
preconception, only one officer was recruited from Singapore, with the final recruit 
from Pulau Bukom. The man from Singapore was Chitharanjan Kuttan, an Indian. He 
had seen the newspaper advertisements and specifically attributes his 'craving to be
441 Straits Times, 13 December 1953, p.9.
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associated with the sea'442 as the main motivating factor for him joining the Navy, 
something which was fostered in Penang where he originally grew up as a boy: 
'Since early days I had this sudden inclination towards the sea.'443 'When the fleet 
visited I made friends with the sailors, talked to them and enjoyed their company. It 
planted the seed'444. After moving to Singapore at the age of fourteen, Kuttan joined 
the Sea Cadet Corps, and though other cadets applied, Kuttan was the only one 
selected, largely due to the experience he had acquired after winning a month-long 
placement aboard a merchant vessel445. All Kuttan's batch successfully graduated 
from Dartmouth, though subsequent ones were not so successful. The second batch 
had three or four casualties, the third batch was 'a disaster... they couldn't take it... 
like round pegs in a square hole'446. Kuttan attributes the drop-outs to the fact that 
they did not possess the same 'call of the sea'; they came from inland - 'land lubbers' 
- and had 'never been to sea or seen a seafront'. Instead they were motivated by 
career opportunity and overseas education447.
442 Interview with (Captain) Chitharanjan Kuttan, conducted by Jason Lim, 11 September 2002, 
accession number 002697, reel 2, OHC, Singapore.
443 Ibid., reel 1.
444 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
445 Idem.
Image 14. Malayan class under steering instruction [Source: The National Archives,
INF 10/199, July 1958]
While Malayan officers were being trained to take over the eventual running of
the RMN, British officers remained custodians of the force in the meantime. There
were issues, however, about the quality of officer being sent. Not all were Royal Navy
regulars, with many being reservists. This caused a degree of hostility among some
of the Malaysian officers returning from Dartmouth with a higher degree of training to
that held by their RNR superiors. These feelings were exacerbated by levels of
unprofessionalism encountered by some. Kuttan's first posting upon returning to
Malaysia in 1961 was as Executive Officer of an inshore minesweeper. His
Commanding Officer was a Lieutenant Commander, RNR, and a veteran of the RMN
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for many years, but a man seen as 'useless at navigation', and a 'disgrace to the 
British navy, a total pisshead'448:
[He was] a very poor professional and also a very poor quality man, he 
was on his whiskey from sunrise to sundown... unhappiness began to 
grow in me right from the start after my return 449
The officer was caught when he was unable to bring the ship alongside the dock in 
harbour after a fleet exercise, after which the Chief of the RMN, Admiral W. J. Dovers, 
came aboard to inspect the vessel and caught the CO asleep in his cabin. The man 
was relieved from his command on the spot.450 He was not the exception, however:
There were quite a number of seconded British officers like him. All terrible, 
had quarrels with them, their professional knowledge was almost zero.
The Royal Navy made a big mistake sending rubbish; it set a very bad 
example. Late on the Malaysian Armed Forces became wise to it and 
started requesting Royal Australian Navy officers, they sent the best451
Ultimately, three Australian officers, Dovers, Commodore A. M. Synnot, and 
Commodore A. N. Dollard, headed the RMN before 'Bob' Thanabalasingam 
Karalasingam was appointed as the first Malaysian to acquire the top position on 1 
December 1967.
Karu Selvaratnam joined the RMN in 1960. Born in Perak, but from a Sri 
Lankan background, he signed up as an artificer apprentice. The course lasted 5
448 Idem.
449 Interview with (Captain) Chitharanjan Kuttan, conducted by Jason Lim, 11 September 2002, 
accession number 002697, reel 2, OHC, Singapore.
450 Confirmed in separate interview conducted by author with Tan Sri Thanabalasingam on 25 June 
2009.
451 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
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years, though a lot of that time Karu spent playing sport, at which he represented 
Malaysia internationally at cricket, hockey, badminton, and track and field, leading 
the naval chief to comment that he would never make a good engineer as he was 
hardly around, and it was 'highly possible you could sink a ship!'452 This sporting 
pedigree, however, helped Karu when he left to do a one-year short-service 
commission course at Dartmouth in 1966, a culture attuned to both the physical and 
moral benefits of sport for its officer class. This high threshold led to one of Karu's 
fellow Malaysian cadets dropping out because he 'didn't have the mental strength 
[and was] physically weak too'. Soon after Karu returned, Thanabalasingam was 
appointed as head of the RMN. The Malayan Navy had traditionally possessed a 
good reputation in track and field, boxing and football, and the new Malaysian chief 
wanted to bring back those 'old glory' days, and so appointed Karu to oversee this 
development453. In 1970 a 'sports carnival TLDM'454 was launched in KD Malaya, the 
RMN's HQ at Woodlands, Singapore, drawing together all its units to compete in a 
variety of sporting events. By 1975 this had expanded to encompass 1,000 
participants in 18 events 455 . Sport thus played an important role in the 
'nationalisation' of the force as a tool to help forge service identity, pride, and unity; 
an important task for any young navy, but even more so for one drawn from a 
multiethnic state.
Graft, Corruption and Patronage
452 Interview with Karu Selvaratnam conducted by author on 30 June 2009.
453 Idem.
454 TLDM = Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia (Royal Malaysian Navy)
455 Royal Malaysian Navy (ed.), Serving the Nation (Kuala Lumpur, 2004), p.40.
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Even though from 1960 onwards British officers no longer held the most 
senior position in the RMN, British influence was still exerted through other means. 
As well as recruitment, another major issue of naval expansion and imperial 
transition to nationalisation was that of procurement. One of Thanabalsingam's early 
priorities was to acquire a surface-to-surface missile system for the RMN, but he was 
unable to find a suitable product in the UK, Australia or India, and so he turned to the 
US. The Americans, however, mistook Thana's meaning of 'missile deterrence' and 
showed him an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), prompting Thana to explain 
that 'if I put one of those missiles aboard one of my ships it would sink!' Thana puts 
their poor state of intelligence on the RMN down to an assumption that the US saw 
them as under the British umbrella. Ultimately he decided to acquire Exocet missiles 
from France, the first time that any naval equipment had been sourced from outside 
the UK, prompting several informal attempts by the British at dissuading Thana, 
including a private dinner invitation from the British High Commissioner456.
Prior to that, in the mid-1960s, four Perkasa-class motor torpedo boats (MTBs) 
were ordered for the RMN from the Vosper Thorneycroft with each boat costing $4.2 
million457. As Kuttan put it, 'the British navy was running the show, so naturally they 
got the contract'458. Between 1966 and 1967, the then Lieutenant Commander 
Kuttan was serving as Staff Officer (Personnel and Training) at the Ministry of 
Defence in Kuala Lumpur. During that time, Kuttan attended a meeting where the 
then Chief of the Navy, Admiral Dollard, briefed the senior staff that following a visit
456 Interview conducted by author with Tan Sri Thanabalasingam on 25 June 2009.
457 Straits Times, 27 September 1967, p.7.
458 Interview with (Captain) Chitharanjan Kuttan, conducted by Jason Lim, 11 September 2002, 
accession number 002697, reel 3, OHC, Singapore.
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to the shipyard, delivery of the MTBs was going to be delayed because of 
engineering problems. This led Kuttan to ask whether a penalty clause was going to 
be imposed, at which Dollard got agitated and ordered the Technical and Finance 
officers to brief him. After Dollard had left, Kuttan was told by the Commanders: 'You 
guys are not in a fit enough state to drive those ships yet1. This prompted the reply, 
'Sir, I am paying for my boat, whether I am fit enough to drive her is my business'459. 
There was still a belief amongst the British that the Malaysians were not yet ready to 
run their own navy and a prolonged British presence was still required. This cultural 
hegemony was reinforced by the technical dependency the Malaysians still had on 
the Royal Navy and British shipbuilding, and the relative influence the latter had to 
affect RMN operations, and by extension, Malaysian foreign policy in a region which 
was still, albeit only just, part of Britain's sphere of influence. The MTBs were needed 
operationally, but were delayed by months and did not enter service until 1967. The 
incident led Kuttan to question his future career in the Navy:
At that point I realised I cannot go on like this. I had taken on the Chief of 
the Navy and two major heads of department, I knew my promotion 
prospects were all gone. So I started thinking about leaving at that 
stage.460
Around thirty years later, one of the British officers came to stay with Kuttan in 
Singapore, during which time he confirmed to Kuttan the real reason for the delays 
and why no penalty clause was exacted461:
459 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
460 Interview with (Captain) Chitharanjan Kuttan, conducted by Jason Lim, 11 September to 24 
September 2002, accession number 002697, reel 4, OHC, Singapore.
461 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
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A lot of people were on the take, a lot of kickback... that's why they didn't 
want to impose it see...not just at that level, but it was all the way up. 
You're talking about millions and millions and millions, one percent, two 
percent, a hell of a lot of money. Under those circumstances my 
sentiments towards the navy started waning.462
The kickbacks were said to have gone up as far as civil service level, but this culture 
of corruption was much more deeply engrained in the RMN, even at its lower levels. 
As the Commanding Officer of a motor launch, Kuttan had once broken a scam 
involving the supply of fresh victuals. These were very difficult to account for, as 
items such as fish and vegetables could not be counted in terms of numbers. As he 
was signing away the bills one day Kuttan noticed that certain figures were familiar, 
yet they could not be exactly the same, so he checked it out and discovered there 
had been double billing:
The smallest ones get caught first, I reported him, he was sent to detention. 
The kickback went all the way up to the Chief Supply Officer, a British 
Commander. He was sent back quietly 463
On another occasion, Kuttan was the CO of a minesweeper during the 
Indonesian confrontation when they had to dock for repairs. He knew there was a 
scam going on at the shipyard, so he ordered the engineer to stay in a hotel in the 
vicinity of the shipyard, and each day check every part of the ship on which work was 
meant to have been done. During the month-long refit, the shipyard kept sending 
supplemental lists of supplies for work which was not needed. At the end the
462 Interview with (Captain) Chitharanjan Kuttan, conducted by Jason Lim, 11 September to 24 
September 2002, accession number 002697, reel 4, OHC, Singapore.
463 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
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engineer made a list of all the jobs the shipyard had said they had done but had not, 
and Kuttan sent it directly to the Chief of the Navy. Kuttan was hauled up in front of 
the Chief Technical Officer, a British officer, and castigated for not having followed 
the proper chain of command, but no action was taken against the shipyard464. In 
1972, RMN finance officer Augustus De Cruz was charged on three cases of 
corruption, involving more than $187,000. He was claimed to have used three 
invoices from Guan Bee Slipway Company of Singapore to mislead the Navy in 1969, 
falsely certifying on the invoices that emergency works had been done satisfactorily 
on the three ships while knowing that there were no such works465. Kuttan claims that 
De Cruz was just 'a small boy in the thing, a victim of circumstances, the big bosses 
got away with it... it's still going on'466. The work of R.S. Milne supports Kuttan's 
assertion:
In practice the government's anti-corruption measured have been directed 
almost exclusively to combating petty corruption. An Anti-Corruption 
Agency was founded in 1967... [but] it was generally believed that its 
operations did not touch the “big fish”... It is significant that, by and large, 
the only “big fish” who came under serious pressure were those who had 
clashed with powerful political enemies who were still bigger fish 467
This assessment is further reinforced by Y. Mansoor Marican:
A criticism frequently made about the NBI (and also the ACA) is that it 
arrested mostly the “small fish” (lower level officials who received small
464 Idem.
465 Straits Times, 3 August 1972, p.9.
466 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
467 R.S. Milne, 'Levels of Corruption in Malaysia: A Comment on the Case of Bumiputra Malaysia 
Finance', Asian Journal of Public Administration, June 1987, Vol.9, No.1, pp.56-73, p.57.
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bribes), and left the “big fish” (syndicates, big businessmen, and influential 
politicians involved in large-scale corruption) relatively free to continue 
their illegal operations.468
Furthermore, the Malaysian Government and Royal Malaysian Navy continue 
to be plagued by corruption scandals, and it is acknowledged that despite the 
modernisation of maritime agencies and establishment of new naval bases, 'it 
remains difficult to secure Malaysian waters and corruption is a problem among some 
Malaysian officers'469. The police have even stated that 'a number of pirate victims do 
not report attacks, as they are “afraid of acts of revenge as they believe, or know, that 
law enforcement agencies are themselves involved in illegal activities.”470 In another 
ship procurement scandal, in July 2005, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
revealed serious corruption in the management of the PSC-Naval Dockyard Sdn Bhd 
(PSC-NDSB) and their 5.4 billion ringgit contract to supply six offshore patrol vessels 
(OPVs)471, a figure which became inflated to 6.75 billion ringgits. In relation to the 
case, the Auditor General's Report, tabled in the Malaysian Parliament on 7 
September 2006, revealed details of 'dubious award of contract to an obviously 
unqualified contractor; failure of technical and financial management; hefty 
illegitimate contract price increases, and overpayment, unjustifiable waiver of 
penalties, huge undocumented payments, and complete failure of ministry oversight'. 
This lack of transparency has been seen as symptomatic of the Malaysian trend to 
award contracts to a few favoured individuals and companies, and not through a
468 Y. Mansoor Marican, 'Combating Corruption: The Malaysian Experience', Asian Survey, Vol. 19,
No.6 (June 1979), pp.597-610, p.606.
469 Carolin Liss, 'The Privatisation of Maritime Security -  Maritime Security in Southeast Asia:
Between a rock and a hard place?', Working Paper No. 141, February 2007, Asia Research Centre, 
Murdoch University, p.6.
470 Liss interview (confidential), Malaysia, in idem.
471 Kuldeep S. Jessy, 'Greed and graft in dockyard scandal', The Star, 16 July 2005.
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competitive bidding process. When the OPV deal was initially awarded in September 
1998, PSC-NDSB, a company which had no experience of building anything more 
technically sophisticated than trawlers and police boats, was owned by United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO) member Amin Shah Omar Shah472.
It could be argued that this lack of industrial competitiveness and inadequate 
technical skill-base is a legacy of colonialism, its deliberate underdevelopment of the 
country's indigenous industrial base, particularly amongst the Malay population, and 
its preferential treatment of British firms. Post-independence, not only did local 
infrastructure have to be developed to cope with the demands of the new nation, but 
also there was a perpetuation of the culture of 'patronage'. There is a sizeable 
literature devoted to the academic study of corruption within post-colonial societies, 
particularly Africa and Asia countries. A pioneer in this field has been the Islamic 
Malaysian academic Syed Hussein Alatas. Though he recognises that corruption 
existed during colonialism and before, he argues that the period of decolonisation 
combined a unique set of conditions which provided the opportunity for corruption to 
flourish:
(a) widespread corruption during the war period preceding the 
achievement of independence;
(b) a sudden increase in bureaucracy;
(c) a sudden increase in opportunities for corruption on a bigger and 
higher scale;
472 Kim Quek, 'Malaysia's M$6.75b naval scandal', Malaysia Today, 13 September 2007, 
http://malaysia-today.net/blog2006/corridors.php?itemid=8117.
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(d) the invasion of the different levels of leadership by people of low moral 
integrity;
(e) inexperience of leaders fighting for independence in building an 
incorrupt and efficient government -  some were indifferent and lacking in 
moral integrity; and
(f) manipulation and intrigues of foreign financial and business powers 
through means of corruption.473
The Second World War, and the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia 
produced a situation where a 'scarcity of goods and foodstuffs, together with 
rampant inflation, within the context of little governmental control, made corruption 
the most efficient means of supplementing income'. Post-war, the rise of nationalist 
party-politics in the years surrounding independence, matched with an increased 
emphasis towards economic developments and modernisation, led to a 'marriage of 
business and politics', and fostered an atmosphere where 'in Malaysia it is widely 
believed that firms and industries contribute millions to party funds'. Within such a 
system, the culture of patronage engrained in Malay society helped legitimise the 
corrupt dealings of those businesses who sought the 'patronage' of the ruling politic:
The corruptive influence of the war period, the rapid increase in the 
number of government offices, the rapid extension of the power and 
opportunities of the bureaucracy, coupled with the weakness of 
supervision from the top, and the influence of political parties, provided a 
fertile soil for corruption. It was in this highly vulnerable context that
473 Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Aldershot, 1990), p.69.
192
business and industry began to 'grease the palm' of an already susceptible 
bureaucracy.474
Alatas also links the social migration which accompanies the move towards 
capitalist modernity as another factor in facilitating:
Rapid urbanization brought about the weakening of rural values. Social 
controls which maintained frugality and simplicity of life were replaced by 
those encouraging materialism, impersonalism, status-seeking, greed for 
money and power, and an unwillingness to adhere to moral values. In this 
climate the business and commercial classes, whose ranks were swelled 
by speculators and adventurers of the war period, extend their corruptive 
influence 475
It was this very transformation which preoccupied the minds of the UMNO political 
leadership, particularly following the race riots of 13 May 1969. They believed that 
communal antagonism was symptomatic of structural economic inequalities within 
Malaysian society, focused around the commercially-dominant Chinese classes and 
the largely rural Malay population. This division of labour had grown out of the 
colonial economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where 
'coolie' labour was sought from India and China for the tin and rubber industries 
because of racial stereotypes of the 'lazy Malay'.
Although Alatas argues that the move away from rural structures to urban 
ones broke down the old value systems which acted as a moral compass, he also 
suggests that those same traditional allegiances which accompanied Malay
feudalism remained and adapted to the new structures. The notion of patronage, for 
example, meant Malays still believed that their loyalty granted them a degree of 
protection from their rulers, however morally dubious their actions may be. This 
concept Alatas calls 'psychological feudalism':
The important conditions to obtain protection from feudal rulers and chiefs 
were unflinching loyalty and subservice towards the master. In return for 
these, protection was granted irrespective of the nature and degree of the 
crime. The modern version of this relationship is found in the political 
party.476
Such inherent attitudes and relationships helped foster post-colonial corruption, 
by allowing its exploiters to act safe under the 'patronage' of the UMNO.
Alatas argues that 'the scope and incentive for corruption were greatest at 
points where important decisions were taken which would substantially affect the 
fortunes of interested groups or individuals, such as in assessment and collection of 
taxes, obtaining licences, contracts or orders for supplies'477 . This clearly 
encompasses areas of naval ship procurement and victuals, and Alatas cites further 
examples of corruption within Malaysia's armed forces which substantiate Kuttan's 
earlier claims to this effect. In 1977, the Auditor General noted irregularities in the 
records of the navy stores depot, 'to the extent that is was impossible to ascertain 
whether items from the stores were properly issued'. He concluded that:
Although I have for several years been reporting to the Ministries and 
Departments and to the Treasury about the extent of irregularities and the
476 Syed Hussein Alatas, 'Feudalism in Malaysian society: a study in historical continuity', in Syed 
Hussein Alatas, Modernization and Social Change (Sydney, 1972), pp. 108-9.
477 Alatas, Corruption, p.71.
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supply of fresh rations, no action has to my knowledge been taken to stop 
the abuse as described in the preceding paragraphs, and this practice has 
cost and is continuing to cost the Government several million dollars a 
year.478
Alatas goes on to say that 'I have heard similar laments from auditor-generals in 
Malaysia for at least two decades... From the Malaysian audit reports alone there are 
sufficient grounds to suspect that corruption is firmly entrenched within the usual 
channels of the decision-making chain in the high budget administration'479:
The fear is that since 1957, the year of independence, corruption has 
definitely been growing. We see numerous political figures and others 
amassing wealth through being in office. It is public knowledge that there 
is a great deal of corruption in the customs, among the highway police, 
immigration control, the land office, the supply acquisition units of various 
ministries, the religious departments in the states of the Federation, and 
the road transport offices 480
Official statistics list that in the period 1968-72, of 14,825 corruption cases 
investigated, 303 resulted in convictions and disciplinary actions481. This is in 
contrast to the end-colonial period of 1950-57, where 1,813 cases resulted in 1,411 
convictions482. These included bribes offered by the public and requested by the Civil 
Service, making false declarations in documents with the intention to defraud the 
Government, extortion by members of the public and the civil service, smuggling,
478 Ibid., p.76.
479 Ibid., p.77.
480 Ibid., p.86.
481 Marican, 'Combating Corruption', p.602.
482 Ibid., p.603.
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and possession of illegal drugs and stolen goods483. Such activities mirror the 
allegations levelled at the RMN, particularly when considered in relation to the 1950s 
when RMN members were involved in smuggling, the blackmarket, and the 
patronage of secret societies. Clearly there were colonial roots to such behaviour, 
and attitudes regarding its acceptability which were fostered through official channels 
such as the Navy, thus providing a degree of moral absolution in the process which 
transcended independence. The more accommodating attitude adopted by the 
British following their return to Malaya, so as to solidify their hegemonic position 
undermined by the Japanese, and responding to increased opportunities for 
exploitation which had grown out of wartime conditions, can be viewed in such 
statistics. The comparatively low number of investigations conducted during the last 
decade of colonial rule, but the high proportion of convictions indicates that there 
was a problem with corruption, but an unwillingness to air it except in the most 
serious cases because of the destabilising effect it could have on British power. This 
is reflected in Alatas' assertion that 'not only was there corruption in the colonial 
administration but it was further increased by the indirect effect of nationalist 
agitation against the government'484. Political challenges to colonial rule led the 
British to seek out new collaborative allies, such as secret societies, a relationship 
facilitated through corruption. By contrast, in the post-independence period, the 
prevalence of corruption has been much more widely acknowledged, 'there is no 
dearth of allegations about corrupt practices, with opposition party politicians vocal in
483 David J. Gould and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes, The  Effects of Corruption on Administrative 
Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries', World Bank Staff Working Papers, no.580, 
Management and Development Series, no.7, pp.5-6.
484 Alatas, Corruption, p.90.
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this regard'485, and there has been increased public debate regarding the seeming 
'increase in the incidence of bribery, kickbacks, payoffs, and other corrupt practices 
in the country'486. Corruption's systemic nature in Malaysia, however, has produced 
a proportionally low number of convictions, which in turn has fed the problem by 
decreasing disincentive yet providing increased opportunity for exploitation.
Corruption has also been seen as symptomatic of the UMNO's legislative 
attempts to elevate the economic status of the Malays, primarily through the 
country's New Economic Policy (NEP). Formulated in 1971, in the aftermath of the 
1969 communal riots, it aimed to forge national unity by reducing the socio-economic 
disparity between the largely urban and business-dominant Chinese minority, and 
the predominantly rural Malay majority. This was to be achieved through affirmative 
action afforded to the bumiputra, translated as the 'sons of the soil', and comprising 
specifically the Islamic portion of the Malay population. Such policies encompassed 
'state-held trusts, government contracts, business credit, scholarships, business 
licences, university admission, and employment in the public or corporate sector'487. 
It has been argued by Sri Tharan, however, that 'a potential or capacity for systems 
corruption has emerged alongside the provisions of the NEP for creating a class of 
Malay entrepreneurs'488. Increased Governmental intervention in the fields of 
commerce and industry thus created not only for the "’potential winners”... an 
opportunity for self-gain and benefit', but also:
485 Hans H. Indorf, 'Party System Adaptation to Political Development in Malaysia during the First 
Decade of Independence, 1957-1967', Ph.D. thesis (New York University, 1969), pp.469-70.
486 Marican, 'Combating Corruption', p.609.
487 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Duke University 
Press, 2006), p.80.
488 'Systems Corruption' denotes 'a mode of holistic corruption that is capable of affecting the whole 
political-administrative system, as distinct from other modes of corruption that affect only parts of the 
system' - Sri Tharan, 'Systems Corruption and the New Economic Policy', Philippine Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol.XXIII, No.1 (January 1979), pp.39-60, p.40.
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To the “potential losers,” the threat of relative deprivation in the domain of 
their vested and established interests leads to an “extended search” for 
political protection in an unstable policy environment. They are impelled to 
seek “connections” and to offer a sharing of their wealth and interests in 
exchange for continued access to the arena and participation in new 
opportunities in this field.489
The concept of patronage evinces itself again here in a relationship where 
'political elites assume the role of patrons to business elites (clients)'490, and where 
'diversion-flows'491 are among the mechanisms whereby patronage is reinforced. 
These can manifest themselves in the form of 'illegal surcharges, unrepresented 
checks, spending not governed by rules and regulations, illegal collection of fees, 
unauthorized and unvouched payments, irregular purchases, abuse of powers, and 
improper contract awarding'492. The RMN would have potentially been a prime outlet 
for most of these diversion-flows, as attested by Kuttan. In an incident reminiscent of 
Fosten's drug seizure and prescient considering the wider corruption highlighted by 
Kuttan, in 1971 Lieutenant Commander Karu stopped a coastal merchant ship while 
in command of the patrol craft KD Sri Kelantan. Upon inspection it was discovered 
that the vessel was carrying contraband, at which point the smuggler captain came 
aboard with a briefcase and tried to make a deal. Karu refused and the Marine police
4au Ibid., p.43.
491 'Diversion-flows are flows of resources, funds, etc. away from the intended and officially stated 
purposes, and from target groups to groups who are not intended as recipients. Such flows are 
usually tapped by middle-level and higher-level bureaucrats either on their own or in collaboration with 
individuals and small groups outside the bureaucracy', in ibid., p.43.
492 Ibid., pp.43-6.
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were called in and the case handed to them, which led Karu to be admonished by 
headquarters as the police would have taken the money for themselves493.
'Islamisation' and the Quota System
The RMN's growing post-war plurality led to the increased interference of 
cultural factors in the running of the force, with conflicting outcomes. Whereas during 
both Rahman Abdul and Peter Fosten's time it was commonly accepted that one ate 
whatever food was given, regardless of religious custom, by the mid-1950s as the 
country approached independence this casual acceptance was beginning to change. 
In March 1955, the Utusan Melayu published the complaints of six Muslim Malay 
cooks after they were made to handle pork in the mess. Captain Nicholls responded 
by saying all cook recruits were warned beforehand that they would be required to 
handle items of European diet494. This vocal discontent, however, indicated an 
emerging concept of 'Malayness' within the Navy, conjoined to that which was being 
constructed by nationalists and would be more forcibly imposed on the service after 
it was transferred to the newly-independent Government of Malaya on 1 July 1958.
493 Interview with Karu Selvaratnam conducted by author on 30 June 2009.
494 Straits Times, 5 March 1955, p.7.
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Image 15. The Royal Malayan Navy is transferred to the Federation of Malaya, 
inspected by the Governor of Singapore, Sir William Goode (right) [Source: The 
National Archive, INF 10/199, July 1958]
The 1946 Malayan Union, which was dissolved after just two years, proved a 
catalyst for Malay nationalism. It advocated the termination of the Malay rulers' 
sovereignty and the granting of equal citizenship rights to immigrant groups, which 
threatened the Malays' numerical status, and acted as a rallying call for the 
aristocratic Malay elite who championed the core markers of Malay identity: bahasa 
(Malay language), agama (religion), and raja (royalty)495. These markers have 
subsequently been constitutionally enshrined by the UMNO-dominant post-colonial 
government. Today they define the bumiputra, and by extension, who benefits from
495 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 'Whose Imagined Community?: The Nation-State, Ethnicity and Indigenous 
Minorities in Southeast Asia', paper prepared for the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) Conference on Racism and Public Policy, September 2001, Durban, South 
Africa, p.8.
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the affirmative action afforded the 'sons of the soil' under the aegis of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). Though the NEP was launched in 1970, unofficially this 
institutionalised discrimination existed earlier in the context of Malaysia's armed 
forces, and by extension of that, the RMN.
Within a couple of months of being appointed Staff Officer (Personnel and 
Training) at the Ministry of Defence in 1966, Kuttan was asked to head up a 
selection panel to recruit 10 new officer cadets for the RMN to be sent to Dartmouth 
for training. Kuttan submitted his selections to the Armed Forces Council, which 
included only two Malays, the rest being either Indian or Chinese, only to have them 
rejected and be told to reconvene the panel, ensuring that he observed the quota of 
7:2:1 -  seven Malays, two Chinese, and one other - something he was not informed 
about upon his appointment. It was a significant shift from the heterogenous group 
first sent to Dartmouth of which Kuttan had been a member. Consequently he says 
that a lot of sub-standard officers were brought into the RMN, as the more capable 
Malays tended to look towards the civil service rather than the armed forces as a 
career. He argues that a quota system should never be imposed upon armed forces 
as ultimately lives were at stake, and the most capable men needed to be in 
command and appointed on merit496. This sentiment is echoed by Admiral Tan Sri 
Thanabalasingam, a Sri Lankan Tamil also part of the first Dartmouth batch, who 
became the first Malaysian chief of the Navy in 1967 and was also the only non- 
Malay to ever hold the top position in one of Malaysia's armed forces. He argues that 
the more a force is racially biased towards one race, it discourages others to join, 
and questions of loyalty arise:
496 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
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[They ask] "why should I serve and die, for what, for who?" If a force is 
meritocratic then loyalty will be automatic, but not if promotion is limited or 
if there is a quota on education. I'll fight for my country, [but] that sort of 
thing must be ingrained from a young age.497
Kuttan found his own promotion restricted as a result of the quota system he 
was expected to enforce. As a Lieutenant Commander he watched one of his junior 
officers rise quickly through the ranks until one Sunday the young officer walked into 
his office having just been promoted to Commander, offering his apologies and a 
sole explanation: 'Sir, I'm so sorry. I'm a Melayu'. Kuttan says he did not want to wait 
for the embarrassment of one day having his cadets writing reports on him and so in 
1970 he left the RMN498.
Lieutenant Commander Karu also experienced watching the cadets he had 
trained being promoted above him:
Every other morning a junior would be promoted above you. A fresh 
Commander with half a dog watch, suddenly talks like one, trying to 
portray one, when he doesn't f it499
Karu similarly decided to take early retirement from the force, due to what he saw as 
deteriorating standards forced about by pro-bumiputra policies. This extended to 
language, with everything having to be translated from English, however, Karu says 
that many Royal Navy terms could not be adequately translated into Bahasa Melayu. 
It was an example of service efficiency being compromised for the sake of politics. 
Another enshrined marker of bumiputra identity, Islam, was also actively
497 Interview conducted by author with Tan Sri Thanabalasingam on 25 June 2009.
498 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
499 Interview conducted by author with Karu Selvaratnam on 30 June 2009.
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imposed on the force with contentious outcomes. According to Karu, 'everything had 
a religious implication1 which consequently 'brought down standards', and although 
Karu was religious himself, he did not appreciate the move to religious favour away 
from the more meritocratic post-war model of the British, stating 'you can't sit down 
with a cup of coffee and a cigar and expect God to help you out when you're not 
doing anything'500. It could be inferred that the stereotype of the 'lazy Malay' still 
informs this preconception, a recurrence of deeply-engrained colonial ideologies 
which, according to Alatas, were never displaced during the country's independence 
movement and continued to inform and shape the post-colonial state:
The false consciousness distorts the reality. The Malay ruling party 
inherited the rule from the British without a struggle for independence... As 
such there was also no ideological struggle. There was no intellectual 
break with British ideological thinking at the deeper level of thought. The 
leadership of the party were recruited from the top hierarchy of the civil 
service trained by the British501
Central to the issue of Islam and the Navy were conflicting attitudes towards 
alcohol. Karu says a major motivation for him joining the Navy had been its 
camaraderie, and alcohol formed an important element in that respect, something 
which deteriorated with its banning. Not only that, but Karu argues that alcohol 
played an important role as a facilitator for the resolution of professional problems. At 
the end of the working day, they would meet in a bar and work out issues they had 
not had the chance to do whilst on-duty. When Karu joined the RMN in 1960 he 
describes the force as a 'very good mix, brothers in arms, everybody was doing the
500 Idem.
501 Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, p. 152.
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same things, we were playing together, working together, eating together, drinking 
together'. He says too much emphasis on the 'Islamic factor' eroded this, and worried 
the significant number of non-Malays in the force:
We lost a lot of good officers, some left and others were bypassed. I was 
one of them who was disillusioned with what I was watching. I said: “What 
am I doing here wasting my time, I think I'd better get out", because I 
would have rotted there for another five or six years. It was a good thing I 
left. I sometimes regret not leaving earlier.502
Admiral Thanabalasingam also appreciated the shifting emphasis of the force 
from when he joined in 1955 as one of the first Malaysian officers to be sent to 
Dartmouth:
Everyone drank at the time. It's not so acceptable now to say Malays 
drank, at that point in time the culture was different. We considered them 
good Muslims at the time because we didn't realise anyway. In Malaysia 
today we've become more religious from an Islamic point of view and more 
sensitive to these things. We toasted the king with wine and champagne at 
mess dinner, that was done away with a long time ago. The official toast is 
now done with water. Things have changed drastically.503
Like Karu, Thanabalasingam advocated that alcohol helped develop the social 
attributes required to be good officers, something instilled in him at Dartmouth.
502 Interview conducted by author with Karu Selvaratnam on 30 June 2009.
503 Interview conducted by author with Tan Sri Thanabalasingam on 25 June 2009.
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During his days as RMN chief, he would often punish officers "who could not hold 
their drinks. I was harsh, more so to discipline and make them credible sailors"504.
It was Thanabalasingam's successor as Chief of the Navy, Admiral Mohd Zain 
bin Mohd Salleh, who banned grog from the wardroom and mess, a man Kuttan had 
been particularly close too:
We were close buddies as cadets and shipmates. On leave we would buy 
a bottle of brandy or whisky and drink it on the train, straight from the 
bottle. For him to agree to that policy I don't understand... It was a very big 
thing in the social life of the men and the officers. It affected their morale... 
the non-Malays and even some Malays themselves. Sentiments were 
expressed like “what the heck, what next am I going to be deprived of?”
On that basis some retired early.505
A recurring theme throughout this chapter, and spanning both colonial Malaya 
and postcolonial Malaysia, is the identification of Malays as a 'seagoing' race, first by 
the British and then by the bumiputra. The concept of the 'sons of the soil' as 
previously mentioned is worth particular consideration in this context, not only 
because the inference of the term seems to contradict the construction of the 
seafaring Malay, but also because it provided British validation to Malay claims for 
primacy over the land. It is also a contentious issue if you include Singapore within 
such assertions, which one has to do considering that was where all the local naval 
forces were based predominantly, as the dominant ethnic group on the island were
504 Adrian David, "Old horse' Thanabalasingam touched by award from King", 21 June 2007, 
poobalan.com, http://poobalan.com/blog/indian/2007/06/21/old-horse-thanabalasingam-touched-by- 
award-from-king/
505 Interview conducted by author with Chitharanjan Kuttan on 17 July 2009.
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not Malays but in fact Chinese. Though indeed the Chinese population had been built 
up through immigration over a century, this was also the case with the Indians, and it 
can be argued, that though a small community of around 1,000 Orang Seletar506 
inhabited the island when the British settled, they were a group distinct from the 
mainland Malay population who also settled later.
One way that the bumiputra sought to legitimise the Islamisation of the Navy 
and extension of the quota system, was by appropriating both colonial and pre­
colonial cultural markers. In a naval variation on martial race theory, there had been a 
belief amongst the British at the turn of the century that Malays were an innately 
'seafaring' people, rhetoric which was articulated with increased vigour during the 
1930s when Malays were first recruited into the original naval forces. Even today this 
stereotype is celebrated by Malaysia in books, museums and public commemoration. 
This identity is essentially rooted in the fundamental role played historically by Malay 
merchants and pirate mercenaries in shaping the fortunes of the Malacca Straits, 
upon whose favour the power and influence of the region’s Sultanates traditionally 
rested. The most celebrated of these maritime heroes was Hang Tuah, who has 
become an icon for Malay nationalism for his famous rallying cry: "Malays will never 
vanish from the face of the earth". Yet, Hang Tuah was not ‘Malay’ in the 
contemporary sense, nor were his fellow privateers. They were ‘Orang Laut’, or 
‘People of the Sea’507, boat-dwellers, who lived a rootless and nomadic existence 
from coast to coast, working either as a Sultan’s hired navy, or as fishermen, traders,
506 A specific group of seafaring Malays (Orang Laut) who settled around the northern coast of 
Singapore.
507 Cynthia Chou, The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia: The Inalienable Gift of Territory (London,
2010), p.1.
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and even tax collectors508. The Malay rulers bound the Orang Laut to them by forging 
kinship ties and bestowing titles and emblems of office, vital because of the Orang 
Laut's reputation for transferring their allegiance if it served their interests. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, with the declining influence of the Sultanates and the influx 
of British power, a large number of Orang Laut were forced to settle and find 
alternative work ashore, and became a minority not just among the indigenous 
peoples of Malaya, known collectively as the Orang Asli, but also the growing 
population of predominantly Muslim Malay immigrants from Sumatra and Java. The 
1874 Treaty of Pangkor tied the concept of Malayness or ‘Melayu’, to the Islamic 
faith509, simultaneously disenfranchising the Orang Laut and Orang Asli from their 
Malay ethnicity. The Orang Laut became viewed negatively by the Melayu, as a 
‘dangerous, dirty and unprogressive people’, whose nomadic life was deemed 
unconducive to adhering to the Islamic faith, which can only be observed if one leads 
a sedentary lifestyle510. Yet, it was the Orang Laut who were the true seagoing 
Malays, not the Melayu who both under the British and post-independence have 
been framed as such.
It has been argued that 'globalization has induced new imagined communities 
that stress not merely continuity but also a resurgence of ancient traditions that go 
beyond past achievements to meet the challenges of modernity'511. The Orang Laut's 
nomadism has been contemporarily synonymised with economic backwardness due 
to their reticence to embrace the 'new Islam' preached by the state and legislatively
508 Geoffrey Benjamin, ‘On Being Tribal in the Malay World’, in Geoffrey Benjamin and Cynthia Chou 
(eds.), Tribal Communities in the Malay World: Historical, Cultural and Social Perspectives (Singapore,
2002), p.41, p.45.
509 Ibid., pp.43-44.
510 Cynthia Chou, Indonesian Sea Nomads: Money, Magic and Fear of the Orang Suku Laut (London,
2003), p.2, p.143.
511 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, p.80.
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tied to Malaysia's capitalist development and future prosperity. It is somewhat ironic 
that the Orang Laut, arguably pioneers of transnational trade, should find themselves 
estranged by modern Malaysia's attempts to integrate into a globalised economy. It 
has been emphasised by some scholars that 'history and memory can be used 
“instrumentally” to promote individual or collective interests':
In their struggle for power, competing elites use history as a tool to 
mobilize popular support. Ethnic categories can also be manipulated to 
maintain the power of a dominant group and justify discrimination against 
other groups. This manipulation of the past provides the opportunity to 
mold the present and the future.512
Social scientists have examined the political nature of ethnicity, and how 
colonial and post-colonial states have been instrumental in its social construction, 
flourishing under nationalism513. Eric Hobsbawm has argued that national histories 
are 'invented', while for Elie Kedourie 'nationalists make use of the past in order to 
subvert the present.'514 It has been said that nation states are "built through 
purposeful racial, ethnic, religious, class, or other internal exclusions" such that the 
nationalization of society has tended to move in tandem with the racialization of 
society.515 The identification of Malays as a ‘seafaring race' fits within these 
paradigms, creating a distorting representation based upon the collaborative
512 Zheng Wang, 'National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: 
Patriotic Education Campaign in China', International Studies Quarterly (2008), Vol.52, pp.783-806, 
p.786.
Leonard Y. Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka 
(Honolulu, 2006), p.5.
Peter Hays Gries, ‘Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity 
Today', in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston (eds.), China’s Transformations: The Stories 
beyond the Headlines (Plymouth, 2007), pp. 113-4.
515 Andrew Mark, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and 
Brazil (Cambridge, 1998), p.273, cited in Hilbourne Watson, 'Theorizing the racialization of global 
politics and the Caribbean experience', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol.26, No.4 (Oct.-Dec. 
2001), pp.449-83.
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appropriation and manipulation of a minority group's cultural heritage and ethnic 
identity. The cultivation of an 'imagined community' of seafaring Malays benefitted the 
British, as by instilling a distorted sense of cultural pride and tradition, it broadened 
the popular resonance and appeal of naval service to a wider pool of potential 
recruits across the peninsula. It also acted to disbar the Orang Laut, for though they 
possessed nautical skills and had a reputation as feared fighters, these had been 
used to undermine British trade and the Royal Navy in previous centuries through 
piracy516. They distrusted the 'predatory habits to which these people have always 
been so addicted'517 which when 'allured by the prospects of plunder [would cause] a 
renewal of practices so congenial to Malay habits'518. They were also known for their 
transient loyalty, and the Orang Laut were continually viewed with suspicion, seen to 
lack both the disciplined character and the reliability demanded by the Navy. This 
'invented tradition' was embraced by Melayu nationalists, as by tying into the deeper 
cultural heritage of the indigenous Malay populations it legitimised their own claims 
for racial primacy in the decolonisation process, when in reality they were immigrants 
as much as the Chinese and Indian communities they sought to exceed.
516 Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree, pp. 192-4.
517 Owen to Croker, 14/16 October 1830, cited in Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay 
World (Singapore, 1963), p.51.
518 Presgrave to Muchisa, 5 Dec 1828, cited in ibid., p.41.
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Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the prime impetus behind the formation of local 
naval forces in Southeast Asia was the construction of the Singapore naval base, 
though this connection was played down by both the Governor and imperial interests, 
notably the Admiralty and Colonial Office. The Admiralty's whole philosophy 
regarding colonial naval defence was dependent upon the willingness of colonial 
legislatures to contribute not just men, but money, towards the auxiliary units which 
could relieve imperial overstretch by releasing Royal Navy regulars for duty 
elsewhere. To acknowledge that such naval forces were tied to the base would be to 
admit that their presence was in imperial not local interests, and thus place their 
expense at the foot of the Imperial Government. The metropole thus needed local 
allies, such as the Governor and the Malay Sultans, to collaborate and support such 
schemes.
Justifications were made based on the local benefits derived from the creation
of such naval forces, in this instance the opportunities they provided for the
employment and social improvement of Malay youths. Yet such views were
inherently prejudiced and influenced by racial ideology, in particular the myth of the
'lazy Malay'. The naval forces thus became purveyors of imperial paternalism,
improving the condition and 'character' of the stagnant 'Oriental' through benevolent
British instruction. While the loyalty of the Malays was secured through the Sultans,
doubts existed regarding the other major ethnic groups, most notably the Chinese,
who were seen to have potentially conflicting allegiances to the Kuomintang,
Communists, or secret societies, and the Eurasians, who though they were
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considered more trustworthy, were seen to be of varying quality due to their lack of 
racial purity, which would also undermine white British authority which defined the 
chain of command and the naval officer class. In order to justify the exclusions of 
such groups colonial authorities thus built up the image of Malays as a 'seafaring 
race', propagated through the media, which also served as a recruitment tool and 
broadcast the positive change that British naval training was bringing about.
Western-centric representations of the fall of Singapore have created a 
distorting historical memory of the battle that fails to properly acknowledge the role 
and actions of colonial volunteers. For the MRNVR, the battle was a costly but heroic 
one, more in keeping with the glorification of Dunkirk than Churchill's humiliating 
'capitulation', where they continued the evacuation of civilians in the face of 
insurmountable odds, and in many cases paid the ultimate price in doing so. Yet, it 
was still only the white European officers who were subsequently awarded for their 
bravery, with the Malay ratings overlooked.
Those who did choose to stay with the British after the fall of Singapore did 
less so out of patriotic loyalty than self-preservation. Indeed, push factors generally 
appear more dominant than pull ones behind naval volunteer motives, whether they 
were escaping an abusive domestic life, religious custom, economic hardship, or 
Japanese retribution. Being away from home in Ceylon and coming into contact with 
other colonial troops highlighted comparative inequalities, with fragile imperial unity 
thus fragmenting and causing indiscipline. Rather than being 'brothers in arms' 
fighting for the same Empire in a common cause, they felt like 'friendless exiles in a 
foreign country'. Yet interestingly, protest did not form along ethnic lines, as in the 
case of the Caymanians. Instead, Malays were divided amongst themselves
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according to their individual units which also had age and class associations, with the 
younger full-time Malay Navy against the more numerous and generally older 
MRNVR part-timers. 'Irrational' Malay behaviour was depicted in racially stereotypical 
terms, attributed to culture-bound syndromes such as latah, which reinforced British 
colonial rule. By drawing on the comforting 'knowledge' of imperial discourses of 
power, underlying concerns were masked regarding Britain's ability to reassert its 
control over Malaya, and elsewhere in the Empire, after the war. As in the Caribbean, 
there was a fear that American exposure could undermine British authority in the 
eyes of its colonial subjects. It was recognised that conciliation was needed in order 
to placate dissenting voices that might obstruct the British return. Thus the relative 
position and responsibilities of the Malay sailors was to be raised for them to 
spearhead 'Operation Zipper', but was never actually carried out due to the Japanese 
surrender.
The three original Malay naval units were disbanded after the war, only for a 
new full-time force, the MNF, to be formed a year later in response to the Emergency. 
The changing post-war geopolitical climate of the Cold War meant that old imperial 
ideologies had to be revaluated. Whereas one might assume that concerns towards 
Chinese loyalty might be reinforced by the Communist insurgency, in fact it served to 
draw the non-Communist Chinese into closer sympathy with the colonial authorities 
by providing a common threat to their interests. To encourage this affiliation, the 
Navy thus opened up its formerly restrictive recruitment policy to include non-Malays. 
In doing so though it allowed secret societies, specifically the 18 gang, to spread 
within the organisation, encompassing Malay members as well as Chinese. The 
formerly repressed secret societies were able to flourish in post-war Singapore
because the British needed new collaborators to support their precarious returning 
colonial position, after their prestige had been shattered by Japan. Meanwhile, on the 
ground, and waves, individual British officers were bought off, and it was not until Lee 
Kuan Yew became prime minister in 1959 that serious action was taken to eradicate 
the gangs.
With Malaya gaining independence in 1957, responsibility for the RMN was 
transferred across to the new Government in Kuala Lumpur. Yet even though Britain 
no longer held formal authority over the force, it continued to exert informal influence. 
British officers still served in the RMN for another decade, particularly in the more 
senior positions, officially there to aid its transition to full nationalisation by training up 
its indigenous officers, but using their positions of authority to steer local procurement 
in the direction of British interests.
Nationalisation led to the Islamisation and politicisation of the RMN, with 
service efficiency and esprit de corps compromised for the UMNO's nation-building 
project. Yet this ushered in a new phase of institutionalised discrimination. As the 
pre-war British recruited solely Malays because of concerns regarding the other 
groups' potential loyalties and the threat this could pose to their authority, particularly 
the Chinese, the UMNO-led Government sought to sideline the non-bumiputra within 
the force to assure its allegiance to them and consolidate its political power base 
through affirmative action. Within the RMN, as elsewhere, this took the form of a 
quota system, disproportionate to the national demographic, and ostracised those 
non-lslamic Malay members within the force who suddenly found their promotion 
prospects impeded. As under the British, historical memory was manipulated to 
provide cultural validation for this preferential treatment, appropriating colonial
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discourses to emphasise the innate seafaring qualities and heritage of the Malays. 
Yet this identity was displaced, and though traditional Malay groups such as the 
Orang Laut had strong maritime traditions, they were no longer considered 'Malay' in 
the contemporary sense because they were not Islamic, thus both their seafaring 
identity and Malay ethnicity was taken from them, while their celebrated ancestors 
such as Hang Tuah became rebranded to act as new Malaysia's nationalist heroes. 
Thus, one should question the extent to which Malaysia can be considered a 
'postcolonial' state, a concept still intrinsically juxtaposed with Westerncentricism, 
when a form of internal colonialism519 still exists within the country, after the 'blue 
water' imperialism of the British has ended? It could be argued that British 
paternalism worked too well, with the colonised effectively learning their tactics to 
become colonisers themselves.
519 'Internal colonialism differs from classic colonialism (sometimes called blue water colonialism) in 
that in colonialism's classic form a small group of colonists occupy a land far from the colonial 
metropolis (metropole) and remain a minority, exercising control over a large indigenous population. 
By contrast, in internal colonialism, the native population is swamped by a large mass of colonial 
settlers who, after generations, no longer have a metropole to which to return.' Jace Weaver, 'Chapter 
10: Indigenousness and Indigeneity', in Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray (eds.), A Companion to 
Postcolonial Studies (Oxford, 2000), p.223.
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Case Study Three: East Asia
Introduction
As previously emphasised, the main threat which preoccupied British naval 
thinking for most of the interwar period was presented by Japan, and colonial naval 
development largely emerged in response to the strategic overstretch that this 
created. This threat loomed larger for one colony in particular, situated virtually on 
Japan's doorstep: Hong Kong. This case study will focus on the Hong Kong Royal 
Naval Volunteer Reserve (HKRNVR), and how it developed not just in response to 
these external political and strategic pressures, but internal ones also. As discussed 
in the previous section, during this earlier period the Navy were reluctant to recruit 
Chinese into the Malayan and Straits Settlements' naval forces because of racial and 
cultural stereotypes, with particular concerns regarding their associations and 
loyalties. With an overwhelming Chinese majority in Hong Kong, their enlistment into 
the HKRNVR was unavoidable, yet prejudices remained which would continue to 
influence and inhibit the force into the 1960s, as Britain adjusted to the new threat 
posed by Mao's People's Republic of China. As this case study will demonstrate, the 
delicate balancing act that the Navy attempted in its recruitment and management of 
the HKRNVR reflected deeper imperial anxieties regarding British prestige, so 
shaken by the Second World War, and maintaining Britain's isolated position in that 
small enclave, surrounded by over half a billion 'Chinamen'.
Part One will analyse Hong Kong's naval development in relation to its
broader East Asian context prior to 1945, addressing the following issues: force
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origins; the cultivation of colonial navalism; issues of force expansion and wartime 
mobilisation; perceptions of Chinese 'transient' loyalty; the 'heroic myth' of the 2nd 
MTB flotilla's escape; the view of military/naval service within Chinese culture; and 
the influence of Chinese historiographical trends on Hong Kong's historical memory 
of its naval conflict. Part Two examines the post-war evolution of Hong Kong's naval 
force as it adjusted to the after-effects of the Second World War and the changing 
geopolitical landscape, most notably Communist China's emergence and Britain's 
declining world role. It will address the following key themes: restoring imperial 'face'; 
the reconstitution of the force; racial grouping; compulsory service; riot and unrest; 
and disbandment.
Map 4. Hong Kong Territory
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Part One: Pre-1945
Origins
Records of early colonial navalism in Hong Kong are sparse, but by 25 April 
1885 it is known that a seagoing Hong Kong Auxiliary Flotilla was raised by 
Governor Sir George Bowen, made up of volunteers from the Water Police, local 
yachtsmen, and with the Assistant Harbour-Master as Commodore. Though not 
officially affiliated to the senior service, the Royal Navy did lend its support to the 
endeavour. Two former gunboats, HMS Tweed and HMS Wyvern, were 
reconditioned for use as training vessels by the force, and an RN gunner took on the 
duties of gunner instructor to the force. A requisition order was placed by the 
Governor to the RN Commodore at Hong Kong for 'boats, signal books, signal flags 
and cones for the use of the Aux. Flotilla'. By 16 June 1885, the local Flotilla 
consisted of Government launches, including the Daisy and Lilly, which it was 
suggested should be fitted for the discharge of Whitehead torpedoes, with the 
recommendation that the volunteers should undertake a course of instruction by the 
resident RN Torpedo Lieutenant. This is the last known record relating to the Hong 
Kong Auxiliary Flotilla, however, and it was disbanded some time shortly after520.
In addition, during the nineteenth century, Chinese cooks and personal 
servants were unofficially employed directly by Royal Navy officers on station in East 
Asia. In 1905 this arrangement was formalised, with a Locally Enlisted Personnel
520 South China Morning Post, 24 October 1933, p. 13.
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(LEP) division established consisting of two Seamen Petty Officers, 50 Able Seamen, 
seven stokes and nine Mess Boys.521 These were full-time servicemen appointed to 
Royal Navy vessels, and operated outside of colonial jurisdiction and so will not be 
the focus of this study, however, the distinction needs to be made.
It was not until the interwar years that more serious discussion took place 
regarding local naval volunteerism in reaction to the shifting political, economic and 
strategic climate. The imposition of Article XIX of the 1922 Washington Treaty, 
whereby no new defensive fortifications could be constructed in Hong Kong had 
raised the possibility of forming a local branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
in lieu. At the 1925 Flag Officers Conference in Singapore, it was noted that 
insufficient consideration had been given to Hong Kong's defence relative to the 
priority accorded Singapore522. Despite some pessimistic predictions from the 
Admiralty, the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, suggested that if the naval 
defence provision was increased, the colony could potentially hold out. In February 
the following year, the new Governor Sir Cecil Clementi advanced this case by 
emphasising Hong Kong's strategic importance as a naval anchorage, being 'the 
only defended advanced base from which operations could be conducted against 
Japan'. Key assets were its large repair facilities and eight docks, and its role as a 
convoy assembly point able to equip armed merchantmen. During a European war, 
Hong Kong would act as a contraband control base. Moreover, in the event of war in 
the East, it was emphasised that the colony would be exposed to 'the maximum 
scale of attack', and therefore needed to take all possible precautions available to
521 Commodore P.J. Melson, CBE, Royal Navy (ed.), White Ensign - Red Dragon: The History of the 
Royal Navy in Hong Kong 1841-1997, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong, 1997), p.105.
522 TNA, ADM 116/3121, 'Flag Officers at Singapore Conference', 1925, p. 18.
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defend itself523. Despite this, in view of the 'special expenditure involved in the 
construction of an aerodrome at Hong Kong and the grave depression in the trade of 
the Colony', the Colonial Secretary was unable to sanction the necessary 
expenditure for the RNVR scheme, which was 'postponed until conditions are more 
favourable'524. Yet local culture was also blamed in the form of Hong Kong's 'usual 
"maskee" spirit', an ethnically-characterised form of indifference associated with the 
Chinese, which had 'let the matter [of the RNVR] drift as one of those things which 
will be attended to in due course'525. Maskee is roughly translated as 'don't mind'526. 
It was considered a negative trait, used to derogate the Chinese, and can be 
considered as part of the broader Orientalist discourse underpinning western 
hegemony in the East:
It is "Maskee, maskee," all the time in China. If a stone bridge has 
tumbled down, and a great part of the population is put a couple of miles 
out of its path during year after year, maskee. If a house falls and blocks a 
highway, "Maskee," says everyone, and there the heap lies. "Maskee" is 
what you are told if you suggest that some one go to the help of a man or 
a woman in dire trouble. And even when a foreign power, without warrant 
or excuse, wages war upon the Northern strongholds of the empire, 
"Maskee," says all the rest of China.527
In this account, foreign imperialism is seen as a direct consequence of Chinese 
lethargy and lack of moral and social conscience, qualities the civilising mission
523 TNA, CO 129/505/2, Item 12, 'Committee of Imperial Defence - Hong Kong Local Forces: Note by 
the Naval Staff, 26 September 1927, p.1.
524 TNA, CO 129/505/2, Item 23, From the Admiralty to the Colonial Office, 22 August 1927.
525 China Mail, 6 August 1926, p.6.
526 Mamie Meredith, 'Longfellow's "Excelsior" Done into Pidgin-English', The American Dialect Society, 
vol.5, no.2 (December, 1929), pp.148-151, p.149.
527 Julian Ralph, Alone in China, and other stories (London, 1897), p.70
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claimed to be instilling. China's dominance by the West is therefore seen here as the 
result of a combination of Western activity and Chinese passivity, each an equally 
culpable element in a collaborative restructuring of power, even though a large 
degree of that collaboration may have been unconscious or indirect.
By relating maskee to inefficiency in the Governmental bureaucratic process, 
however, which included a legislative council without a Chinese voice on it, this 
characterisation transcended its ethnically-bound roots to influence Hong Kong's 
European population. It undermined white prestige in the sense that faith in the 
administrative process was being questioned, partly due to apparent inactivity over 
the establishment of a Hong Kong Naval Reserve. It also resonated with Victorian 
beliefs about the morally-corruptive atmosphere of the 'Orient', and the negative 
influence that this could exert upon British character. This seemed to be reflected in 
the inaction and irresponsibility of the Hong Kong Government on the issue of 
colonial naval defence, laying it open to criticism that it was failing in its patriotic duty 
to help the 'motherland' in her defence of the Empire, a prominent theme in Imperial 
Defence Committee meetings earlier that year. During those, the Dominions 
reiterated their willingness to shoulder 'a burden which was growing increasingly 
heavy on the Home taxpayers - the maintenance of naval vessels and personnel', 
but the colonies were now expected to play their part too:
Hong Kong is hardly in a position to build ships or to shoulder more than a
small part of the cost of Imperial Defence but the formation locally of a
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RNVR would give local people the opportunity of indicating their 
willingness to do what is in their power.528
Arguments for the additional social benefits such service would provide beyond the 
strategic evinced themselves, notably 'it would provide young fellows with invaluable 
experience and the opportunity of healthful relaxation and exercise'. Those with most 
to gain from the establishment of a local reserve force, the Royal Navy, on the back 
of the Governor's initial announcement and in hope of influencing the decision­
making process, were quick to voice their practical and moral support for such a 
scheme by offering the loan of personnel and two mine laying sloops, and getting 
public support on-side through the local press:
Hong Kong, as His Excellency remarked at the time, as one of the most 
important outposts of the Empire, is dependent for its prosperity on the 
maintenance of its shipping connections, it is to be hoped that this 
promise of the naval authorities will be made use of and that the whole 
thing will not fall through for lack of interest on the part of the powers that 
be.529
There was a slight contradiction, however, in one of the arguments proffered, most 
notably the benefit it would have towards the 'young fellows' of the colony, as the 
potential recruits identified were the 'several ex-naval men at present resident in the 
Colony', and members of the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club, who would 'provide 
other enthusiasts with the advantage of a knowledge of our local coasts', men who 
already derived the lauded benefits for self and social improvement.
528 China Mail, 6 August 1926, p.6.
529 Idem.
222
In reaction to the Colonial Office's 'postponement' of the RNVR scheme, the 
Admiralty were keen to stress the potential ramifications, with issues of imperial 
overstretch dominating. It was admitted that in the event of war, the Navy would 
struggle to meet its operational requirements 'without the assistance of a number of 
RNVR Officers and a minesweeping vessel' in Hong Kong. It also threatened 'the 
Admiralty policy of encouraging Colonies to assist in Naval defence', being a 
'precedent which may be expected to react adversely on the willingness which other 
Colonies were also beginning to show, to prepare to form their own minesweeping 
units'. Finally, it was stated that the enthusiasm of those men who had volunteered 
from the Yacht Club, 'will have been very effectually damped, and the revival of the 
proposal in the future rendered difficult'530, though this conclusion was inaccurate as 
it would transpire.
The proposal for a HKRNR force resurfaced again three years later in more 
concrete form when it was included in the draft estimates of expenditure for the 
Legislative Council. These amounted to $25,488 per annum, which included $2,832 
for personal emoluments, to be split between an officer instructor, a warrant officer, 
two petty officers, a clerk and a messenger, $6,000 for cruising, $4,000 for 
ammunition, $6,600 for uniforms, and $960 for the formation of a drill ground at the 
proposed headquarters to be based at the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club. A sum of 
$2,800 was also earmarked for fitting out the rescue tug, Kau Sing, for use by the 
force531. The proposal, however, was not 'considered on its merits. The dollar had 
slumped and economy was called for - so the RNVR scheme perished along with the
TNA, CO 129/505/2, Item 23 and 24, From the Admiralty to the Colonial Office, 22 August 1927.
531 Hong Kong Telegraph, 6 September 1929, p.1.
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Saikung road and other seeming extravagances'532. It was not only economic factors 
that again counted against it. Traditional inter-service rivalry between the Army and 
Navy and parochial self-interest raised its head, with military circles voicing their 
opposition to the proposed force, fearing the effect it would have on their own 
recruitment:
We are of the opinion that the formation of the RNVR may to a certain 
extent detrimentally affect the Volunteers Defence Corps, and that Corps 
serves a far more useful and practical purpose. We consider that the RNR 
is unnecessary here and that Naval work should be left to the Navy; and 
we shall vote against the item for its establishment in the Appropriation Bill 
for 1930.533
There existed, therefore, a lack of either local understanding or concern for the 
issues of imperial defence, the operational overstretch that existed, and the strategic 
role that such a naval reserve would play in helping ease that burden. Colonial 
expectation was that the Royal Navy would continue to defend Hong Kong from 
naval threats, despite the notion running contrary to the Navy's primary expeditionary 
mission, intercepting an enemy on the high seas before it could threaten ports. In 
fact, such assumptions had been reinforced in 1924, when Admiral Richmond, 
seeing Hong Kong as Japan’s primary target in a potential war, stated: 'In my opinion 
the strategical situation which would result from the loss of Hong Kong does not 
justify withholding naval forces if by their action they could contribute towards 
preventing its loss'534. It was thus considered that 'naval forces had to play a
532 South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12.
533 The China Mail, 19 September 1929, p.6.
534 TNA, ADM 116/6125, 'Remarks on Paragraphs in Detail, Part 1', p.3.
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significant role in the defence of the colony, despite the long-established policy of not 
tying naval forces to local defence of bases'535. To a large degree this was influenced 
by the weak state of Hong Kong's physical defences, which could not be drastically 
improved due to Article XIX536.
Cultivating Colonial Navalism
By mid-1933, despite several false starts, there still existed no permanent 
naval volunteer force in Hong Kong. This was partly attributed to a 'lack of contact 
between the Navy and the Hong Kong community, with a resulting absence of 
understanding and friendship', considered 'extraordinary at a naval base and 
inexplicable in view of the fact that the Colony is unquestionably ship-minded'537. 
Blame was apportioned to both 'the community for its selfishness and the Navy for its 
exaggerated independence and its traditional silence', though it was observed that 
naval men who had left the service in Hong Kong had been 'absorbed with a peculiar 
facility into local life, demonstrating that there is no great difficulty'538. The catalyst for 
change was in the appointment of a new Commodore in charge at Hong Kong, 
Commodore Frank Elliot OBE, a descendent of Captain Charles Elliot, the first 
administrator of the colony, and perhaps this personal connection made him more 
adept at and attuned to navigating local conditions. It is he who is accredited with the
Ibid., 'Part II', p.5.
536 Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (London, 2004), pp.61-2.
537 South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12.
538 Idem.
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shift in the Navy, ‘liberalising its local outlook and entering more deeply into the 
Colony's consciousness'539.
In 1933, despite the shackles of the Washington Treaty and uncertainty over 
the colony's defensibility in an East Asian war, the Admiralty acknowledged to the 
Commander-in-Chief, China Station, Admiral Sir F. C. Dreyer, Hong Kong's 
importance as a base for protecting Britain's Chinese interests and for enabling the 
Royal Navy to operate in Japanese waters540. Upon his appointment that same year, 
Commodore Elliot was called by Dreyer, and told that he had to 'get the RNVR 
proposal going', but he faced similar problems to 1929:
One difficulty is finance. Another and more serious one is that though 
personnel exists it is otherwise committed. There has always been sign of 
jealousy between different auxiliary units. It is argued that the VDC would 
be more usefully employed as Special Police: and the Volunteers 
themselves are frequently appealing for recruits.541
As had happened four years earlier, traditional rivalries and parochialism meant that 
in order to implement the scheme, Elliot had to first surmount the obstructive moves 
of the Hong Kong military, centred around the Royal Hong Kong Regiment or 'The 
Volunteers', who viewed the creation of a 'rival' naval volunteer force as a threat to 
their own recruitment interests:
Looking at the past history it appeared that every time the question of a 
Naval Defence Force had come before the Council it was squashed by 
the General, who also represented the three services on the Council,
539 Idem.
540 Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, p. 102.
541 South China Morning Post, 8 September 1933, p. 12.
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unless the C-in-C was present. Commodore Hong Kong was not on the 
council. It therefore seemed that somehow or other I had to "get" at 
Members before the meeting and get the Governor on my side.542
Elliot's solution was to throw a 'Red, White and Blue" cocktail party for the wives of 
all the leading 'Taipans'543, and after several rounds making an impassioned speech, 
saying that 'the women of the Colony were the brains of the Colony, etc., that every 
time this question came up their menfolk were browbeaten by the General (Barret) 
into turning the scheme down on the grounds that it would interfere with the Local 
Defence Force'544. After convincing the wives to get their husbands to vote in Council 
for the formation of the Force being started, Elliot then produced the Secretary of the 
Hong Kong branch of the Navy League who signed on not only the wives, but also 
their husbands in lieu, raising their membership from just ten members to over one 
hundred overnight. When the question was raised again in Council and put to a vote, 
'much to the disgust of the General it was carried unanimously... I don't think he ever 
forgave me for... as he said... completely out manoeuvring him'545.
Commodore Elliot followed up on this by arranging a meeting at the Royal 
Hong Kong Yacht Club at 17.30 on Thursday 28 September 1933, to sound out 
potential recruits for the force. Over sixty men attended, following up on interest 
expressed the last time the scheme was raised:
"You can count on me up to the hilt," said the Commodore.
"Anything I can do to further the scheme I will do. I have been
542 Public Records Office of Hong Kong (PROHK), HKRS 6-1-1695, Letter from Rear Admiral F. Elliot 
to Commander F. Warrington-Strong, HKRNR, 26 February 1967.
543 Tai-pan = foreign businessmen.
544 Idem.
545 Idem.
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talking to the heads of shipping concerns and I feel sure we shall 
get support from them. They realise that in summer it will actually 
benefit a man's health as well as promote his training as a Naval 
Volunteer if he goes away for a few days fresh air on an anti-piracy 
patrol." The Commodore then made some observations with a view 
to making it clear to the layman that the Colony cannot be 
adequately defended solely by land forces. In time of emergency 
the greater part of the China Fleet might have to go elsewhere and 
there was definite need for a nucleus of men who knew something 
about minesweeping and could keep channels clear.546
Here again, health and the resulting social benefits to the colony were utilised to 
attract support. It would also appear that the message had an additional political 
agenda, with Commodore Elliot addressing not merely the assembled congregation, 
who by their nature as yachtsmen could hardly be considered 'laymen', but also 
through the local press the Hong Kong Government and wider public, less 
knowledgeable about naval affairs, suffering from that aforementioned 'absence of 
understanding and friendship', and perhaps susceptible to the military's propaganda.
Furthermore, this absence of friendship had begun to border on distrust 
amongst the ruling elites, who for the first time found their basic assumptions of 
British supremacy being challenged from within547. A growing number of ‘mavericks’ 
were beginning to side actively with the Asian population during the 1930s, and one 
of these had been a Royal Navy officer. C.M. Faure was a Commander stationed in
546 South China Morning Post, 30 September 1933, p. 16.
547 Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation (London, 2003),
p. 19.
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Canton before resigning from the service in 1928. Having been involved in the 
Navy’s suppression of Chinese demonstrators in Shamian three years previously, it 
was believed that this had awoken him to the ‘cruder manifestations of British power’. 
He had since moved to Hong Kong, where he ‘went native’ in the eyes of his fellow 
expatriates, ‘living among the Chinese in the Wanchai district and advising members 
of the banned leftist unions in their collisions with the colony’s Government’548.
Elliot’s naval reserve and his courting of the taipans' wives and local yacht 
club were part of a larger co-ordinated strategy to turn colonial thoughts seaward and 
foster a greater integration and understanding between the local community and the 
Navy, so as to offset such destabilising influences. It has been argued by Nicholas 
Rodger that 'the demands of sea power were not only greater... but fell upon a much 
wider cross-section of society, and required a much greater degree of social, political, 
and administrative integration than armies did'. Therefore, whereas 'a military regime 
could sustain itself by force... a navy had to earn public support. Autocracy was 
adequate for an army, but navies needed consensus', and thus the Navy became 
associated with liberalism549. This need for consensus also applies to Elliot in Hong 
Kong, for in order to combat Barret's military autocracy he had to win the public over 
to his naval scheme. The first public turnout for the embryonic Hong Kong Naval 
Volunteer Force (HKNVF) as it was initially known, was thus coincided with the 
inaugural Hong Kong 'Navy Week', another of Elliot's ideas, bookended by Trafalgar 
Day on Saturday 21 October, and Hong Kong's first ever 'Navy Day' the following 
Saturday, based along the lines of the popular naval exhibitions of the same name
549 N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Great Britain, vol. 1, 660-1649  
(London, 1997), p.432, in Jeremy Black, A  Post-Imperial Power? Britain and the Royal Navy', Orbis, 
Vol.49, No.1 (Spring, 2005), pp.353-65, pp.355-6.
229
celebrated back in Britain. Doubts were raised in some quarters that though 'the idea 
itself is not new, and has been advocated from time-to-time - optimists have even 
wondered whether there is not sufficient keenness to enable public interest to last a 
whole week'550. Elliot, however, was more sanguine about 'Navy Week's fortunes, not 
just regarding its popular appeal, but also in achieving its immediate material goal; he 
'hoped that as a result of the celebrations, a sufficient number of people would agree 
to join' the new naval force, and 'there would be a good turn out of prospective 
volunteers on Trafalgar Day to show the Governor and the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 
who would be in Hong Kong that day, that the Colony was earnest in this matter'551. 
Up to then, Trafalgar Day 'has fallen to become one of Britain's minor anniversaries':
In Hong Kong in some years there was nothing to mark it except a display 
of flags afloat, whose message did not penetrate far into the civilian 
consciousness: and in some other parts of the Empire the day was not 
observed at all... what the Navy means to the Colony it should not be 
necessary to emphasise. After the war, there were frequent expressions 
of hope that the celebration would be more elaborate her and for many 
years there had been talk of a naval "tattoo" - not merely for our 
entertainment , but to keep interest alive and cement the feelings of 
companionship and interdependence of the Silent Service and the civilian 
community...552
The optimistic view that 'there is unquestionably much scope for cooperation' in 
Hong Kong was fuelled by the reestablishment of the local branch of the Navy
550 South China Morning Post, 21 October 1933.
551 Idem.
552 South China Morning Post, 23 October 1933, p. 12.
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League in 1923, and successful fundraisers the following year with a Flag Day and a 
Grand Concert. It was admitted, however, that it was because of the combined 
impetus of 'the threat of another World War, and the co-operative spirit of our new 
and popular Commodore', that Hong Kong was viewing the Navy with increased 
sympathy:
The Navy remains the Empire's first line of defence, however, and there is 
nothing in the world situation today to justify neglect of preparedness... 
here in Hong Kong, however, far away from home without political 
influence, though likely to be uncomfortably close to the next war, we 
need not trouble ourselves with questions of consistency upon the 
armaments problem. Our role is to accommodate the fleet, its personnel, 
as well as its vessels. It is appropriate therefore that, whatever our views 
upon peace and war, we should cultivate comradeship with officers and 
men of the Navy: that, in fact, should be the principal object of the Hong 
Kong branch of the Navy League.553
It appears at this time that there was a strong public belief that war was not only 
possible, but probable, and though not mentioned specifically, the obvious 
insinuation was that the belligerent in such a conflict would be Japan, a view shared 
by the Admiralty. Back in London, however, the press reported that rather than being 
defensive and reactionary in its function and formation, the establishment of a RNVR 
force in Hong Kong actually fuelled tension in the Pacific554. Therefore, efforts were 
made to distance these public celebrations of the Navy from any negative 
association with jingoism, as 'in these days the Jingo has no friends, nor is it the
553 Idem.
554 Hong Kong Telegraph, 25 October 1933, p. 10.
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intention to promote a war spirit'555. This can be viewed as symptomatic of the 
changing attitudes following the First World War, where the jingoism that 
accompanied the origins and early days of that conflict had become overshadowed 
by the spectre of death that it had brought.
Jim English's study of 'Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958' offers a useful model 
for analysing the celebration of Trafalgar Day and Navy Week in Hong Kong. 
English's premise is that 'the survival of and (in some places) extension of Empire 
Day celebrations appears curious, given that its attendant militaristic rituals and 
jingoistic legacy appeared anachronistic after the catastrophe of the war'556. Such 
characteristics can also apply to Trafalgar Day. English argues that Empire Day's 
continued popular relevance can be attributed to 'its ability to connect with popular 
sentiment by means of cultural transformation', and its hegemonic function in 
presenting 'imperial identity as an effective counter to radical socialist or 'red' 
identity'557. In the first instance, rather than Trafalgar Day being a reaction to pre­
existing popular sentiment, it was instead envisaged as playing a more active role in 
inculcating and shaping popular sentiment, namely, to increase awareness of and 
support for the Navy amongst an apathetic, or 'sea blind'558, Hong Kong public. As 
for English's latter explanation, within the context of Hong Kong, a predominantly 
Chinese community situated on the border of mainland China, which since 1927 had
555 South China Morning Post, 23 October 1933, p. 12.
556 Jim English, 'Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958', The Historical Journal, Vol.49, Issue 1 (2006), 
pp.247-276, p.260.
7 Idem.
558 The concept of 'sea blindness', 'maritime blindness' and 'strategic myopia' are all terms which have 
proliferated within defence circles in recent years (the 'post-naval era') to describe an inability or 
unwillingness for a politic and/or public to perceive or give appropriate recognition to naval/maritime 
issues within its national strategic interest. For an introduction to this notion read Editorial, 'Maritime 
Blindness, You Say?', Canadian Naval Review, Vol.6, No.3 (Fall, 2010), pp.2-3. Though this is 
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232
been in a state of civil war between Kuomintang (KMT) - the Chinese Nationalist 
Party - and the Communist Party of China (CCP), this notion takes on an added 
ideological dimension.
The role of Trafalgar Day in fortifying imperial unity is reflected in Herfried 
Munkler's theory that 'the representation and attributed meaning of war as mediated 
through culture creates the idea of a common history and mutual solidarity'559. By 
drawing the Chinese community in Hong Kong closer to Britain, sentimentally as well 
as materially, they would in turn be drawn away from potential Communist 
sympathies from across the border, and the political and social threat that this posed 
to British rule in the colony.
In English's study, the First World War had led to the rebuttal of jingoism by 
new conventions of public behaviour, reflected by the inclusion of elements of 
Armistice Day into Empire Day's activities, namely the 'incorporation of solemn rites 
of remembrance'. Though the act of remembrance was incorporated into Trafalgar 
Day in Hong Kong, overall the celebratory mood of 'Navy Week' was anachronistic, 
and more in keeping with the pre-war Empire Day festivals, despite attempts to 
officially downplay any jingoistic overtones. It could be argued that the geographical, 
as well as personal distance of Hong Kong from the First World War, and the smaller 
proportion of the colony's population who would have lost their life there, meant that 
Hong Kong was shielded from the full horrors of that conflict, thus the act of 
remembrance lacked for them the same level of emotional intensity and was 
culturally displaced, more a foreign import than an act rooted in the fabric of the 
colony. In addition, a central aim for Elliot's 'Navy Week', was to attract volunteers to
559 Herfried Munkler, 'Nation as a model of political order and the growth of national identity in Europe', 
International Sociology, Vol.14, No.3 (September, 1999), pp.283-299, p.289.
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the new naval volunteer force, and thus to focus too much attention on the prospect 
of death, especially through association with the Navy, either in a past or perceived 
future war, would have acted as a disincentive.
Hong Kong's 'Navy Week' benefitted from the support of the local press, who 
publicised the event via several naval-themed articles in the weeks leading up to and 
during the festivities. This naval fervour even penetrated the South China Morning 
Post's regular, 'World of Women' column, which carried an article exploring the 
fashion history of 'Sailors' Suits'560. A suggestion was proposed that 'ladies and girls 
in the Colony might make a special effort to include Navy blue in their costumes on 
these two days'561. 'World of Women' correspondent 'Abigail' reporting on Navy Day, 
lauded the displays arranged in the Naval Yard, marvelling that 'even the dress of 
the diver changes'562. Other items in the day's programme, 'designed with the object 
of affording the public opportunities to view the ships and some of their activities at 
close quarters thereby bringing the Colony of Hong Kong into close touch with the 
Royal Navy', included 'H.M. Ships Open to Visitors, H.M. Destroyers in Action, 
Destruction of Enemy Submarine, Engagement with Pirate Junk, Cinema showing 
Naval films, Amusement Park, [and] Various Nautical Tableaux'563.
This can be all viewed as an example of 'naval theatre', to draw on Jan 
Ruger's pioneering work. As Sir George Sydenham argued in 1898 that the 
representation of the Navy was 'one of the principal factors in promoting and 
maintaining the unity of Empire', the Admiralty became 'adamant that the naval
560 South China Morning Post, 5 October 1933, p. 17.
561 Ibid., 16 September 1933, p.10.
562 Ibid., 31 October 1933, p.10.
563 Ibid., 16 September 1933, p.10.
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theatre should be exploited for the fostering of imperial sentiment'564. Naval theatre 
could be deceptive, projecting 'an image of imperial strength that belied the strategic 
realities'565, notably imperial overstretch. By 'merging regional, national and imperial 
identities, the naval theatre provided an important stage for processes of cultural 
nation-building, at a time when shared visions of nationhood were contested both 
from within and without'566. It seemed to work; the newspapers were quick to 
proclaim the events an overwhelming success, that 'has aroused considerable public 
interest' in the 'silent service', and proved that 'Navy Week has a real significance' in 
Hong Kong567:
Highly reminiscent of Navy Week at Chatham or Portsmouth, the local 
Navy Day celebrations on Saturday will long remain as the most 
successful variety of entertainment ever provided in the Colony. 
Approximately 6,300 persons entered the Navy Yard between 1.30pm and 
6pm, exceeding by far the highest anticipations. So dense were the 
throngs, particularly aboard HMS Eagle, that long queues had to be 
formed to control them. The happy inspiration that prompted the 
authorities to throw open the Naval Yard for the first time in local history 
has succeeded, in an unparalleled manner, in awakening interest in the 
Silent Service. At no point in the history of Hong Kong have relations 
between the Navy and the general public stood so high as they do today, 
and Navy Day, following so close upon Trafalgar Day, has undoubtedly
564 George Sydenham Clarke, quoted in Jan RQger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in 
the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 175-6.
565 Ibid., p.241.
566 Ibid., p.182.
567 South China Morning Post, 26 October 1933, p.11.
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cemented the bonds of friendship that have grown rapidly during the past 
few months.568
i
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Image 16. HMS Cornflower [Source: http://www.clydesite.co.uk]
Elliot’s motivations may not have been entirely altruistic or service-concerned, 
however. As with other imperial missionaries on the frontiers of Empire, such as 
Cardinall, he was also guided by his own legacy. The Royal Navy presented the 
HKNVF on 31 March 1934 with the First World War sloop HMS Cornflower on 
permanent loan to serve as its drill ship. Elliot used this to commemorate for 
perpetuity his status as founder of the HKNVF and its successors when he ‘kindly 
granted permission to embody his family insignia and motto in a new crest for the 
Force’. The Elliots are one of the most famous Scottish border clans. Thus ‘the 
facsimile of the head of the Cornflower was replaced by that of a forearm and hand 
wielding a scimitar. The scroll with the motto “FORTITER ET RECTE” ["Bravely and 
Right"] was added’569. This branding of the force with Elliot’s family crest was not 
merely a vainglorious act of self-validation, but also cemented the long connection
568 Ibid., 30 October 1933, p.11.
569 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1695, Item 2, ‘HKRNVR Crest'.
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between Hong Kong and the Elliot family, stretching back to the moment Captain 
Charles Elliot had first negotiated the acquisition of the island for Britain and acted 
as its first administrator. In doing so, it not only celebrated the Elliot family’s historical 
role in shaping the colony, but redressed the public humiliation served by Lord 
Palmerston, who disapproving of the terms negotiated by Charles Elliot, dismissed 
him and denounced the island as 'a barren rock with nary a house upon it1. Hong 
Kong’s subsequent prosperity had vindicated Charles Elliot’s vision, a fact now 
demonstratively embedded within the new naval force and restoring the Elliot clan's 
honour, an important concept within the lineage of military/naval dynasties.
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Image 17. The original crest of HMS Cornflower (left) and the HKRNVR version 
incorporating the Elliot family crest and motto (right) which remained in use until the 
force's disbandment [Sources: http://www.hongkongescape.org and PROHK, HKRS
41-2-296]
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1Image 18. The Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force in the grounds of the naval college, 
6 November 1934 [Source: TNA, CN 1/14/61]
Force Expansion
The acquisition of the Cornflower again raised issues regarding Article XIX, as 
a result of the deteriorating material condition of the aging vessel. Though in her 
capacity as the force's headquarters, Cornflower did not have to remain seaworthy, 
the stipulations of the treaty that 'no new fortifications shall be established in the 
territories specified' meant that the vessel could 'not be allowed to degenerate to a 
hulk so that she can be considered part of the fixed defence of Hong Kong'570. As the 
conditions of the loan had not included the cost for maintenance of the propelling
570 TNA, ADM 116/4343, M. 05094/35, From Commander-in-Chief, China to The Commodore, Hong 
Kong, 2 December 1934.
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machinery, this resulted in financial wrangling between the Colony and the Admiralty 
as to who was liable, with the cost ultimately falling on the Hong Kong Government. 
From an initial estimate of $15,000 per annum, the cost of the ship's upkeep over 
five years amounted to $120,000, approximately half of the money voted to maintain 
the HKNVF571.
The Admiralty, keen to relieve its financial burdens as well as manpower ones, 
sought to offset their expenses further by having the colonial government cover the 
costs of one of their new Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) to be stationed in Hong Kong, 
and would be manned entirely by members of the HKNVF who up to that point had 
received limited seagoing time due to possessing a lack of suitable vessels of their 
own. It was considered that 'the use of one of these M.T.Bs. by the R.N.V.R. would 
be of great value from training the force in the local waters of the Colony and its 
possession would be an undoubted encouragement to the morale and prestige of the 
force', with knock-on benefits for recruitment. For the Admiralty's part, 'on the 
manning side, we should gain in a branch in which the shortage is most acute'. 
Though disadvantages were perceived as being 'a possible slight reduction in the 
efficiency of the M.T.B. flotilla for local defence purposes... it is thought that this 
would be offset by the gain in the local knowledge and keenness of the R.N.V.R. 
personnel'572.
This desired expansion of the force, however, presented a constitutional 
problem for the HKNVF, with the Admiralty's plans for the force diverging from the 
role envisaged by the Hong Kong Government. The initial Ordinance under the 1931
571 TNA, ADM 116/4343, 'Appendix to letter of 21st December, 1938 from Commanding Office, Hong 
Kong Naval Volunteer Force to commodore, Hong Kong', p.1.
572 TNA, ADM 116/4343, M.03144/37, Director of Plans, 1 July 1937.
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Colonial Naval Defence Act allowed for the Governor to 'raise and maintain a force of 
volunteers for the naval defence of the Colony within its territorial waters'573. It did not, 
however, allow such a force to 'maintain and use vessels of war'574. This would 
include the MTB, which even if 'if its maintenance by the Colony were possible, 
would [consequently] be confined to the territorial waters of Hong Kong'. For the 
force to be able to operate the vessel, a second Ordinance would have to be created 
which place the HKNVF at 'His Majesty's disposal for general service for the Royal 
Navy any such war vessel and any officers and men of the local Naval Volunteer 
Force as have been entered on terms accepting such service'575. This was what the 
Admiralty had always wanted, to give them ultimate operational jurisdiction over the 
force, but they encountered a stumbling block in the form of the local Defence 
Committee in Hong Kong, which considered that 'it would be undesirable and 
contrary to the best interests of the Colony to proceed with the Second Ordinance'. 
Again, the Army and General Barret were seen as among the main dissidents, 
'influenced by the consideration that the military volunteers in Hong Kong are below 
strength, partly on account of the business depression in China which has cut down 
the European staffs employed by the big firms'576.
Despite these difficulties, it was remarked by the Commodore that 'great 
progress has been made by the Chinese ratings, who are now able to form an 
efficient minesweeping personnel'. These ratings were specifically recruited from 
maritime backgrounds, in particular 'Chinese boat "Boys", sampan owners and 
launch hands'. That basic 'sea sense inherent in them' was then 'developed by
573 TNA, CO 129/555/9, Item 4, 30 November 1935.
574 TNA, ADM 116/4343, Head of Naval Branch, 16 July 1937.
575 TNA, CO 129/555/9, Item 4, 30 November 1935.
576 Idem.
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training in western equipment and routine, gunnery, signals, etc.'577 Consequently, 
under British tutelage they were said to have gained a 'fair' general knowledge of 
seamanship, and 'their bearing at the various parades which they attended showed 
them to be keen and smart'. The 'credit for this progress is entirely due to the 
unfailing patience and tact' of their Royal Navy instructors578 so the report concluded, 
in the process placing naval training of the local force within a longer tradition of 
paternalism which underpinned British imperialism. Despite such development 
discourse, 'very serious objections' were raised at the potential liability for Europeans 
to serve outside the Colony, and concerns over local security reflected deeper 
prejudices which resided regarding the Chinese population and their reliability during 
wartime:
The European man-power of the Colony is strictly limited and in a serious 
emergency every available European will be required to man the defences 
and essential services. If at such a time an important part of this man­
power were to be called elsewhere as members of the Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve... the sudden withdrawal of only a few officers or 
Cadets would disorganise the whole Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force, 
very grave concern would be caused to those responsible for the Colony's 
defence.579
On 25 March 1936, the limited number of European volunteers prompted the 
Governor of Hong Kong to officially extend 'an invitation to volunteer service', stating
577 TNA, ADM 116/4343, 'Annual Report - 1st April 1936 to 31st March, 1937', From Commanding 
Officer, HKNVR, to Commodore, Hong Kong, 2 April 1937.
578 TNA, CO 129/557/7, Item 50, From Commodore, Hong Kong, to the Governor, Hong Kong, 17 
April 1936.
TNA, CO 129/555/9, 'Letter from Officer Administering the Government to the Right Honourable 
Malcolm Macdonald, M.P.'28 August 1935, pp.2-3.
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it to be 'the duty of every able-bodied British-born man of suitable age to undergo 
training which will qualify him to take part in the most effective manner possible in 
the in the defence of the Colony'580. The status of permanent seamen ratings was 
increased from Class II to Class I with a rise of $2 in salary per month, in the hope of 
securing 'a better type' of permanent European rating 'to be an example to the 
Chinese Volunteers.'581 Yet response to such measures was slow, and to bolster 
their ranks, conditions for entry to the HKRNVR were not always rigorously enforced.
The Wavy Navy was not so bad and not so hot... I was very lazy as 
regards signalling... I only passed through my signalling test owing to the 
fact that several of us were taken at the same time and I was able to listen 
to the others calling out the dots and dashes for my benefit.582
As in Trinidad and the Cayman Islands, the local Scouting organisation was seen to 
offer a potential alternative source for signalmen583. The ‘crisis’ of September 1938, 
when the Sino-Japanese war spilled over into Hong Kong's territorial waters where 
Japanese warships attacked Chinese junks, brought home ‘the importance to the 
Colony of the Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Reserve and its value to the Navy’584. This 
‘period of strained relations when expansion and preparation is necessary’ raised 
‘certain questions regarding the status, pay, victualling and storing of the crews of 
small auxiliary vessels which carry out duties in regard to the Defence of Hong Kong’. 
The Japanese action raised the very real prospect of combat, and challenged the
580 TNA, CO 129/557/7, W .T. Southern, Colonial Secretary, 12 March 1936.
581 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1716, from Commodore, Hong Kong to CO, HKNVF, 'Annual Estimates 1938', 
12 August 1937.
582 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, 'With the MTB's - Escape from Hong Kong. December 1941: excerpts 
from a letter of a Sub-Lieutenant of the HKRNVR to his brother'.
583 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1716, 'To the Commanding Officer Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force from 
Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force Communications Branch', 30 March 1938.
584 TNA, ADM 116/4343, ‘Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force -  Annual Report for Year Ended 31st 
March, 1939 (Commodore, Hong Kong No.172.C/39 of 13th April, 1939)’.
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organisational restrictions which had been imposed on the force on social, political 
and economic grounds. Additional auxiliary craft for intensified operations could be 
acquired on dormant contracts or requisitioned by the Admiralty. Yet, ‘as no 
European crews are available it is necessary to enlist in many cases the Chinese 
crews who usually man them’. Prejudices regarding their potential allegiance again 
influenced these concerns, with the pessimistic conclusion that ‘as no conscription 
law exists they will have to be persuaded to serve voluntarily’. Furthermore, 
additional European officers would have to be found for any ‘Asiatic crews’ who 
could be so persuaded. It was therefore suggested that combatant status could be 
granted to Tug Masters and Commanding Officers of Police launches’ as a solution 
to this potential shortfall. The other impediment was financial, but any additional 
colonial expenditure could be redressed by agreeing to place the force at His 
Majesty’s disposal, thus passing responsibility for pay and victualling to the Royal 
Navy for those members of the force who volunteered for general service.585 At the 
same time, Japan's unabated expansion into China and the escalating situation in 
Europe, decreased the likelihood that Britain would be able to successfully defend 
Hong Kong in the event of war. In late 1937, a revised War Memorandum (Eastern) 
now advised that should such an eventuality occur, Hong Kong could not be held 
and would have to be evacuated due to its vulnerability to Japanese air attack which 
also ruled out its use as an advanced base for the fleet586.
585 TNA, ADM 1/9833, ‘Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Force’, From The Commander-in-Chief, China 
Station, to The Secretary of the Admiralty, 7 February 1939.
586 Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 
(Oxford, 1996), pp.21-22.
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Under this pressure, on 1 August 1939, after almost four years of discussion, 
Ordinance No.25 finally came into operation587, allowing the local naval force to 
legally man vessels of war outside of its territorial waters, and giving 'authority to the 
Navy to use the force at any parts requiring assistance, especially Singapore, should 
the occasion arise'588. Thus, local defence priorities became superseded by imperial 
ones, with the surviving men and vessels of the HKRNVR now able to be redeployed 
and continue fighting should Hong Kong have to be abandoned as anticipated. In 
relation, its members were asked if they were prepared to volunteer for general 
service in emergency; of the European Officers of the Executive and Non-Executive 
Branches, sixty eight from seventy seven accepted - 88%, as well as 'a very high 
percentage of the Minewatching Branch and considerable numbers of Asiatics'589. 
These were thus constituted into the formal Hong Kong Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve (HKRNVR), though the HKNVF technically remained in effect alongside it 
for those few men unwilling to volunteer for general service. By 1941, 90% of the 
local naval force had accepted the obligation590. Though RNVR officers would not 
normally have been eligible for Royal Navy commissions, 'owing to the needs of 
projected naval expansion', this impediment was removed for Hong Kong591. To 
offset local concerns regarding an absence of European manpower, the formation of
587 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 24, 'Hong Kong Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force-Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.1.
588 South China Morning Post, 3 June 1937, p.2.
589 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 24, 'Hong Kona Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force - Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.2.
590 TNA, CO 825/32/3, Item 29, 'Statutory Declaration' declared by Commander James Petrie at Mint, 
Building, Sydney, 1942.
591 South China Morning Post, 5 June 1937. The offer of Royal Navy commissions had previously 
been reserved solely for Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) officers, that branch being made up of 
Professional merchant seamen, whereas the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) consisted of 
amateur seamen with a minimum of practical sea experience. The RNR and RNVR were 
amalgamated in 1958.
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an additional 'European Seamen Branch' was authorised 'primarily for the defence of 
the Colony'592.
Mobilisation for War
The outbreak of war with Germany, followed by the occupation of the border 
region of the New Territories by Japanese troops, increased local tensions and led to 
the partial mobilization of the HKRNVR. This was 'partly as a measure of general 
preparedness and to ensure a better surveillance of the waters surrounding the 
Colony; and partly to assist in the control of British merchant ships'593. The first 
members were mobilized for full-time service on 30th August 1939, with subsequent 
batches following on 4 September and 26 October that year, making the HKRNVR 
the first Naval Volunteer Unit within the British Empire to be mobilized and sent to 
sea, before the outbreak of the war, and with its own officers in command of some of 
the craft of the auxiliary flotilla594. Within the first week of mobilization, HKRNVR 
officers had taken command of all the ships of the flotilla, and had to overcome a 
number of difficulties due to 'the heterogeneous collection of craft' they were largely 
unfamiliar with:
To the sea-going members the first few weeks were occupied by officers 
in getting to know ships. It was not a case of getting to know their own
592 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 24, 'Hong Kona Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force - Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.2.
593 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 32, From Commodore A.M. Peters to the Governor, 11 April 1940, p.1.
594 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 30, Commander Petrie, H.K.R.N.V.R. Commanding Officer, 8 
September 1939, A.S.R.9, p.1.
245
ship because there was not any -  they were given a different ship almost 
everyday until they knew them all.595
The age and condition of the equipment bequeathed to them caused ‘disorganisation 
due to failure of some, in fact most, of the old A.P.V’s [Auxiliary Patrol Vessels] to 
stand up to unaccustomed heavy duty’. Not initially designed for continuous naval 
patrols, there were also no cooking facilities on the ships, and they had to make do 
with improvised living quarters. The lack of sea-going experience acquired by the 
force during peacetime also caused issues, and for some 'the acquiring of "sea legs" 
was a painful process'596. In particular, the Communication Branch Ratings 'did not 
take kindly to routine and discipline, suffered from sea-sickness and were pretty 
miserable and difficult.'597 Despite these challenges, overall ‘the adjustment to some 
semblance of order and routine was hard work but it was accomplished with 
remarkable harmony and good temper’598. Though it would be two years before the 
conflict spread to the East, the growing need of the war in Europe necessitated the 
withdrawal of increasing numbers of Royal Navy personnel from Hong Kong, with 
consequently additional devolving to the HKRNVR599. Thus, the force successfully 
filled the role envisaged by the Admiralty when the 1931 Colonial Defence Act was 
conceived, despite attracting scepticism in some circles:
Although the past seven months have not seen the tide of war approach 
near the Colony, so that in ill-informed quarters the work of the Hong 
Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve may be considered of little value,
595 TNA, CO 129/588/15, Item 9, Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Reserve -  A.S.R. 71/40 (Auxiliary 
Services Routine), 30 August 1940, p.1.
596 Idem.
597 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 26, 'Hong Kona Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force - Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.3.
598 Idem.
599 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, From Ralph Smith to B.J.B. Morahan, 14 April 1950, p.3.
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yet it has contributed directly and in no small measure to the Imperial 
War effort in two important factors, firstly, by adding to the security of the 
Fortress of Hong Kong, and, secondly, by relieving Active Service 
officers and men, in order that they may proceed to the United Kingdom 
for service in the Fleet in home waters.600
This fed into a wider discourse whereby 'military spokesmen propagated the dogma 
(first heard, and distrusted, by Rudyard Kipling on a visit to the colony in 1889) that 
Hong Kong was an "impregnable fortress"'601, though due to the restrictions of the 
Washington Treaty such bravado remained a myth rather than a reality.
The HKRNVR's response and conduct during the early days of the war 
earned it plaudits from the colony's Governor:
I wish in the first place to acknowledge both the ready alacrity with which 
those who were called up turned out and the high sense of public spirit of 
many of their employers who were seriously embarrassed by the sudden 
depletion of their staffs.602
This ‘high sense of public spirit’ prompted the influential Eurasian businessman Sir 
Robert Ho Tung on 17 August 1940 to loan the HKRNVR the river steamer Tai Hing 
for the duration of the war as a replacement for the decrepit Cornflower She was 
likewise renamed on 7 September 1940 after the Admiralty authorised the 
Commodore’s proposal ‘to retain the name HMS Cornflower in perpetuity for use of
600 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 32, From Commodore A.M. Peters to the Governor, 11 April 1940, p.1.
601 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p.47.
602 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 30, Commander Petrie, H.K.R.N.V.R. Commanding Officer, 8 
September 1939, A.S.R.9, p.1.
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the HKRNVR Headquarters whether afloat or ashore’603, strengthening the force’s 
identity, esprit de corps and pride in the service, and tightening the bond fostered by 
Elliot between the Hong Kong public and the Navy. It also created a tradition, and 
demonstrated that though the force may have been raised in response to the short­
term threat of Japan, growing under the pressures of war, it was seen to have a 
longer-term role to play after the current conflict had ended, not just in local thinking, 
but also in the ‘official mind’ of the Admiralty back in the metropole. The pressures of 
war had seemingly produced a positive effect on Hong Kong, strengthening its sense 
of duty both socially and imperially, so it was argued in The Times:
The backwash of war has made changes in the life and habits of Hong­
kong... Local-born British subjects, a "minority" of growing importance in 
Hong-kong, are becoming more articulate for their rights... the social 
conscience is being awakened so that it is no longer left to the zealous 
few to tackle the social evils of the place... the general attitude of 20 years 
ago, "I am not here for my health," had given way to a stronger sense of 
civic duty. People who could not, at one time, see beyond the Kowloon 
hills, now have a broader concept of Hong-kong's position in relation to 
China, the Empire, and the changing world in which we live.604
This article was written at a distance from the colony, however, and for a besieged 
British public who were now cut off from Europe in the struggle against Germany, 
stories and propaganda about the Empire and its war contribution helped to boost 
morale at home by instilling the sense that Britain was not alone after all. Framed in
603 TNA, CO 129/588/15, Item 8, ‘Annual report by the Commanding Officer, 1st April 1940 to 31st 
March 1941, p.2.
604 The Times, 7 July 1941, p.5.
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the context of fascist authoritarianism, the fact that within the British Empire ‘freedom’ 
was flourishing, producing positive social and moral benefits reinforced both Britain’s 
raison d'etre for the war, and her imperial role itself. Yet, this sense of colonial unity 
was superficial, as the local-born British ‘minority’ were here politicised as a group in 
reaction to the increased influx of Chinese refugees from across the border. Rather 
than the colony coming closer together as a whole, ethnic divisions were actually 
being brought into sharper focus.
Even within the European community, the public face of harmonious solidarity 
between civil and naval/military interests was cracking. The Governor had 'entrusted' 
Commander Petrie to prepare a mobilization roster, 'to nominate if possible only 
those whose mobilization would cause least inconvenience to the civil community'. 
He was expected to make 'a private assessment of their value in the civil community 
in relation to my need for their services'. Petrie came to overriding conclusion that 'my 
need for Senior Officers, however, out-weighed other considerations'605. On 15 
September, after two mobilizations had been effected, concerns were already being 
aired that subordinated 'civilian employers might oppose further mobilization of 
members of their staff. This was based on the fact that 'during the summer months 
foreign firms have members of their staffs on Home Leave'606. It was not found 
practicable to mobilise any of the European seamen ratings, as the pay provided 
could not match their civilian wages and would be 'inadequate to support their 
families', and they had to remain 'in reserve against an emergency when the entire
605 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 26, 'Hong Kona Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force - Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.3.
606 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 27, 'Hong Kong Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force - Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.4.
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man-power of the Colony might be mobilized'607. Paradoxically, the fact that Hong 
Kong was detached from the main theatre of conflict and therefore continued with a 
policy of ‘business as usual’, while at the same time preparing for the worst, stretched 
the colony’s resources even more than if ‘total war’ had been declared with full 
mobilization of the war economy that that entailed:
There was shortage of mobilized officer personnel due to the main effect 
of the war not having reached Hong Kong. A balance between local sea 
defence requirements and the needs of employers to retain their staff 
had to be found. The Admiralty needed the men but the Home 
Government stated that trade must be maintained -  result, the formation 
of a local Reference Board to assess the claims of both parties.608
By 16 May 1940, the strains on European manpower in all facets of Hong Kong 
society meant that Petrie had to begin searching outside the Colony for additional 
full-time naval officers:
He was told that the war-made demands upon the Civil Service were 
such that I could hold out no hope of more members of the Service who 
hold commission in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve or Naval 
Volunteer Force being available for mobilization - fourteen were 
mobilized in the early months of the war and eleven are still on regular 
duty - nor did it appear from what he said that the prospects of getting 
many more from the non-official community were at all bright: on the
607 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Item 29, ’Hong Kong Royal Naval Reserve and Hong Kong Naval Volunteer 
Force - Annual Report: 1st April, 1939 to 31s March, 1940', p.6.
608 TNA, CO 129/588/15, Item 9, Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Reserve -  A.S.R. 71/40 (Auxiliary 
Services Routine), 30 August 1940, p.1.
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other hand occasional casualties are bound to occur among his present 
personnel. In these circumstances I advised him to discuss with the 
Commodore the feasibility of getting, say, a dozen sea-faring men of the 
officer class from Shanghai.609
Yet, attracting them to Hong Kong was another matter and was done so by feeding 
misinformation regarding the extent of the HKRNVR's wartime importance and role, 
causing a degree of discontent and exacerbating traditional inter-colonial rivalries 
which undermined service unity and esprit de corps:
The 1940 recruitment and intake of our “Shanghai contingent”. Excellent 
chaps, nearly all of them, but they were persuaded in Shanghai to 
volunteer into the Hong Kong RNVR on what was at best a 
misunderstanding -  and was viewed by some of them (eager for active 
service) as downright deception. That, and the not uncommon pre-war 
Shanghai-Hong Kong rivalry, tended to make them a rather indigestible 
intake at least at the start!610
Unable to spare any personnel under such conditions, members of the 
HKRNVR had to forgo their regular 'Home Leave' back to Britain, 'a hurdle which we 
cannot expect to clear until after the war', and in addition their local duties had 
become 'so arduous that local leave has been almost impossible'611. The restrictions 
imposed by the colonial authorities frustrated the aspirations of the British members 
of the HKRNVR, who felt divorced from their 'home' and the war being waged. The
609 TNA, CO 129/584/8, Items 21-22, From the Governor to the Right Honourable Lord Lloyd of 
Dolobran, 16 May 1940, pp. 1-2.
610 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p.2.
611 TNA, CO 129/588/15, Item 10, Hong Kong Naval Volunteer Reserve -  A.S.R. 71/40 (Auxiliary 
Services Routine), 30 August 1940, p.2.
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fact that they freed up regular Royal Navy personnel for deployment to more active 
theatres was little comfort for their own desires for action and feelings they were 
making a difference. The fact that they continued to identify 'home' as being Britain 
and not Hong Kong, which was merely seen as their temporary domicile, meant that 
they subordinated the local needs of the colony to those of the imperial motherland. 
Again, an appeal to Empire unity was utilised to combat this sense of 
disconnectedness and 'restlessness':
We are impatient to be “in it” at home. Our unmobilized men want to be 
mobilized. All over the Empire unmobilized men want to be mobilized; 
mobilized men want active engagement with the enemy. This World War 
is today being actively fought by the privileged few... It is also being 
fought less spectacularly but no less decisively by others of whom we are 
part... We have volunteered for General Service. The Admiralty knows it 
and will call upon us for service elsewhere when we are required. We are 
doing our job for the Empire and we are doing it well. It is the Empire 
which is at war.612
In contrast, ‘to the Seamen Ratings the first few weeks seemed as sublimely 
uneventful as life in general seems to the mass of Chinese’.613 They did not possess 
the same personal attachment to Britain, or shared concerns about her fortunes in 
the European war, and several of the unmobilized Chinese members of the force 
were struck off for not attending drills614. This was despite moves to provide Chinese
Ibid., pp.2-3.
613 TNA, CO 129/588/15, Item 9, Hong Kong Naval Volunteer R eserve -A .S .R . 71/40 (Auxiliary 
Services Routine), 30 August 1940, p.1.
614 TNA, CO 129/588/15, Item 7, ‘Annual report by the Commanding Officer, 1st April 1940 to 31st 
March 1941, p.1.
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ratings with a free meal on Tuesdays and Fridays at 1630 before training, for 'many 
of the Volunteers are either very poorly paid or unemployed', and 'a Rating travelling 
several miles to attend a Drill is poorly recompensed by 15 cents and that to provide 
a meal, in addition to the bounty, would ensure a larger attendance of men fit to 
undergo instruction'615. One tactic to combat apathy was to institute a series of short 
broadcasts on naval subjects of general interest 'in order to provide efficient 
propaganda on Naval matters'616. Such absentees did not prevent the formation of 
an additional Engineering branch for Chinese617, partly for absence of alternatives, 
though it was a role for which they were deemed particularly suited by the Navy, as 
mirrored by similar moves later on in Singapore.
Though the existing European members of the HKRNVR wanted to fight, this 
sense of patriotic duty did not reflect the attitudes of the wider civilian community. 
Hong Kong had been the first Crown Colony to implement compulsory service, 
forming a tribunal on Monday 28 August 1939 to press civilian men into the military 
and emergency corps. This caused a backlash from different sections of society. A 
number of men called before the tribunal protested against compulsory service on 
work grounds and other conflicting time commitments. Such excuses were not 
viewed with sympathy from some quarters. A '(Mrs) M.' wrote to the South China 
Morning Post, 'disgusted with some of the men in Hong Kong for the silly excuses 
some put forward to exempt them from military service':
615 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1716, From Commodore, Hong Kong to CO, HKNVF, 'Annual Estimates 1938', 
12 August 1937.
616 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1771(1), Publicity on Naval Matters - Broadcasts, 19 April 1940.
617 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1716, From Commodore, Hong Kong to CO, HKNVF, 'Annual Estimates 1938', 
12 August 1937.
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Quite a lot of people seem to think that their jobs are very important, but 
don't they understand that they would all be at a standstill in the case of 
an emergency?... Thank Heaven we have the Regular Army and Navy. I 
suppose some of these "busy men" in Hong Kong think that the Services 
can guard the Colony so that they can keep their jobs in comfort.618
In response, 'BUSINESSMAN' argued that:
The members of the fighting forces are so by choice, having taken to the 
Navy or Army as a profession and as such, during the last twenty odd 
years, have a very pleasant time, short working hours and plenty of 
games... As far as the male civilian population of this Colony is concerned,
I have little doubt that in the event of an emergency they will do their bit... 
a number were involved in the last war and experience has taught them 
not to allow themselves to fall into the grip of officialdom until absolutely
619necessary.
It appears that those 'bonds of friendship' and understanding which Commodore 
Elliot had worked so hard to foster between the Navy and the Hong Kong public, 
quickly began to unravel when it came to the crunch, and the latter were called upon 
to step up and share the former's burden. The local perception that the war in 
Europe did not constitute an emergency in Hong Kong, and thus did not warrant their 
active involvement, was further emphasised by 'NOT YET A VOLUNTEER', who
618 South China Morning Post, 1 September 1939, p.8.
619 Ibid., 2 August 1939, p.8.
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stated that 'if and when the war does come I do not think that it will require 
"Compulsory Service" to make most Englishmen do their bit'620.
Chinese 'transient' loyalty
War and disagreements around compulsory service not only sparked divisions 
between civil society and the services, men and women, but also along ethnic lines, 
emphasised by the comment regarding 'most Englishmen', and the loyalty of the 
local Chinese population was particularly called into question:
While any decent foreigner (our opponents excepted of course) will fight 
for or help willingly the country which gave him hospitality, nearly all 
Chinese seem either not to mind a bit or are ready to rush elsewhere, for 
safety. The native population is composed of what? Eighty per cent of 
coolies, shop fokis and the like; hardly with a brain and of course without 
any sense of country; they are hardly over the animal class and must be 
treated as such. Those remaining (real Hong Kong Chinese apart) are 
composed of taipans, retired officials or generals, traders, and tens of 
thousands of little sneaks who ran away from their country to escape their 
military duties. The whole lot (or nearly) is full of corruption, ready to sell 
anything to anyone or acclaim any flag for a few dollars.621
620 Idem.
621 Ibid., 1 September 1939, p.8.
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Though this perception of Mr 'Gallus' was no doubt an extreme one, loaded with 
racial prejudice and stereotypes, it does reflect some of the identity problems 
associated with Hong Kong's nature as an entrepot. This status had naturally 
encouraged a transient trading community to develop in the colony, bearing a 
cosmopolitan commercial outlook. Chinese businessmen followed the opportunities 
that Hong Kong presented, but generally did not settle there, instead returning to 
their 'homelands' and the families they'd left behind with money made from their 
transnational ventures:
...few, if any, having been born at the place. The majority of these men 
are engaged in trade, and only reside in Hong-Kong long enough to obtain 
a competency with which they may return to their native land. The 
facilities of transit now afforded by the various lines of steamers render a 
trip home so inexpensive and expeditious, that those who can afford it 
frequently avail themselves of a run to the old country.622
Out of a population of 849,800 in 1931, less than a third, 276,400, were born in Hong 
Kong.623 The very ideology of free trade capitalism cut across national borders and 
allegiances, yet what strengthened the colony during peacetime with the wealth that 
it cultivated, potentially compromised Hong Kong at war, with such transiency 
causing the British to question the loyalty and willingness of these economic 
migrants to defend the colony which did not constitute their 'home':
From the point of view of defence it would be no exaggeration to say that 
all Chinamen in Hong Kong would be open to suspicion of anti-British
623 Fan Shu Ching, The Population of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1974), pp. 18-19.
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intentions should they be present in a siege of Hong Kong as part of a 
beleaguered populace. We feel that their reactions would immediately 
turn to the side which appeared likely to be the probable winner. The 
world situation and other such things we feel are unlikely to influence the 
transient loyalty of a Chinaman.624
Yet, by encouraging a laissez-faire outlook in Hong Kong, the British were 
themselves the architects in fostering there this all-encompassing, and morally- 
eroding, commerciality:
The Colony is just a big godown, armed to the teeth, in the Far East. Its 
soil is not productive by nature and therefore cannot support an 
agricultural population worth mentioning. It has to depend on trade and 
handicraft manufactures. Napoleon has said - "Commerce dries up the 
soul; the merchant has neither faith nor country". Chinese are just humans 
and if what Bonaparte said applies well to his people and their neighbours; 
it cannot be surprising some Chinese merchants have degraded.625
This perception is much more sympathetic towards the Chinese than that of Mr 
'Gallus', recognising them as 'just humans' as opposed to 'hardly over the animal 
class'. More significantly, however, here the Chinese are depicted as moral victims of 
the influx of Western capitalism. More often, colonial discourse positioned benighted 
Oriental immorality and decay as the 'other' to enlightened British imperialism and 
progress. China was recognised as having once been a civilised country, but had 
fallen into a state of stagnancy as a consequence of its long self-imposed isolation
624 TNA, FO 371/27622, Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel F.C. Scott of the W ar Office to Gent of the 
Colonial Office, 22 August 1941, p. 185.
625 Ibid., 2 September 1939, p.8.
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from the West. The 'civilising mission' in the Chinese context was thus about 
resurrecting Chinese civilisation along 'modern' Western models, rather than building 
it up from scratch, though both emphasised a paternal-dependent relationship. 
Within this dynamic, there resided a fear that the 'teacher' could become corrupted 
by the moral decay which thus was associated with both the cultural and 
geographical climate of the Orient. In the previous example, however, rather than 
being the antidote, the degrading force is portrayed as the West and its 'civilising' 
values.
This was a minority view, however, and the extreme attitudes of those such as 
Mr 'Gallus', built on top of the more conservative views regarding Hong Kong's 
inherent transient commerciality, prompted an angry response from the Chinese 
community, exacerbating internal divisions and reinforcing stereotypes on the eve of 
the Second World War:
It is always good to know what others think of us. Besides, I had always 
wondered why we who are living here are so apathetic and indifferent to 
its safety. Now I know. If Gallus' outburst be representative of the general 
European sentiments towards their fellow Chinese residents, thinking that 
80% of us are "hardly with a brain and of course without any sense of 
country" and "are hardly over the animal class" then what more could they 
expect from us?
Preconceptions regarding Chinese unreliability were reinforced by wide scale
desertions from the HKRNVR following the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong on 8
December 1941. By failing to keep the non-European population informed about the
war situation, the colonial authorities effectively confirmed Chinese assumptions 'that
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the war was a British affair that had nothing to do with them... Faced with this crisis, 
their instinct was to run'626. The HKRNVR practice of mooring vessels in lots of two 
down Aberdeen Harbour seemed 'disturbingly idiotic to Chinese after [the] first 
bombing'627; when HMS Indira was sunk by such 'morale-shaking bombing', all the 
crew of the adjacent HMS Perla bolted'. Panic usually spread from the engine room 
ratings, who were trapped within the bowels of the ship, unable to see what was 
going on outside.628 Aboard HMS Minnie on 11 December, two men were 
unconscious from fear, mess boys and engine room ratings rioted, the crew refused 
to go to sea again, and every time Aberdeen was raided and the dockyard police 
disappeared into the shelters, the crew would take advantage and run. Minnie's 
Commanding Officer managed to gather replacement crew by 16 December, only for 
them to arrive at the dockyard gates at noon, just in time to witness a large air-raid; 
they immediately reversed their decision to join629. Though a number of Chinese 
remained loyal, some British officers retained a suspicion even of these. When the 
crew of HMS Frosty rendezvoused at the Aberdeen Industrial School on 19 
December to receive their evacuation orders, the CO was told by the on-duty RN 
officer, Lt. Commander Harrison: “tell all your Chinese to fuck off, and you to get up 
into the hills... I’m not standing any truck from a two and a half wavy navy... your 
messman might be a fifth columnist”630. The suspected Chinese messman had 
fifteen years service in the RN to his name. Upon the British return to Hong Kong 
after the war, conscious of their more precarious position in reasserting authority 
there, 'it was agreed that to avoid possible political complications and damage to
626 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp.55-6.
627 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p.7.
628 Ibid., p.10.
629 Idem.
630 Ibid., p.24.
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British prestige the trouble must be cleared up' regarding those Chinese ratings 
illegally discharged by Harrison, and settling questions regarding pay and 
demobilisation631.
The reasons behind the desertions were not the result of any innately 
unreliable characteristic amongst the Chinese, despite the British harbouring such 
fears. In fact, many of the conditions which prompted Chinese naval personnel to 
desert from the force were created by the naval and colonial authorities themselves. 
There was disenchantment with the round-the-clock work and meagre rations. There 
had been particular resentment at the fact on 11 December they had been ordered 
to fire upon fellow Chinese, destroying at least twenty junks and crippling many more 
suspected of carrying Japanese infiltrators, rumours which proved to be false.632 At 
the same time, shore batteries bombarded a fishing village at the head of Picnic Bay. 
It was later admitted by HKRNVR officer J.C. McDouall, that these actions were 
taken without seeking formal identification, as 'no officer on any ship concerned or in 
any shore battery saw any Japanese in the junks, though all but those on Perla and 
Poseidon were admittedly too far away to distinguish faces'633.
The suddenness of the Japanese attack meant that billeting of HKRNVR 
families could not be sanctioned in time to move them from the mainland and into 
safe houses on the island. Fear for their families' safety thus increased amongst the 
men when the Japanese entered Kowloon and unopposed air raids escalated, 
exacerbated by 'over-optimistic assurances of families being looked after' which
631 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1716, From CO, HKRNVR, to C-in-C, Hong Kong, 8 September 1945.
632 Lieutenant-Commander Gandy, HKRNVR, quoted in Snow: The Fall of Hong Kong, p.69.
633 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p.15.
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were 'too often quickly found to be false'634. With a lack of opportunities to visit and 
check on their families, many deserters took matters into their own hands. Those 
ratings 'without families usually seemed comparatively undisturbed by danger'635, 
ironic considering it were those Chinese without roots in Hong Kong who the British 
originally believed could not be relied upon in war. A large proportion of the deserters 
had formerly been merchant sailors enlisted in the HKRNVR on T.124 contracts 
when their vessels were requisitioned, and therefore 'because they had always been 
able to leave or be dismissed at one month’s notice, their training and discipline had 
consequently suffered'. They thus should not be considered volunteers in the same 
sense, and they had not received the same degree of naval training to maintain 
discipline: 'from the Ratings point of view they were employed and paid as Merchant 
crews -  bombing was not in the contract'636.
What is also not fully regarded in British dispersions of Chinese loyalty is that 
within Chinese culture, military service was considered lesser in status than the 
merchant-class. Therefore, even though wider volunteering may have led to 
increased British respect, or at least drawn less criticism, it would have lowered 
many in the eyes of their fellow Chinese, which was the group opinion that mattered 
most to them. Ironically, official policy since the nineteenth century had fostered this 
lack of Chinese sympathy with colonial affairs by preserving communal 
distinctiveness, leaving the Chinese community to handle their own internal policing, 
adjudication, social welfare and medical care through an assortment of indigenous 
institutions. By 1936, Hong Kong’s European and Chinese communities were only
634 Idem.
635 Idem.
636 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p.10.
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‘just beginning’ to mix on a social basis’637, and during this decade 'pushing forward 
within the framework of their own self-contained world the Chinese were starting in 
various ways to pose a steadily growing challenge to British hegemony'638.
One such challenge that the Colonial authorities were wary of was the 
prominent ‘communistic element’ rooted in the Chinese Seamen’s Union 639. 
Considering this in relation to the links between the Royal Navy and local capitalist 
interests, colonial efforts to turn Hong Kong attention seaward and create alternative 
organisational outlets for the colony’s Chinese maritime community to reinforce 
British hegemony and counteract the influence of subversive groups, can be seen as 
part of a larger strategy of preserving the imperial status quo.
The coming of war to East Asia brought with it a change in discourse. On 8 
December 1941, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, eight hours after the strike on 
Pearl Harbour. The following day, the Commander-in-Chief Far East Command, Air 
Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, and Commander-in-Chief China Station, 
Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, issued the following statement:
Let us all remember that we here in the Far East form part of the great 
campaign for the preservation in the world of truth and justice and 
freedom; confidence, resolution, enterprise and devotion to the cause 
must and will inspire every one of us in the fighting services, while from 
the civilian population, we expect that patience, endurance and serenity
637 Percy Chen, China Called Me: My Life inside the Chinese Revolution (Boston, 1979), p.277, p. 17.
638 Snow, The Fall o f Hong Kong, pp.4-5.
639 Ibid., p.30.
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which is the great virtue of the East and which will go far to assist the 
fighting men to gain final and complete victory.640
With the colony besieged by Japanese soldiers, it could not afford to face opposition 
within its own ranks as well as at its gate. The British official response above is 
interesting not merely because of its increased appeal to trans-ethnic colonial unity 
in the face of a common enemy, but its attempts at cultural sympathy. The language 
adopted is layered with subtextual resonance for the Chinese community. 'Serenity' 
is explicitly mentioned in relation to the 'East'. The notion carries specific religious 
connotations, being commonly associated with Buddhism, though it also influenced 
Taoism. Buddhism and Taoism were the major religions in Hong Kong, and the 
Colony was affected by the Buddhist revival that likewise occurred in South China 
during the 1920s641. One of the Ten Perfections (dasa paramiyo) listed in the 
Buddhavamsa scripture of Theravada Buddhism is serenity, which alongside 
equanimity, represents 'upekkha':
Upekkha means equanimity in the face of the fluctuations of worldly 
fortune... it is indifference only to the demands of the ego-self with its 
craving for pleasure and position, not to the well-being of one's fellow 
human beings. True equanimity is the pinnacle of the four social attitudes 
that the Buddhist texts call the 'divine abodes'.642
The Second World War can surely be viewed as one of the ultimate 'fluctuations of 
worldly fortune'. A call for serenity/upekkha upon the invasion of Hong Kong by the
640 South China Morning Post, 9 December 1941, p.6.
641 Bernard H. K. Luk, 'Religion in Hong Kong History' in Lee Pui-tak (ed.), Colonial Hong Kong and 
Modern China: interaction and reintegration (Hong Kong, 2005), pp.45-6.
642 Bhikku Bodhi, 'Toward a Threshold of Understanding', Access to Insight, 5 June 2010, 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_30.html
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Japanese was an appeal to that higher virtue within the transient Chinese population 
whom the British had been uncertain about, to put aside their selfish impulses to 
abandon the Colony, or possibly even aid the Japanese, and act for its greater social 
good as upekkha dictated. The utilisation of such cultural signifiers thus acted as a 
mechanism for colonial control, aiding the British in helping preserve social law and 
order during the crisis. It would also have offset any attempts at garnering popular 
support through religious solidarity by Buddhist elements of the Japanese army. 
Beyond serenity, most of the qualities that the Brooke-Popham/Layton statement 
categorically list carry religious connotations. 'Truth', or 'sacca', is found in Buddha's 
'Four Noble Truths', as well as being one of the Ten Perfections. 'Resolution' or 
'adhitthana' is another of the Ten Perfections, as are 'patience' and 'endurance', 
known together as 'khanti', 'virtue' itself is equated with 'Sfla', and 'enterprise' is 
comparable with energy, vigour, and effort which constitute 'viriya'. Of the Ten 
Perfections, the Brooke-Popham/Layton statement directly appeals to six.
As the situation deteriorated in Hong Kong in the face of the Japanese 
onslaught, and with Chinese desertions from the HKRNVR, official moves were 
made to disperse doubts regarding Britain's ability to continue defending the colony, 
and maintain the support of the Chinese community:
The public morale is good and Command Headquarters pay tribute to the 
remarkable imperturbability of the Chinese. This quick adaption to war 
conditions is necessary and helpful. It is no small achievement to have
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settled down in a few days to war routine. Again is demonstrated the 
Chinese capacity for making the best of things.643
Again, the choice of language is interesting here, notably the reference to the 
Chinese having 'settled down1 to a war routine. The fact that this was 'no small 
achievement' for the general population is again a reference to the traditional 
presumption regarding its innate transitoriness, and thus the added need to 
emphasise it and preserve order with the Japanese gaining the upper hand in the 
battle for Hong Kong. Such assurances were merely a smokescreen, however, and 
within days of their issuance, calm had given way and preparations were already 
being made for the inevitable surrender:
The order came through for all ships in the harbour to be scuttled. The 
Japs had made a sudden break-through and there was a sudden sort of 
panic. Actually it was another week before we gave in. We only had a 
quarter of the island left in which to fight.644
The Escape of 2nd MTB
Despite the desperate situation, and perhaps symptomatic of not being 
professional Royal Navy officers fully indoctrinated in service discipline, a group of 
European HKRNVR men deliberately disobeyed this order:
643 South China Morning Post, 13 December 1941, p.4.
644 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, 'With the MTB's - Escape from Hong Kong. December 1941: excerpts 
from a letter of a Sub-Lieutenant of the HKRNVR to his brother'.
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We emphatically refused to scuttle. Around us was the most miserable 
sight that could greet any seaman's eyes; ships in all stages of being sunk, 
not by enemy action but by our own hands. It was certainly a black 
morning. We refused to scuttle because among many reasons we were 
determined never to give up our boats to the Japs but make a break for it 
at the last moment.645
Upon reflection, they considered that their disobedience was 'certainly lucky for the 
defenders that we hadn't scuttled', as the MTBs, being the only British vessels left 
afloat with the exception of two gunboats, became invaluable. They were drafted to 
undertake a variety of tasks they were not designed for, such as 'ferrying troops, 
stores and ammunition, patrol work, messenger work, evacuating troops off rocky 
shores at night and anything else that needed to be done'646. Word then reached the 
high authorities of their planned escape:
They were interested in getting away from the island Admiral Chan Chak, 
China’s No.2 Admiral, some of his staff and some higher British Officers 
and decided to combine the two parties. Three or Four days before the 
end we were under official orders to get away at the last moment at all 
costs after picking up the official party. We were selfishly pleased. It was a 
chance. It was obvious that the island could not hold out very much 
longer.647
Needless to say, the HKRNVR officers chose to follow these particular orders, it 
being in their better interests, though regret was expressed at having to hide the fact
away from comrades, and 'leave behind so many of one's pals and slip off in the 
night as if we were running away at the last moment, even though we realised that 
that was not the case'648. In regards to this last sentiment, however, that had been 
their original intention, before the plan to evacuate the Admiral was imposed on 
them by the authorities, thus providing them with a moral absolution that 
retrospectively altered their perception of the incident and their motives. 
Consequently, collective empathy relating character and the notion of the 'heroic last 
stand' with the battle for Hong Kong was preserved, emphasised by the resolute 
understanding that Hong Kong ‘could not be held but must be defended'649:
When I think of what happened in Malaya and at Singapore I am filled with 
pride at the thought of the really marvellous show which had been put up 
by the island's defenders. At the end, after about ten days of non-stop 
fighting against heavy odds, with hardly any sleep, food or rest and with 
no reserves at all, they were outnumbered about five to one, but they 
didn't give in until the Japs had taken about three quarters of the island.650
Here, it is not so much a collective or Empire-transcendent British character which is 
being lauded. Instead, Hong Kong heroism is being defined not merely in relation to 
the Japanese aggressors, but also the seeming capitulation of their colonial 
'brethren' in Singapore and Malaya. This sense of distinction was further emphasised 
by the clear priority given to Singapore by the Admiralty, both in pre-war planning 
and in April 1941, when the Commander-in-Chief, Singapore, transferred a number
649 Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, Footprints: The Memoirs ofS irSelw yn Selwyn-Clarke (Hong Kong,
1975), p.58.
650 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, 'With the MTB's - Escape from Hong Kong. December 1941: excerpts 
from a letter of a Sub-Lieutenant of the HKRNVR to his brother'.
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of inferior Chinese Bren guns to naval vessels based in Hong Kong, in exchange for 
their superior Lewis Guns which were then dispatched to Singapore651. Furthermore, 
‘the RNVR had been issued with dud Bren gun ammunition that cost us dearly 
enough’652 when put into action against the Japanese later that year, as displayed in 
the sample of failure rates below:
Table 5. Sample of HKRNVR vessels and dud ammunition fired during 
hostilities, 8-19 December, 1941
HKRNVR Vessel Percentage of duds
Cornflower At least 50%
Minnie 30%
Shun Wo 10%
Perla At least 60%
Source: J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p. 1, HKRS 6-1-1706, 
PROHK.
Vessels also had to operate under-strength because of the personnel transfers, such 
as the Insect-class gunboats Moth and Cicala, who did not have enough crew to 
operate all their guns, leaving an undesirable situation where they would man only 
'those which are more urgent at the moment':
If "MOTH" or "CICALA" or both are supporting the left flank of Army at 
any time on mainland and are attacked by aircraft whilst bombarding with 
their 6" armament, I consider that they should temporarily cease fire with
651 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall Papers, p.38.
652 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p.1.
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A or B Gun and with the 8 men thus released man their pom-pom and 3" 
until the attack is driven off.653
The feelings of one of the aforementioned ‘pals’ left behind, Ralph Goodwin, 
were more mixed, having been laid-up in hospital when he heard ‘a muffled 
throbbing roar’ from the engines of the surviving MTBs ‘tuning up for their last run’:
The sound of those motors warming up on Christmas night, 1942, is still 
with me whenever my thoughts drift back, just as I heard it at the time, 
from my hospital bed. My feelings were confused and violent. Pleasure 
that some of the boats were still afloat and would yet cheat the enemy; 
anger at my own helpless impotence; despair when the low roar faded 
into distance, and the feeling that the last link with freedom had gone.654
Though Goodwin did not apparently resent the escapees, their actions nevertheless 
had a profound effect on those they left behind. The MTBs and the Navy became 
personified with British-attributed qualities of freedom and liberty, and their departure 
from the colony after it had officially surrendered, reflected the symbolic final moment 
whereby Hong Kong shifted from Britain’s ‘benevolent’ rule to Japanese despotism. 
The escapees carried Hong Kong’s freedom with them, resigning those fellow 
servicemen they left behind to the Prisoner-of-War (POW) camps; in the words of 
Goodwin, ‘there could be no “Dunkirk” for the beleaguered troops’655. Whereas 2nd 
MTB’s escape from the island was celebrated, though it prompted some sense of 
abandonment, subsequent individual attempts to escape the POW camps, including
653 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1716, From Captain, Extended Defence Officer to Commodore, Hong Kong, 3 
May 1941.
654 R.B., Goodwin, Hongkong Escape (London, 1953), p.213.
655 Ibid., p.9.
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by Goodwin himself, caused stronger feelings as those left behind were made to 
suffer ‘additional privations’ such as interrogation, torture and additional arrests, as a 
consequence of escapees’ actions656. Yet for the majority, the shared group identity 
of belonging to the HKRNVR overrode such separation and hardship:
We were after all still mobilised, and we lived, worked, and went through 
it very much as a unit. That episode [in the POW camps] is part of Hong 
Kong RNVR’s history... It was this feeling of belonging to the HKRNVR 
that prompted me in writing... so much about activities of individual 
members who left us for weeks or months in 1940 or 1941... They were 
only away from us for a time, they came back to us, and even whilst 
away they were still representatives of the HKRNVR.657
The experience in the camps helped foster a collective memory amongst the 
HKRNVR of valour in defeat, which would be epitomised by the 2nd MTB, though the 
reality for many was less triumphant:
Every single CO had insisted that wherever there was any real fighting it 
was his men and his along that had been in the thick of it, and that on the 
rare occasions when any other unit had been seen at all they had been 
taking cover or running away... I think there is a very reasonable 
explanation of this apparently myopic and vainglorious attitude from which 
the various COs, especially suffered in the Camp. The fact is that after the 
first few days of the battle communications, co-ordination and general 
control by HQ Command steadily deteriorated to near vanishing point...
Ibid., pp.220-1.
657 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1706, J.C. McDouall to A. Sommerfelt, 5 April 1961, p.3.
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COs doing their very best in the field became clueless as to what was 
going on elsewhere, and steadily lost all co-ordinated contact with other 
units. No wonder that their principal recollections 3 1/4 years later, whilst 
still POWs, were of little but what their own men had been doing in a long 
series of mainly rearguard and often unsupported actions.658
The glorification of the 2nd MTB Flotilla's escape from the island has been 
borne out in the subsequent historiography and its popular commemoration659. The 
actions of ‘a fleet which amounted, in one dismissive summary, to a ‘few naval 
launches”660, has been elevated to the status of 'heroic myth', not just of the British 
Empire661, but the Hong Kong Chinese as well662. The latter case rests on the 
presence of Admiral Chan Chak, whose role in the escape, depending upon the 
source and historiographical viewpoint in which he is conveyed, varies between that 
of benign passenger to courageous leader. That his evacuation was orchestrated by 
the Admiralty, on its vessels, manned by its personnel, compounded by the fact that 
he was shot in the wrist during the retreat and already suffered the disability of an 
amputated leg, would heavily support the former depiction and present his actual 
role in the group’s escape from the island as minimal, though his assistance in their 
crossing the Chinese mainland is less disputed:
bt>0 Ibid., pp.3-4.
659 The Hong Kong Escape Re-enactment Organisation (HERO), comprised of some of its 
descendents, have been particularly ardent in raising public awareness and recognition of 2 nd MTB’s 
actions, most notably through the exhibition ‘Escape from Hong Kong: Road to Waichow’, which 
opened on 24th December 2009 at the Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defence.
Selwyn-Clarke, Footprints, p. 184.
661 Though not specifically citing Hong Kong, John M. Mackenzie has conceptualised 'Heroic Myths of 
Empire', in Mackenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850-1950  (Manchester, 1992), 
pp. 109-138.
HERO place particular emphasis on this unity, highlighting that ‘this was the first time in history that 
the Chinese and British joined forces against a common enemy': http://www.hongkongescape.org -  
mission statement. A film in Production by Lion Rock Films also features the tag-line ‘An Epic Tale of 
East Meets West’: http://lionrockfilms.com.
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The British considered themselves to be rescuing Chan Chak: Chan Chak, 
however, had no doubt that he was rescuing them... Only he had the local 
knowledge and contact that would enable the party to proceed into the 
Chinese interior. Maltby’s headquarters had tacitly admitted their 
dependence by placing the naval squadron under Chan Chak’s 
command.663
Even then, his British companions considered him a 'gallant little Admiral'664 and 
'great little man'665, and despite such plaudits, these words are not indicative of 
reverence towards one seen as their superior. Instead, their tone is almost 
patronising, with emphasis on the Admiral's diminutive stature, both physically and 
authoritatively in the eyes of the British, who despite being lower in rank consider 
themselves racially and culturally superior, in that they were the ones with the 'moral 
authority' to bestow such approval and reinforce their position as the natural leaders. 
This sense of hierarchy extended to the naval authorities, in whose eyes it was 
‘unheard of for a commander to prejudice the safety of his ships to save two Chinese, 
however, distinguished’666, and thus the MTBs left the rendezvous before Chan 
Chak had arrived, forcing him to catch-up with them on-land. Again, this 
abandonment does not reflect the actions of a crew towards a Commanding Officer. 
Concern for Chan Chak's wellbeing came less from naval quarters and more from 
F.W. Kendal of the Secret Service, who believed that the nationalist Chinese leader 
Chiang Kai-shek would lose trust in Britain if the Admiral and his aide were captured
663 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p.74.
664 Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Goring, cited in Tributes to Admiral Chan Chak', The Escape of the 2nd 
MTB Flotilla, http://www.hongkongescape.org/images/HK/Tributes_to_CC.pdf.
665 Lieutenant Commander G. H. Gandy RN (Retd.), 2nd MTB Flotilla Senior Officer, cited in Tributes 
to Admiral Chan Chak', The Escape of the 2nd MTB Flotilla, 
http://www.hongkongescape.org/images/HK/Tributes_to_CC.pdf.
666 Oliver Lindsay, Going Down of the Sun: Hong Kong and South-East Asia 1941-1945  (London,
1981), p.7.
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and likely tortured and killed667, compromising British prestige in East Asia and their 
military alliance.
Image 19. Admiral Chan Chak [Source: http://www.hongkongescape.org] 
Military Service within Chinese Culture
A hegemonic relationship was inculcated over the preceding decade, when 
Chan Chak had been in Hong Kong conducting a study of European navies from 
which to plan the reorganisation of that of China's, and was present at the birth of the 
HKNVF in 1933.668 Prior to Western and Japanese incursions, ‘invaders were 
Sinicized, and barbarians beyond the border paid humble tribute to “civilization,”
668 South China Morning Post, 19 September 1933.
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reinforcing a Sinocentric view of Chinese civilization as universal and superior’669. 
Confucian universalism in essence involved a 'fierce racism, rejection of other 
cultures... and cultural superiority'670. Confucian teachings also questioned the value 
of direct military action:
The traditional view held by Confucius is that caution is the better part of 
valor and that it ill behooves the wise man to risk his own life 
inappropriately. The profound pacification of the country, especially after 
the rule of the Mongols, greatly enhanced this mood. The empire became 
an empire of peace.671
Neo-Confucianism bred not only anti-foreignism, but also anti-militarism, resulting in 
a paradox, but one which set a precedent for the future utilisation of military 
knowledge from abroad:
The stress on civil virtues and the growing importance of the vaunted 
examination system as a channel for upward mobility led to a general 
decline in martial spirit. Yet even as China turned inward, her ever-present 
need for foreign military and administrative expertise assured that 
outsiders would continue to find their way into the Chinese service.672
The position of the soldier thus came to occupy 'the lowest rung of Chinese society', 
and giving rise to the Chinese proverb: "good iron is not used for nails; good men do
669 Peter Hays Gries, 'Narratives to Live By: The Century of Humiliation and Chinese National Identity 
Today’, in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston (eds.), China’s Transformations: The Stories 
beyond the Headlines (Plymouth, 2007), p.115.
670 Lei Yi, 'Modern 'Sinocentricism' and 'Nationalism", pp.49-50, cited in Peter Hays Gries, China’s 
New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (London, 2004), p.8.
671 Max Weber, T h e  Chinese Literati', H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology (London, 1948), p.422.
672 Richard J. Smith, 'The Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Ching 
Practice', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, Vol. 15 (1975), pp. 113-38, p. 121.
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not become soldiers"673. The military became a 'despised' occupation, and 'a 
cultivated literary man would not engage in social intercourse on an equal footing 
with army officers'674. Classed lower than merchants, the soldier was excluded from 
the standard Confucian list of the four occupations, as established in Chinese lore, 
which in descending order constituted the scholar (shi), farmer (nong), artisan (gong), 
and merchant (shang). This ommission was because the Confucian wenren (literati) 
who did the listing regarded the practitioners of wu (violence) as their mortal enemies, 
incarnating the very evil of brute force that it was the Confucians' moral duty to 
extirpate in the cause of civilized behaviours. 675 Such cultural perceptions 
contributed to the difficulties in recruiting for the HKRNVR.
Demonstrations of violence and militarism were considered antithetical to 
Confucian notions of civilisation and Chinese cultural superiority. It has been argued 
by Charles Hucker among others that China thus 'became so civilized they lacked 
the martial values and sense of ethnicity (as opposed to culturalism) with which to 
fight off the invaders, who ordinarily promised to rule in the Chinese fashion'676. In 
this sense, they came to view themselves as a non-'martial race', an identity which 
was then reflected to the outside world, in external perceptions, notably Occidental 
ones.
The shock to the system came with the so-called 'Century of Humiliation' and 
increased western imperial aggression following the First Opium War which 
'fundamentally dislodged Chinese intellectuals from their Confucian haven [creating
673 Morton H. Fried, ‘Military Status in Chinese Society’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 4 
(January, 1952), pp.347-357, p.348.
Weber, 'The Chinese Literati', p.422.
675 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (London, 2001), p.109.
676 Ibid., pp.109-10.
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a] sense of impotence, frustration, and humiliation.'677 This period highlighted the 
technological - and by extension military and naval -  disparity between China and 
the industrialised West, as evinced in the popular Chinese phrase 
“backwards/beaten” (luohou aida):
Interpreted as “the backwards will be beaten” (luohou jiuyao aida), the 
phrase implies that the former caused the latter: economic and 
technological backwardness led to China’s defeat at the hands of the 
West.678
Therefore modernisation of its military along Western lines came to be viewed as a 
way of reversing this 'backwardness'. Thus, in modelling China’s navy on the Royal 
Navy and with the latter's assistance, Chan Chak and the Chinese Government 
acknowledged British superiority not only in naval equipment and organisation, but 
also culturally, fostering a teacher-student dynamic.
The British were cast in a leadership role, not only to the Hong Kong Chinese 
who came under their 'formal' jurisdiction, but to the sovereign Republic of China 
who consequently fell under their 'informal' influence in this context. This cultural 
hierarchy then disseminated down to inform the personal level of interaction between 
individual officers and ratings. This superseded the organisational hierarchy of rank, 
for though such chains of command were outwardly similar and semantically 
identifiable, the cultural and racial status attached to such positions was 
disproportionate; a Chinese Admiral did not command the same level of professional 
respect as a British one. He was only allowed to direct 2nd MTB by the grace of Lt.
677 Tu Wei-ming, Cultural China, p.2, cited in Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp.47-8.
678 Original italicisation. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy 
(London, 2004), p.50.
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Commander Gandy, the flotilla's Commanding Officer, who realised that he and his 
men could use the Admiral's local knowledge once they landed on the Chinese 
mainland.
Chinese Historical Memory
The retrospective glorification of Admiral Chan Chak's role in the escape from 
the island, and the rise of Hong Kong's 'heroic myth', can be better understood when 
considered in relation to ideological shifts in Chinese historiography over the last 
sixty years in response to the state's use of historical memory. It has been said that 
'forging a country's collective memory is an integral part of nation-building... with the 
aim of consolidating the bond between the individual citizen and the homeland'.679 
When the CCP defeated the KMT in the Chinese Civil War and founded the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, to help consolidate and legitimise its newfound 
power amongst the wider populace, the Maoist regime consciously sought to alter 
the country's collective memory. Instead of the nationalist depiction of China as 
victims of the West, 'the Maoist account of the Century highlighted the heroism of the 
anti-feudal, anti-imperialist masses in throwing off their chains and repelling foreign 
invaders... New China needed heroes.'680 In the words of Mao Zedong, “The 
Chinese people have stood up”, thus marking the end of the ‘Century of Humiliation’; 
‘the civil war between the Communists and Chiang Kei-shek’s Nationalist Party was
679 Zheng Wang, 'National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: 
Patriotic Education Campaign in China', International Studies Quarterly (2008), Vol. 52, pp.783-806, 
p.783.
80 Gries, 'Narratives to Live By’, p.116.
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over, foreign influence had been driven from the mainland, and, from an ideological 
perspective, socialism had defeated capitalism.’681
The Maoist ‘victor narrative’ was an ideological attack on both colonialism and 
capitalism, posing an economic, political, and social threat to the British in Hong 
Kong, whose ongoing prosperity and presence there rested on the principles of free 
trade. Therefore, a 'heroic' narrative of their own needed to be developed and was 
proliferated, emphasising a sense of victory even in the 'humiliation' of defeat by an 
Asian power, to counteract Communist discourse, defend British imperialism from 
internal and external dissidents, and forge a more distinctive Hong Kong Chinese 
identity separate from the mainland. Whereas the PRC used historical memory to 
build a nation-state based upon a shared Communist identity, the British used 
historical memory of the war to dissociate Chinese ethnicity from race, and promote 
an alternative Chinese identity more closely aligned to British colonial and capitalist 
interests. Seeking to reassert control over the colony following the Japanese 
invasion, Britain needed to reaffirm her moral and political authority there, fearing 
possible Communist subversion from the growing tide of immigrants from the 
Chinese mainland. Since its founding, ’laissez-faireism’ had encouraged Hong 
Kong’s growth as a free port through economic migration, but meant that the colony 
developed as ‘a commercial centre where there is no culture’682, giving rise to British 
fears over Chinese loyalty in the HKRNVR. In a post-war policy shift, there was a 
more conscious effort on the part of the colonial authorities to forge a greater sense
681 This is one historical narrative, and it is debated whether the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 
marked the official end of the ‘Century’, whether it ended with the reunification of China with Hong 
Kong and Macao, or whether it is still ongoing due to the ongoing disunity with Chinese Taipei 
(Taiwan). See Gries, ‘Narratives to Live By’, p.119.
Document Vl.a4: Yu Sheng, ‘Notes on Hong Kong’ (source: Ch’ien-t’u, volume 2, no.5, 1 May 
1934), in Steve Tsang (ed.), Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong, 1995), p.239.
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and awareness of a 'Hong Kong' identity, to foster a 'Hongkonger' community, less 
transient or aligned to allegiances on the mainland.
The promotion of a 'heroic myth' based upon Hong Kong's brave last stand 
and the 2nd MTB flotilla’s escape, where both its Chinese and non-Chinese 
population fought together side-by-side against a common enemy, was thus one tool 
for rectifying this and inculcating a sense of civic pride and unity that cut across 
ethnic boundaries to bind together both groups within a shared Hong Kong identity. 
The fact that the colony had been expected to hold out for ninety days and had 
managed just eighteen683, with the HKRNVR experiencing a significant number of 
Chinese desertions over that period, was immaterial. It was not only ‘New China’ 
who ‘needed heroes’, to extend Peter Hays Gries' argument; in response, British 
Hong Kong needed heroes of its own. Paradoxically, Chan Chak filled that role for 
the colonial authorities; he was Chinese, anti-Communist, he respected and was 
deferential to British (naval) hegemony and tradition having also been awarded the 
K.B.E. (Knight Commander of the British Empire) for his work with the colonial 
authorities, and he epitomised the collaborative spirit between the British and
Chinese which it emphasised was essential to the mutual prosperity of both
communities in Hong Kong. Though Chan Chak was sent by Chiang Kai-shek in 
1938 to take charge of the Nationalist underground there, he had ended up ‘working 
quietly with the British police and intelligence services’ 684. He thus actively
collaborated with the colonial authorities to fortify their position of control. Though
Chan Chak the man was not from Hong Kong himself, his idealised ‘spirit’ became 
rooted in the colony, and became a rallying symbol for ‘Hongkonger’ nationalism,
683 Snow, The Fall o f Hong Kong, p.73.
684 Ibid., p.41.
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representing its own collective strength and perseverance during wartime in the face 
of overwhelming odds. Gries has argued that ‘war is at once the graveyard of 
peoples and the birthplace of nations. Most nations are born out of the ashes of war; 
indeed, nations define themselves through conflict with other nations’685. Its invasion 
by the Japanese in the Second World War was the moment Hong Kong and its 
people came of age, changing its relationship with both Britain and China invariably.
685 Michael Howard, Causes of W a r(1983), cited in Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p.69.
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Part Two: Post-Second World War
Restoring Imperial 'Face'
The initial defeat of Britain by an Asian power in the Second World War 
marked a shift in Chinese attitudes towards British power, compounded by their 
elevation in the new post-war international system to one of the 'big five' powers. 
According to Steve Tsang, 'the Chinese no longer tolerated a slag in the face as 
readily as they had done before the war'.686 Whereas Chinese prestige increased, 
Britain’s had diminished, and to the British naval authorities returning to Hong Kong, 
the restoration of their own prestige, or ‘face’, in the eyes of the local Chinese 
population, was inexorably tied to their ability to legitimately re-establish colonial 
power:
“Face” (=prestige) is important to the Oriental. When we surrendered 
Hong Kong we lost face; we now have to regain Hong Kong and face. The 
Chinese will judge us by our behaviour ashore and first impressions will 
count.687
Though the intrinsic notion of the civilising mission under British leadership remained, 
the language of it had altered from a providentially ordained right to rule, to a more 
progressive, constructive and cooperative discourse of development. As with 
Governor Young’s plans for political reform, there was a more pronounced
686 Steve Tsang, Governing Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 2007), p.54.
687 PROHK, HKMS No.74 1-1, 'Some Instructions and Hints in the Event of Surrender By the 
Japanese. Precautions Against Treachery', Enclosure to Commander Task Force 111.2 No. 1039/1 
dated 21st August, 1945, p.2.
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realisation that Britain’s position in Hong Kong was more precarious and could only 
be maintained in closer collaboration with the local Chinese population, and that 
relationship needed to be built upon increased cultural understanding as opposed to 
a notion of inherent respect based upon racial hierarchy. Steve Tsang has termed 
this 'the 1946 outlook', which recognised that 'the very survival of British rule in Hong 
Kong would depend on winning over the hearts and minds of the majority Chinese 
residents'688. This new spirit of tolerance was symbolised most poignantly by the 
removal of the long-established colour bar which prohibited Chinese from residing on 
the Peak. These progressive changes, however, were born largely out of political 
pragmatism. During the war, an understanding was reached between the British 
Government and Chiang Kai-shek that the issue of the New Territories and Hong 
Kong could be addressed after the defeat of Japan. Governor Young believed that 
'given the Chinese Government's determination to recover Hong Kong... the only 
way to keep the colony British was to make the local inhabitants want to do so'689. 
For that to happen, they needed to be transformed 'from Chinese sojourners into 
citizens of British Hong Kong'690. Political and social reform, like cultural devices 
such historical memory and heroic myth, were thus tools consciously utilised by 
Britain to forge a sympathetic 'Hongkonger' identity which would help the 
reestablishment of British imperial rule there.
To understand 'face' within this context, however, one must appreciate its 
more nuanced meaning within Chinese culture, evinced in its dual translation as both 
lien and mien-tzu:
688 Tsang, Government and Politics, p.6.
689 Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in 
Hong Kong 1945-1952 (Oxford, 1988), p. 186.
690 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (London, 2007), pp.43-4.
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Mien-tzu, stands for the kind of prestige that is emphasized in this country 
[America]: a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through 
success and ostentation. This is prestige that is accumulated by means of 
personal effort or clever maneuvering... The other kind of "face", lien... is 
the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation... It 
represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral 
character, the loss of which makes it impossible to function properly within 
the community.691
Though Britain had acquired power and mien-tzu through economic and military 
strength, her actions at the outset of the Second World War were seen as 
unbefitting of her high status and the moral character that was expected of one 
in that position, causing Britain to lose lien in the eyes of the Chinese:
The appeasement policy of Chamberlain up to the outbreak of the 
European War, in the face of Britain's treaty to smaller nations, was felt as 
extremely "//e/7-losing" in China. To be unwilling to keep promises to 
weaker nations because of its own interests was neither compatible with 
its claim to status as the most powerful empire of the world, nor with the 
desire of the leaders of the nation to be termed gentlemen.692
There was a belief that this behaviour had spread to Britain's dealings with China too, 
and 'in their eyes the British were feeling their way to a 'Far Eastern Munich"693. Lien, 
or moral conduct, thus appears to have held more gravitas and effect for the Chinese
691 Hsein Chin Hu, T h e  Chinese Concept of Face', American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January - 
March, 1944), pp.45-64, p.45.
692 Ibid., p.48.
693 Xia, 'Liao Chengzhi zai Xianggang', p. 156, cited in Snow, The Fall o f Hong Kong, p.33.
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population than expressions of British material supremacy, such as the Navy or 
finance, constituting mien-tzu, in maintaining Britain’s imperial authority. This also 
raises a significant parallel within imperial theory and the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony, whereby political power flows from moral authority rather than force. The 
erosion of Britain’s lien had a foreboding antecedent in the Republic of China, where 
a similar neglect of lien had contributed to internal unrest there:
Once wealth is acquired, power attained and position consolidated, they 
trust their mien-tzu to be strong enough to hush talk about their moral 
character. The warlords during the early part of the Republic are a good 
example. Each of them maintained his power by military force, 
perpetrating many crimes for the sake of money... They believed that they 
could maintain their position and prestige by means of money and military 
force, but their disregard for lien earned them the contempt of their 
nation.694
Flaunting British mien-tzu through a show of naval theatre in Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil 
Harcourt's impressive returning British Pacific Fleet and the promise of commercial 
growth were thus not enough; the British had to also restore their lien to prevent 
Hong Kong going the same way, and forever losing her position there.
The desire and need to regain face in the eyes of the Chinese can also help 
explain the development of Hong Kong’s wartime heroic myth. The twentieth century 
Chinese writer, Lu Xun, critiqued the Chinese 'vain desire for face' in his caricature,
694 Hsein Chin Hu, T h e  Chinese Concept of Face', American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January - 
March, 1944), pp.45-64, p.64.
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Ah Q, known for his 'psychological victory technique' by which he maintains an 
inflated sense of himself695:
After suffering humiliating public beatings, Ah Q frequently hits himself.
Why? Ah Q sought to fool himself into thinking that he was actually giving
- not receiving - a licking.696
Lu Xun suggests that by turning defeats into victories, Ah Q is able to save face. 
Gries has demonstrated that 'many Chinese narratives of Sino-American and Sino- 
Japanese military encounters... transform defeats into heroic victories with an Ah Q- 
like magic'697. It can be argued that this revisionist tradition extends to the Battle of 
Hong Kong, not just within Chinese narratives but British ones too. British authority 
had given her a high degree of mien-tzu, but whereas one 'who has mien-tzu is in a 
position to exercise considerable influence, even control of others in both direct and 
indirect ways... he is under strong constraint to act in a manner consistent with the 
requirements for maintaining his mien-tzu'698. When Governor Young surrendered to 
the Japanese on Christmas Day in 1941, it could be deemed that Britain had failed to 
act in the manner expected of her preeminent position, having failed to defend Hong 
Kong and her citizens of a lesser mien-tzu, who looked up to her because of the 
impression of 'British invincibility' that had been falsely conveyed to them. Britain 
thus correspondingly lost lien. Consequently, in 1942 the Ministry of Information put 
forward a new scheme for propaganda in China with the aim of re-establishing
695 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p.27.
696 Lu Xun, True Story of Ah Q'. p.75 cited in ibid., p.27.
697 ibid., p.28.
698 David Yau-fai Ho, 'On the Concept of Face', American Journal of Sociology, Vol.81, No.4 (January,
1976), pp.867-884, p.873.
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British prestige there.699 By resorting to Ah Q's 'psychological victory technique', the 
British could turn defeat at Hong Kong into victory, perpetuated via 'heroic myth', in 
order to help restore lost lien.
There exists a phrase, fu-yen mien-tzu, or “padding (someone’s) mien-tzu"700. 
This is where one will show another person just enough deference so as to obtain 
their goodwill, though it may hide one's true judgement. The British were seen as 
being guilty of this during the war:
A Chinese student remarked one day that all through the Sino-Japanese 
war the British had been fu-yenning China’s mien-tzu, encouraging her to 
fight on, and making promises when necessary, but sending only a 
minimum of effective aid. This expressed clearly that the student had no 
confidence in Britain’s sincerity.701
The gentleman’s agreement made with Chiang Kai-shek regarding discussion over 
the issue of the New Territories can be viewed as another case, co-opting an 'ally' 
through vague, and ultimately false, promises. The British also reneged on an earlier 
understanding that as Allied Commander of the China theatre, Hong Kong was 
'within the operational sphere of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek', and that as laid 
down in General Order No.1, the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to 
Chiang702; however, the British dispatched Rear Admiral Harcourt's task force to 
Hong Kong to formally accept the Japanese surrender ahead of Chiang's army.
699 Christopher Thorne, 'Wartime British Planning for the Post-War Far East', in Ian Nish (ed.), Anglo- 
Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the 
Second World W ar (Cambridge, 1982), p.205.
700 Hsein, 'The Chinese Concept of Face', p.59
701 Idem.
702 F0371/46251, Undated note, 'Arrangements for the Administration of Hong Kong in the Event of 
its Liberation by Regular Chinese Forces', c. late July 1945, cited in Tsang, A Modern History of Hong 
Kong, p. 133.
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Though it had been in Britain's interests during wartime to fu-yen Chiang's mien-tzu
by acknowledging his 'authority', the reality was that Britain considered it 'a point of 
national honour... to recover [Hong Kong], and restore it to its normal state and 
prosperity'703. Furthermore, Chiang could not be allowed to reach Hong Kong ahead 
of them, as 'once in occupation, a Chinese force of whatever nature might prove 
difficult to extrude by diplomatic means'704. Thus, being the first ones to recover 
Hong Kong was considered very important for British 'prestige and future relations 
with China'705. Yet this proved counter-productive, as upon hearing of the British 
action, the Chinese Government was offended by their 'rather high-handed' 
behaviour706, which further compromised Britain's lien. In fu-yenning China's mien- 
tzu in these instances, Britain shrouded her own ulterior motives and superior 
attitudes beneath a veil of equanimity; to act in this way diminished her moral 
integrity and lien, losing her Chinese respect and trust.
Though, the concept had indigenous roots, during the nineteenth century, 
'face' became utilised by the British missionary Arthur Smith to emphasise the 
defects of 'Chinese racial character' and justify his Christian civilising mission, thus it 
became integrated into Orientalist discourse:
Face, it seems, represented duplicitous Oriental "disguise." Fearful of 
society - "the mob" and its unruly passions - classical Liberals began to 
use words like face to project their fears about society and the emotions 
onto the Orient, the realm of the mindless Yellow Horde. Paradoxically,
703 F0371/46251, T h e  Political Issues between Great Britain and China regarding Hong Kong', 7 July 
1945, cited in ibid., p.132.
704 HS1/171, Rait's minute to DDMI (P/W), 19 August 1944, cited in idem.
705 HS1/171, Britmis Chungking to W ar Office, 200900H, 20 July 1945, cited in idem.
706 F0371/46252, Chungking to Foreign Office 857, 16 August 1945, cited in ibid., p .134.
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the East came to represent both a passive "herd mentality" and a cunning 
duplicitousness to Western minds. This helped preserve the good
qualities of individualism and rationality for Liberalism and the West.707
Now those qualities of individualism were needed again to rebuild British capitalism
in Hong Kong, yet because their 'face' in the eyes of the Chinese had been
compromised, they needed to reconcile this first. As sociologist David Ho points out, 
'Face is never a purely individual thing. It does not make sense to speak of the face 
of an individual as something lodged within his person; it is meaningful only when his 
face is considered in relation to that of others in the social network'708. "Face' had 
traditionally been ascribed to the Oriental 'other', as a characteristic which lowered 
him in relation to the European. Whereas originally the British were the ones looking 
upon Chinese 'face', often down from an elevated position, now British 'face' was the 
one being scrutinised by the eyes of the Chinese; their roles had been reversed; the 
Chinese could now look the British in the eye, and in order to do so, they had 
acquired an equal footing. The British now had to appeal to Chinese perceptions and 
values, and altered their own actions and behaviour accordingly; now the Chinese 
were setting a moral standard for the British to aspire to in order to regain lien in their 
eyes, essential for the restoration of mien-tzu and colonial authority. This was 
emphasised to returning British naval personnel:
The behaviour and bearing of our landing parties must be exemplary. 
There will be numerous temptations, values may have changed and liquor 
of a kind available for barter, women camp followers of the Japanese will 
be seeking new patronage, etc., etc. The Chinese have great dignity. For
707 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp.22-3.
708 Ho, 'On the Concept of Face', p.882.
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instance, they are never seen drunk in public, whatever they may do in 
private, and for a British rank or rating to misbehave with wine or women 
at this time will do us no good.709
In particular, the 'rape of Nanking' by the Japanese had prompted a resurrection of 
the 'recurring figure of China as a raped woman' within nationalist discourse, causing 
many young Chinese men to become 'enraged by the very idea of white men 
intimately involved with Chinese women'710. Before the war, relationships with local 
women had been tolerated by the Navy, albeit as ‘the sordid pursuit of low-grade 
whites'711. This dynamic had been exploited by Japanese espionage efforts before 
the invasion, in particular at Nagasaki Joe’s, a popular Japanese bar in the Wanchai 
district, where ‘a pint of beer cost ten cents less than anywhere else in town; and the 
girls made a beeline for British naval ratings’ to gather information712. HKRNVR 
officers fraternising with foreigners in the Hong Kong Club had to be warned about 
'careless conversation about service matters such as ship movements'713. Now, not 
only were the Chinese more protective of both their female members and their new 
status, any such intimate association, regardless of ‘rank or rating’, was considered 
even less desirable and more threatening by the British, having been undermined 
once before. Despite designs to win over the local population, there remained a 
suspicion of too close an interaction. Returning naval personnel had to tread a 
difficult balance between approaching the Hong Kong Chinese as friends on the one- 
hand, and maintaining a reserved and respectful distance on the other:
709 PROHK, HKMS No.74 1-1, 'Some Instructions and Hints in the Event of Surrender By the 
Japanese. Precautions Against Treachery', Enclosure to Commander Task Force 111.2 No. 1039/1 
dated 21st August, 1945, p.2.
710 Gries, China's New Nationalism, p. 10.
711 Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p.11.
712 Ibid. p.36.
713 PROHK, HKRS 7-1-1771(1), C-in-C's Memorandum No.2527, 10 January 1940, p.3.
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In dealing with the Chinese good humour and a sense of humour always 
help. If you make a Chinese laugh, preferably with you, not at you, things 
should be well. In the case of the Chinese the difficulty will not be to keep 
away from them, but to keep them away from you. They will be keen to 
help in any way and will try to join up as washers up, sweepers, dhobi 
boys, etc. This must not be allowed, anyway to begin with.714
Yet, as the saying fu-yen mien-tzu implies, though the British may have been 
padding Chinese mien-tzu by praising Chinese 'great dignity' and 'humour' in this 
manner, it covered up true reflections, and officially the line reiterated upon their 
return was to 'regard all Orientals with suspicion'715. Though the British were now 
more conscious of reflecting a positive 'face' of their own, the pejorative view clearly 
still continued in relation to that of the local population. In particular, the previously 
metaphorical 'Oriental "disguise"' had taken on a dangerous new physical and quite 
literal manifestation:
Inexperienced people are unable to distinguish between Japanese and 
Chinese. A favourite Japanese trick is to adopt Chinese dress and to hide 
a bomb, grenade or machine gun under the long gown. It is appreciated 
that many old friends of China Station days such as mess-boys, sampan 
men, side-party "Marys", cobblers, tailors and dhobi men will be anxious 
to renew relations, but at present all Orientals must be treated with 
suspicion.716
714 PROHK, HKMS No.74 1-1, 'Some Instructions and Hints in the Event of Surrender By the 
Japanese. Precautions Against Treachery', Enclosure to Commander Task Force 111.2 No. 1039/1 
dated 21st August, 1945, p.2.
715 Idem.
716 Idem.
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This tricky tension between presenting a more positive, equitable attitude 
towards the Chinese population and maintaining the imperial status quo affected the 
discussions regarding war gratuities. During these, the institutionalised discrimination 
which had underpinned the force’s chain of command came to light, along with its 
prevailing influence, presenting some uncomfortable dilemmas. Though the HKRNVR 
was not as clearly divided along racial lines as some colonial naval volunteer forces, 
in that some Europeans filled the enlisted rates as well as the officer ranks, this equal 
footing with the Chinese rates was shared merely on a superficial level during 
peacetime, and was not a desirable situation for war. Plans had therefore been put in 
place to ensure European command over the Chinese during the heat of battle:
Up to July 1941 no Europeans were serving as seamen but it was agreed 
that when they were called into service they would receive Admiralty 
sterling rates... They would also be promoted Petty Officers in charge of 
guns' crews to give them seniority over the Chinese seamen guns'
717crews.
Inequalities also existed financially, with the rates of pay and allowances given to 
‘Asiatic ratings’ in the HKRNVR, ‘of a much lower standard’ than those of European 
ratings, and with no marriage allowances provided for718. Again, conscious of their 
tentative post-war position in the colony and need to appeal for Chinese ‘hearts and 
minds’, the British accepted that ‘it would appear unfair generally to introduce two 
different rates, i.e. British European rates for Pay and Allowances, and Chinese rates 
for “War Gratuities”. Another issue was the fact that the ‘Asiatic other ranks’ of the
717 TNA, CO 825/41/7, Item 76, 'Note By the Hong Kong Finance Liaison Officer'.
718 TNA, CO 825/41/7, Item 12, From Acting Commanding Officer, HKRNVR to C.C.A.O., 18 March 
1946.
military Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, were being paid British European 
Service rates, having not been mobilised till December 1941, much later than the 
naval force. Though these factors advocated that the gratuity received by the 
HKRNVR’s Chinese ratings should be brought in line with Europeans’, such 
considerations presented a potential can of worms to the Admiralty. If such a motion 
was passed, it would have wider ramifications, not just on Hong Kong, but on the fleet 
and its finances as a whole, for there were a significant number Chinese personnel 
serving aboard regular Royal Navy vessels, namely through the LEP, ‘who were 
doing much the same sort of work as HKRNVR ratings, [and] will have cause for 
complaint’719. What this indicates is that the Chinese serving in the Royal Navy itself, 
among largely British crews, were more accepting of their subordinate position and 
the disparity in pay that brought with it. It was only the prospect that another Chinese 
rating might receive more than them that threatened to destabilise that delicate 
balance. The Hong Kong-based Chinese in contrast, on account of their first-hand 
experience of the Japanese and Britain’s defeat, had been awakened to such imperial 
inequalities and were no longer willing to conform to them. Such were the complex 
problems Britain faced in trying to reassert and maintain her power after the war. The 
old paradigms had shifted; ethnic groups could no longer be conveniently categorised 
and treated with blanket uniformity.
The financial complaints extended further. Personnel from outside Hong Kong, 
who were entitled to repatriation but had elected to remain in the colony, were 
afforded a cash grant in lieu of the usual Overseas Benefit Leave. This had wrongly
719 Idem.
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been extended to certain European HKRNVR personnel, despite the fact they 
‘belonged to Hong Kong’, causing further grievance for the Chinese ratings:
This mistake had led to discrimination, which in effect was racial 
discrimination and in consequence there was amongst the Hong Kong 
Volunteers demobilised in the colony a feeling of considerable 
discontent720.
To offset this, the Colonial Office was asked to sanction an ex gratia cash grant in lieu 
of the cash equivalent of overseas benefit leave to all Hong Kong Volunteers 
domiciled and demobilized in the colony.
There were also issues over back pay. Following Hong Kong’s defeat, all 
services personnel in the colony were given until June 1943 to report to Waichow, 
roughly seventy miles from Hong Kong, where they would be given six months back 
pay. Those who had did not report at Waichow were to receive only one month’s back 
pay. Yet, ‘representatives of the HKRNVR... had no knowledge relative to anyone 
having to report at Waichow during the Japanese occupation’. In addition, a 
‘HKRNVR representative questioned some of his ratings now in Hong Kong and they 
state that they never heard of such an order’. In recognition of the unofficial 
contribution volunteers continued to make to the Allied cause even after the colony’s 
fall, but more significantly wanting to again avoid any further charges of racial 
prejudice with future security considerations in mind, back pay was subsequently 
granted to all personnel released or who escaped before 1 August 1945:
720 TNA, CO 825/41/7, Item 23, 'Record of the First Meeting of the Hong Kong Forces, W ar Service 
Committee held on 12th December, 1945’.
293
We feel that in the interests of future volunteering, it would be very 
unwise to take unequal treatment in our forces such as recommended by 
the committee. It must be remembered that many volunteers who did 
remain in Hongkong suffered hardships and were beaten up and 
imprisoned by the Japanese simply because they were Volunteers, and 
in many cases because they were suspected of intriguing on behalf of 
the Allied Cause by sending money and food into the POW camps, etc., 
and by assisting in 'escapes'.721
Reconstitution
The defeat of Japan did not in itself ease Britain’s defensive burden, if 
anything it reinstated its pre-war imperial commitments, and colonial volunteers were 
still seen as a necessary solution to overstretch. One of the big debates over the 
next three years was whether to establish a permanent, full-time local naval force, 
along the lines of the Malayan Naval Force, or resurrect a part-time volunteer unit 
along similar lines to the old HKRNVR. The Admiralty favoured the former, but faced 
an opponent in the form of the Governor, who believed that the money spent on 
such a force might ‘be better applied to the expansion of the Water Police’722. Again, 
the tug of war between Admiralty and local interests with regards to control over 
such a unit arises here, and a big concern continues to be manpower. Despite
721 TNA, CO 825/41/7, Item 20, 'Back Pay of locally enlisted Volunteers (other ranks and ratings)',
From Representatives, HKRNVR and HKVDC to The Chairman, Hongkong Forces W ar Service 
Committee, 15 December 1946.
722 TNA, CO 537/4163, ‘Extract from the Governor of Hong Kong’s Secret despatch of the 21st
October, 1946’.
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overtures being made to the Chinese community through official colonial channels, 
unofficially it was still believed they could not be relied upon, demonstrated by the 
desertions witnessed during the Battle of Hong Kong. A significant change was the 
nature of the likely enemy Hong Kong could now face, namely from China. Local 
recruitment of officers for the Force was seen to ‘present considerable difficulty’, in 
the fact that ‘the non-commissioned ranks... would of necessity be mainly or wholly 
of Chinese race, and this factor would vitiate the potential value of the Force as a 
whole in any emergency which can be visualised as likely to arise in the future’723.
The ‘most probable form of emergency’ conceived by the local Government at 
this time, was not so much direct attack from a foreign power, but ‘civil disturbance 
involving a general strike and the cessation of essential services, possibly combined 
with or in sympathy with an external threat from a warlord operating in South 
China’724. In such a scenario, it was expected that ‘no assistance of any sort will be 
forthcoming from the Chinese population, and the Colony may have to be 
maintained by the efforts of the non-Chinese population alone’. In the words of 
Governor Grantham:
The final, and in my view, decisive point against the formation of a local 
naval force is the questions of crews. The maintenance of such a force 
would entail the enlistment of a large number of Asiatics as ratings. It has 
already been explained that the most probable emergency in which 
Government forces would be employed is that of civil disturbances 
involving the disaffection of almost the entire Chinese populace. In these
724 TNA, CO 537/4163, Secretariat File No: 6/1397/46TS, Appendix V. Annex I, Government House, 
Hong Kong, 6 August 1947, p.5.
295
circumstances the ships of a local naval force would in all probability 
cease to be effective units and would become a liability rather than an 
asset.725
Again, despite the public fagade of conciliation, key figures in the British 
administration still did not trust the Chinese come the crunch. A significant factor 
here was the huge post-war influx of immigrants from mainland China, with Hong 
Kong's population rising from around 600,000 in 1945 to over 2 million in 1950, and 
then 2.5 million in 1955 726 , increasing potential anti-colonial subversives. 
Consequently, any such scheme would ‘likely detract from the [European] man­
power available for the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps and the manning of 
essential services’, which a naval force would be less equipped to deal with. It was 
‘for these reasons it has been felt that the establishment of a local naval force in 
Hong Kong would be wasteful and without justification’727.
The Overseas Defence Committee concurred with Governor Grantham that 
the establishment of a permanent naval force in Hong Kong was unfeasible. 
However, it did conclude that as an alternative, the formation of a new volunteer 
force ‘would be justified on account of its value in time of war’, despite the fact that it 
‘would have little value in case of civil disturbances’728. At the same time, it was 
decided to re-establish the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. Several issues 
were raised, however, which were seen as prohibitive to the reconstitution of the two 
individual forces along the same pre-war lines. Again, it was stressed that ‘there is
725 Ibid., p.6.
726 Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 167.
727 TNA, CO 537/4163, Secretariat File No: 6/1397/46TS, Appendix V. Annex I, Government House, 
Hong Kong, 6 August 1947, p.6.
728 TNA, CO 537/4163, ‘From the Secretary of State for the Colonies To the Officer Administering the 
Government of Hong Kong’, 2 January 1948.
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no doubt that the greatest single problem facing the civil administration is the 
shortage of reliable manpower’729. There was a fear within Government circles back 
in Britain that 'China, assisted by her large expatriate communities in south-east Asia, 
could become an even greater menace to Britain's interests than Japan had 
been.'730 ‘It would not be possible’, it was thus considered, ‘in the event of war with 
China, to rely on the great majority of Chinese in the Colony’. Whereas before the 
war there had been doubts about Chinese allegiance to Hong Kong and the extend 
to which they could be trusted to stay and defend a place they did not consider their 
first home, despite actions to this effect by some during the Japanese invasion, such 
suspicions had now evolved into outright distrust:
The dangers that those responsible for the Colony’s defence consider 
most probable are internal unrest, and attacks by guerrilla forces from 
without, or a combination of the two. Briefly, in the circumstances 
envisaged it is not improbable that the vast majority of the Chinese who 
preponderate in the Colony would be, at best, of no assistance to the 
Government, and, at the worst, actually hostile.731
It was concluded that both the potential threat and ‘support obtained from the 
Chinese will depend, more than on any other single factor, on the military strength of 
the Colony’s defences’732. There was still a clear belief in the power of British military 
and naval prestige. With this in mind, it was even more essential that the local
729 TNA, CAB 21/2431, ‘Extract from report on Progress made in planning civil measures for defence’,
p.6.
Christopher Thorne, 'Wartime British Planning for the Post-War Far East', in Ian Nish (ed.), Anglo- 
Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the 
Second World War (Cambridge, 1982), pp.215-6.
731 TNA, CAB 21/2431, ‘The Hong Kong Defence Force’, p.2.
732 TNA, CAB 21/2431, ‘Extract from report on Progress made in planning civil measures for defence’,
p.6.
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defence forces be re-established. It was estimated that the number of reliable non- 
Chinese civilians in the Colony was only 6,000, including adult males and ‘such adult 
females as are in a position to assist. Yet, it was considered that ‘something like 
15,800 persons are required to man all civilian service, including the local forces and 
the Police’, and consequently, ‘every single reliable non-Chinese will be needed to 
play a part and not infrequently two parts’. It was thus unavoidable that ‘very
considerable reliance must be placed on Chinese’733, despite reservations. The
manpower issue was exacerbated by the fact that recruitment for the reconstituted 
forces would be virtually from scratch, as ‘many members of the [previous] forces 
had been killed or had died while prisoners-of-war, others had passed the age limit 
for service’, and in another example of Hong Kong’s transient nature, ‘some had 
retired from Hong Kong never to return’734.
The first-hand negative civilian experience of the Japanese invasion acted as 
a disincentive, prompting a ‘reluctance of the general public to come forward for 
voluntary service so soon after a war’. This was marked ‘by a certain cynicism, bred 
by the events of 1941-45, regarding the value of defence preparations’735; it was not 
merely the Chinese population who were affected by British prestige, or a seeming 
absence of it in this instance. British defeat to the Japanese, and a sense of
abandonment further fostered by the Governor’s response to Hong Kong’s
downgrading as a strategic port736, clearly resonated more broadly within the colony. 
Rather than galvanising the local population into taking responsibility for their own
733 Idem.
734 TNA, CAB 21/2431, T h e  Hong Kong Defence Force’, p.1.
735 Idem.
736 Class C - “A port at which it will be impossible or unnecessary to install or store defences in 
peacetime, but for which defence schemes should be prepared to meet Probable wartime uses" - 
TNA, CO 537/4163, Secretariat File No: 6/1397/46TS, Appendix V. Annex I, Government House,
Hong Kong, 6 August 1947, p.6.
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defence, as one might expect737, it had the adverse effect, increasing Hong Kong’s 
dependence on Britain.
There were not merely manpower issues to contend with either. How to fund 
two separate local defence forces was a difficult question to reconcile due to 
‘financial stringency brought about by many calls upon the Colony’s revenue in the 
years of reconstruction consequent upon the damage received during the war 
years’738. The realities of active service in 1941 had also ‘revealed a number of 
defects in the status of the Volunteer Forces and their organisation’739. In the case of 
the HKRNVR, they had to contend with the overriding demands of the Royal Navy, 
with their needs subordinated on account of the fact that they were funded by the 
Colonial and not Imperial Government, causing ‘endless complications and 
expense’740. It was realised that ‘those who are coming back to Hong Kong will soon 
be all here and unless we are able to maintain their interest they will drift out of touch 
or become involved with other Units’. Of particular worry was the Navy’s traditional 
rivalry with the HKVDC, ‘who have the advantage of a HQ building, will soon be 
recruiting and we may lose some promising material’. Yet, Commander Vernall, the 
HKRNVR Commanding Officer, also faced direct competition from the Royal Navy 
itself, who were drawing on colonial manpower to reinforce their regular ranks. Again, 
the determining factor was racial in nature, with Vernall stating ‘I am concerned
737 There is a precedent in the case of Australia, which made a concerted effort to form its own navy 
following the apparent British abandonment of them to the Japanese with the 1902 treaty.
738 TNA, CAB 21/2431, T h e  Hong Kong Defence Force’, p.1.
739 Idem.
740 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1695, ‘Future of the HKRNVR’, P.J. Vernall, Cmdr., HKRNVR, CO, 9 
November 1946, p.1.
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primarily with the European personnel since most of my best ratings have joined the 
Royal Navy or Police and are lost to me’741.
The solution, rather than reorganising the two distinct units as they had been 
before the war, the colony’s ‘limited man-power and financial resources’ dictated that 
‘the most efficient and economical solution is to combine the Naval and Military 
elements for all practicable purposes into one force -  to be called the Hong Kong 
Defence Force’742. This would provide ‘economies in overhead expenses for office 
accommodation, staff and recreational facilities’743. It was particularly stressed that 
the new force should not merely recruit and train a body of volunteers, but ‘provide 
full social and recreational services’, with such facilities being seen as integrally 
‘important to the spirit and efficiency of the Corps’744.
A Colony's conception of its obligation to the Volunteer must be enlarged 
to extend beyond mercenary rewards for services rendered... They must 
in addition be the Headquarters of the social, recreational and public 
spirited life of the youth of the Colony... providing a common meeting 
place where all ranks and those of different social groups can meet on 
equal terms... There was never any intention of using this as bait... I see 
in the provision of a reasonable Recreation and Welfare Wing in the new 
Headquarters an excellent opportunity of engendering and fostering that 
civic spirit which the Press is continually and rightly pointing out is one of
741 Idem.
742 TNA, CO 537/4163, Copy of a Signal (KK 28/4) dated 5th April 1948 from the Commodore-in- 
Charge, Hong Kong, to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, 'Future of the Hong Kong 
RNVR’, p.1.
743 TNA, CAB 21/2431, T h e  Hong Kong Defence Force’, p.2.
744 TNA, CO 537/4163, Copy of a Signal (KK 28/4) dated 5th April 1948 from the Commodore-in- 
Charge, Hong Kong, to the Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, 'Future of the Hong Kong 
RNVR’, p.1.
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the great needs in this colony... the Force as envisaged will provide that 
common ground for mutual service and understanding which is the only 
basis on which a community such as ours can hope to exist and prosper 
in the world as it is today.745
Thus, volunteerism continued to be depicted in terms of its wider benefit to 
society, and in this period, particularly its community-binding faculties in the face of 
internal divisions. An additional advantage it was hoped would be the traditional 
inter-service rivalry that Vernall feared, as ‘by combining within one unit the principle 
users of man-power, cut-throat competition is eliminated, and a planned use of the 
man-power available becomes possible’746.
Concerned about the possible ramifications this might have for the efficiency 
of the unit, the Admiralty stressed that ‘naval training must not repetition not however 
be swamped by military activities’747. In addition, to prevent the spread of any 
unwelcome precedents, unfavourable comparisons elsewhere in the Empire, and 
ensure inter-force operability, they insisted that despite this amalgamation, the 
‘Naval Wing should work on lines similar to any other local Colonial Naval force’. 
Implementing this at the local level, Commodore L.N. Brownfield, Royal Navy 
Commodore-in-Charge at Hong Kong, who feared a diminishment of his own 
authority, stated that he possessed ‘considerable experience of the workings of the 
Straits Settlements RNVR both before and during the war and consider that we 
cannot do better than organise on the lines which were in force there’748. The guiding
745 PROHK, HKRS 212-1/5-/7, 'Hong Kong Defence Force - Speech by Ride before Legislative 
Council on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948’, p. 12.
746 TNA, CAB 21/2431, T h e  Hong Kong Defence Force’, p.2.
747 Ibid., ‘Copy of a Signal (031658A/June) dated 3rd June, 1948 from the Admiralty to the 
Commodore-in-Charge Hong Kong’.
748 PROHK, HKRS 304-8-32, Commodore L.N. Brownfield to Colonel L.T. Ride, 24 January 1950.
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principle here was that ‘their organisation placed the RNVR firmly under the wing of 
the Royal Navy’. Here Hong Kong and Admiralty interests diverged again, and the 
force was involved in a three-way tug-of-war, between Brownfield, Colonel L.T. Ride, 
Commandant of the Hong Kong Defence Force, the man responsible for its 
conception, and Commander Morahan, Vernall's successor as Commanding Officer 
of the HKRNVR. As Brownfield put it to Ride:
The present organisation for running the HKRNVR is unsatisfactory. As I 
see it, there appear to be three people attempting to run it, you, Morahan, 
and myself. This is bound to lead to confusion and difficulty... I am in 
favour of the Hong Kong RNVR becoming an off-shoot of its parent 
service the Royal Navy... There is nothing personal in my suggestions. I 
mention this as there has undoubtedly been some clash or personalities 
on a lower level. It is my opinion that I hold the machinery efficiently to 
look after the RNVR and by so doing might relieve you of an 
embarrassing child... I am sure that both of us have the same aim which 
is to produce a happy and efficient Volunteer Force.749
Brownfield simultaneously petitioned the Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong on this 
matter:
It is felt that the war and peace organisation must be the same. In war 
the Hong Kong RNVR becomes an integral part of the Royal Navy and it 
is felt that, for them efficiently to play their part, they must be closely 
integrated with the Royal Navy in peace. The existing regulations state 
"...the Naval Force when serving in the Colony shall be under the orders
749 Idem.
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of the Commodore, Hong Kong..." This seems both logical and desirable, 
and, if accepted, the obvious outcome should be that the Commodore is 
responsible to the Governor for all matters concerning the Naval Force.
This is a responsibility I am most willing to assume.750
Morahan also favoured a closer association with the Royal Navy over the new 
Defence Force that it technically fell under, to the degree where Ride felt that the 
HKRNVR CO was publically 'making things difficult again' for him, and had to himself 
approach Governor Grantham to force Monahan to fall in line. At the annual Review 
Morahan had objected to the Defence Force Sergeant Major marching in front of his 
Colour Party, and thus conveying an impression that the naval unit was led by their 
traditional rivals the Volunteers Corps. This was only overcome by increasing the 
distance between Sergeant Major Jones and the HKRNVR so that they appeared 
separate751. When arrangements were made for the Queen's Birthday Parade, 
Morahan raised the issue again, arguing that 'as Parade Commander he does not 
require the presence of an Adjutant or R.S.M. [Regiment Sergeant Major]'. Ride 
responded that 'the composition of the Detachment representing the RHKDF is my 
responsibility, and that the R.S.M. (Mr Jones) is to parade and will parade in his 
proper place', causing Morahan to air his grievance in another letter to Colonel 
Vaughan:
750 PROHK, HKRS 304-8-32, L.N. Brownfield to The Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong. No. H.K. 33/4, 
23 January 1950.
751 Ibid., Commandant [Ride] to Sir Alexander Grantham, 18 April 1953,.
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The 'Combined Forces' nature of the detachment is adequately shown by 
the fact that the HKRNVR and the Regiment are marching in the rear of 
the RAF instead of their proper place in the rear of their parent service.752
Ride contended that Morahan was 'entirely incorrect' in his belief here, and that 'the 
HKRNVR is a part of the RHKDF and its proper place is with the Force and not with 
its parent service', adding that 'it is part of the same old plan of Morahan to dissociate 
the HKRNVR as much as possible from HK Forces'. Under pressure from the 
Governor, Morahan said 'he had been misrepresented', which Ride derided: 'If 
Commander Morahan does not mean what he writes in letter, he should not write 
them and waste his own and other people's time', adding that 'at RHKDF HQ we 
never have this type of trouble with either the Auxiliary Air Force or the H.K. 
Regiment, nor do we have this trouble with the HKRNVR when Commander Morahan 
is not in command'753. This sentiment was re-emphasised in a Working Party interim 
report for the reorganisation of the RHKDF:
The HQ of the Hong Kong Defence Force which has exercised 
administrative control over all three services within the Force, has proved 
its value to the Army and the Royal Air Force... The RNVR, on the other 
hand, report that the intervention of a HQ has prejudiced their efficiency; 
they consider that it has had a retrograde effect on the work both of the 
HQ and of the Naval Squadron.754
752 Idem.
753 Idem.
754 PROHK, HKRS 304-8-32, 'Recommendations By A Working Party Convened to Examine the
Reorganisation of the HK Defence Force' - Interim Report, 28 July 1950, p.3.
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The main reasons for the 'divergence of opinion' between the Services was attributed 
to three factors: (a) in time of war the RNVR would operate under the direct 
command of the Commodore in Charge Hong Kong, therefore, it was 'considered 
that administration, as well as command, should be vested in the Royal Navy, and 
not in an inter-Service Defence Force HQ', and in HMS Tamar an appropriate facility 
already existed; (b) both the Army and RAF had produced Regular Officers to 
facilitate co-operation, while the Admiralty had not yet filled this position; and (c) 
'personalities involved have not overcome their differences and have allowed them to 
interfere with Service efficiency'.755
Of course, point (a)'s assumption regarding Tamar overlooks the fact that 
during the Second World War, priority was given to the Royal Navy for resources, 
stifling HKRNVR operations 756. After discussion by the Working Party, which 
produced a 'complete divergence of views concerning the Naval Force, with strong 
arguments being put forward on both sides', it was decided that the only solution was 
to 'find that good old British answer, the suitable compromise': that the HKRNVR 
would remain part of the HK Defence Force in name, but would be run to 'a 
considerably larger extent by the Commodore in charge' with 'only certain reserve 
subjects...laid down and dealt with through the Commandant'. This would 'meet all 
the requirements of the RN without involving a lot of new legislature and public split' 
and would enable the force to continue sharing the 'Messes and canteens, sports 
gatherings and social evenings, shooting matches etc., which it is considered form an 
important part of volunteering in the Colony'757. Sport in particular was seen to play
756 TNA, CO 537/4163, Memorandum on points raised in letter HK 33/1 of 13th July, 1948 from 
Commodore-in-Charge to Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong.
757 Idem.
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an important role, both symbolically and practically, in reinforcing the RHKDF's 
authority and the HKRNVR's association with the organisation, it being deemed that 
'in this case the Defence Force shall have first call on all members of the HKRNVR to 
represent the Command in all competitions and sports', and not the Royal Navy758.
The Commodore-in-Charge believed it ‘essential’, bearing in mind the 
inferior status and treatment afforded the HKRNVR during the previous conflict 
and haemorrhaging of personnel to the senior service, that ‘although the force 
will form a part of the unified Defence Force, it should nevertheless be able to 
feel itself just as much a part of the Navy... there should be no suggestion in 
any quarter that the local naval force is a “poor relation’” 759. Despite the 
Commodore’s call, however, the new HKRNVR experienced ‘difficulties in the 
purchase of stores and supplies from the Royal Navy and in reconciliation of 
Naval Methods with those of local Government’760, partly on account of lacking 
a permanent Supply Officer due to the restrictions on manpower.
Racial Grouping
In his speech to the Legislative Council, Ride 'made the point that the new 
Force is designed to eliminate all racial discrimination without losing the advantages 
of racial grouping':
758 PROHK, HKRS 304-8-32, Letter from L.N. Brownfield, Commodore to H.E. The General Officer 
Commanding-in-chief, 8 August 1950.
759 TNA, CO 537/4163, Memorandum on points raised in letter HK 33/1 of 13th July, 1948 from 
Commodore-in-Charge to Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong.
760 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1695, ‘HK RNVR 1950-51’, W.G. Willcock, Lt.Cmdr. RN, CO, HKRNVR, 20 
June 1951, p.3.
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If we draft men into the Companies on the old racial basis we are quite 
liable to have one company only 30 or 40 strong, and another over 200 
strong, a state of affairs impossible in any modern army... The only claim 
to promotion in the new Force is to be competence... the future officers 
will be officers of the Force and not of any one group, and as such they 
will be competent to hold any post of their rank.761
This presented a ‘problem of officering’ that was ‘causing a certain amount of 
uneasiness’ amongst some of the men resistant to the prospect of ‘one racial group 
being commanded by an officer of another group’762.
Despite Ride’s public assertions regarding the meritocratic nature of the new 
Defence Force, it had been decided that ‘racial grouping -  though not racial 
discrimination -  will be maintained to a limited extent’763. Furthermore, the new 
policy applied primarily to the Hong Kong Regiment, and was not considered 
suitable for the naval force, where it was advocated that racial segregation should be 
preserved:
It is inevitable that in the narrow confines of a ship there must be some 
form of racial division unless the Asiatic is educated to European 
standards in certain respects. The galley and sanitary arrangements for a 
mixed European and Asiatic ship’s company may well render
761 PROHK, HKRS 212-1/5-/7, 'Hong Kong Defence Force - Speech by Ride before Legislative 
Council on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948', pp.4-6.
762 Idem.
763 TNA, CAB 21/2431, T h e  Hong Kong Defence Force’, p.3.
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impracticable the mixed manning of a ship. It is essential that recruits be 
drawn from the better educated type of Asiatic.764
This was not simply a case of racial prejudice, as a higher technological skill- 
level was required to operate a naval vessel as opposed to a field rifle in the 
Volunteers Corps. But in practice it acted as racial disbarment because of the 
generally lower standard of education afforded the Chinese community in the colony 
which meant those skills were harder for them the opportunity to acquire. Further 
racial division was advocated in the naval branch come mobilisation, in which case it 
was stated that 'all the personnel and dependents of European officers and men 
shall become the sole responsibility of the Royal Navy' with 'the welfare of the 
dependents of Asiatics to remain a Colonial responsibility'765. Nor was this a clear 
split along rank lines. Along with the British there were Australian, New Zealander, 
and South African officers who fell into the former category, with Indian and 
Ceylonese officers in the latter766. In the non-commissioned ranks were British and 
Portuguese ratings alongside Chinese. With such an arrangement for mobilisation, it 
is understandable why European members of the HKRNVR such as Morahan, felt 
that ultimately their allegiance rested with their parent service, and not the new 
Defence Force. On a practical level at least, it was commented by the HKRNVR CO 
that ‘there is much give and take between groups and races -  and there is keen 
interest in promotion in all branches'767. Yet despite such ‘enthusiasm engendered 
by the successful Camp and Sea Training period’, the HKRNVR’s ‘chief problem
764 Ibid., p.4.
765 PROHK, HKRS 304-8-32, Letter from L.N. Brownfield, Commodore to H.E. The General Officer 
Commanding-in-chief, 8 August 1950.
766 PROHK, HKRS 303-8-2, Analysis by Unit and Place of Birth of Persons Attested up to 20 
December 1949.
767 PROHK, HKRS 6-1-1695, ‘HK RNVR 1950-51’, W.G. Willcock, Lt.Cmdr. RN, CO, HKRNVR, 20 
June 1951, p.4.
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throughout [1950-1951] has been a lack of continuity in attendance. Particularly do 
those Volunteers who work in Banks find it difficult to get away from their work.’768
One way of alleviating the personnel problems, was to incorporate a group 
formerly excluded from service in the local naval force. Rather than widening racial 
participation, it was deemed more desirable to integrate woman from the European 
community into the support branches of the force, thus freeing up the limited male 
personnel for more front-line roles. Ironically, this was a microcosm of the 
Admiralty’s own strategy for relieving Royal Navy regulars for more strategically 
imperative theatres, and illustrates not only the successful hegemonic dissemination 
of British naval doctrine, but also the notion of social hierarchy that it institutionalised. 
These women were formed under the auspice of a local Women’s Royal Naval 
Service (WRENS) unit:
The Wrens are being trained in Secretariat, Meteorological, and Supply 
duties and a Plotting team is about to start. Their attendance is always 
very high...Occasionally the ladies go out for a day in the MFV and they 
attend all Ceremonial Parades. They also attended occasional 
lectures.769
Command of this unit was given to Mrs Pamela Mary Butler, a qualified first-class 
stenographer secretary and the wife of a naval officer, thus giving her 'a knowledge 
of Naval matters which is so essential in this post'770. In addition, a Cadet Force was
768 Ibid., p.3.
769 Idem.
770 PROHK, HKRS 303-8-2, To Hon. Colonial Secretary via Commandant, HKDF from B.J.B. Morahan, 
Commander, CO, HKRNVR, 31 March 1950.
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established to give basic military training, to 'bring together boys and girls of all 
nationalities', and to provide cadets with a healthy and useful interest.771
One concern raised by a number of prospective recruits, was if they joined 
the Defence Force, would they then be able to leave the colony and join the regular 
British forces, feeling ‘I don’t want to have to stay here training in Hong Kong during 
a war when I could be more usefully employed elsewhere’. This presented another 
conflict of interest between local and imperial interests, which recalled the drain of 
colonial manpower to the British regular forces that had occurred during the last war, 
and in particular the inability of the HKRNVR to recruit suitable replacements 
because the Royal Navy had already exhausted their prospective pools:
The specific answer to such a question is yes, he could, but not after an 
emergency was declared here; but the general answer is that this is 
Hong Kong’s army, recruited from Hong Kong’s citizens, to defend Hong 
Kong and paid for by Hong Kong’s citizens, and the Force was therefore 
not designed to cater for such people. Each citizen of service age must 
make up his own mind whether he feels it is his duty to serve the Empire 
in general or his colony in particular. This Force is for those who wish to 
serve in defence of this Colony in particular.772
This issue of allegiance reflected deeper local concerns regarding Britain's 
continued ability and commitment to defending Hong Kong and preserving it as a 
British colony, having already surrendered it once and with the wave of 
decolonisation sweeping across the Empire. Prospective volunteers found
771 PROHK, HKRS 305-8-45, Draft Regulations, Second Schedule, p.2.
772 PROHK, HKRS 212-1/5-7, 'Hong Kong Defence Force - Speech by Ride before Legislative Council 
on first reading of Defence Force Bill 1948', p.9.
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themselves asking the question, "What is the good of all this unless we know it is the 
policy of His Majesty's Government to hold Hong Kong?" This was addressed in the 
House of Commons by Mr. Mayhew, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 
response to Winston Churchill, and conveyed to the Hong Kong public:
It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain their position 
in Hong Kong. We entirely appreciate the importance of Hong Kong as 
described by the Honourable Gentleman. Indeed, we feel in this 
particularly troubled situation the value and the importance of Hong Kong 
as a centre of stability will be greater than ever"773.
Another question continuously asked of Ride and the Defence Force in the 
correspondence columns of the Hong Kong press was “against whom are we being 
asked to defend the Colony?”:
We shall defend the Colony against all comers; this Force is not 
designed to be directed against any one in particular not to resist any one 
possible aggressor... Any one will therefore search in vain, if he looks to 
the organisation of the Force for a clue as to the identity of Hong Kong’s 
most probable public enemy no. 1.774
Yet despite this public reticence, the prospective 'public enemy no.T was very 
clearly China, as it had influenced discussion regarding the organisation and 
composition of the Defence Force from the outset.
In the Cold War context, however, it was not solely Communist infiltration 
from China that was feared. Again, the colony’s transient, cosmopolitan nature
fuelled security concerns, with the Navy speculating that ‘as the force will be 
international it must be considered highly probable that the Soviets will be able to 
introduce an agent among the ratings’. Consequently, it was ‘proposed that 
instruction in A/S [anti-submarine] should be confined to officers’775, who by their 
nature were 'European':
Not only have the Communists overrun CHINA, but increasing Russian 
assistance is a menace to the safety of Hong Kong. The Chinese 
Peoples Government possess in Communism means be which they 
could ferment Internal Security problems within the Colony to an extent 
not possessed by previous Governments of CHINA.776
Compulsory Service
In September 1949, the Commandant in a letter to the Colonial Secretariat 
commented that 'it is the excellent local [Chinese] response that provides another 
excuse for Europeans holding back, they fear that a Force with a large percentage of 
local volunteers will be unsafe to be in'777. Such fears were exacerbated by the move 
away from racial grouping, adopted more on political grounds. It was not simply a 
case of getting volunteers; they had to be 'reliable' volunteers. With insufficient 
numbers of European volunteering, it was decided in September 1951 to reintroduce
775 TNA, CO 537/4163, From Commander in Chief Far East Station to Admiralty, 18 December 1948.
776 PROHK, HKRS 304-8-32, 'Recommendations By A Working Party Convened to Examine the 
Reorganisation of the HK Defence Force' - Interim Report, 28 July 1950, p.2.
777 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, Memorandum No. 6 Manpower (Paper No. 2) Additional Reductions In 
Strength, 1959, pp.3-4.
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compulsory service in the colony as a potential solution to this problem.778 The racial 
proportion of Europeans to Non-Europeans in the RHKDF was fixed at 1:1, despite 
over 97 per cent of the general population being Chinese779, a ratio that became 
increasingly disproportionate as Chinese immigration rose. This was racial grouping 
of a sort. To compensate for this disparity, included in the European/Non-Chinese 
allocation were Indians, Pakistanis, Malays, Singhalese, as well as British, Old 
Dominion, Eurasians and Portuguese.780 In fact, by factoring these groups into the 
'European' category, the ratio is closer to 3:2 against the Chinese, as demonstrated 
in the following table:
Table 6. RHKDF Membership by 'Races' (including HKRNVR), 31 December 
1956
Force UK/Old Others/Non- Total Non- Chinese Total
Dominion Chinese Chinese Strength
RHKDF 347 496 843 603 1,446
HKRNVR 85 13 98 96 194
Source: PROHK, HKRS 369-11-9, Manpower Statement of the Auxiliary Defence Services - Hong 
Kong: Male Membership by Races as at 31st December, 1956.
The flexibility of identity and in particular a desire to shed markers of 
'otherness', perhaps to offset prejudices regarding allegiance, was demonstrated in 
many of the registration forms, where inaccurate or ambiguous data was entered 
under "race". A number of persons who declared themselves to be of British race 
were 'patently of some other racial origin, while others, including many of British race,
778 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, T h e  Royal Hong Kong Defence Force' by Lt.-Col. C.P. Vaughan, p.4.
779 Fan, The Population of Hong Kong, pp. 18.
780 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-10, Report of a Working Part on the Reorganisation of the RHKDF, 1959.
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merely described themselves as "European", "white", o r " human'".781 The 1:1 ratio 
was fixed for the overall force, however, and within it the European manpower was 
'very unequally distributed', and 'the proportion of British and Portuguese in the Hong 
Kong Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and the Auxiliary Air Force is very much higher 
than that in the Hong Kong Regiment'.782
One factor behind this was that the HKRNVR was unique amongst the 
RHKDF's constituent elements in that it remained an all-volunteer unit while the 
others all incorporated compulsory servicemen. This was partly attributed to the 
unique appeal naval service had to those who possessed the 'call of the sea':
Certain units by their intrinsic nature are likely to attract more volunteers 
than others, namely the HKRNVR and HKAAF who will always attract 
personnel who are by nature interested in the sea or air.783
Yet, this positive slant was also balanced by Admiralty 'objections of principle 
to entering in the RNVR persons who are not genuine volunteers in the sense that 
they have not undertaken the normal peacetime obligations'784. It was agreed in 
principle that 'there must be good leadership and promotion prospects in any 
organisation for it to be successful', and that 'racial integration is a fact for ratings'. It 
was, however, considered 'impracticable... for officers due to security considerations'. 
785 A major factor was that, unlike the Hong Kong Regiment, which remained an 
entirely local force, the HKRNVR 'was liable to serve in any part of the world in the
781 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-8, From Dept, of Statistics to Colonial Sec., 10 February 1951.
782 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, From Colonial Secretariat to Deputy Commandant, RHKDF, 18 
September 1953.
783 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, Memorandum No. 6 Manpower (Paper No. 2) Additional Reductions In 
Strength, 1959, pp.3-4.
784 TNA, CO 537/6432, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, To Commodore Superintendent, Hong 
Kong, M. 02009/49, 8 March 1949.
785 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-10, Questionnaire on the Effects of Voluntary Service, 3 January 1961.
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event of hostilities'786, with its men incorporated into the Royal Navy, thus the risk of 
incorporating subversive Chinese would become a far greater security threat to 
imperial defence than merely colonial defence, again demonstrating the Admiralty's 
relative priorities. Yet this restriction on the naval officer class conflicted with Colonel 
Ride's assertion that 'racial or social status can not be the grounds on which any 
differentiation in rank, pay or treatment is based'787. It also created operational 
difficulties, as not all the Chinese ratings spoke sufficient English. With no Chinese 
allowed in command positions, 'the language difficulty for English-speaking personnel 
in controlling Chinese ratings sometimes led to the European doing too much of the 
actual work instead of directing others to do the job.'788
The HKRNVR was able to take advantage of the relative unpopularity of the 
Regiment in attracting a greater portion of Europeans. This was due to the fact that if 
a European was called up to the Regiment, they could avoid service with that unit if 
they instead agreed to 'volunteer' for the HKRNVR. In one intake, of 34 UK-born men 
conscripted to the RHKDF, 'only 15 were enrolled in the Regiment; 19 objected to 
service and of that 19... six volunteered for the Hong Kong RNVR only to avoid 
conscription into the Hong Kong Regiment'.789 It was deemed 'wishful thinking that 
should... the Hong Kong Regiment be put on the same basis as the HKRVNR, that 
they will receive that number of volunteers to enable that Unit to function'. For some 
'volunteers', it was not so much the maritime appeal of the HKRNVR that pulled them
786 Ibid., Ratio of Chinese to Non-Chinese Manpower, 1961.
787 Ibid., Extracts from a memo, by Brigadier L.T. Ride, 4 February 1948.
788 PROHK, HKRS 41-2-343, Commodore A.R.L. Butler, RN, Report of Inspection HMS Cardingham 
and Etchingham, 14 July 1961.
789 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-15, 'Compulsory Service Ordinance, 1951' Further to discussion, 14 April 
1958, pp.1-3.
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to the force, as an 'abhorrence of the physical effort involved' in military service which 
pushed them away from the Regiment.790
The technicality that such men were classed as 'volunteers' meant that if they 
failed to comply with training instruction they would be discharged as being 
'unsuitable or inefficient', whereas in the Regiment they would be liable to 
prosecution, further encouraged 'those who would dodge the rigours of the HKR, 
applying for service in the HKRNVR even though such service does not appeal to 
them, for which they have no interest and in all probability would become seasick.'791 
It was, however, stressed that Hong Kong's nature as a naval base meant that the 
HKRNVR 'would always have a place in defence plans', and its maritime connection 
meant that 'there should be enough volunteers to fill 50% to 60% of the present small 
establishment even if there were no question of having to join another service if they 
did not volunteer for the RNVR'.792 Yet, within a decade of this being written in 1957, 
the naval reserve would be disbanded.
The Chinese community were also treated differently in regards to compulsory 
service:
Because of the large numbers of British Chinese, their diverse quality 
and the desirability in some units of having a suitable balance between 
Chinese and Non-Chinese, it has been possible to be selective in 
compulsion of Chinese... it has always been the policy not to preserve
790 Ibid.
791 Ibid.
792 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-8, Memo, from V.F. Clarke, Assistant Director of Manpower to the Hon. 
Colonial Sec., 19 March 1957.
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unduly with those who in one way or another fail to measure up, as it has 
always been possible to replace them.
This ran counter to both the post-war development discourse preached by colonial 
administrators, and the treatment of Europeans who would be prosecuted, while a 
Chinese 'who is quite capable of fulfilling his part is not only never prosecuted but is 
discarded and thus usually relieved of all responsibilities'. It was stated that it was 
'not in the interests of Government or of the successful administration of compulsory 
service' for this to become public knowledge.793
Even though there were about 15,000 Chinese registered as British Subjects, 
several times more than the number utilised by the RHKDF, this was disproportionate 
to the number of Hong Kong-born Chinese males in the colony over 17 years of age, 
estimated between 300,000 and 600,000:
In other words only 2.5% to 5% of the Chinese British subjects in the 
Colony have registered as such... there are some who although Hong 
Kong born do not consider themselves as British Subjects, some who 
prefer not to register in case it should be held against them, some to 
avoid being conscripted and some who are illiterate.794
This reinforced the perception that the Chinese had questionable loyalty and 
allegiance should there be a case of internal unrest or external attack. Though like 
military service more generally, compulsory service had particularly negative 
associations rooted within Chinese culture that inhibited more from registering as
793 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-8, From Col. Secretariat to Deputy Commandant, RHKDF, 20 December 
1958.
794 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-9, From Assistant Director of Manpower, V.F. Clarke, to Hon. Colonial 
Secretary, 8 February 1957.
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British subjects, and which colonial authorities struggled to overcome as they sought 
to convey more positive meaning through their propaganda:
The most appropriate Chinese words by which to render the difficult 
English expression "National Service" are shau pei tuk, mo. The literal 
translation of these four words is "Defence Service" or "Defensive 
Service". I discussed this with the Hon. S.C.A. [Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs] and the three Chinese Members this morning and have also 
discussed it with the Political Adviser. Every other possible alternative 
appears to be rules out by reason of undesirable word-association. It is 
important that the word "conscription" be avoided. Conscription as 
practiced in England, i.e., compulsory registration with exemption on 
grounds of conscientious objection etc., is a totally different thing from 
conscription in China which is a press gang affair couple with the worst 
form of official corruption. Nevertheless, both are accurately described as 
"conscription". The Chinese words to avoid are CHING and KEUNG PIK 
as both of these have undesirable connotations... We must also find 
suitable translations for other defence terms. No satisfactory equivalent 
appears to exist for "Civil Defence", "Passive Air Defence", and so on.795
Yet at the same time, outspoken British citizens of Hong Kong also took a 
negative stand against compulsory service, viewing it as antithetical to 'we British 
who are so often lauding the benefits of Democracy with its freedom of speech and 
guarding of person rights'. Such discourse helped define British Hong Kong against
795 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-8, From Deputy Colonial Secretary to Public Relations Officer, 9 January 
1951.
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'the gentlemen across the border'796, and it was added that 'if we are going to preach 
democracy, let us practice it'797. The authorities realised that compulsory service 
would not be maintainable in the face of increasing public hostility once Britain 
abandoned it, and it ceased in the colony in March 1961.
Riot and Unrest
Many of the reservations about integrating more Chinese into the RHKDF 
stemmed from fears regarding their loyalty in the face of fellow Chinese, either in the 
form of soldiers attacking from the mainland, or internal agitators and dissidents. 
Back in 1948 it had been suggested that 'Hong Kong is the sort of place where a 
volunteer is almost certain to be intimidated or got at in some way if there is a civil 
disturbance'798. Such a disturbance occurred on 10 October 1956, the anniversary of 
the 1911 October Revolution which brought down the Qing Dynasty, pro-Nationalists 
clashed with Communist supporters, leading to large-scale rioting lasting two days. 
Communist and anti-colonial groups presented 'a constant challenge to British rule 
and were quick to take advantage of any exploitative situations to undermine the 
credibility and image of British rule'799. Though the riot was not primarily a protest 
against British colonialism it did threaten its stability, and 'whenever expatriate
796 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, South China Morning Post, 26 August 1954.
797 Ibid., 2 September 1954.
798 PROHK, HKRS 305-8-45, Lt. Commander George Reynolds to Office of the Commodore, 25 June 
1948.
799 Connie Lee Hong-nee, 'Society and policing in Hong Kong: a study of the 1956 riot', Ph.D. thesis 
(University of Hong Kong, 1995), pp.100-1.
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officers were deployed to the scene, there were reports that they became the target 
of attack.'800
The RHKDF was not deployed to assist the Police and the British Army in 
restoring law and order, attracting further public criticism and questioning why Hong 
Kong's citizens were wasting their time and taxes on a force that was not called out in 
a civil emergency801. Commandant Ride replied that 'the role which the Force has to 
play in a time of trouble is no longer to assist in maintaining internal security', and 
that it was 'primarily trained for an operational role in warfare, not for internal security 
duties'. He went on to argue that to call out the RHKDF would have been counter­
productive, as 'the dislocation of the economic life of the Colony resulting from the 
disturbances and the curfew would have been considerably increased if members of 
the Force living on the Island had been withdrawn from their normal employment'802. 
Yet, four years earlier, a report by the Deputy Commandant stated that:
The object of the RHKDF may be taken as to raise, maintain, and train a 
local armed force in the Colony of Hong Kong to provide assistance to 
the Police Force in the event of internal security disorders, and to 
supplement the Regular Forces of the Crown in the event of War.803
This was reinforced in communication between Hong Kong cabinet members, 
highlighting the RHKDF's 'primary role, to assist the Regular Forces in maintenance 
of internal security', while fighting alongside regular military and naval forces in
800 Ibid., p.101.
801 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, various cuttings from the South China Morning Post, October 1956.
802 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, From E.B. Ride to Brigadier L.T. Ride, 31 October 1956.
803 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, 'The Royal Hong Kong Defence Force' by Lt.-Col. C.P. Vaughan, p.5.
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defence of the colony was only deemed its 'secondary role1.804 Furthermore, it was 
stated that the RHKDF would reach 'a satisfactory stage of training' to take on 
Internal Security duties from May 1952, should the need arise. It was, however, 
expressed that:
Opinion amongst responsible officers of the Force is divided on the 
question of how the Chinese component would stand up to I.S. duties.
Col. Bailey... is apprehensive. He assures me that the I.S. role is 
generally very unpopular in the rank and file of the Force and he is most 
anxious that we should not stress this role more than we have to.805
Following the riot, Commandant Ride privately 'hinted that the real reason the 
Regiment was not mobilized was that because it is predominantly Chinese, it could 
not be trusted', immediately adding 'obviously you can't mention this latter point'806. 
Ironically, a member of the public advocating the RHKDF's use as an 'Internal 
Security Force', argued that the fact that it contained 'many members who could 
speak fluent Chinese... would give them an enormous advantage over Regular Army 
units when dealing with unruly mobs.'807 Therefore, fears within the establishment 
about Chinese reliability did not necessarily permeate into broader society.
Two years later, the Navy experienced unrest within its own ranks. On 4 
September 1958, four ratings were tried for slackness in obeying orders. They were 
acquitted through lack of clear and sufficient evidence, but during the case, a 
Chinese senior Engineroom Artificer from the same ship wilfully disobeyed an order
804 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, Note on Internal Security Role of RHKDF, To Hon. Colonial Secretary 
from Defence Secretary Claude Burgess, 5 April 1952, pp. 1-2.
805 Idem.
806 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, From L.T. Ride to the Hon. E. B. David, Colonial Secretariat, Hong 
Kong, 30 October 1956.
807 PROHK, HKRS 367-10-14, South China Morning Post, 22 October 1956.
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to remain on board to go ashore to HMS Tamar, where he was subsequently placed 
under close arrest. This prompted an orderly demonstration by ratings in HMS Tamar 
who remained behind after work for three and a half hours. After they had been 
addressed about half went home, though another thirty made a further scene outside 
the main gate in front of left-wing reporters. On 10 September another rating refused 
to obey an order to join one of HM Ships of the local flotilla. He was charged with 
wilful disobedience and dismissed from the service. Those chiefly affected being 
engineroom ratings, a number of seamen and some communications ratings, and the 
'immediate symptoms of the malaise' were a general 'reluctance to man the local 
flotilla'. The bigger issue was believed to be 'recent Chinese measures against 
fishermen and the intensive patrolling which the Navy had to put on to counter them. 
This meant more seatime which was one of the pretexts that the men advanced'. 
Behind this though, there was evidence to suggest that the political situation had 
resulted in 'intimidation and pressure on families':
I fear that the true explanation is more likely to be a reluctance to 
become too closely involved in action so clearly opposed to the Chinese 
Government's policy, aided and abetted by intimidation by left-wing union 
leaders. Many of the ratings are members of the left-wing Government 
Armed Forces and Hospital Workers Union. It Is difficult to assess at this 
stage the seriousness of the trouble, or the extent to which it is being co­
ordinated with the renewal of left-wing agitation in the Dockyard. It is
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however clear that left-wing activity is involved, and it is also clear that 
the security of the local flotilla is distinctly threatened.808
It was therefore arranged to temporarily increase U.K. personnel in each 
minesweeper from 5 to 7, thus raising their complements from 17 to 19. The Colonial 
Officer stated that this was 'a disturbing state of affairs', and suggested that the 
Admiralty make plans for the replacement of the locally-enlisted personnel in the 
inshore minesweepers by British ratings, which it did809, under concern for the 
possible effects on British prestige vis-a-vis China:
These ships are British naval vessels, and as they are out-numbered by 
Chinese Communist vessels in the vicinity of Hong Kong it is vitally 
important that they operate at full efficiency. We would look silly if one of 
them was seized by a dissident crew and taken over to Communist China.
We would also look silly if at a time of great stress it was found that they 
would not go to sea. The situation in Hong Kong, particularly the naval 
situation, at present looks to me to be rather dicey.810
A year later it was acknowledged that 'a sense of insecurity about their future' had 
made Chinese naval personnel 'a target for union agitation', and though 'triad 
penetration of Hong Kong Other Ranks has been substantially reduced by judicious 
weeding out', it was admitted that 'further attempts at infiltration are expected'811. Yet, 
the HKRNVR itself was seen to offer an outlet for combating the influence of such
808 TNA, CAB 21/2431, Items 21-22, From the Governor, Hong Kong, To the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 11 September 1958, pp. 1-2.
809 TNA, CAB 21/2431, Item 10, From the Secretary of State for the Colonies, To the Officer 
Administering the Government of Hong Kong, 14 October 1958.
810 TNA, CAB 21/2431, Item 5, Minute by A. Campbell, Colonial Office, 24 September 1958.
811 TNA, CAB 21/2431, Item 9, Extract from L.I.C. Monthly Intelligence Report, Hong Kong, October 
1959.
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undesirable elements within both the force, and society more broadly, with the 
Governor evoking earlier arguments made by both Elliot and Ride:
In Hong Kong there are, it is true, many undesirable influences which can 
induce young people to go wrong, but there are also very many 
opportunities for young men and women to join organisations, such as 
yours, which will not only give them useful training but will also offer them 
outlets for their surplus energies and their high spirits, and in a way 
moreover that is of real service to the community... your work and 
training in the RNR or WRNR [Women's Royal Naval Reserve] as the 
case may be is a form of public service of great use and value to the 
Colony... Hong Kong as a community depends greatly upon the sea and 
upon sea communications... Your ships form a valuable addition to what 
is otherwise available for the protection of Hong Kong's interests.812
Disbandment
On 1st January, 1959 the title of the HKRNVR was changed to that of the Hong 
Kong Royal Naval Reserve (HKRNR), as the Admiralty incorporated all its remaining 
RNVR forces across the Empire into the RNR.813 In the short term, this did not 
present much real change for the unit operationally; it still remained a part of the 
RHKDF; but by bringing the HKRNR closer in-line with the Royal Navy and its own
812 PROHK, HKRS 545-1-201-1, Hong Kong Government Information Services: Daily Info. Bulletin, 
Wednesday 18 November 1964, p.3.
813 PROHK, HKRS 369-11-2, Progress Report by Defence Secretary (1 January - 31 March 1959), p.4.
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RNR unit based in HMS Tamar, the HKRNR lost its local distinctiveness which would 
ultimately lead to its demise.
Image 20. HMS Cardinham [Source: http://www.oldships.org.uk]
Since 21 June 1959, the sole vessels operated by the HKRNR were two 
'Ham'-class minesweepers, Her Majesty's Ships Cardinham (often incorrectly spelt 
Cardingham) and Etchingham, which had been supplied by the Admiralty on free 
loan, though the Hong Kong Government paid for all the maintenance and running 
costs of the two vessels.814 Despite only having been launched in 1952 and 1957 
respectively, both vessels were not built to handle the tropical conditions of East Asia 
which accelerated the corrosion of their aluminium-lined hulls, increasing the 
expense for the Hong Kong Government815. In late 1966 the issue came to a head 
with Cardinham requiring a major refit in order to continue in service. This came at a
814 PROHK, HKRS 70-3-323, Tw o Inshore Minesweepers for HKRNR: Commissioning Service on 
Sunday, 18 June 1959.
815 PROHK, HKRS 70-3-323, Memo, for Executive Council: HKRNR, 29 November 1966.
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time when debate was taking place regarding Hong Kong's defence contribution to 
Britain, and how it should represent 'something that is meaningful and of value under 
present conditions, not merely something which was meaningful at some point in the 
past'.816 The HKRNR was singled out in this regard, for 'while it was considered 
important for the Colony to have some defence against mines when the vessels were 
acquired, this is not regarded as essential today', partly on account of the fact that 
the Royal Navy also operated its own minesweeping flotilla at Hong Kong. It was also 
noted that on only two occasions since the end of the Second World War had the 
colony valued a naval presence, and both times the HKRNR had been superfluous:
On the first, when Chinese gunboats were skirmishing with Hong Kong 
fishing vessels in the Pearl River Estuary [in 1952], we depended on a 
Royal Navy frigate to show the flag and when the seaborne influx of 
illegal immigrants developed in 1962 the minesweepers with their 
wooden frames and thin aluminium "skin" were found to be unsuitable for 
the job of putting boarding parties on to suspected "snakeboats".817
This operational ineffectiveness was compounded by their lack of use for internal 
security, notably demonstrated during the 1956 riots.
The HKRNR, at $1.2 million a year, was already the most expensive part-time 
service in the colony in terms of cost per man, a warship inevitably being a more 
expensive piece of equipment than the light armaments the Regiment possessed. 
When the deteriorating condition of the minesweepers was discovered, 
representations were made to the British Government regarding their replacement.
816 PROHK, HKRS 70-3-323, Hong Kong Star, 10 December 1966.
817 PROHK, HKRS 70-3-323, South China Morning Post, 9 December 1966.
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The Secretary of State for the colonies replied, however, that the possibility of the 
HKRNR being disbanded was not considered a strong enough reason for giving 
another 'gift or loan'818. The geopolitical map had shifted dramatically in the 
intervening years. Cyprus, British Somaliland, Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone, 
Tanganyika, British Cameroons (1961), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, 
Western Samoa (1962), Kenya, Zanzibar (1963), Zambia, Malawi, Malta, Gambia 
(1964), Botswana and Lesotho (1966) had all gained independence, and within a 
year Harold Wilson's Government would announce Britain's withdrawal 'East of Suez'. 
Large-scale decolonisation meant there was no longer a problem of imperial 
overstretch, thus removing the necessity of maintaining colonial naval reserves, and 
with Royal Navy vessels permanently on station in Hong Kong, the HKRNR was no 
longer considered worth subsidising from a metropole perspective.
During these negotiations, local investigations were made into finding a more 
relevant raison d'etre for the modern HKRNR, such as 'a more realistic role in internal 
security or the prevention of illegal immigration'. Marine Defence against these 
threats was, however, primarily the responsibility of the Marine Police, and apart from 
the minesweepers, the majority of Government craft suitable for such purpose had 
already been earmarked for use by the Marine Police or their auxiliaries819. Thus, the 
capital expenditure required to replace the HKRNR minesweepers could not be 
justified for an internal security role, 'since expenditure of about $3.5 million (the cost 
of two naval seaward defence vessels) would equally produce a pair of the new 
larger police sector launches'. It was regrettably concluded, therefore, that 'in the
818 PROHK, HKRS 70-3-323, Memo, for Executive Council: HKRNR, 29 November 1966.
819 Idem
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absence of support from the British Government towards their external role, the 
increasing expenditure on the HKRNR can no longer be justified.'820
On Sunday 12 March 1967, a service was held at St. John's Cathedral to 
commemorate the HKRNR's decommissioning. It was remarked by Reverend A. 
Howison that 'in bringing their Ensign to the Cathedral the Reserve were laying 
before God their contribution to the cause of freedom, order and justice between men 
and nations'821. Thus, even at its wake, the connection between the Navy and liberty, 
depicted so strongly during the Second World War in the British Empire's self- 
identification and its strategies for colonial unity and mobilisation, was reaffirmed.
Yet, in 'training too closely with the Royal Navy and emphasising its British 
rather than Hong Kong connections', most notably during Commander Morahan's 
tenure as CO, the HKRNR had made 'a tactical error'822. It failed to evolve with the 
changing social landscape of the colony and the dramatic rise in immigration from the 
mainland, while its prejudiced aversion to Chinese manpower along with its 
determination to remain a 'Volunteer' force meant it existed to a large extent 
detached and aloof from emerging Hongkonger identity, preferring to draw closer to 
its British associations than engage in the nation-building project of the Hong Kong 
Government. Whereas the Hong Kong 'regiment was not one of the British Army's so 
the Hong Kong Government continued its funding', the HKRNR was ultimately 
considered expendable by both the British and the colonial governments, as it merely 
supplemented the strategic role already provided by the permanent Royal Navy units 
stationed there. This made it a prime and easy target for budget cuts at a time when
821 PROHK, HKRS 70-3-323, South China Morning Post, 13 March 1967.
822 Commodore P.J. Melson, CBE, Royal Navy (ed.), White Ensign - Red Dragon: The History of the 
Royal Navy in Hong Kong 1841-1997, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong, 1997), p. 113.
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Hong Kong was already facing huge financial outlay on large civic projects such as 
highways, housing, industrialisation, tunnels and reservoirs demanded by its booming 
population.
It had been stressed from the outset of the force's reconstitution that 'the long 
term aim of any RNVR must be to attain such standard of proficiency in all aspects of 
Naval Life that they may take their place in the Royal Navy if required'823. Following 
the HKRNR's demise, its remaining members were incorporated into the Royal 
Navy's own RNR unit at Hong Kong, running a Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) 
unit.824 Arguably, the force achieved its goal too well, and made itself irrelevant in the 
process.
823 PROHK, HKRS 41-2-296, HKRNVR 1949-50 - Report by B.J.B. Morahan, CO, 21 July 1950.
824 Melson, White Ensign - Red Dragon, p.113.
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Conclusion
As with the other colonial naval forces examined, the HKRNVR was born out 
of and developed according to a mixture of local and metropole-driven influences, 
which themselves were shaped by a range of strategic, political, social, economic 
and cultural concerns. Though the Admiralty and Colonial Office back in the 
metropole 'encouraged' the colonies to play their part in imperial defence by forming 
naval volunteer forces, distance meant they struggled to overcome parochial 
interests and rivals for funding from the colonial budget, notably General Barret's 
Royal Hong Kong Regiment. This fostered prejudice, relating colonial inefficiency to 
maskee, and framing Chinese culture as undermining British moral values. Such 
negative preconceptions then influenced attitudes towards Chinese recruitment. The 
Admiralty were therefore dependent on men on the spot, such as Commodore Frank 
Elliot, to take their naval scheme forward by courting key civic and political figures, 
and drawing the public into 'active sympathy' with the Navy's aims through means of 
'naval theatre'. Though Elliot was acting on orders from the Admiralty, he was also 
motivated by family honour and legacy. Thus, a mix of motives - imperial, local and 
personal - intersected to influence the force's development, and not always in its best 
interests.
A key justification for the naval force framed it within the discourse of the
civilising mission and Empire development, emphasising the moral and social
improvement that paternalist Royal Navy instruction could bring to the colony's
Chinese population. Yet, there were limits to what it could achieve, and some more
negative traits were seen to be intrinsically tied to Chinese character, notably
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'transient' loyalty. Yet paradoxically, the British played an active role in fostering such 
fluid ties and allegiances, encouraging the economic migrancy required for Hong 
Kong to flourish as an entrepot. Thus disloyalty, untrustworthiness, or unreliability, 
were not so much innate Chinese racial attributes, as depicted by colonial authorities, 
but more elements of ethnic identity created by cultural and economic circumstances.
During the Japanese invasion, although some Chinese remained loyal until the 
end, the fact that a significant number deserted reaffirmed British preconceptions 
about Chinese character. Yet, a number of factors behind the Chinese reaction were 
to a degree created by the British authorities, such as an absence of information, 
constant work with no shore leave to check on families who had not been billeted, 
poor rations, misguided orders to fire on Chinese junks, as well as more explicit 
racism from certain officers on the ground. A distinction should also be made 
between those Chinese ratings who had genuinely volunteered to serve in the 
HKRNVR, and those who were enlisted only because their merchant vessels had 
been requisitioned into the force, and whose allegiance as well as their training and 
discipline were thus more questionable, highlighting the problem of forming 
conclusions on a primarily racial basis.
The British authorities also displayed a lack of sympathy with the cultural 
stigma attached to military service by Confucianism, and the impact this had on 
Chinese attitudes towards the forces. They sought to address this upon their return to 
Hong Kong, following their humiliating defeat by the Japanese. There was a 
realisation that in order to re-establish British colonial authority and imperial 'prestige', 
they needed to regain 'face' in the eyes of the Chinese population. They refrained 
from applying western definitions of such concepts uniformly, and expressed a
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greater appreciation of Chinese cultural nuances and the impact their actions and 
language could have on the community. A more egalitarian, collaborative relationship 
was fostered, though this masked imperial insecurities on their return, as it did 
elsewhere in the Empire. To achieve this, a stronger sense of 'Hongkonger' identity 
needed to be forged, to move away from parochial allegiances that had held the 
colony back in the past. Historical memory was utilised for this goal. A 'heroic myth' of 
Hong Kong's brave last stand emerged, emphasising a 'victor narrative' rather than 
one of British humiliation, and thus restoring prestige and face in the process. In 
addition, Admiral Chan Chak came to represent the new spirit of Anglo-Chinese 
cooperation and what could be achieved if they worked together.
Yet this discourse confronted more entrenched resistance within the ranks of 
the Defence Force, despite the conciliatory public rhetoric espoused by senior figures 
such as Brigadier Ride. Compulsory service was brought in, not so much because 
there were not enough potential volunteers for the defence force, but because the 
majority of such volunteers would be Chinese. Whereas previous doubts about the 
Chinese were focused around their perceived unreliability, flightiness, and lack of 
patriotism, such doubts grew into fears when the People's Republic of China 
emerged as the main threat to British colonial interests. Paradoxically, whereas 
before, the Hong Kong Chinese were cited as specifically lacking in a sense of 
patriotic duty because they had fled China following its invasion rather than staying 
and fighting the Japanese, the major argument for their continued sidelining within 
the Defence Force was that during a time of emergency, they could be a subversive 
element that would aid Communist insurgents. They had thus somehow acquired a 
sense of patriotism towards China in the intervening period. Such arguments were
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clearly flawed and contradictory, influenced by underlying racial prejudices built upon 
collective paranoia regarding the 'European' community's numerical inferiority and 
Britain's precarious post-war imperial position.
Such fears were exacerbated by civil unrest, and insubordination within the 
naval force. The response of the HKRNVR was to further tighten its British 
connection with the Royal Navy, rather than try to engage more with the burgeoning 
Hongkongers disassociated from the force. Service insularity and local detachment 
meant that the HKRNR, as it became, failed to find contemporary relevance and 
adapt to the rapidly changing political, economic and strategic climate in the late 
1950s and 1960s. Its identity became bound up in anachronistic sentimentality tied to 
past imperial glories, and not in keeping with the progressive spirit of the times. With 
neither a practical nor a political purpose, for either the Hong Kong Government or 
the metropole, the HKRNR ultimately became consumed by the very organisation 
that had given it birth.
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General Conclusion
'Imperial overstretch' is a contentious subject which has come under intense 
attack from a variety of historians adopting very different methodological and 
theoretical approaches. Economic historians have analysed the cost-benefit ratio of 
Empire to Britain to debate whether it was worth having despite increasing 
commitments, while cultural historians have argued that such calculations also fail to 
take into account the unquantifiable additional benefits derived from imperial power, 
such as status or 'prestige', which influenced international relations. Such challenges 
have spawned attempts to redefine the concept, such as 'strategic overextension'. 
Yet, the persistence of the original terminology emphasises the concept's fluid 
intangibility for both historians and political theorists. One problem is it has become 
divorced from its original context, being appropriated as a theoretical framework to 
apply to other imperial case studies for which it does not necessarily fit. For the 
British Empire, the issue was intrinsically bound up in imperial naval defence. The 
material strength of the Royal Navy and its ability to defend Britain's global interests 
was what preoccupied the rise of this discourse for contemporaries, most famously 
during Chamberlain's 'weary Titan' speech of 1902. If we reconsider 'imperial 
overstretch' within its naval context, as this thesis does in relation to the development 
of colonial naval recruitment, the concept maintains its integrity. The restrictions of 
the Washington Naval Treaty and the deteriorating geopolitical situation in the 
interwar years, particularly regarding Japan, meant that the Royal Navy simply no 
longer had the resources, both financially and in terms of personnel, to meet all of its 
global responsibilities. This was openly acknowledged by the Admiralty, who were
forced to put aside racially-prejudiced reservations regarding non-white colonial 
manpower, to appeal to Britain's dependencies to take on a local share of this 
burden.
As this thesis has shown, to achieve this desired outcome, collaboration was 
crucial. The Admiralty in the metropole could not create colonial naval forces on its 
own from afar. It needed 'men on the spot' to ascertain local conditions, forge 
alliances with key political and business figures, including the illegal variety in the 
form of Chinese secret societies, cajole obstructive elements - or their wives - court 
the press, and canvass the support of the general public from whom volunteers 
would ultimately have to be drawn. The success of its efforts in the Cayman Islands 
and Hong Kong, as discussed in case studies one and three, were heavily reliant on 
the dynamism of Commissioner Cardinall and Commodore Elliot, men who believed 
in both the service and the Empire, but were also concerned about their personal 
legacies. They recognised the need to bring the colonies into 'active sympathy' with 
the Navy, through a coordinated strategy of 'invented traditions', 'naval theatre' and 
public relations exercises, including in both instances the celebration of Trafalgar 
Day. In Trinidad, though the Admiralty had the support of local legislative members 
and oil industrialists, such groups were at odds with the demands of the working- 
class population that formed the basis of the emerging nationalist movement, and 
from whom they saw the force as protecting their interests and positions of colonial 
authority. The scheme thus never developed the same level of popular support on 
the island, meaning it had to turn elsewhere in the Caribbean to sustain itself.
Yet like the Admiralty, Cardinall and Elliot were approaching the issue from a 
position of imperial weakness instead of strength. This thesis demonstrates that
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rather than the colonies acting as dependencies of the mother country, the Navy 
found itself dependent upon the local legislatures who held the purse strings and the 
power to either support or veto its scheme. Local interests thus superseded imperial 
ones in trying to sell the need for such a force to the public, through the economic, 
social and health benefits its existence would bring to the community. The 
diminishing influence of the metropole within colonial affairs corresponded with 
increasing uncertainty and concern over the future integrity of the Empire. Thus, 
though the MNF/RMN did see active service during the Malayan Emergency, as 
discussed in case study two, it was supplemented by a Royal Navy presence, and 
generally the colonial navies after the war acted as 'prestige forces', reconstituted 
more for political reasons than operational necessities. In both the Caribbean and 
Malaya, there was a fear that American cultural influence could undermine British 
imperial authority, while in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong the preoccupation was 
with the PRC, and potential Chinese subversives from within the colonies.
As in the case of martial race theory, there existed no definitive ethno-cultural 
framework defining a 'seafaring race' for colonial naval recruiters. This thesis has 
shown how such conceptions varied between regions and evolved according to local 
conditions and imperial requirements. 'Seafaring race' theory was but one of several 
pseudo-scientific racial ideologies utilised over the forerunning century to reaffirm 
British racial primacy and legitimise their imperial authority. It interacted with 
Orientalist discourse to reinforce the notion of the colonial 'other' by perpetuating 
concepts such as maskee, latah, and 'face'. Within the context of the armed forces, 
this implicit hegemony played an additional role in enforcing discipline and 
preserving the chain of command. Seafaring race theory provided a convenient
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excuse to sideline those groups seen as potentially disruptive influences to this 
ordering and British authority, such as Chinese leftists in Singapore, and the Orang 
Laut in Malaya. It served to divide and rule, such as in Malaya, where maritime 
heritage and ethnicity were manipulated to buttress colonial collaborators, leaving a 
post-colonial cultural legacy where Melayu ruling elites were able to supplant British 
racial primacy with that of their own. In the Caribbean too, Caymanians were 
afforded favoured status, officially on account of their seafaring qualities, though this 
masked the fact they were considered more reliable on account of their skin colour 
and ethnic heritage than the more African-descended West Indians who had 
expressed anti-colonial nationalistic sentiments. Such ethnic divisions cultivated 
within the forces inhibited the growth of greater group identification, such as a shared 
sense of West-lndianess', and esprit de corps, bringing inequalities into sharper 
focus and resulting in discontent and protest. Where no alternative groups of 
manpower were available, such as in Hong Kong, the innate prejudices that this 
imperial ideology helped foster towards the Chinese population fuelled distrust within 
the ranks which undermined force cohesion and discipline when subjected to 
wartime duress. Ultimately, for British colonial and naval authorities, the perceived 
imperial loyalty of their naval recruits was considered much more important than any 
actual seafaring ability they may have possessed, inherent or otherwise.
This thesis has thus demonstrated how, despite the relatively small numerical 
size of British colonial naval forces, they can tell us a significant amount about the 
imperial system they were born out of, how it reacted to a combination of internal 
and external pressures and reinforced its authority on both a practical and 
ideological level, and the impact and legacy it has had upon the politics, cultures and
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societies it sought to dominate. In the process, it has furthered developments within 
the 'new naval history1, by reconceptualising our understanding of navies as not 
merely organisations for the physical projection and maintenance of political and 
economic influence, but as human and cultural institutions, in which power was 
expressed as much in the ideas and relations they cultivated, as the barrels of their 
guns. This thesis offers future research opportunities by providing a framework to 
analyse the other British colonial naval forces not explored within these case studies, 
by allowing for a comparison of experiences between colonial naval forces and their 
military counterparts, or for comparing the British case with that of other colonial 
empires.
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